

KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN
FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN

**Ethnic and Cultural Diversity,
Integration Policies and
Social Cohesion in Europe**

A Comparative Analysis of the Relation between
Cultural Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe

Promotor: Prof. Dr. M. Hooghe
Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO]

Proefschrift tot het verkrijgen
van de graad van:
Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen
aangeboden door
Tim REESKENS

2009

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List of Abbreviations

DF	Degrees of freedom
DIOC	Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries
EB223	Eurobarometer 223
EFA	Exploratory factor analysis
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSS	General Social Survey
MGCFA	Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policies Index
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares (regression)
Peoplefair	“Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?”
Peoplehelp	“Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?”
Peopletrust	“Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful?”
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
SCC	Social Cultural Changes survey
TLI	Tucker-Lewis Index
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WVS	World Values Survey

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Introduction

Investigating the Conditional Impact of Diversity on European Societies

1. Immigration and Social Change in Europe

When at a certain moment in time, social historians will document the major social changes that have characterized European societies after the Second World War, they will envisage a number of evolutions that affected human life deeply. These scholars will notice that after World War II, many political supranational organizations were founded mainly aiming at preventing a new World War and creating one economic market (Dinan, 2005). They will see that women increasingly entered the labor market (Crompton, 1999; Blossfeld & Drobnic, 2001) while at the end of the twentieth century, they were still looking through the so-called glass ceiling (Arulampalam et al., 2007), meaning that they had limited access to the highest ranked jobs and that earnings for the same function are still considerable lower compared with those of men. These historians might take their electronic devices for granted, even though at the time of the fall of the Iron Curtain, the density of the World Wide Web was quite limited (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002) and 'to google' was only included in the Oxford English Dictionary in the first years of the 21st century.

However, without any doubt, at least one of the chapters in such a volume on major social changes that took place on the European continent from the middle of the twentieth century onwards will be dedicated to the so-called 'Age of Migration' (Castles & Miller, 2003), which is referred to as the rapid rise in immigration and, consequently, the increase in ethnic-cultural diversity of the European population since the second half of the 20th century. Indeed, taking a glance at the OECD Migration Statistics (2008a), the influx of immigrants to those 15 states that were member of the European Union in 2000¹ has doubled from roughly 1 million in 1980 to about 2 million in the

¹ These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. For Greece, no data was available for 1980 and 2000 while for Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal, no data have been available for the 1980 period, however. Migration to the last four countries sums up to about 125,000 for 2000 or about 6,5 percent of the total migrant inflow of the 15 EU Member States. See also Chapter 5 for more elaborate data and analyses.

last year of the 20th century, which equates to an average yearly increase of 50,000 foreigners (OECD, 2008a; Salt, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2008). Yet, not only the number of immigrants has been rising steadily, also the number of countries these immigrants originate from has been growing over time. Over the past decades, it is acknowledged that there is a rise in the number of nationalities that migrate to European countries, although a vast majority of immigrants are still coming from a small share of countries (Faist, 2000a) that largely reflect former colonial ties or chain migration that result from a tradition in guestworker programs.

It can be expected that in the years ahead, Europe will become even more diverse (Alho et al., 2006; Hooghe et al., 2008). Demographic trends predict a massive outflow of the elderly into retirement in the next decade to come – the OECD has calculated that for its member states, the dependence ratio, i.e. the population older than 65 as a percentage of the working-age population, might exceed 30 percent while this ratio was about 18 percent in 1990 (Jacobzone et al., 2000). While a growing number of baby-boomers will enjoy their retirement in the next few years, there is hardly a sufficient share of youngsters to enter the labor market to eventually fill in those open job positions. Even though economists highly doubt that immigration can compensate for the growing dependence ratio (Coleman, 2002; Fehr et al., 2004), labor market analysis shows that the availability to low-skilled jobs will lower the burdens for industrialized societies to attract newcomers (Kogan, 2006).

Moreover, even if a full immigration stop is considered as a policy option – which seems highly implausible given the discussed economic and demographic changes – European nation-states will nevertheless become more colorful in the next decade. On average, the total fertility rate of the female natives across Europe is less than the replacement rate of about 2.1 (Council of Europe, 2004) – meaning that the share of youth is declining year after year. On the other hand, demographic analysis also shows that immigrant women give birth to more children compared with the majority population (Coleman, 2008; Andersson, 2004), although among immigrant population too, fertility is rapidly declining (Toulemon, 2004). Consequently, the share of children with immigrant parents will affect the ethnic-cultural composition of European societies as well. Together with the economic trends, the demographic evolutions therefore seem to predict that the share of people with foreign roots will keep on rising steadily.

As happens with all major social changes, the impact on societies are regarded to be drastic. For instance, sociology as a scientific discipline has its roots in the investigation of the societal causes and consequences of the Industrial Revolution (Paxton, 1999, p. 88; Fukuyama, 1999). Scholars noted that modern forms of community cohesion were different compared with pre-modern forms of traditional social solidarity (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]; Tönnies, 1965 [1887]). Since immigration can be classified as a major social change that is characterizing the European post Second World War era, consequently, it can be expected that increasing ethnic-cultural diversity may also affect

social cohesion profoundly. At present, both in public opinion, among policy makers and among scholars, there is indeed a widespread concern that the social consequences of an unregulated immigrant influx are difficult to bear for society.

First of all, among public opinion, a significant share of the population expresses concern about the rising inflow of immigrants. At present, hostile attitudes towards immigrants and negative opinions regarding immigration are quite widespread across the continent (Semyonov et al., 2006; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Meuleman et al., 2009). Using the 2002 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), Sides and Citrin (2007, p. 483) for instance show that, while about half of the Europeans think that cultural life is enriched due to immigration, more than two thirds of the population perceives crime rates as increased because people of other countries have settled on European soil. The opposition towards immigration is, moreover, strongest in Greece and Hungary while the Luxembourgers and Swedes are more accepting for immigrants. This cross-sectional diagnosis has received additional leverage by the trend analysis on several Eurobarometer surveys by which Semyonov and colleagues (2006, p. 443) demonstrate “a dramatic increase in anti-foreigner sentiments in all countries over time” over a period of 13 years, i.e. from 1988 to 2000. It needs to be noted that this increase has started considerable time before the 9/11-events, while many spectators have expected ameliorated out-group hostility after the attacks on the World Trade Center (Schildkraut, 2002).

Second, also in policy circles, there is a shared concern about the alleged decline in social cohesion under the condition of increasing diversity. With the figures on anti-immigrant attitudes in hand, governments are concerned about persistent disrespect towards newcomers since this hostility touches upon the core of democratic nation-states (Arneil, 2006). Since recent influx of immigrants has shown to become long-term settlement, national governments have created policies that aimed at adapting immigrants to their new host country. Both with regard to immigration – who gets in when and under what conditions – and immigrant policies – which rights and obligations are immigrants granted – there is a considerable range of policies that have been adapted by various countries over the years (Joppke, 1998a; Geddes, 2003). Next to the national level, also at the supranational levels, regulating global immigration flows and the basic rights foreigners should enjoy is intensively debated and regulated, like initiated in the 1999 Tampere Agreement (Bendel, 2005). At present, there is a proposal for a EU Directive concerning a European ‘Blue Card’ system, comparable with the US green card (European Union, 2007). On top, not only national and supranational organizations are concerned about the social consequences of increasing diversity. Recently, the key focus that the Club de Madrid (2007) – an international think-tank gathering more than 70 world leaders and intellectuals – has embraced regards the question how to achieve social cohesion in diverse or ‘shared’ societies.

Third, in contrast with public opinion and policy makers, the social consequences of the recent increase in immigrant influx are at present far less discussed among academics. In fact, the social impact of increasing complexity has always been at the core of social sciences: “It could be argued that the birth of sociology occurred in concerns about potential declines in community due to industrialization and the advent of modernity” (Paxton, 1999, p. 88). Predominantly the concept of social capital – the features of social organization like networks, trust and reciprocity that facilitate cooperation (Putnam, 1993, 2000) – has made research into social consequences, i.e. the impact of social phenomena on community life, more tangible and quantitatively assessable. However, while Putnam originally (2000) highlighted that interpersonal diverse contacts have in general positive externalities for individuals, he complemented this claim seven years later with information about the impact of contextual diversity on social capital indicators. In ‘E Pluribus Unum’ Putnam (2007, p. 151) gives empirical evidence for a negative relation, arguing that “diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us”. By stating that diversity does not increase negative race relations but, on the other hand, erodes social solidarity within and between all groups of society, Putnam has set the empirical agenda for subsequent research.

Putnam’s findings have led to a series of lively debates among scholars, for instance the newsletter of the Comparative Politics section of the American Political Science Association (Gourevitch, 2009), and also Political Studies dedicated a special issue on the Putnam debate (Stolle & Howard, 2008). Among policy makers too, Putnam’s findings have not remained unnoticed (e.g. Zonderop (28.06.2008) on Putnam’s visit to the Dutch Government or Johnson (19.07.2007) on the influence of Putnam on British Government). Putnam’s latest findings that the social fabric of American communities are in decline due to ethnic-cultural diversity (2007) may sound convincing, however, a solid empirical test of this relation, relying on the most rigorous theoretical and methodological considerations, is thus far absent in the European context. Is it actually the case that diversity lowers cohesion in Europe? Or to put it differently, is it more difficult to live in countries that have higher levels of foreigners than in countries that are rather homogeneous with regard to their ethnic-cultural composition?

Turning back to the social historians and their expected documentation of the European post Second World War era, they will also acknowledge that across Europe, there are remarkable differences between those policies that are aimed at integrating these newcomers into society (Favell, 2001b; Joppke, 1998a). Countries will take initiatives to prevent tensions that have their fertile ground in ethnic-cultural oppositions. However, the enacted policies will differ from country to country. To exemplify the openness of these regimes towards immigrant citizenship, these historians will probably discover that in the first decade of the 21st century, France had a president, Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, whose father had Hungarian citizenship, which is in line with the so-called *ius soli*-model underlying French citizenship (Brubaker, 1992). In contrast, they will notice that due to German exclusive modes of immigrant integration,

it is not hard to understand that the position of *Bundeskanzler* has been difficult to pursue by residents with foreigner roots.

When documenting these remarkable differences across Europe, these historians might find out that social scientists have shown that contemporary practices of immigrant integration reflect historical models of citizenship conceptions (Brubaker, 1992). The civic conception of citizenship, of which France is the textbook example, refers to an inclusive form in which joining the nation-state depends upon adherence to a set of national norms and values. The ethnic conception, on the other hand, is rather exclusive, since it conveys membership to the nation-state as dependent upon a long-lasting relation with the country (Kohn, 1944; Janmaat, 2006). In these countries, of which Germany is the classic example, the willingness to comply with the political norms and national values is not enough for being considered as a true citizen; the most determining element is a so-called blood-tie with the nation-state (Brubaker, 1992).

Thus, given the variability in ethnic-cultural diversity and the policies that are enacted to promote immigrant incorporation across Europe, it can be expected that these regimes of immigrant integration not only guide the incorporation of immigrants (Fennema & Tillie, 2004; van Tubergen et al., 2004) but also affect wider society (Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Weldon, 2006). In this dissertation, considerable attention will be paid to the investigation of the effects of diversity on social cohesion in Europe. However, given the varying national regimes of migrant integration, the question regarding the social consequences of increasing ethnic-cultural diversity cannot be separated from the plausible mitigating effect of these regimes on this alleged negative impact (Hooghe, 2007). In other words, in this study I want to assess whether certain migrant integration regimes are better able than others to strengthen the social fabric of diverse societies.

2. Why Care about Social Cohesion?

Before turning to the formulation of the research question regarding the conditional relation between diversity and social cohesion in Europe, one might question why it is in the first place necessary to aim at high levels of social cohesion. In this study, I want to investigate empirically the theoretical puzzle whether social cohesion and diversity are reconcilable. In such a manner, social cohesion is regarded as an objective that is desirable for policy formulation.² At the local level, research has shown that community cohesion has many important and positive externalities on wider society. Already in the 1960s, Jane Jacobs (1961) demonstrated that, by analyzing modern urban planning, destroying local level interactions could have detrimental effects on social control in

² In this Introduction, I will predominantly rely on Putnam's concept of social capital, which is highly framed on the involvement of citizens in associational life. In Chapter 1, I will more critically reflect on how social cohesion in diverse societies can be conceived.

these neighborhoods. About four decades later, in 'Bowling Alone', Putnam (2000) argued that the steady decline in various indicators of social cohesion has a series of negative outcomes in various social spheres. Similarly, sociologists and criminologists discovered that communities in which 'collective efficacy' is present are less prone to criminal behavior (Sampson et al., 1997; Morenoff et al., 2001).

But also at the individual level, cohesive societies result in a series of positive outcomes. There is for instance an increasing body of research outcomes that documents a positive relation between cohesion and health outcomes and subjective measures of well-being (Helliwell & Putnam, 2004). To cite but a few studies, an investigation in Los Angeles County, aiming at disentangling the relation between collective efficacy and obesity, revealed that members of vibrant communities report lower levels on the body mass index (Cohen et al., 2006). A European study on the social conditioning of smoking behavior in seven urban cities has revealed that in those neighborhoods that are in disorder, residents have a higher chance to smoke (Miles, 2006). An increasing number of findings also demonstrates that societies that rank high on cohesion also add to higher levels of self-reported health (Subramanian et al., 2001).

Next to the individual and the neighborhood level, social cohesion at the national level has also resulted in various positive externalities, although the causal structure is not always as clear as studies on micro- and meso-level consequences of community cohesion. Nevertheless, political scientists have shown that cooperative behavior and supporting norms have positive effects on the democratic performance of nation-states (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). In an extensive inquiry into the determinants of differentials in democratic performance at the Italian regional level, Putnam (1993) discovered that not economic progress but a dense community life, which he labeled as social capital, is best able to explain why certain Italian regions outperform others with regard to democratic practices. Relying on a Tocquevillian conception of democracy (de Tocqueville, 2004 [1835-1840]), Putnam argued that associations actually serve as a learning school in which democratic practices, like sharing information, arguing and reaching a consensus, are exercised. Moreover, while economic progress may not be the best predictor for democratic practices, research has disentangled the causes of economic progress. Already the early sociological writings have emphasized the importance of horizontal networks and norms, which are central in the Protestant tradition, to generate wealth (Weber, 1958 [1904-1905]). In those countries that rank high on social capital, corresponding high levels of wealth are discovered (Fukuyama, 1995; Zak & Knack, 2001)

Relying on the concept social capital, the processes in which social cohesion results in positive externalities works in at least three ways (for an overview, see Putnam, 2000). First of all, cohesive societies are better able to resolve collective action problems. The best example available to exemplify this mechanism concerns tax compliance. Making abstraction from potential legal claims, one may opt to pay taxes or refrain from paying

them. However, in the end, states do provide collective goods for everyone including those who did not contribute. Therefore, in calculating costs and benefits, individual actors may consider not to pay taxes since services are provided anyway (Scholz & Lubell, 1998, p. 400). It has been shown that social cohesion enhances tax compliance, i.e. in those societies in which there is a strong shared sense of belonging, citizens are more likely to pay taxes before law enforcement takes place (Levi, 1988; Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Bergman, 2002). Scholars have even emphasized that an effective policy recommendation that aims at higher tax revenues is exactly investing in social capital (Levi, 1988). Consequently, in an era in which certain complex problems, like environmental issues, become collective, social cohesion thus might provide a basis to resolve these collective action problems (Ostrom et al., 1999).

The second mechanism underpinning the positive effects of social cohesion regard the reduction in transaction costs (Putnam, 2000; Knack & Keefer, 1997). Transaction costs, a term that is widespread in economy, point to the notion that everyday interactions involve a certain cost. For instance, when going shopping, the efficiency, i.e. the decrease of the queue at the cash register, is increased if customers discard to check the change in a detailed manner after having paid. In choosing to check the change thoroughly, customers may think that cashiers would try to make abuse of them by not giving the correct change. It can be expected that in cohesive societies, the latter mechanism is less common. For this reason, one of the most cited quotes with regard to the effect of community cohesion on transaction costs concerns Arrow (1972, p. 357) who, pointing to Banfield's seminal study on the lack of co-operation in Montegrano (1970 [1958]), emphasized that "virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence."

The third mechanism that requires attention is the distribution of information, which is considered to flow easily in cohesive societies. Many students of sociology of labor relations have discovered that dense networks are vital for the labor market, i.e. to find a job (Granovetter, 1973; Lin & Dumin, 1986). The authors point to the fact that vacancies run more easily within the networks that are predominantly composed out of so-called weak ties – ties between actors you rarely meet. But also research in other research domains has emphasized the importance of information flow through cohesive communities. Coleman's famous educational research (1988) underscored that dense networks between parents, both within the family and community, increased the flow of information regarding the behavior of the children and expectations concerning the school curriculum, leading to more social control. In this study, Coleman argues (1988) that these mechanisms, i.e. social capital, had in fact positive externalities on the human capital, i.e. students' school dropout. Thus, the availability of dense social networks contributes to the increase of information gathering.

While the literature has pointed to more than only these three mechanisms (Putnam, 2000), resolving collective action problems, reducing transaction costs and enhancing the flow of information are the most essential pathways to which social cohesion affects society positively. Yet, what is, next to these three mechanisms, important to keep track of with regard to social cohesion is the distinction between the internal and external effects (Putnam, 2000, 2007). Relying on an example concerning involvement in local level neighborhood associations, the internal effect of this involvement refers to the fact that each member may be ‘of value’ for the other members. For instance, when meeting at the weekly gathering, one of the members may be looking for a nanny for the weekend, in which other members can provide. Yet, also external effects that go beyond the members that attend the weekly gatherings are essential to be remembered. Especially because of the availability of a dense network of neighbors that meet regularly, those neighbors who prefer not to get involved in these associations still enjoy the positive benefits of this dense network, like for instance an increased social control, which can result in preventing crime. Foremost the external effects seem to be of high relevance for the study of social cohesion.

Therefore, both scholars and policy makers are increasingly aware that social cohesion is an aim that is desirable within society. To highlight but one example, a couple of days before Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th President of the United States, he founded ‘Organizing for America’, a group that, according to Mr. Obama (2009), “will continue the work of the largest grassroots movement in history. Volunteers, grassroots leaders, and ordinary citizens will drive this organization and help bring about the changes we proposed during this presidential campaign.” This call for more involvement into American local communities follows on the alarming statements that were articulated in the mid-1990s (Putnam, 1995) on a decline in social capital, i.e. those structural features, like networks and associational involvement, and structural features, like norms of generalized trust and reciprocity, of social organization that facilitate cooperation (Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000). In the US, there has been documented a general decline in involvement in various types of associations, like church practice, voluntary organizations, union membership, bowling leagues, and so on. Also with regard to the norms that underpin them, like trust and philanthropy, a steady decline from the 1960s to the present situation is reported. Given this general decline in social capital combined with the positive externalities of generalized trust, it may come as no surprise that Mr. Obama calls for more involvement into the local community.

However, focusing again on Europe, various voices have raised the question to what extent this general decline in civic engagement in the US is also present across the Atlantic. Indeed, various scholars put question marks to the universal claim inherent in the Putnam debate, especially for European countries (Stolle & Hooghe, 2005; Norris & Davis, 2007). It has to be noted that in a cross-national investigation of trends in social capital, Putnam (2002, p. 410) noticed that “at the most general level, our investigation has found no general and simultaneous decline in social capital throughout the

industrial/postindustrial world over the last generation". Looking for instance at the Benelux-countries, recent analyses show that the alarming sounds from across the Atlantic hardly find any access in Belgium and Netherlands. While longitudinal trends show that associational involvement is not declining in both countries, there is however a shift from membership in traditional organizations, like women's organizations, to membership in new forms, like there are environmental organizations (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007; Schnabel, et al., 2008). But also in other European countries, like the UK, a decline in community involvement has not been detected (Hall, 1999).

However, from a comparative perspective, it has to be noted that there is considerable variation across Europe with regard to the distribution of social capital indicators. As Newton and Montero (2007) acknowledge in their research into patterns of political and social participation, Europe seems to be composed out of a number of country clusters, with the Northern European countries at the top of the list while the Mediterranean countries on the one hand, and the Central and Eastern European countries on the other hand, are ranked at the bottom. Also with regard to levels of generalized trust, a similar regional divide within Europe is present (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Norris & Davis, 2007). Delhey and Newton (2005) even refer to a Nordic exceptionalism, meaning that the Scandinavian countries outperform the general European trend.

While indicators of social cohesion may not be in decline across Europe, the spatial distribution of these social cohesion indicators requires more attention than has been given this far. Certainly with regard to the non-exhaustive list of positive externalities of social cohesion the emerging democracies and economies in Eastern Europe may, for instance, like to find out what measures can be implemented to attain those high levels of cohesion that are found specifically in the Nordic countries but generally in Western Europe. Therefore, a thorough inquiry into what explains cross-national differences in social cohesion is essential for the future of European nation-states.

3. Formulating the Research Question

Combining the evidence of a geographical spread with regard to indicators of social cohesion in Europe, together with the reported increase in immigration that eventually can be considered as one type of social change that characterizes contemporary Europe, the logical next question is to what extent immigration-caused diversity is responsible for the regional divide of social cohesion in Europe. As Delhey and Newton (2005) already found out, using an Alesina et al (2003) Herfindahl measure for ethnic fractionalization, it is quite illustrative that the countries that rank highest on generalized trust, namely the Nordic countries, are also the ones that with regard to this indicator for fractionalization rank quite low compared with other countries.

In this respect, Delhey and Newton (2005) clearly formulate that the level of generalized trust within a country is partially dependent upon how diverse it is. But the


authors also show that cross-national variation in generalized trust is influenced by many other factors, like for instance a Protestant religious tradition in which horizontal bonds among fellow citizens are at the core. In assessing the unique effect of diversity on social cohesion, it is essential that other factors that explain variability in trust need to be taken into account.

Therefore, combining the fact that there are regional differences with regard to the level of social cohesion in Europe, the facts that some European countries are more diverse than others and that countries reflect distinct regimes of migrant integration, the research question that is central in this dissertation can be summarized as follows:

Under control of other possible factors that explain cross-national differences in social cohesion across European nation-states, does immigration-caused diversity weaken social cohesion, and if so, are regimes of migrant integration able to mitigate this negative effect?

Figure 1 summarizes the research question of this dissertation in a conceptual diagram, which also represent the three major parts of this manuscript. At the right-hand side of the box, there is social cohesion, which is a highly abstract concept and serves as the dependent variable of interest; variability in social cohesion will be explained throughout this dissertation. The main explanatory variable of interest in this study is immigration-caused diversity. However, to assess the unique effect of ethnic-cultural diversity on social cohesion, other possible influences on cohesion, which are graphically exemplified by the two empty boxes below the diversity box, need to be assessed as well. Finally, next to the direct effect of diversity on cohesion, the conditional effect interacted by migrant integration regimes will also be estimated. The arrow from regimes of migrant integration on the effect of diversity on social cohesion represents how migrant integration regimes might buffer the effect of diversity on social cohesion; yet, this interaction should also be controlled for the main effects of respectively diversity and the regimes of migrant integration on social cohesion.

Figure 1. Conceptual Diagram of this Research on Ethnic-Cultural Diversity, Integration Regimes and Social Cohesion in Europe



Plotting the research question onto a conceptual diagram (Figure 1), it is evident that about every aspect in it is highly controversial. How is social cohesion, for instance,

made operational for this kind of comparative research? How is ethnic-cultural diversity represented in order to have a solid interpretation of heterogeneity at the country level? How can it be assured that data for migrant integration reflect certain regimes and not only variation in national policies? Not to mention that comparative research entails its own methodological rules of thumb that, throughout this dissertation, will be given the necessary attention it requires. Each of these three boxes will be a distinct part of this dissertation, covering at least two chapters. However, seven general issues that are present when investigating the conditional relation between diversity and social cohesion are first discussed before the actual research will be commenced.

4. Empirical Challenges and Outline of the Dissertation

The social consequences of diversity is a topic high at the agenda, both across public opinion, among policy makers and among scholars. Therefore, it is important that, when investigating this hotly debated topic, all steps in the analysis confirm to the most rigor theoretical and methodological considerations. In this section, I would like to address seven substantial issues that need to be clarified when doing not only research into the effects of diversity on social cohesion to be specific, but also in other types of social science research.³ These seven issues regard the dependent variable, i.e. social cohesion, the independent variable, i.e. ethnic-cultural diversity, the level of aggregation, the causal relation, the control variables in the analysis, the issue of self-selection and, last but not least, the context in which the relation takes place.

First of all, the dependent variable needs to be clearly delineated. In this introduction, social cohesion has regularly been equated with ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 1993, 2000). However, social cohesion is a complex phenomenon that requires both theoretical and empirical scrutiny before differentials in social cohesion in Europe can be addressed. From a theoretical point of view, it is far from clear what social cohesion actually refers to in contemporary diverse societies (Reeskens et al., 2009). To give but one example, if authors express social cohesion as a consensus in a common set of values and norms (Bellah et al., 1985; Schwartz & Sagie, 2000), theoretically, questions can be raised regarding the level of shared norms and values for keeping societies cohesive. In the first chapter of this dissertation, theoretical reflections on the concept of social cohesion in diverse societies will be raised and arguments are provided that, for being considered as cohesive, contemporary societies need to have a citizenry that has high levels of trust in the generalized other (Uslaner, 2002; Newton, 2007a).

³ These seven issues have been raised by Robert Putnam during a Roundtable Discussion on Diversity and Social Capital that took place during the Harvard-Manchester Workshop on Diversity and Social Capital in Britain and the US, which took place in Disley, Manchester (UK) from June 9-20, 2008.

Also empirically, the operationalization of social cohesion entails difficulties since in this comparative research the concepts under investigation need to have the same meaning across countries (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997; Billiet, 2003; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). One clear example relates to the structural component of social capital, as has been frequently operationalized by means of an additive scale of involvement in associations. It is widely known that in certain countries, membership in certain organizations is rather institutionally defined (van Deth, 1998), like for instance union membership (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 1999). Therefore, an additive scale including this indicator yields problems of equivalence in comparative research strategies. But also with regard to generalized trust, one needs to be assure that this latent concept is equivalently measured across countries, keeping the same logic applied to associational membership in mind. Taken together, in the second chapter of this dissertation, I will reflect on the appropriate construction of the concept of generalized trust that will be used as a proxy for social cohesion, and what problems may be present when investigating generalized trust across countries.

The second issue that needs to be addressed in this research is the independent variable. Ethnic-cultural diversity will be used to explain variations in generalized trust; consequently, the operationalization of this concept will need to reflect the true diversity within the country. In US-based research strategies, scholars have made use of the so-called Herfindahl index of fractionalization (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Costa & Kahn, 2003; Putnam, 2007), which represents “the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different groups”⁴ (Alesina et al., 2003, pp. 158-159). However, this measure has quite often been criticized for being color-blind (Stolle et al., 2008; Dawkins, 2008). For instance, a community with 40 percent Whites and 60 percent Blacks would have the same fractionalization index, namely 0.48 as a community with 40 percent Asians and 60 percent Whites, while the ethnic-cultural composition is clearly different. Next to this argument for not using such fractionalization index, another argument regards the data collection. The US Herfindahl indicators are based on individual census information on race. In Europe, it is almost impossible to replicate such a fractionalization indicator since, as various authors have expressed (Giddens, 2007), European governments refrain from questioning country of origin.

Both regarding the problems regarding the availability of the data as well as the fact that the fractionalization index is problematic in itself, I will rely on the Migration Statistics as have been gathered by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Since the 1980s, this organization has gathered data with regard to the stocks of foreigners and migrant inflow, predominantly with the aim of having a

⁴ The formula is $f_i = 1 - \sum_k s_{ki}^2$ with i the geographical area, k the category and s the share.

better insight into labor-market evolutions. The OECD Migration Statistics make it possible to construct several indicators that encapsulate various forms of diversity, like for instance the share of immigrants that represent large cultural distances with the general population. As such, diversity is assessed as multidimensional (Hooghe, 2007), contrasting static Herfindahl indicators for ethnic fractionalization. Yet, repeatedly, questions regarding the lack of comparability of the OECD Migration data have been raised (Dumont & Lemaître, 2005; Lemaître, 2005). To have a more pragmatical view on the use of these data – can the migration data be used as independent variable of ethnic-cultural diversity in the relation between diversity and trust in Europe? – as well as to give an overview of how diverse Europe actually is and which determinants have contributed to the heterogeneity of the European countries, in Chapter 5, determinants of migration to European countries from 1980 to 2006 are given.

The third issue in the investigation of the social consequences of diversity regards the level of aggregation. The soundest studies on this relation, departing with Putnam's analysis within the US (2007), have focused on the lowest level as possible in community research, namely the census tract. Indeed, arguing that community cohesion is fostered where interactions take place, authors have emphasized the importance of geographical units like the census tract, which consists of approximately 6,000-8,000 inhabitants. In this dissertation the main focus lies, however, at the country level. Various comments can be raised about this issue, with the most important one that a national index of diversity does not take regional variation into account and might thus be hampered by ecological fallacy.

However, throughout this dissertation, I will argue that this comment on the level of aggregation is of subordinate importance for the research question as it has been formulated. It needs to be remembered that this dissertation focuses on how regimes of migrant integration might mediate a potential negative relation of diversity on trust. Since these regimes are largely reflected in legislation, the most logical level of analysis is the national one. But also with regard to the theoretical models that predict the social consequences of diversity, which will be introduced in Chapter 4, in this kind of research, the distinction between explanations of contextual diversity and explanations regarding intergroup relations must be made. The research question as proposed is a typical example of contextual diversity, of which the level of aggregation is of less importance compared with intergroup relation theories. Next to the theoretical arguments also on methodological basis evidence will be given that a lot of the variability in generalized trust can be explained by the national context, which makes this level relevant for research. It is indeed argued that the context of the country, and consequently also the level of diversity of the country, as for instance the argument of Delhey and Newton (2005), matters for generating trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Levi, 1996). Furthermore, the limited availability of local level data to assess the relation between diversity and trust across Europe may not hamper the growth of the general knowledge accumulation on the social consequences of diversity.

As King et al (1994) argue, information at various levels of aggregation need to be taken into account. This recommendation to combine several levels of aggregation has recently gained more attention in the modeling of context effects on individual outcomes (e.g. Soobader & LeClere, 1999). The main assumption is that effects may run differently at varying levels of aggregation. In a study on inequality and health outcomes, Soobader and LeClere (1999) argue that at higher levels of aggregation, i.e. the county level, inequality works directly on health outcomes while at lower levels, i.e. the census tract, this effect is conditioned by relative social class positions and absolute position of the tract. Applying this logic to the effect of diversity on trust, studying the effects at various levels must be considered, including the national level (Chapter 6) and the local level (Chapter 7), even if the causal mechanisms are expected to be difficult to disentangle at each level of aggregation.

Therefore, to add to this debate regarding the context, this dissertation will be complemented with a local level case study in Chapter 7. The case under analysis is Flanders (Belgium) and is one of the many Western European regions for which the diversity on trust relation has not yet been empirically grounded – for an overview of local level studies across Europe, see Chapter 4. The added value of this case is not only provided by the availability of both a representative geo-coded survey as well as local level diversity data, which enable a replication of the so-called Putnam thesis, also on substantial grounds, Flanders is of benefit for the general debate. While generalized claims to Europe on the basis of this study is not the aim, this study will add significantly to other Western European local level studies on diversity and trust and, importantly, to the interpretation of the country level research as obtained in Chapter 6.

The fourth issue in the relation between diversity and social cohesion concerns the causality of the relation. More precisely, does diversity lower social cohesion or are more cohesive societies better able to keep foreigners out? Ideally, this question is solved by investigating longitudinal trends regarding ethnic-cultural diversity and social cohesion (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2008). In reality, longitudinal data for this research question is scarce. On the one hand, the dependent variable of interest, generalized trust, is obtained from the European Social Survey (ESS), a biennial survey project that started in 2002 (Jowell, et al., 2007). At maximum, I can rely on only three waves, which is too limited for longitudinal trends. Moreover, even though additional waves would be available, they could not have been used for the reason that the policy data regarding of migrant integration regimes have been gathered for the first time for a wide variety of countries in 2006, which make earlier waves of the ESS redundant. Moreover, with regard to causality, I also need to warn for the terminology that is used throughout this dissertation. Frequently, words like ‘effect’, ‘impact’ and ‘consequences’ imply a causal relation from ethnic-cultural diversity on social cohesion. However, this terminology merely reflects the specification of the regression model rather than from a substantial point of view. Therefore, for every causal claim that is made in this investigation into

the relation between diversity and trust, one needs to remember that the only relation I can demonstrate is correlation.

The fifth issue in investigating the social consequences of diversity regards the other variables that are taken into account to explain variability in social cohesion. I would like to have a view on the unique effect of immigration-caused diversity on social cohesion. However, to gain this insight, one needs to incorporate other covariates. To be more precise, it is widely known that generalized trust, the dependent variable of interest, is highly context-dependent, but also determined by individual factors (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003; Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2007). For instance, generalized trust is assumed to be expressed by the so-called winners of society (Newton, 2001), and therefore, individual factors expressing high social status certainly need to be modeled as well as contextual factors that express that all country residents are winners, like for instance high national wealth. In Chapter 3, which respondent and country factors influence the generation of individual trust are investigated. As such, a baseline model, that will be used to estimate the conditional effect of diversity on trust, is established.

In this empirical investigation into the determinants of generalized trust, we will without any doubt be confronted with methodological issues that are present in quantitative comparative research on a limited number of countries. Since I would like to estimate simultaneously the influences of two levels, i.e. the individual and the country, on individual level trust, the most appropriate technique will be multilevel multiple regression analysis (Hox, 2002; Gelman & Hill, 2006). However, various challenges are present applying this technique to a limited number of countries. To mention but two examples, first of all there is the issue of statistical power, which decreases steeply when samples become smaller (Maas & Hox, 2005; Meuleman & Billiet, 2009); second the degrees of freedom problem, meaning that only a limited set of independent variables can be included in the regression equation, is an important issue that needs to be addressed as well. In the methodological Chapter 2, many of these methodological issues will be discussed.

Sixth, the problem of self-selection (Heckman, 1979) seems to be one of the most important challenges for community-based research. What is meant with this challenge concerns the possibility that a potential negative effect of diversity on community life, i.e. on generalized trust, is due to the fact that those people with high levels of trust have fled the most mixed communities. In his US-based analysis, Putnam (2007, pp. 153-154) has warned for this possible spurious effect. Yet, he also added that this effect is highly unlikely since from a logical perspective, it can be expected that those with the lowest social capital, i.e. those people that miss the skills to bridge across different groups in society, would be the first to flee. However, an analysis of the likelihood to move out in the near future has shown that living in diverse communities increases one's willingness to move out; there is no significant difference between moving preferences between low and high trusters living in mixed neighborhoods

(Reeskens, 2008). The self-selection issue becomes, contrary, less pronounced when taking the country as level of aggregation into account. While it may be the case that individuals move out of their community when immigration increases, moving to another country entails a higher burden, which provide an additional argument for analyzing the relation between diversity and trust at the national level. Therefore, in this dissertation, I will not focus on the problem of selection bias.

The seventh issue regards the context of the country. With regard to the contributions of this dissertation, the context of the country in which the effect of diversity on trust is conditioned adds without consideration most significantly to the current debate on the effect of heterogeneity on social cohesion. For instance, exporting Putnam's findings to European countries neglects the differential US-European contexts in which these effects can run differently. Across Europe, several different regimes of migrant integration are in effect. While there are indications that those regimes are converging towards a more civic model (Joppke, 2007), there still exists a huge variation across Europe with regard to the policies that are applied (Jacobs & Rea, 2007; Favell, 2001b; Koopmans et al., 2005). The point of departure that is taken in this dissertation is that these migrant integration regimes actually can make a difference in the way diversity affects society as a whole. In final Chapter 9, the conditional impact will be empirically qualified.

However, before this conditional effect of diversity on social cohesion can be estimated, a valid typology of regimes of migrant integration needs to be constructed. In this Introduction the terms 'civic' and 'ethnic' have already been introduced as a heuristic classification to distinguish countries on the basis of immigrants' citizenship access (Brubaker, 1992). Nevertheless, questions about its empirical validity have been raised (Shulman, 2002; Janmaat, 2006) but not often been addressed. In Chapter 8, using various data sources, the validity of current migrant integration regimes is investigated and empirical grounding is provided for the representation of regimes of migrant integration across Europe.

To summarize the outline this dissertation, three main core parts have arisen out of the research question. The first part will consist out of a thorough investigation into social cohesion and generalized trust. In the first chapter, theoretical groundings are given for generalized trust as being indispensable for representing social cohesion in contemporary diverse societies. In the second chapter, methodological remarks with regard to measuring and investigating generalized trust across countries are given. The third chapter explains which individual and contextual factors contribute to cross-national variation in generalized trust. In the second part of the dissertation, the focus is on the effect of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust across Europe. In the fourth chapter, a literature review, including an overview of a number of theoretical models and an elaboration on recent research findings, will be given. The fifth chapter presents the data on ethnic-cultural diversity in Europe and provides arguments

regarding migration patterns to European countries in time. In the sixth chapter, the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust in Europe is estimated, or in more formal terms, the social consequences of immigration-caused diversity are assessed. Flemish results on this relation, as a local level case study, will be shown in Chapter 7. The third part of this dissertation is dedicated to migrant integration regimes as a conditioning element in the relation into diversity and trust. The eighth chapter will, using different sources of data, provide a thorough test of the validity of typologies of regimes of migrant integration. In the ninth chapter, the relation of diversity on trust under condition of these migrant integration regimes will be tested. In the last and concluding chapter, I will critically reflect on the results and present an agenda for future research.

PART I

SOCIAL COHESION AND GENERALIZED TRUST

Chapter 1

Defining Social Cohesion in Diverse Societies

Ce que je constate: ce sont les ravages actuels; c'est la disparition effrayante des espèces vivantes, qu'elles soient végétales ou animales et le fait que du fait même de sa densité actuelle, l'espèce humaine vit sous une sorte de régime d'empoisonnement interne – si je puis dire – et je pense au présent et au monde dans lequel je suis en train de finir mon existence. Ce n'est pas un monde que j'aime. (Levi-Strauss, 2005)

1. Introduction

Since its foundation as a scientific discipline, social cohesion has been at the core of sociological research. In the past, various scholars have investigated those processes that keep society together, and whether these processes are under pressure due to major social changes, like for instance the Industrial Revolution (e.g. Marx, 1946 [1848]; Tönnies, 1965 [1887]; Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). The more recent major social changes that have taken place after the Second World War (cf. Introduction) have contributed to a renewed interest in the investigation of those processes that unite people together and to society (Bellah et al., 1985; Putnam, 2000). Since the recent upsurge in immigrant influx to European societies can be classified as one major example of social change, it is highly unlikely that this process does not impact society as a whole.

However, before an empirical investigation into the conditional effects of ethnic-cultural diversity on social cohesion can take place, it is evident that in the first place, the dependent variable, namely social cohesion needs to be clearly delineated, i.e. what does social cohesion in diverse societies actually refer to?⁵ Yet, despite the main interest of contemporary social sciences in social cohesion, a clear definition or conceptualization of this concept has been far from evident (Harell & Stolle, 2009). In this respect, it may already be indicative that a monograph such as the Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology (Turner, 2006) misses a definition of social cohesion while it is presented as the “overview of the classical and the contemporary” field of sociology. Intuitively, social cohesion seems to be present in many contemporary social science concepts like for instance social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2000), collective efficacy

⁵ The content of this chapter is reflected in parts of the following publications: Reeskens (2007), Reeskens et al (2009), and Botterman et al (2009).

(Sampson et al., 1997) and value consensus (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). It may not surprise that recent theoretical efforts to give ground to social cohesion have implemented elements of one of these concepts, predominantly social capital (Harell & Stolle, 2009; Chan et al., 2006).

Nevertheless, despite recent interests to integrate different perspectives in theoretical reflections on social cohesion, most problematic in current typologies regard the absence of reference to the heterogeneous character of contemporary industrialized societies. Relying on for instance the traditional notion of value consensus (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000), which embarks a rather communitarian perspective on social cohesion (Bellah et al., 1985), it is difficult to reconcile this traditional approach towards social cohesion with ethnic-cultural diversity. This communitarian perspective notes that it is difficult to unite people if they don't converge on a similar set of values. In this respect, it is not surprising that critical spectators have classified social cohesion as a 'quasi-concept' meaning that it is "one of those hybrid mental constructions that politics proposes to us more and more often in order to simultaneously detect possible consensuses on a reading of reality, and to forge them" (Bernard, 1999, p. 2). Indeed, while various spheres in society, including public opinion, policy makers and academics, are concerned about an alleged decline in social cohesion due to diversity, the absence of a clear-cut delineation of the concept for diverse societies hinder the debate and appropriate benchmarking. In this chapter, my goal therefore is to tackle the interpretation of social cohesion as a quasi-concept by providing a framework to which contemporary diverse societies can be classified on with regard to their general levels of social cohesion.

In order to give a clear representation of social cohesion in diverse societies, the point of departure are current policy and academic perspectives on the concept. While the policy perspective envisages a top-down approach towards social cohesion, scholars on the contrary present a multidimensional view that is rather bottom-up oriented. Yet, in its application to contemporary diverse societies, both approaches entail conceptual difficulties. To provide in concept clarification, an important author is Emile Durkheim. More precisely, Durkheim's seminal social diagnosis on the 'Division of Labor in Society' (1984 [1893]) will be critical reviewed. By this theoretical reflection on this monograph, an understanding is given of what social cohesion at present day might look like, taking the complexity of modern societies into account. More specifically, precisely the concept of trust is indispensable to unite people in mixed countries. In the fourth section, departing from Levi's definition of trust (1998), a brief overview of this concept will be given. In the fifth section, the relation between generalized trust and classic multidimensional perspectives to social cohesion, as presented in the second section, is regarded. This chapter is concluded by implications of representing contemporary societies by trusting the generalized other.

2. Current Conceptualizations of Social Cohesion

The main point of departure in this dissertation is the question whether social cohesion is under pressure because of increased heterogeneity. In this respect, there is a concern among policy makers and a critical reflection among scholars that the recent upsurge in immigration to European countries erodes the social fabric of society. Given the emphasis of both groups with regard to an alleged decline in social cohesion, in this section, I will overview both viewpoints towards this concept, i.e. from the policy and academic perspective. Concerning the policy domain, mainly the approaches that have been put forward by the Council of Europe are discussed. With regard to the scholarly definition of social cohesion, significant attention is paid to the Kearns and Forrest (2000; see also Forrest & Kearns, 2001) multidimensional conceptualization of social cohesion, which have become widespread within the literature.

2.1. The Policy Perspective on Social Cohesion

Since the 2000 Lisbon Summit, social cohesion has been put to the fore as one of the key interests of the European Union, predominantly derived from the logic that cohesive societies are able to contribute to one of the aims of the EU, namely the growth of one integrated economic market. In the Summit Conclusions, the Presidency strives “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Lisbon European Council, 2000). In order to strengthen the social fabric of society, the Council has argued that it is necessary to reform the European social model in such a manner that investments in people and initiatives against social exclusion are central. As such, the Council emphasizes that it is possible to enhance social cohesion by emancipating each and every individual citizen.

Unlike the Council of the European Union, which clearly refrains from delineating social cohesion, the Council of Europe (2005) has proposed a benchmark in its Methodological Guide. It has defined social cohesion as “society’s ability to secure the long-term well-being of all its members, including equitable access to available resources, respect for human dignity with due regard for diversity, personal and collective autonomy and responsible participation”. Reviewing this definition, first of all, it closely relates to the Council of the European Union its interest in strengthening the social fabric on the continent; i.e. social cohesion is from a public policy point of view considered as vital to invest in. Second, a considerable emphasis has been laid on societies’ abilities and capacities. As such, the Council of Europe follows a top-down approach to social cohesion, arguing that state actors have a major responsibility in generating the bonds that unite citizens. Third, the definition clarifies the multidimensional approach to social cohesion. The individual inclusion into society regards various life domains, such as the personal dignity and economic sustainability.

The Council of Europe has also put considerable stress on ‘diversity’; yet, it is far less clear to which kind of diversity this concept actually refers to. To sum up, ‘social cohesion’ according to the Council of Europe seems to be a process that is influenced, in a large extent, by governmental policies and must include a number of basic rights for citizens, like there are autonomy and participation.

In a more recent edition of its ‘Trends in Social Cohesion’ series, the Council of Europe (2006) has dedicated a special edition to diversity and social cohesion as a result of an academic symposium. While a thorough theoretical reflection on the social cohesion concept is absent, the inside flap of the corresponding publication reveals the problems, goals and means for attaining social cohesion in Europe’s diverse societies that the Council of Europe seems to embark:

The development of social cohesion in a multicultural Europe is a key political objective, both vital and attainable, for our modern societies. It can be achieved by transcending the limits of so-called “integration” policies, particularly when they take the form of unilateral processes in which migrants and their descendants are not acknowledged as partners in decisions concerning them.

By editing this special volume on the social consequences of diversity in the Social Cohesion-series, the Council of Europe implicitly acknowledges that the relation between the two may be tense. In line with the definition from the Methodological Guide (Council of Europe, 2005), the Council of Europe explicitly underscores the importance of governments in fostering social bonds; the top-down approach is once again at the focal point in its reflection upon social cohesion. More precisely, governments should create policies that transcend those measures that impose raw assimilation into the host society. Contrary, the Council ascribes immigrant groups the role of active partners in the discussion of policy proposals that are aimed at strengthening the social tissue. As such, the Council clearly rejects policies that tend to exclude immigrants from basic rights within society or those regimes that impose an integration trajectory upon immigrants instead of building a partnership with the newcomers in the pathways towards full integration in society.

Combining the two approaches to social cohesion as proposed by the Council, three conclusions can be derived. First of all, while the Council emphasizes that “social cohesion is not a ‘nostalgic’ concept hunkering after a ‘lost social harmony’, but a highly topical one that encompasses key aspects of political strategy for a modern society based on the recognition of rights,” (Council of Europe, 2005, p. 23) yet, the Council nevertheless seems to opt for a rather communitarian view on social cohesion. In this respect, social cohesion is regarded from a top-down perspective, emphasizing the responsibility and ability of the state to secure an environment in which citizens can express themselves, can freely participate in society, are kept out of poverty and

marginalization, and the like. Compared with the active role of state, individuals seem to be regarded as rather passive.

Second, the Council of Europe (2005) puts a particularly emphasis on “all its members” of member countries. Even though the Council (2006) repeats that “migrants are partners” in policymaking, the question is largely left open to whom this definition might refer to. Despite trends in convergence of immigration and integration policies across European countries to become civic (Joppke, 2007) national governments still have considerable influence in defining who is considered as a citizen and what criteria they should comply to in order to have access to full citizenship (Groenendijk & Guild, 2001; Jacobs & Rea, 2007). It may therefore not surprise that compared with natives, immigrants are excluded from considerable citizenship rights in many countries; about two decades ago, Hammar (1990) even introduced the concept of ‘denizens’ to describe the underclass position of immigrants with regard to citizenship rights. Given these restricted citizenship rights, it is questionable whom the Council’s refers to when pointing to “all its members”.

Third, social cohesion is described from a rather functionalist perspective. The main interpretation is that the results of strategic national investments in economic, cultural and social capital – making sure that all its citizens are equipped with the appropriate skills for participation everyday life – social cohesion will be the outcome. As such, it is obscure how cohesive societies can be conceived and, consequently, how, the policy implementations in this domain can be monitored. Certainly with respect to diversity and social cohesion, the Council has emphasized that policy measures should make a difference; yet, they have not addressed delineated benchmarks. Crudely reformulated, can low cohesive societies be differentiated from high ones on the basis of structural statistical information, like for instance the extensive set of Human Development Indicators? Reference to immigrants is in this respect even more troublesome since it is known that immigrants are not doing well on a number of socio-economical indicators (Heath et al., 2008). Therefore, given the lack of clear representations of the concept, it is far from evident to monitor such trends in a coherent manner. In trying to tackle some of these problems, some scholars have attempted to define social cohesion and how it can be monitored.

2.2. The Contemporary Academic View on Social Cohesion

Contemporary scholarly approaches to social cohesion differ largely from the policy makers’ viewpoint. Foremost, the academic literature has shifted from social cohesion inherently promoted by the state to the individual. Harell and Stolle (2009, p. 19), e.g., combine the individual approach with a normative dimension by defining social cohesion as the collection of “cooperative relations among individuals and groups of individuals that are based on mutual respect, equality and norms of reciprocity”. It is clear, therefore, that in the current literature, social cohesion does not just refer to the

ability of members of a society to co-operate in order to reach collective goals, but also to do so in a voluntary manner. Similarly, Chan et al (2006, p. 290) emphasize that these relations are not only horizontal but also include a vertical dimension, i.e. social cohesion is regarded “a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral manifestations.”

What is clear from these definitions is that social cohesion regards a multidimensional representation and includes both structural, i.e. the conditions in which individuals live in, as well as normative considerations, i.e. cultural dispositions that link people together. With regard to the structural components here, reference is made to the distribution of material goods between individuals with regard to work, housing patterns, economic interaction and other material goods. Typically, the expectation is that this network of interactions extends toward all members of society (Burt, 1982), preventing social exclusion and the fight against discrimination as they imply that some individuals or groups of individuals cannot participate in society (Atkinson et al., 2002). It is striking however, that normative considerations are just as crucial in these social cohesion definitions. To a large extent these normative elements are seen as procedural: reciprocity, equality and lack of discrimination are not considered as goals by themselves but as prerequisites for successful co-operation to occur. The assumption is that individuals will not be inclined to co-operate with others if there is not a norm of reciprocity governing the exchange. A sense of reciprocity is assumed to be essential to guarantee the long-term stability of exchange networks (Putnam, 1993).

Kearns and Forrest (2000) have clearly elaborated on such a multidimensional perspective on social cohesion by introducing five distinct dimensions. In fact, the reason why this multidimensional concept is highlighted is that those authors combine many elements that are essential to unite individuals to each other and to society in one heuristic representation, including common values (cf. Schwartz & Sagie, 2000), social order (cf. Sampson et al., 2002) and social capital (cf. Putnam, 2000). The first dimension involves a civic culture with shared values and norms, more specifically values and norms that strive to facilitate the exchange relations with other citizens. There is a considerable interest from policy actors in this dimension of social cohesion since in several societies the trend towards individualization is perceived as a threat for this set of common values (Inglehart, 1997). The current interest lies mainly in the question whether the alleged fragmentation of these common values hinders social life and the establishment of connectedness between members of society (Cantle, 2005). Most communitarian approaches argue that a consensus on a set of common values is indispensable to maintain a cohesive society (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000; Bellah et al., 1985). Yet, the crumbling of sets of overarching norms and values may be even more immanent in societies that are characterized by ethnic-cultural diversity, making it *a priori* difficult to reconcile diversity with social cohesion.

The second dimension refers to social order and social control. Societies that are more cohesive will be characterized by a common willingness to uphold norms and to the ability to enforce sanctions if necessary (Janowitz, 1975). This social order and social control dimension, must, however, not be regarded in the light of external policing, but is caused by social mechanisms that sanction deviant behavior effectively. This form of collective empowerment, or collective efficacy as is the terminology in the criminology literature, ideally would lead to a safer environment for all members of society (Sampson, 1986; Sampson et al., 1997, 1999; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). Building upon consensus theories, predicting other's behavior, which is central in the concepts of social order and social control, is more problematic when groups adhere to different set of norms, which may be the case in diverse settings (Messick & Kramer, 2001). Thus also in this regard, the theoretical reflection on social cohesion in diverse societies presents us with two irreconcilable concepts.

Third, Kearns and Forrest (2000) include social solidarity and the absence of structural inequalities as a dimension of social cohesion. According to The Club of Rome, this specific citizenship concept is highly important: in contemporary pluralistic societies, conflict over valuable resources is inevitable (Berger, 1988), so policy efforts are simply necessary to guarantee access to these resources, like labor market participation. It is thus argued that strong and persistent inequalities in a society will augment social tensions. Poor and excluded groups within society have no incentive to believe in the fairness of the system while on the other hand the privileged groups are likely to perceive other members of society as potentially threatening. In this respect, in many countries, ethnic-cultural minorities are still far of from equal rights compared with natives (Heath et al., 2008). Not only do non-nationals have a disadvantaged position on for instance the labor market (Heath et al., 2008; Hartung, 2010), also with regard to more formal rights, immigrants still face structural disadvantages (Waldrauch, 2005). Consequently, putting the diversity perspective into combating inequalities also obscures a clear depiction of social cohesion.

The fourth dimension described by Kearns and Forrest (2000) regards social networks and social capital, which is frequently conceptualized as a necessary resource allowing societies to function (Putnam, 1993). Societies that have dense social networks and a high level of social capital, i.e. a corresponding set of norms of generalized reciprocity and trust, are considered as more cohesive than societies in which these elements are missing. In the literature, it is argued that the importance of networks should not be underestimated, and that both strong networks and relations with people you know as well as weak relations are important (Granovetter, 1973). However, it has recently been articulated that a dense network may also work exclusionary for immigrants (Arneil, 2006; Hero, 2003, 2007). Arneil (2006), on the one hand, argues that the decline in social capital has occurred at the same time as Blacks have gained more civil rights. In a more quantitative manner, Hero (2003, 2007) shows that in US States with high levels of social life, Blacks are significantly less involved in public life, i.e. do less participate in

politics and the like. Consequently, also with regard social networks as the operationalization of the social capital approach is difficult to equate with increasing diversity to contemporary societies.

Finally, Kearns and Forrest (2000) identify a common identification with a specific geographical unit. A cohesive society is characterized by a feeling of belonging to a certain locus. Individuals are socialized in their loci that direct their attitudes and behaviors in a certain way. A strong identification with society can have external spillover effects and causes involvement towards this geographical entity and other positive externalities encompassing all members of society (Johnston, 1991). To a large extent, this perspective falls back to the debate on attitudes towards the in-group and out-group under the condition of increasing immigration. Highlighting but one of the theoretical models, namely group threat theories (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Sherif et al., 1961; Blalock, 1967; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) individuals have the universal tendency to reduce the complexity in everyday life by making categorizations. Those categories representing otherness become more incongruent with the own group when interests compete. Thus also this fifth dimension on social cohesion conflicts initially with ethnic-cultural diversity, hindering empirical scrutiny.

The dominant multidimensional conceptions of social cohesion inhibit a clear-cut and applicable conceptualization for contemporary diverse societies, of which the Kearns & Forrest-typology (2000) is a thankful example to make this claim. What is to a considerable extent problematic is the fact that each of these dimensions seem to behave like Weberian ideal types (1978): they do hold in theory but hard to sustain in the real world. Yet, if they all add up, a society that maximizes in cohesion should be the results. Moreover, those five conceptions implicitly embark the perspective that social cohesion and diversity are largely incommensurable and behave like water and fire. For this reason, I would like to take a step back from the current multidimensional concepts and build upon one of sociology's classic monographs on social cohesion, namely Emile Durkheim's 'Division of Labor in Society', to arrive in an overarching framework of social cohesion and provide in a clear conceptualization of social cohesion in diverse societies.

3. A Durkheimian Approach

Since contemporary approaches toward social cohesion largely fall short in providing in a comprehensive framework to represent social cohesion in diverse societies, the main aim of this section is to go back to the classics of sociology and review how classical models of social cohesion can be stretched to contemporary societies. In this section, I will particularly focus on Emile Durkheim's 'Division of Labor in Society' (1984 [1893]). Therefore, first of all arguments are given why Durkheim's seminal monograph will be applied to conceive social cohesion in diverse society. Second, there will be a

considerable elaboration on the different types of social cohesion that Durkheim has presented, namely mechanical and organic solidarity. In the third part, the causes that Durkheim has provided for the transformation of traditional cohesion in organic solidarity will be presented. Since Durkheim regarded the process of immigration as important for establishing social cohesion in industrialized society, his position on this topic will be clarified in the fourth part. Fifth and final, all information on the modern form of organic solidarity and Durkheim's position on race and immigration are integrated to arrive at a representation of present forms of social cohesion.

3.1. In Defense of Emile Durkheim

The end of the 19th century can be regarded as a cornerstone for social science discipline. Industrialization gave rise to scientific reflection on the consequences of the major social changes that were transforming Western societies: "The consequences of the shift from agricultural to industrial societies on social norms were so large that they gave birth to an entirely new academic discipline, sociology, which sought to describe and understand these changes. Virtually all of the great social thinkers at the end of the nineteenth century (...) devoted their careers to explicating the nature of this transition" (Fukuyama, 1999, p. 9). Among the sociologists that have marked the foundation of sociology are Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Tönnies and Max Weber (Bruhn, 2004). While highlighting different accents, all authors seem to converge to the diagnosis that social cohesion is remarkably different in modern industrialized societies compared with premodern traditional ones.

Concerning the different emphases, foremost regarding the utilitarian claims on group behavior and the level of optimism regarding the new forms of social bonds legitimate the choice of Durkheim in representing social cohesion in contemporary diverse societies. First of all, in classic sociology, there has been a divide between authors that have emphasized a utilitarian perspective towards social cohesion and those that interpreted group behavior as rather socially inspired. According to certain authors, including Spencer (1978 [1897]) and Marx (1946 [1848]), industrial changes fuelled the economic rationale in everyday man. The basis of social cohesion, in the utilitarian view, was exchange (Spencer, 1978 [1897]) and the representation of industrial societies related to social class (Marx, 1946 [1848]). In contrast, Durkheim (1984 [1893], p. 22) draws the attention to the notion that this utilitarian viewpoint discards the social functions of exchange:

If exchange alone has often been held to constitute the social relationships that arise from the division of labor, it is because we have failed to recognize what exchange implies and what results from it. It presumes that two beings are mutually dependent upon each other because they are both incomplete, and it does no more than interpret externally this mutual dependence.

Thus, social cohesion cannot be interpreted merely from an economic viewpoint on the exchange of good between individuals that are “juxtaposed” (Merton, 1934) for the simple reason that these opposed interest is expected to lead to a Hobbesian state of nature (Giddens, 1978).

The second element that legitimates Durkheim’s perspective on social cohesion has been the connotation, inherent in the interpretation of the social consequences of industrialization. The lion’s share of sociology’s founding fathers regarded this process as irreconcilable with social cohesion. For Marx (1946 [1848]), social change could not be disentangled from a struggle between various classes. Weber (1958 [1904-1905]) on the other hand predicted that the increasing rationalization of social life would lead to an iron cage that alienated individuals from wider society. Moreover, while Tönnies’ and Durkheim’s ideal types of social cohesion in traditional and modern societies are closely related, Tönnies (1965 [1887]) preferred the traditional *Gemeinschaft* above the modern *Gesellschaft* for the reason that the latter represented atomistic individuals whose interests are dominated by self-interests above group interests. In contrast, Durkheim envisioned a positive understanding of industrial societies. Elaborating on his understanding of social cohesion, which will be presented later in this chapter, he argued (1984 [1893]) that the mechanical bonds that characterize traditional societies are generally quite easy to disrupt while the organic bonds of industrial societies are less easy to break. Since the point of departure in this dissertation is that it is in fact possible to reconcile social cohesion with complex diverse forms of social organization, Durkheim’s optimistic standpoint may serve as guiding point of departure.

Durkheim’s diagnosis of modern society cannot be started without a brief remark on his terminology regarding social cohesion. In his work, he abundantly uses refers to the notion of ‘*solidarité sociale*’ (1984 [1893]). However, Durkheim’s positive outlook on modern forms of social cohesion may not be derived from the value-driven interpretation of solidarity, which has been done frequently after the publication of his ‘Division of Labor in Society’. On the contrary, Durkheim regarded social solidarity as quite value neutral and observed it, as Alpert denotes (1961 [1938], p. 178), even in a “biological sense” to discuss the relation between individuals and society. For Durkheim, this social solidarity, i.e. the bonds that connect individuals to a social aggregate, was the core of his sociological thought (Alpert, 1961; Lukes, 1973, p. 139).

What also needs to be noted is that Durkheim has had many critics, predominantly for his misinterpretation of historical fact. Predominantly Tilly (1981) has recently argued that Durkheim has become completely useless for the simple reason that many of his historical analyses are based on wrong information. Lukes also argues (1973, p. 159) that “Durkheim vastly understated the degree of interdependence and reciprocity in pre-industrial societies (...); he vastly overstated the role of repressive law in pre-industrial societies, and its insignificance in industrial societies.” Nevertheless, in line with Emirbayer (1996), I do hold on to the argument Durkheim and much of his

envisaged, namely that social cohesion in complex societies is effectively possible; yet, the bonds that unite people are strikingly different in complex societies compared with more traditional ones.

3.2. Different Forms of Social Cohesion

Indeed, Durkheim proposed that social cohesion in industrialized societies is of a different form compared with the one in traditional societies. Before discussing the two forms, it is impossible to understand Durkheim's conceptions of social cohesion in traditional and modern societies without reference to his sociological method. His point of departure was that social phenomena could only be investigated by means of social facts: "the study of solidarity lies within the domain of sociology. It is a social fact that can only be thoroughly known through its social effects" (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 27). The social facts that served as "indices" for the forms of social solidarity (Merton, 1934) were the dominant types of law in any given society. The logic behind such an analysis of the types of law is straightforward, namely "since law reproduces the main forms of social solidarity, we have only to classify the different types of law in order to be able to investigate which types of social solidarity corresponds to them" (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 28). Durkheim noted that in traditional society, law was predominantly of the repressive kind while modern societies are characterized by the restitutive kind.

Thus, in traditional societies, "penal law prescribes only sanctions and says nothing about the obligations to which they relate" (1984 [1893], p. 35). Repressive law had the objective to punish the perpetrator while leaving the restoration to the original situation largely untouched. However, the main aim of this act of punishing, which was solely "for the sake of punishing" (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 14), was to restore what Durkheim has referred to as the '*conscience collective*', which he described as "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society [that form] a determinate system with a life of its own" (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 39). In traditional societies, criminal offences tore at this collective consciousness, and to compensate for this offense towards this act to imbalance society as a whole, the punishment aimed to canalize the collective sentiments.

On the contrary, for modern societies Durkheim noticed the dominance of a type of law that juxtaposes penal law: "In civil [or restitutive] law (...) the legislator (...) determines the nature of the obligation as exactly as possible; only then does he state the manner in which a sanction should be applied" (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 35). What is moreover highly characterizing for restitutive law is that it does not cover the whole society but is directed to different parts of society, like for instance the family or enterprises. Durkheim's (1984 [1893], p. 70) main argument is that this type of law is not in relation with an entity like a collective consciousness, yet, these rules also "do not merely concern private individuals." Indeed, Durkheim argues that the restitutive rules

are instituted “between limited and particular elements in society, which they link to one another” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 71). Thus, for Durkheim, the structure of modern societies is one characterized by various different interrelated parts.

Based upon the distinction between repressive and restitutive law, Durkheim argued that social cohesion is vastly different in traditional than in modern societies. Thus, in traditional society, the central element in Durkheim’s reasoning was the presence of the collective consciousness that connected individuals directly to the society (1984 [1893], p. 61). Society is kept together because individuals are “attracted to one another because they resemble one another, because they have a fund of beliefs and practices common to them all” (Alpert, 1961 [1938], p. 180). Durkheim labeled this type of solidarity based on similarity as ‘mechanical’, for the reason that the “the social molecules (...) could only operate in harmony in so far as they do not operate independently” (Lukes, 1973, p. 148).

In modern societies, on the contrary, restitutive law reflects the presence of various independent parts that link people to each other. What is characteristic for modern societies is that individuals are situated in one, or more (cf. Simmel, 1950), of these independent parts, even in such an extent that certain societal parts cannot keep track of the other (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 82). Consequently, the mechanism that kept modern societies together was precisely that all these different parts form an interdependent structure that unites individuals. Social cohesion in industrial societies is thus based on “mutual and complementary differences” (Alpert, 1961 [1938], p. 181). Individuals are not directly linked to society but by intermediate bonds of the compartments they are part of. Durkheim emphasized that social cohesion in modern societies is at its maximum the more differentiated its members are. The label he applied to this type of solidarity is ‘organic’ because “society becomes more capable of operating in harmony, in so far as each of its elements operates more independently” (Lukes, 1973, p. 148).

The different types of social cohesion also reflect a different social organization. For Durkheim (1984 [1893], p. 59), mechanic solidarity that reflects the similarity between the individuals is only possible in societies in which the “physical concentration of the whole group, bringing the interpenetration of minds even closer, also facilitates every concerted action.” Only in small-scaled, closed communities, i.e. segmented societies for which the clan is the ideal typical representation, cohesion based on resemblance is at its highest. Durkheim states (1984 [1893], p. 59) that in those societies in which individuals are “too diverse in quantity or quality a complete fusion would not be possible between those elements which were partially heterogeneous and irreducible” mechanic solidarity is not possible; rather the contrary, organic solidarity flourishes for modern societies are heterogeneous, which is essential for cohesion based on differences.

3.3. The Genesis of Organic Solidarity

Building upon different types of legal norms, Durkheim thus arrives to the conclusion that cohesion in industrial societies is based upon differences between various societal parts. This statement does however not clear the process(es) that explains why in modern societies the conscience collective lost its strength and social bonds were based on the mutual differences. In explaining the genesis of organic solidarity, Durkheim refers to Darwin's idea of toleration between different species (1984 [1893], p. 209). While Darwin has argued that organisms, including individuals that are alike live in a state of struggle right because they have similar interests, this struggle may not be induced if there are plenty of resources available. If organisms have different interests, they can live together in a harmonious way since the available resources of interest largely vary (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], pp. 208-209). Specialization, or the social division of labor, is thus the necessary consequence when population increases in size

The first process that encompasses population growth, according to Durkheim (1984 [1893], p. 201) is the concentration of peoples over geographical areas. In traditional societies, groups "spread themselves over areas that are relatively vast in comparison with the number of individuals that constitute them" (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 201). On the contrary, in modern societies, at the same time as there has been documented a general population growth, the spread of peoples came to a halt and people did concentrate to certain locations. Second, the concentration of peoples also led to the creation of towns. This process is not only due to the increase in population but also to immigration from other peoples into the town. According to Durkheim (1984 [1893], p. 202), the emergence of towns had largely to do with the "need that drives individuals to keep constantly in the closest possible contact with one another." Third and last, technical innovations, for instance with regard to transportation and communication, also resulted in the sprawl of people over a certain geographical area.

Yet, according to Durkheim the concentration of individuals in towns with associated modes of transportation and communication is not a necessary condition for the division of labor in society. He explicitly argues (1984 [1893], p. 205) that "the division of labor varies in direct proportion to the volume and density of societies and if it progresses in a continuous manner over the course of societal development it is because societies become regularly more dense and generally more voluminous." Thus, the increase of societies may not only be understood in an increase in population; also the density of society and corresponding intergroup relations must be present in order to result the division of labor in bonds of mutual interdependence.

Thus, the fact that societies became both with regard to the quantity and density more voluminous, which resulted in the division of labor in society, eroded the common conscience. As Durkheim argues (1984 [1893], p. 82), "special task, by their very nature, are exempt from the effects of the collective consciousness. This is because if

something is to be the object of shared sentiments, the first condition is that it should be shared.” Modern societies that are characterized by a high level of division of labor are likewise characterized by an increased individualization, that is the erosion of a shared collective conscience. Using a slightly different terminology, Lukes adds that only the division of labor “enables the necessities of social cohesion to be reconciled with the principle of individuation” (Lukes, 1973, p. 147).

After the widespread acceptance of the ‘Division of Labor in Society’, Durkheim was criticized on various grounds, yet particularly with regard to the linear transformation his social genesis implied. Poggi (2000, p. 45), for instance, argues that organic solidarity always implies the precondition of a mechanical form of social solidarity. He has derived this finding partially from Durkheim’s expression (1984 [1893], p. 123) that “the history of these two types [of social solidarity] indeed shows that the one has only made progress in the proportion to which the other has regressed.” While Durkheim is very careful in his formulation, he does not restrict organic solidarity to specific timeframes, like for instance the Industrial Revolution (1984 [1893], p. 121): “The new societies that replace extinct social types never embark on their course at the very spot where the others came to a halt:”

A similar argument regards the ideal typical depiction of his approach, referring to alleged statements that traditional societies are equalized solely with mechanical forms of solidarity and industrialized societies with organic solidarity. However, as the statement above already indicated, Durkheim did not directly assume a temporal lag in his model, i.e. that he equated one time period with one type of solidarity. But what is even more important to underscore is that he resists of framing one type of solidarity to one single society. Alpert (1961 [1938], pp. 182-183) summarizes Durkheim’s outlook by arguing that “there is no society in which both of them are not present. (...) It is therefore misleading to attribute to Durkheim the proposition that “there is no division of labor among primitive people.” Applying this reasoning to contemporary diverse societies, it can be expected that, to a limited extent, social cohesion also has incorporated elements of mechanical solidarity. Thus, even though social cohesion is based on differences, elements of a collective conscience might also be present.

3.4. Immigration, Ethnic-Cultural Diversity, and Social Solidarity

Yet, the main process driving societies to develop organic solidarity was exactly a growing societal density with a corresponding increase in intergroup relations that characterized Western industrialization at the half of the 19th century. While Durkheim described immigration as one of the processes that contributed to population growth of centralized areas such as town, this theoretical argument does not clarify Durkheim’s position towards mass immigration flows and the creation of social bonds in modern mixed societies. Before elaborating on his conception of immigration and ethnic-cultural diversity in modern society, it needs to be clarified that his viewpoint on this

issue might be skewed due to his own experience. Born from Jewish descent and actively involved in the Dreyfus affair, he became a prominent scholar in the public debate the issue of ethnic-cultural diversity in France. Yet, Durkheim's prominent position in this debate does, however, not reveal an ambiguous standpoint.

In the aftermath of the Dreyfus-affair, Durkheim took position on the problematic intergroup relations in France. Despite tensions based on ethnic-cultural grounds, he refused to regard the French as fundamentally racist on the basis of the upsurge in anti-Semitism during the affair. On the contrary, Durkheim attributed this rise in out-group hostility as a "consequence and the superficial symptom of a state of social malaise" (Fenton, 1984, p. 119). As Fenton (1984, p. 119) argues, using this formulation, Durkheim was one of the first to describe scapegoat theory that would later become more prominent in the literature on realistic group threat theories (see Chapter 4). Thus, he saw diversity not inherently irreconcilable with society, yet, in this line of argumentation, he seems to suggest that perfect harmony between various groups is attainable when society is well integrated.⁶

Durkheim's position on ethnic-cultural diversity is nevertheless completely in line with his thought on traditional and modern societies. In traditional societies, social solidarity was based on similarity, i.e. "resemblances (moral and physique) are at a maximum" (Fenton, 1984, p. 121). In modern societies that are characterized by bonds of mutual interdependence, one's ethnic-cultural identity loses its significance. In this respect, Durkheim seems to report ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood (cf. Chapter 8), in which traditional societies adhered to an ethnic logic regarding the importance of descent while modern societies rather refuted this logic. In this respect, it comes as no surprise that Durkheim adhered to a rather positive understanding on migrant groups' integration into the mainstream society. Fenton documented that Durkheim expected a full integration of for instance the Jews into French society, yet, at a pace of two generations (Fenton, 1984, p. 120).

Yet, his viewpoint on ethnic-cultural diversity in modern societies is more complicated than is stated above. While Durkheim (1984 [1893], p. 132) indeed does acknowledge that modern solidarity in industrial societies is predominantly based on functional and not on normative integration, he is also aware of the fact that the accomplishment of mutually dependent bonds are far from easily achieved in times of mass immigration. In arguing that "the slacker the thread that links society together, the easier it must be for foreign elements to be incorporated into societies" (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 104), he refers to Rome in which citizenship was easily granted to conquered peoples and

⁶ Alternatively, Durkheim applied the term of *anomie* for those societies that are not integrated, well, i.e. more specific in those societies in which the general morale has not brought into relation with the social phenomena are that impact society deeply. See Chapter 4 for a more elaborate description of *anomie* theory.

refugees. On the contrary, in more complex societies, incorporation and citizenship are more difficult to aspire: “undoubtedly the foreigner can temporarily insert himself into a society, but the process by which he is assimilated, that is, that of naturalization, becomes long drawn-out and complex” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 104). Durkheim seems to acknowledge that immigration may bring along certain problems of social integration and that it might take time before minority groups are assimilated into the mainstream.

3.5. Concluding Notes on Social Cohesion in Diverse Societies

Bringing all elements together, in this last part on Durkheim’s diagnosis of social cohesion, it will be clarified how social cohesion in contemporary diverse societies can be understood, which is difficult to derive from his monographs. What we actually do know at this point is that cohesion in complex societies is based on functional integration, i.e. the mutual interdependence between various interrelated parts of societies, while traditional societies were kept together on the basis of normative integration, i.e. the similarity of its members in the collective conscience. Durkheim also acknowledged that both types of solidarity actually may be present in any given society, i.e. that there still is adherence to a vast number of shared norms in modern societies; yet, compared with traditional societies, this set of common values is rather limited. For the reason that modern societies become more cohesive when heterogeneity between its parts increases, Durkheim also reports that ethnic-cultural diversity and social solidarity are not inherently mutually exclusive, although he reports that integration into the mainstream may take time. The unsolved puzzle is, however, how this social solidarity in contemporary modern societies can be conceived.

In giving a representation of the social bonds that connect individuals to each other and to society at present times, Durkheim (1984 [1893], p. 338-339) refers to the economic system of exchange. Arguing that the economic rationale is not sufficient for cohesion, he furthermore notes that exchange “creates between men a whole system of rights and duties joining them in a lasting way to one another.” This system of rights and duties are sound elements in the concept of a contract, Durkheim noticed (1984 [1893], p. 80). However, he clearly rejects the notion of the social contract in advanced societies, for the reason that a contract assumes a shared agreement of all members of society, which he assumes to conflict with the increased specialization due to modernization. Therefore, he adds (1984 [1893], p. 151) that “the conception of the social contract is today therefore very difficult to defend.” As an alternative, Durkheim argues that social control enters more vastly into the public realm to regulate the exchange that is inherent in society. This form of social control has its foundation in the social contract: “we cooperate because we have wished to do so, but our voluntary cooperation creates for us duties that we have not desired” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 161).

According to this model, individuals agree voluntarily to cooperate, and consequently, to live together in a cohesive manner. In this respect, Durkheim (1984 [1893], p. 173) refers to the concept of altruism, yet, at the same time arguing that it is “not a kind of pleasant ornament of our social life, but one that will always be its fundamental basis.” Thus, altruism, which is, according to the Oxford English Dictionary described as the “unselfish concern for others,” is following Durkheim, the glue for contemporary diverse societies. Yet, it is difficult to conceive the concept of altruism as underlying an exchange relation between two different parts. In an exchange relation, both parties have an interest that is not always reconcilable, i.e. one of the parties wants to benefit while the other party wants to profit. The ‘unselfish’-component in this definition of altruism therefore conflicts with economic exchange relations since it implies that none of the parties in this relation might benefit.

However, where the concept of altruism seems to fail to deliver in a solid basis for exchange relations, the notion of trust can in fact provide a solid ground for social exchange. For instance, Newton (2007, p. 343-344) describes trust as “the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible.” While altruism is rather alter-centered and underscores the importance of one’s own unselfish concern, the concept of trust is actually defined in a relational manner and, consequently, adds to exchange as one of the main ordering principles of social solidarity in complex societies. Thus, after reflecting on a Durkheim’s understanding of different forms of social cohesion, I argue that the social fabric of diverse societies is largely based on trust between the members of society.

4. What is Trust?

While the Durkheimian analysis of social cohesion in complex societies has revealed that trust is the synthetic element that keeps diverse societies together, other authors have, throughout the years also underscored the important role of trust to unite people to each other and to society. Simmel, for instance, has stated that trust is “one of the most important synthetic forces within society” (Simmel, 1950, p. 326). Luhmann, on the other hand, connects the notion of trust to taking of risks that is inherent in contemporary complex societies and therefore states that “risk-taking will as far as others are involved, require trust” (Luhmann, 1988, p. 105). Yet, before this concept can theoretically be connected to the multidimensional conceptualization as provided by Kearns and Forrest (2000), it is essential to reflect on what trust actually is. In this section, my approach towards trust will be articulated. Based on this definition, the various types of trust are distinguished in the second section, in which additional arguments are given why specific generalized trust is indispensable for diverse societies.

4.1. Defining Trust

In defining trust Levi's definition (1996) is taken as a point of departure. She conceives trust as "a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definition of self-interest" (Levi, 1998, p. 78). As Levi's description reveals, trust is far from easy to define. To cope with this conceptual fuzziness, we might take a look at the so-called bases of trust. Lewis and Weigert (1985, pp. 968-971), for instance, describe trust in an aggregate and functional manner, i.e. "by the members of that system act according to and are secure in the expected futures constituted by the presence of each other or their symbolic representation." This operationalization of trust also refers to the collectivity, but at the same time the authors apply the classical distinction in attitudinal research between a cognitive, an emotional and a behavioral component (Ajzen, 2005). Levi (1998, p. 78) also adapts these three attitudinal components by arguing that "the act of trust is the knowledge or belief that the trusted will have an incentive to do what she engages to do." In what remains, the behavioral manifestation of trust is discarded, yet considerable attention is given to the cognitive and emotional components.

On the one hand, by referring to knowledge as inherent in the act of trust, Levi underscores its cognitive basis. According to a theoretical strand in the trust-literature, cognition is the constituting element of trust: "trust is the cognitive premise with which individual or collective/corporate actors enter into interaction with other actors" (Offe, 1999, p. 45). The rational choice approach towards trust comes close to the cognitive dimension, even in such a manner that trust is represented as one's encapsulated interest (Hardin, 2002, 2006). In this framework, trust is predominantly fostered by past experiences and the trusted's reputation (Gambetta, 1988; Offe, 1999; Hardin, 2006). First, of all, individuals trust others because in previous similar situations, the trusted has shown to be trustworthy. Second, the reputation of the trustee and, as a consequence, his/her trustworthiness is important as well (Offe, 1999). According to the cognitive approach, we will need to assess how trustworthy somebody so a trade-off can be made in putting some trust in him/her.

On the other hand, while the cognitive component of trust provides a solid basis for a rational depiction of individuals in engaging in trust, in fact, the processes underlying a cognitive approach towards trust is highly in conflict with contemporary society. The open character of Western societies opposes both ideas of previous experiences and reputation. In many situations, we need to decide to trust individuals who we have never encountered and of which the prediction of betrayal of trust is difficult to assess. Therefore, next to the cognitive basis, trust also entails an emotional grounding. Indeed, in various cases, one cannot rely on previous experiences or reputation to assess one's trustworthiness when being in exchange with unknown others. Trust is in this respect expected to being committed to because trust in itself is valued; i.e. there is an

emotional basis in trust that may juxtapose a cognitive assessment of trustworthiness. Uslaner formulates this emotional basis of trust in the notion of moralistic trust, which “answers questions that the strategic view cannot” (2002, p. 20). Also Luhmann’s notion of ‘system trust’ may have a cognitive basis, yet, the irrational basis is apparent when he argues that “each trusts on the assumption that others trust” (1979, p. 69). Moreover, the fact that there is a strong emotional basis underlying trust is well described by Lewis and Weigert: “The betrayal of personal trust strikes a deadly blow at the foundation possible to make a rational calculation of the trustworthiness of the other, not only because contemporary open societies generate a multifold of opportunities that have no of the relationship itself” (1985, p. 971).

4.2. The Types of Trust

The cognitive and emotional components of trust can be related to different dimensions of trust. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that trust is not a one-dimensional concept (Newton, 1999) but, contrary, a distinction between three types of trust has been introduced (Khodyakov, 2007), namely between particularized or thick trust, generalized or thin trust, and political or institutional trust. First, particularized trust is the type of trust we have developed in our in-groups: family members, relatives, friends and co-workers; thus, in situations where the conscience collective still is quite dominant. This type of trust highly depends on resemblance with the trusted: we do trust the other because they are alike. It is something Durkheim has called mechanical solidarity: particularized trust is more easily to grasp because it is strongest in “small, face-to-face communities where people know each other, and social controls are strong” (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Gambetta, 1988). Thick trust highly correlates with the cognitive component: because of the familiarity and predictability of our in-groups, we know their past behavior and their reputation. This type of trust is also expected to flourish highly in closed societies (Hooghe, 2007).

Second, in contrast with particularized trust, which is fostered easily in closed societies, contemporary open societies are heterogeneous in many respects. Daily, we are involved in activities with people we do not know. In this respect, especially trust in the generalized other is relevant in large-scale societies where social ties are rather weak (Granovetter, 1973). Generalized trust also results from “the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible” (Newton, 2007a). Vital in this description is the interpretation that others do not necessarily include those who you are familiar with. Indeed, especially what Uslaner (2002, pp. 16-17) refers to as the ‘moral’ component is important in this concept of generalized trust: “the central idea distinguishing generalized from particularized trust is how inclusive your moral community is.” While, particularized trust offers evidence that previous experiences and reputation of the

trusted are important, this is simply not the case for generalized trust. Therefore, to commit in a trust relation is much riskier for generalized than for particularized trust.

The third type of trust is political or institutionalized trust. “Scholars have profitably defined political trust as a basic evaluative orientation toward the government founded on how well the government is operating according to people’s normative expectations” (Hetherington, 1998, p. 791). Political trust is argued to depend upon cognitive elements but also on perceptions of legitimacy, competence and efficiency. Authors have frequently warned for separating political trust from trust in other persons (Hardin, 1998, p. 10; Newton, 1999b). Highly important in the concept of political trust is “the trustworthiness of the state” (Levi, 1998, p. 80). Political trust is not actually about having trust in the state but, as Levi states, citizen “are declaring a belief that, on average, its agents will prove to be trustworthy” (Levi, 1998, p. 80). Yet, even though trust in institutions is different than trust in individuals, this does not necessarily mean that this type of trust is less important, as Khodyakov argues (2007, p. 123): “trust in institutions is often more important than interpersonal trust in a modern society, because institutions can have more resources to provide people with the means of achieving some of their goals.” Yet, since this Durkheimian analysis of social cohesion has emphasized the horizontal interdependence between fellow citizens, vertical trust relations between citizens and the state do not correspond to these horizontal bonds and therefore needs to be discarded.

The relation between thick and thin types of trust is, however, far from clear. Recently, Chan and colleagues (2006) have argued that all aspects of trust and social capital in general are the best assessments for the cohesiveness of societies. Yet, conceptualizing social cohesion by all dimensions entails conceptual shortcomings. In the first place, particularized trust is expected to conflict with diversity. Banfield’s research in Montegrano (1958) clearly reveals that high in-group trust without out-group trust can be detrimental for society to progress. Therefore, particularized trust as an indicator for social cohesion would probably lead to wrong conclusions on social cohesion. Indeed, generalized trust is about trusting the unknown other, which is highly relevant for contemporary open and diverse societies. However, this finding does not mean that there is no association between generalized trust and other types of trust. For instance, generalized trusters are also particularized trusters, while the contrary is less evident: “Generalized trusters have positive views toward both their own in-group and out-groups. But they rank their own groups less highly than do particularized trusters” (Uslaner, 2002, pp. 32-33). In sum, generalized trust encapsulates a basis for exchange that was underlying Durkheim’s description of ‘organic solidarity’.

5. Relating Generalized Trust to the Social Cohesion Dimensions

The overview on the various types of trust has shown that predominantly the generalized kind features as the most important aspect of contemporary societies to be cohesive. However, even though the concept has been theoretically deduced from Durkheim's 'Division of Labor in Society' (1984 [1893]), the final test is to relate generalized trust to the five Kearns and Forrest (2000) dimensions regarding social cohesion, namely common values, social order and social control, reductions in wealth disparities, social networks and social capital, and territorial identification.

The first link between generalized trust and common values and identity is rather ambiguous. Fukuyama argues that "trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest behavior" (1995, p. 153). Thus, in societies in which the population shares a common set of values, trust is expected to be widespread. This link between trust and common values seems, however, largely go by to the presence of immigrants and a plural set of values within any given society. Therefore, Uslaner adds that individuals that are inclusive towards minorities might reflect high generalized trust levels right because generalized trust is merely about accepting strangers into the 'moral community': "Strangers may look different from us, they may have different ideologies or religions. But we believe that there is an underlying commonality of values. So it is not quite so risky to place faith in others" (Uslaner, 2002, p. 1). At this point, the problem which is associated with the common values dimension as described by Kearns and Forrest (2000), namely which values go along with a specific community is solved: generalized trust simply transcends societal values and norms.

Second, with respect to linking trust to social order, Rawls has argued in his famous 'A Theory of Justice' that "distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise avoid" (1999 [1971], p. 6). The relation between generalized trust and social order seems to be the strongest link of all Kearns and Forrest (2000) social cohesion dimensions. Misztal's seminal work on trust in modern society (1996) clarifies this relation. She differentiates between three forms of order that are related to trust. In the first type of order, i.e. the stable type, trust functions as a feature that enables everyday interaction. Trust makes life predictable, reliable and legible. The second type of order is the cohesive one, in which trust is based on the basic trust formed in the family, the bonds friendship has delivered, and the common faith and values that are present in society. Finally, the third type of order is the collaborative order. In this type of order, trust fosters solidarity to a larger social whole, toleration towards others and legitimacy towards the political system. While Misztal (1996) argues that all three characteristics are necessary for societies to function, it is largely the relation between generalized trust and the latter, i.e. collaborative order, which is required in diverse settings.

The third link, namely the one between generalized trust and the reductions in wealth disparities, is also straightforward. One of the key findings in Uslaner's seminal work (2002) was the strong relation between generalized trust and economic inequality: as income inequality rises, generalized trust lowers (Uslaner, 2002, p. 18). Moreover, Rothstein (2005) argues that, based on a Swedish study, universal welfare regimes can increase levels of generalized trust (2005, pp. 89-91). Evidence for this findings are, in this respect, twofold (cf. Chapter 3 and Chapter 9). First, the universal welfare system has discarded the fact that services are granted after a profound means-assessment, meaning that all citizens are treated in the same manner. Because of the universality of the program, everybody is regarded as equal, which prevents suspicious notions among fellow citizens (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). Second, in accordance with Uslaner (2002), universal welfare systems are aimed at lowering economic inequality which is expected to increase social trust (Rothstein, 2005). More recently, Nannestad (2008) has summarized this link between generalized trust and equality that it is not exactly a mere measure of income equality that is best able to explain why trust is higher in more equal societies, but precisely egalitarian norms that underscore the strive for reductions in income inequality. With regard to diverse societies, it can thus be expected that reductions in disparities between natives and immigrants contribute to the generation of trust in the generalized other.

Fourth, the link between generalized trust and social capital may be well established, i.e. generalized trust is originally been formulated in the definition of social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2000), yet, the relation is far from clear. Newton for instance has already stated that "trust is a – probably the – main component of social capital, and social capital is a necessary condition of social integration, economic efficiency, and democratic stability" (1999, p. 202), yet, only recently, considerable attention has been paid to validating trust for societies to be cohesive. When looking at the connection between generalized trust and organizational membership, the structural features of social capital, this link is far from clear (cf. Chapter 3). Stolle (1998), for instance, found out that generalized trust increases only moderately when joining a voluntary organization. Related to diversity, the general assumption is that those associations that are of the bridging type, i.e. bring together people from across social cleavages, are better able to grasp trust than bonding associations (Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Coffé & Geys, 2007).

The fifth link regards the relation between membership and generalized trust. Of all five links, especially the literature on this one is underspecified, namely there is hardly any evidence available regarding the relation between territorial identification and generalized trust. If we can stretch the concept of membership to having trust in the in-group, i.e. a thick conception of trust, I must repeat the outcomes that declare that generalized trusters are also known to have high level of trust in the in-group, yet, particularized trusters are not always inclined to engage in trust-relations with people they are not familiar with (Uslaner, 2002; Newton & Zmerli, 2009). For Miller (1995, p. p. 140), trust across groups is in fact possible, yet it "depends upon a common

identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide.” However, empirically, it is not clarified what exactly the relation between national identity and trust in the other is (cf. Chapter 9).

6. Conclusion

This chapter took as point of departure Bernard’s (1999) controversial statement that social cohesion can be regarded as a ‘quasi-concept’, arguing that the concept is present as a hybrid category among both policy makers and scholars. To counter this statement, a recent number of scholars have already introduced theoretical reflections on social cohesion (Harell & Stolle, 2009; Chan et al., 2006) to the wider scholarly literature. Similarly, this chapter on defining social cohesion aimed to contribute to this theoretical debate by arriving at a representation of social cohesion that had the goal to meet two criteria. The first criterion referred to the fact that this representation must embrace the diverse character of contemporary societies. Being member of a society in which, for instance, various ethnic-cultural groups are present, it can be expected that social cohesion is possible without, to give but one example, a consensus over values. The second criterion that has been upheld was that this representation must result in a concept that enables benchmarking in the policy sphere of social cohesion, which means that the concept must be quantifiable. After a Durkheimian analysis of social cohesion, generalized trust has proposed as the glue of contemporary diverse societies: the unity between the individuals that are unknown to each other is facilitated by this type of thin trust.

Indeed, an important conclusion in discussing the relation between diversity and social cohesion is first of all that social cohesion in complex societies is considered to rely on other mechanisms compared with social cohesion in traditional societies. As spectators have already acknowledged (Simmel, 1950; Luhmann, 1988), trusting the generalized other is expected to strengthen the social fabric. By departing from Durkheim’s seminal ‘Division of Labor in Society’ (1984 [1893]), this chapter has given theoretical arguments for this expectation: indeed, exchange between mutual yet unknown interdependent parts in societies is facilitated if generalized trust is at play. Given the fact that this type of trust enhances social unity, in further analyses, the general hypothesis consequently is that to be considered as cohesive, societies must have a citizenry that expresses that it can put trust in the generalized other.

Yet, the Durkheimian analysis does not come without any discussion. By arriving at an operationalization of generalized trust, a highly quantifiable concept is delivered. In the last half century, generalized trust has been frequently questioned in surveys. The survey is, however, a sociological method that violates Durkheim’s understanding that social cohesion is *sui generis* and cannot be investigated by means of individual respondents. Nevertheless, it must be made clear that the theoretical analysis of social cohesion in

diverse societies delivered generalized trust as a valid operationalization; yet, the investigation of trust entails a distinct research methodology that is difficult to reconcile with Durkheim's method. Over the past couple of years, the investigation into trust, both with regards its determinant and its consequences, has been on the rise, and it is evident that this research on the social consequences of diversity, relying on the concept of trust, explores the state-of-the-art methodologies that have been proposed recently.

Also, Durkheim was quite unclear about the role of diversity and immigration as such. As one of the driving forces for organic solidarity, i.e. the modern type of social cohesion, he paid a lot of attention to volume density of society, which was partly driven by migration to urban areas but also by contact between the various parts of these societies. While critics may argue that homogeneous societies therefore are expected to have low levels of generalized trust since the general population simply cannot have trust in the generalized other, evidence suggests that also among the most homogeneous European societies (e.g. Poland) this type of trust is a crystallized latent concept and, consequently, can be studied (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008).

Turning back then to Durkheim's understanding of diversity in different forms of social solidarity, he also noticed that the integration of immigrants into wider society is more difficult to achieve in complex societies than in traditional ones. One of the main aspects of Durkheim's 'Social Division of Labor' (1984 [1893]) indeed suggests that societies can turn into a state of anomie if in times of rapid social change the general morale is not given meaning to these changes that are taking place. As such, it can be expected that also immigration as a process that affects European societies deeply might alienate people from wider society. Consequently, the investigation into the consequences of immigration-caused diversity from a generalized trust perspective is required.

But there is more. Academics have demonstrated that, in order to create a sense of solidarity and consequently to prevent a state of anomie, the role of the government is essential. As Giddens argues (1978, p. 32): "Organic solidarity presupposed social justice and equality of opportunity, or it cannot function 'normally.'" Applying this logic to the relation between diversity and trust, Durkheim makes it highly plausible that certain governmental policies are better able to promote equality among all citizens, including immigrants, than other. Thus, in investigating the social consequences of diversity on trust, from a Durkheimian perspective, it is unthinkable to investigate the social consequences of increasing diversity without keeping track of the different national regimes might be better able than others to generate trust in diverse societies. While Durkheim and its students have underspecified specific policy options, the trust-literature has embraced so-called universal policies in the generation of trust (cf. Chapter 3 and Chapter 9). It needs no comment that the link between such regimes of migrant integration and trust in diverse societies is among the aims of this dissertation.

Chapter 2

Measuring and Analyzing Generalized Trust across European Countries

The advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every crevice and cranny of human life: the economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable (Mill, 1848, p. 131).

1. Introduction

Social cohesion in contemporary complex and diverse societies cannot be properly understood without a reference to generalized trust, as argued in preceding Chapter 1. Trusting the generalized other enhances cooperative action, reduces transaction costs and facilitates the flow of information (Putnam, 2000). This thin type of trust is considered to be the chicken soup of society and entails healthy and positive effects for it (Uslaner, 2002). However, in the search for an appropriate operationalization of the dependent variable of interest, i.e. social cohesion by means of generalized trust, next to theoretical considerations, also empirical and methodological arguments need to be taken into account. It needs to be assessed whether the indicators that are at hand for measuring generalized trust are valid and reliable for comparative research.

Various authors, already dating back to the 19th century, have questioned to what extent trust as such can be measured and investigated in a valid and reliable manner.⁷ Indeed, both trust in itself but also its correlates need to meet scientific standards that are common in attitudinal research. Moreover, concerning the investigation of trust in a comparative perspective, additional cross-national methodological considerations that are not apparent in within-country research settings also need to be reflected upon. The aim of this chapter is therefore to survey the methodological challenges that are present in this comparative research design into explaining generalized trust.

⁷ The content of this chapter is reflected in parts of the following publications: Hooghe et al (2009), Hooghe & Reeskens (2007), Meuleman & Reeskens (2007), Reeskens & Hooghe (2007, 2008).

In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss the validity of the operationalization of generalized trust for survey research. In this section, the extent to which the classic survey items on generalized trust actually measure what they claim to measure is investigated (Messick, 1995). To have a clear insight into this issue of validity, the research outcomes that target the three classic types of validity will be summarized, namely (1) content validity (Carmines & Zeller, 1979) – do the classic survey items represent all facets of the concept of generalized trust? – (2) construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) – do differences in response scales lead to varying regression outcomes of covariates do better discriminate among respondents? – (3) an additional test of measurement validity will consist out of a correlate between trust with other items that are supposed to measure trust in unknown others.

Second, after assessing the validity of the generalized trust questions, I will determine which cross-national survey data has the most valid trust measurement at its disposal. By reviewing the comparative social survey data sets that are currently available, arguments are provided that the ESS (Jowell et al., 2007) provides the most valid measurements. Therefore, in the second section of this chapter additional attention will be paid to this comparative survey project, how it has been established, its rationale, and give an overview of the participating countries in this survey project. Next, there will be a specific focus on the efforts that have been done to reduce various types of error that may be present in various stages of the survey design and fieldwork in this cross-national survey (Jowell, 1998; Stoop et al., 2002).

Third, managing error during the processes of survey construction and data gathering does not necessarily mean that there is no cross-national bias present in the final survey data set. Predominantly with regard to cross-national attitudinal research, additional tests for potential forms of bias need to be performed (Meuleman, 2009). First, with regard to the cross-cultural measurement equivalence of generalized trust – does trust have the same underlying latent structure across countries – a thorough investigation needs to take place (Mullen, 1995; Harkness et al., 2003). A second type of bias may be differential nonresponse bias (Couper & De Leeuw, 2003) meaning that different response rates across countries may induce an additional bias in the generalized trust outcome. Third, the analysis technique that will be applied, multilevel analysis (Hox, 2002; Gelman & Hill, 2006), will be discussed together with its limitations with regard to group level sample size (Kreft, 1996; Meuleman & Billiet, 2009). Performing multilevel analysis moreover has similar limitations compared with regular regression, like for instance outliers that may hamper regression parameters. This type of bias will also be discussed and how to cope with it.

2. The Validity of the Operationalization of Generalized Trust

The issue of validity must be at the core of every social science research project. According to Messick (1995, p. 741), validity can be described as “an overall judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of interpretations and actions on the basis of tests scores or other models of assessment.” According to this definition, the assessment of validity must be high on the research agenda of quantitative strategies since the analysis of survey questions leave little room for interpretation while the actual psychological rationale of the respondents is more difficult to assess (Zaller, 1992; Tourangeau et al., 2000). Also the reference to action in Messick’s definition is especially at the core of research into attitudes in general, and generalized trust specifically, namely to what extent the relation between the trust-attitude is also expressed in actual behavior – are those who express to be trusting also the ones who engage in this action? In this section, a considerable attention will be paid to the validity – concept, criterion and construct – of the classic generalized trust questions.

Rosenberg has developed the classic set of generalized trust indicators in 1956 in an investigation to disentangle the relation between misanthropy – “faith in people” (p. 690) – and political orientations. The misanthropy scale Rosenberg developed consisted out of the following five indicators which are, according to the analysis of the ‘coefficient of reproducibility’ (92 percent), internally reliable:

- Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say that you can’t be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about that?
- Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others or more inclined to look out for themselves?
- If you don’t watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.
- No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.
- Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.

This scale has served as a source of inspiration for other social surveys across the globe. Over the last four decades, the first three items out of the Rosenberg five item scale have been questioned repeatedly, of among the first times in the 1972 US General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis & Smith, 2006), but has also appeared in for instance the cross-national World Values Survey (WVS) project (Inglehart, 1994). The question wording changed slightly compared with Rosenberg’s misanthropy-scale. To be more precise, the exact phrasing has been⁸:

⁸ From this point on, these three specific items will be discussed intensely throughout this chapter. Consequently, when I refer to the ‘classic generalized trust questions’ or the ‘GSS trust questions’, I actually point to the ‘peopletrust’, ‘peoplefair’ and ‘peoplehelp’ questions.

- Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? ('peopletrust')
- Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? ('peoplefair')
- Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? ('peoplehelp')

Together with the boom in the social capital literature, of which generalized trust has been recognized as the component tapping its cultural dimension (Putnam, 1993), accordingly the concept has gained considerable attention in social and political science research (Nannestad, 2008). Consequently, issues regarding the validity of the trust measures have been questioned extensively (Glaeser et al., 2000; Uslaner, 2002, 2008b; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2007, 2008; Soroka et al., 2005; Sturgis & Smith, 2008). In this section of this chapter, a review of the current state of the art with regard to the validity of the trust questions will be presented.

2.1. Content Validity

Content validity refers to “the extent to which an empirical measurement reflects a specific content of the domain” (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 20). Applying this type of validity to generalized trust, both the trust and the generalized component need to be assured. While I will elaborate some more on the generalized component later in this Chapter, i.e. when the construct validity of generalized trust is evaluated, the focus in this section is on the one hand on the discussion whether the classic trust questions actually measures trust or trustworthiness, and on the other hand on the dimensional structure of the latent generalized trust concept.


2.1.1. Trust or Trustworthiness?

One of the most intriguing questions regarding the content validity of generalized trust is self-evidently whether the classic GSS question encapsulates trust and not a different concept (Glaeser et al., 2000; Rotenberg et al., 2005; Sturgis & Smith, 2008). Based on two experiments, Glaeser and his colleagues arrive to the conclusion that “standard survey questions do not appear to measure trust” (2000, p. 841). Rather, they discovered that these trust questions rather tap one's trustworthiness. Thus, those people who were involved in the experiment did, in evaluating the trust question, not assessed the trust-level of the trusted but made rather a critical review of whether they as truster could be trusted. Given the stress both on trustworthiness and particularly on trust within the social capital literature, Glaeser and his colleagues (2000) are quite hesitant to throw away the so-called baby with the bathwater and argue in favor of the trust-items. Nevertheless, they do add that findings based on the classic trust questions need to be reinterpreted and re-examined.

Moreover, in the ongoing debate on the validity of the set of generalized trust questions, some scholars claim that these questions are more or less redundant and should be abolished for the research into the cultural component of social capital. This debate was mostly fuelled by Uslaner's inquiry into the moral foundation of trust (2002) in which he explains that trust is a stable attitude and "relatively unaffected by experience" (Stolle et al., 2008). Because of the stability of this attitude, Soroka et al (2005) propose more experience-oriented measurements for generalized trust, and more specifically questions whether one thinks that a lost wallet is returned (1) by someone who lives close to the respondent, (2) by a clerk of the respondents' local grocery store, (3) by a police officer, and (4) by a complete stranger. In testing the construct validity of the classic trust versus the wallet trust questions, Soroka and his colleagues (2005) find differential regression results that of course add to the ongoing debate on the validity of the classic questions.

Soroka and his colleagues (2005) found their inspiration for the wallet questions in the now already classic yet nonscientific experiment conducted by Reader's Digest (Bennett, 1995). In this experiment, which originally was conducted in the mid-1990s in 12 cities in the US but was also replicated in 20 cities across 14 Western European countries, several wallets per city were dropped in. All wallets contained 50 dollars in cash together with the phone number of its owner. In the US, most of the wallets, namely 9 out of 10, were returned in Seattle, while in Houston and Las Vegas, many wallets were kept by their respective finders. Across the globe, most of the wallets were returned in the Scandinavian countries while the least wallets were returned in East Germany, Italy and Czech Republic (Knack, 2001).

Despite the fact that the experience based approach to generalized trust, namely the wallet questions as have been proposed by Soroka and colleagues (2005), actually makes a lot of sense, i.e. the differential regression outcomes depending on the use of the classic generalized trust versus the wallet trust questions indeed pose concern on the construct validity of the generalized trust questions, correlational analysis on the Reader's Digest experiment may suggest that the concern may be exaggerated. In questioning to what extent the results of the nonscientific Reader's Digest wallets experiment corresponds to the generalized trust in the WVS, Knack (2001) correlated the number of returned wallets to the aggregated score of generalized trust in the WVS. He discovered that the correlation between the two is fairly high, namely .65. Moreover, Knack adds that this crude correlation coefficient increases when taking the potential spurious correlation of per capita incomes, meaning that it is far from easy to discard the classic generalized trust indicators as a valid measurement.

Figure 2. Correlation Between Returned Wallets and Generalized Trust

Source: Knack, S. (2001)

Thus, based on the evaluation of the classic set of trust questions, as has been proposed by Rosenberg in 1956, while under a profound scrutiny, in general population surveys, the items seem to measure what they aim to measure. Yet, many other issues regarding their validity are still unnoticed.

2.1.2. The Dimensionality of Generalized Trust

Another debate with regard to the content validity of generalized trust relates to the dimensional structure of the three survey items. More specifically, this controversy deals with the question whether generalized trust should be measured by one single indicator, i.e. the so-called 'peopletrust'-question, or by a factor scale composed out of the indicators 'peopletrust', 'peoplefair' and 'peoplehelp'. Currently, there is an ongoing debate on this topic, yet, a consistent stream of research outcomes that juxtapose the two opinions, namely one or three indicators, is absent. Therefore, until research outcomes are cross-validated, both opinions seem to be correct (or false).

On the one hand, Uslaner leads the group of scholars who argue in favor of analyzing only the 'peopletrust'-question. In "The Moral Foundations of Trust" (2002), he provides six arguments why this question should be preferred over a composite scale. The first argument simply refers to the phrasing: assuming that people are helpful is just not assuming that people can be trusted. To put it differently: on theoretical grounds, there is no reason to include fairness or helpfulness if one is interested in trust (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007). Second, Uslaner also noticed that there are issues with the fairness questions, inhibiting the use of a composite scale. Third, over time, the three items do not follow the same pattern. Fourth, the 'peoplefair' and 'peoplehelp' questions are, according to Uslaner, less stable than the 'peopletrust' question. Fifth, the 'peopletrust' question should be more beneficial for individuals than the other two

indicators, and Uslaner provides correlational analysis that this indeed is the case. In his last argument, Uslaner states that open ended questions have revealed that the three indicators are interpreted differently, i.e. the ‘peopletrust’ question is more interpreted in moral terms than based on experience.

On the other hand, while Uslaner has given many arguments for using only the ‘peopletrust’-question, the last argument can also be used to counter the argument. It is for instance known in scale construction that to measure an abstract concept, like for instance generalized trust, one need to rely on several indicators that may be interpreted differently but, in final, are expected to measure the same underlying latent concept, which can be demonstrated by means of data reduction techniques like factor analysis. Thus, while it may be the case that from a substantial point of view, the three indicators are differently interpreted, if statistical analysis demonstrate that the three indicators share considerable levels of communality, it can be expected that they do measure the same underlying concept (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008; Zmerli & Newton, 2008). To add leverage to this discussion, the group favoring the use of a composite measure applies three different arguments.

First of all, single item measurements tend to be unreliable because “persons do not produce responses that are consistent over time” (Spector 1992, 4). Although Uslaner has shown that trust is quite stable over time (2002), individual responses in general are expected to vary over time. Therefore, using multiple indicators to survey a latent construct might reduce this temporal variance. Second, single-item measurements lack precision and consequently tend to be unreliable, as for cognitive reasons the number of answering categories is limited, and thus also the statistical power of that variable (Churchill, 1979; Peter, 1979). Using multiple indicators allows for the creation of continuous measurement scales, thus allowing for a more reliable measurement of the attitude under investigation. Third, single-item measurements lack sufficient scope (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996), because “many measured characteristics are broad in scope and not easily assessed with a single question” (Spector, 1992, p. 4). Given the conceptual and theoretical complexity of an attitude like generalized trust, in this case too it is highly questionable whether this attitude can be adequately measured using a single item measurement.

What is lacking in this debate are solid methodological arguments which become apparent in cross-national research designs, as is the case in this doctoral research, should be present. Already in within-country settings, multiple indicators seem to be the advice for abstract survey concepts (Johnson, 1998). This argument becomes even more sounding in a comparative research setting for which it is claimed that at least two, preferable three or more indicators should be the aim (Smith, 1988). Taken together, while I do share Uslaner’s concern about the substantive difference between the trust question, if there is sufficient evidence available that the three indicators are statistically different measuring the same underlying concept, as many authors argue (Brehm &

Rahn, 1997; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008; Zmerli & Newton, 2009) for the trust items in the GSS, it would be unreliable to only fall back on the ‘peopletrust’ indicator, certainly given methodological concerns articulated in comparative attitudinal research.

2.2. Construct Validity

The last type of validity that is under scrutiny is construct validity. More specifically, I will discuss how many response categories yield the highest predictive power. In most surveys, e.g. the WVS, trust is measured by a limited number of response categories, namely two or three, suggesting that respondents are either trusting or not trusting. To put it differently: trust is considered in the same manner as pregnancy: either you are, or you are not, but except extraordinary exceptions, there is no middle option. In fact, people do not trust everybody in every occasion. Therefore, conventional wisdom would argue that continuous scales always offer more information than a dichotomous yes/no-condition. On the other hand, if there is indeed a cognitive overload, measurement errors might render the 11-point scale almost useless. In general, despite Miller’s (1956) classic advice for ‘the magical number seven’, plus or minus two, various authors recognize that the number of response categories being offered to respondents cannot be fixed in a general formula, but is dependent upon the specific characteristics and variables that are being investigated (Green & Rao, 1970; Cox, 1980; Spector, 1992; Preston & Coman, 2000).

Three arguments can be raised against using dichotomous response categories. First, it has been argued that a limited number of answering categories simply do not allow respondents to label their attitude in a correct and coherent manner: “response degradation to three-point or two-point scales results in poor recovery of the original (synthetic) configuration” (Green & Rao, 1970, p. 420). The second form of criticism deals with the statistical analysis of the scales. Reliability analysis has shown that the internal consistency of scales with few items tends to be rather low. In general, the discriminatory power of scales with few answering categories is also lower than that of more elaborated scales (Preston & Colman, 2000, p. 11). Third, dichotomous answering categories can also lead to respondent dissatisfaction, as the respondent has the feeling that his or her feelings and opinions cannot be adequately expressed using a simple dichotomy. In an evaluation study, dichotomies “were rated extremely unfavorably on the extent to which they allow the respondents to express their feelings adequately” (Preston & Colman, 2000, p. 12). Respondents themselves prefer five or seven answering categories, echoing Miller’s remarks about the ‘magical number seven’: “It is ironic that the magic number seven plus or minus two appears to be a reasonable range for the optimal number of response alternatives” (Cox, 1980, p. 420).

On the other hand, recently, Uslaner (2009a) has argued in defense of only two response categories as is present in the WVS. His argument is straightforward: a continuous measurement contains too much response categories and therefore makes it

for individual respondents too complex to place themselves on this scale. With eleven response categories, people do not seem to choose for the extreme options since they, on the one hand do not trust all the people all the time, or on the other hand only trust a small number of people even if they are not very trusting in general. For this reason, people tend to clump in the middle (Uslaner, 2009a). Indeed, convincing evidence has been given that clumping may be the present and, more importantly, that this is phenomenon is more common in distrusting societies, which provides additional leverage for the point Uslaner would like to make.

However, considerable evidence regarding which of two alternatives works best – the two response categories or continuous response scales – has been given by Hooghe and Reeskens (2007) after investigating the Belgian Youth Survey (Hooghe et al., 2006), in which the ‘peopletrust’ and ‘peoplehelp’ with both alternative sets of response categories have been offered, i.e. the dichotomous response categories in the first half of the survey, and the eleven categories option in the second half. To test for the validity of the items, they were both independently as well as scale-wise (i.e. scales were constructed of respectively the dichotomous and continuous measurements) correlated with a number of theoretically relevant covariates. Looking at the results of this test of construct validity, the dichotomous ‘peopletrust’ in itself, as has been offered in the WVS, works remarkably well. Nevertheless, in a scale, the continuous response categories outperformed the dichotomous one. Thus, as already indicated, scholars interested in attitudinal research should refrain from measuring trust with a single item. As the basic literature on scale analysis would predict, measurement errors on the various items cancel each other out, and the end results is a well-balanced and performative scale.

Thus, when measured appropriately (in this case: with two items with an 11-point scale) many significant effects on and of generalized trust have been detected, while a similar scale based on dichotomous coding did not lead to similar significant effects. Therefore, with regard to the construct validity of the trust questions, it seems that at least two indicator variables and eleven response categories lead to the best measurement of generalized trust.


2.3. An Additional Test of Measurement Validity

While issues related to the content and construct validity are quite frequently articulated, it is less well investigated to what extent generalized trust correlates with a construct that is closely related to it. In his seminal ‘Moral Foundations of Trust’, Uslaner (2002) argues that generalized trust is about having trust in strangers, about accepting people who are not similar to you into your moral community. Applying this kind of reasoning to an empirical relation, one might argue that generalized trust and tolerance towards rather marginalized groups in societies, like there are immigrants, homosexuals and disabled, should be fairly high. Given the widespread availability of anti-immigrant

attitudes in social science surveys – i.e. opinions about those groups that from a social, legal and cultural point of view are most distant from us – we could expect that generalized trust and this out-group tolerance should correlate considerably. Given the interest into the level of measurement validity of generalized trust, one might therefore ask to what level generalized trust actually reflects accepting others into our moral community; or to put it differently, this assessment relates to the question how ‘generalized’ generalized trust is. It is indeed highly assumable that people do not trust everybody in every occasion (Nannestad, 2008).

Recently, Nannestad (2008) has empirically tested how inclusive the Danish are towards minority groups by investigating the relation between generalized trust and tolerance towards those groups. Of the immigrant population, slightly less than 50 percent of the respondents indicated that they trust most of the people; however, within this group of generalized trusters, slightly less than eight percent indicated that they don’t trust the Danes while ten percent doesn’t trust other immigrants with the same ethnic background. Contrary, among the native population, slightly more than 80 percent has been responded affirmatively on the generalized trust question while, within this group, about 20 percent did not trust immigrants. In general, it seems that the correlation between generalized trust and tolerance towards other groups is quite high, however, there seem to be limitations: according to the Danish data, individuals are conditional with regard to who they trust in which occasion.

Figure 3. Canonical Correlation between Generalized Trust and Tolerance towards Immigrants



Source: ESS 2006. Weighted with a combined $dweight$ and $pweight$.

To cross-validate Nannestad’s findings on the radius of generalized trust (2008), generalized trust is correlated with tolerance towards immigrants, obtained from the 2006 wave of the ESS (see further for more information on this survey). Applying canonical correlational analysis (Figure 3), which enables for controlling for measurement error present in the items, the correlation between the three items of generalized trust and positive attitudes towards immigrants is about .29, which is in line with Nannestad’s findings in Denmark, namely that the overlap between generalized trust and tolerance towards other is fairly high – a correlation coefficient of almost .30

is quite high in attitudinal research. Yet, the correlation coefficient also shows that generalized trust is different from tolerance towards immigrant groups.

3. Questioning Generalized Trust across Europe

As I have shown, several issues against the validity of the generalized trust question, as based on Rosenberg misanthropy scale (1956), can be raised. Yet, a profound investigation into the validity of the trust questions seems to show that trust in the generalized other can be measured accurately. Therefore, in choosing the appropriate cross-national survey instrument to measure generalized trust across countries, the results of this validity test of generalized trust need to be incorporated; i.e. trust measured by at least two indicators and preferable eleven response categories. When directing to the available high-level standards cross-national data sets that offer a sufficient number of European countries, one can, currently, point to about four major data sources, namely the World Values Survey (WVS), the Eurobarometer 223 (EB223), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the European Social Survey (ESS). In this section, I will overview them and elaborate on the ESS that seems to offer the most reliable measurement of generalized trust.

3.1. Which Cross-National Sets to Choose?

First of all, the WVS has, within the generalized trust literature, been regarded as a benchmark. The WVS is a survey program that has been conducted in more than 50 countries about every 10 years since 1980 (Inglehart, 1996). Since its first wave, the classic ‘peopletrust’ question has been taken up. Given the boom in the social capital literature, and consequently, in the concept of generalized trust, the WVS has been used abundantly to predict variability in cross-national variations in trust (Uslaner, 2002; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2008). However, what have been widely neglected in this respect are the methodological remarks from preceding section, namely the fact that at least two items and eleven response categories are preferred. In the WVS, only ‘peopletrust’ has been questioned with only two response categories, namely ‘can be trusted’ and ‘cannot be too careful’.

Second, the Eurobarometer has recently gained access into the trust literature (Gesthuizen, van der Meer & Scheepers, 2009) for its social capital module in the Special EB223 survey (TNS Opinion & Social, 2005), which has been conducted in 2004 in about 25 countries. Also generalized trust has been questioned in this ‘Social Capital’-module; however, not in the format that is preferred, i.e. the EB223 only has questioned the ‘peopletrust’-question and not the ‘peoplefair’ and ‘peoplehelp’-items. Also regarding the number of response categories, EB223 has imitated the answer categories of the General Social Survey, namely ‘can be trusted’, ‘cannot be too careful’ and ‘depends’.

The third cross-national data set that is widely analyzed is the ISSP. This survey program is carried out every year in about 40 countries, however, each year covering another topic. The 2004 wave of the ISSP has been framed around ‘Citizenship’ (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 2004) and in this questionnaire, the ‘peopletrust’ item was questioned. In line with WVS and EB223, the two other trust items are missing. The minor advantage of the ISSP over the WVS and the ESS is the presence of four answer categories instead of three. Nevertheless, given the absence of at least two indicators and a continuous response scale, this survey project also lacks the valid measures I am aiming for.

Fourth, the ESS (Jowell, 2007) is a comparative research project that has been established recently, i.e. its first wave has been carried out in 2002 and its access into the social science community is growing every day. Nevertheless, since it’s founding in 2002, this survey program that is carried every two year in more than 20 countries has questioned generalized trust by means of the set of three GSS trust questions. More specifically, all three trust-questions, namely ‘peopletrust’, ‘peoplefair’ and ‘peoplehelp’ are available. Moreover, the WVS, the EB223 and ISSP have limited response categories while the ESS offers a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 10. For this reason, the ESS seems to meet the criterions concerning the measurement of trust.

Table 1. Comparing Cross-National Datasets

	World Values Survey	Euro-barometer	International Social Survey Programme	European Social Survey
# Items	1 (0/1)	1 (0/1)	1 (0/1)	3 (1/1)
# Resp. cat	2 (0/1)	3 (0/1)	4 (0/1)	11 (1/1)
# Countries	60 (1/1)	25 (0/1)	38 (1/1)	25 (0/1)
Score	1/3	0/3	1/3	2/3
Rank	2	4	2	1

Note: The data between brackets represent a scoring based on the best practices: i.e. three trust measurements which are offered with a continuous response scale. Regarding the number of countries, the Kreft 30/30-rule (1996) has been kept in mind, meaning that at least 30 countries need to be present.

However, reliability lies not only in the quality of the data but also in the sample size, as will be shown later. For this reason, there is a trade-off: the WVS offers about 60 countries while the ESS is limited to only about 25 countries, and therefore the WVS adds significantly to the statistical power of the analysis. On the other hand, the trust measure combined with only two response categories leads to a comparative disadvantage compared with the ESS. While every choice entails its consequences, I prefer to continue with the analysis of the ESS as data source for the reason that this data set provides me with the best tools to manage various types of error that stem from offering three trust questions with continuous response scales to the respondents

(see further). In investigating the conditional effects of diversity on generalized trust, each indicator needs to be as reliable as possible, and it is clear that the WVS does not reach the ESS standards with regard to measuring trust. As I will show, the fact that only 20 to 25 countries are involved in the ESS limits statistical power, but this limitation can be handled.

3.2. Introducing the European Social Survey

The choice for the ESS as source of information covering generalized trust is well considered. The main reason is the valid measurement of generalized trust but as I will show in this section, the other important criterion relates to the effort to harmonize and regulate all stages in the survey and fieldwork design.

3.2.1. History of the ESS

The history of the ESS cannot be distinguished from a current upsurge into constructing composite indicators to monitor societal progress. For instance, the OECD has introduced the project “Measuring the Progress of Societies” (OECD, 2008b), in which the organization looks at the construction and evolution of social indicators that reach beyond classic economic benchmarks. The indicators that thus far have been used as benchmarks relate predominantly to the socioeconomic sphere, like the GDP per capita indicator for national wealth, Gini for income inequality, literacy rates, infant mortality rates; also with regard to the sociopolitical sphere, many indicators have been pushed to the fore, like the Freedom House Indicator to measure political rights and civil liberties, Transparency Corruption Index as an indicator for corruption, and the Kauffmann indicators for good governance (Norris, 2009). Under impulse of social scientists, many national governments and inter- and supranational organizations have discovered that the current set of indicators is quite limited to measure progress of societies.

To monitor social progress, national governments nowadays look more into the direction of individual attitudes and behavior. Largely inspired by Putnam’s research into the effects of networks and norms of trust and reciprocity on democratic performance of societies (1993), international organization have amended the research agenda with a range of attitudinal and behavioral indicators to compare countries on their prosperity. While the WVS was the first large scaled survey project that has been available for this purpose and also the ISSP and the Eurobarometer have a longstanding tradition in questioning residents across countries, many social scientists were struggling with the limitations of these surveys (Jowell, 1998).

Most of these comparative disadvantages have to do with the survey and fieldwork design of these cross-national attitudinal surveys which, self-evidently, may lead to a box of Pandora full of cross-national bias. As Jowell et al phrase it (2007, p. 1): “design

inconsistencies that would never be tolerated in important national studies have frequently been shrugged off in important comparative studies.” Without going into detail into these inconsistencies, looking at the investments into reducing various types of error (see further on in this chapter), one can deductively argue which the most important drawbacks of some cross-national survey projects were.

To counterbalance these inconsistencies, after a long deliberation that goes back to 1996 – when an agreement that a European version of the US General Social survey should be established was reached among an expert group – the so-called ‘Blueprint’-document has been established (ESF, 1999). In this document, the recommendations on how to investigate residents within European countries in an equivalent manner were described. This document was then distributed among all members and member organizations of the European Science Foundation (ESF). This document gained also access to many social scientists who were familiar with comparative values research. The collaboration between the ESS and ESF has been institutionalized since that moment, which is still apparent in the organization of the study. The core activities of the ESS, like the organization of the uniform survey instrument, the warehousing of the data, and so on, are funded by the ESF while the national fieldwork has, largely, been subsidized by national science foundations. In its initial stage in 2002, 22 countries participated in the ESS and this number rose to about 25. To honor the innovations in comparative measurement (see further in this Chapter), the ESS has been awarded the Descartes Prize.

According the Central Coordinating Team, the ESS has three aims. First of all, it wants to “monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values within Europe and to investigate how they interact with Europe’s changing institutions” (Jowell et al., 2007). As such, the ESS has embodied in its core the fact that its aim is to constitute a time-series of cross-sectional surveys that in the long run can be analyzed and be correlated with institutional changes across European countries. The second aim of the ESS is to contribute to the methodology of cross-national research. Indeed, comparative values research entails a distinct methodology that is continuously under thorough theoretical, statistical and empirical scrutiny. Consequently, my research cuts in the middle of some ongoing debates, for instance on the use of multilevel analysis. Third, the last aim of the ESS is to invest in the development of social indicators. This research has explicitly pushed generalized trust at the fore, which is considered to be essential for diverse societies to be considered as cohesive. Nevertheless, the question modules that are present within the ESS allow for a thorough test of social attitudes; i.e. an assessment of the variability in these indicators can be made, just as a thorough inquiry into its determinants and its effects.

3.2.2. Mixed and Rotating Modules

The in-depth analysis of these social indicators has been made possible by the dual design of the survey, which is also one of its most important substantial strengths. More precisely, the ESS consists first of all out of four fixed modules that are questioned every two years and allow for long-term trend analysis. The first fixed module deals with questions about media issues and social or generalized trust. The second one deals with issues regarding politics, like political interest, voting behavior party affiliation and socio-political orientations. The third fixed module taps attitudes and behavior towards subjective well-being, social exclusion, religious involvement, perceived discrimination and identity. Last but not least, the fourth module is the so-called ‘socio-demographic respondent characteristics’, asking questions with regard to one’s sex, age, employment status and household composition. Since generalized trust is taken up in the core of the questionnaire, in the near future, longitudinal trends in changes in trust can be analyzed.

The strength of the ESS is, next to the fixed modules, also exemplified in the rotating modules. The aim of these modules is to provide in a cross-sectional in-depth cross-national analysis on selected topics. Every two years, there is room to cover two topics in these rotating modules. In the 2002 wave, these two rotating modules dealt with attitudes towards immigration, immigrants and asylum, as well as civic involvement. In 2004, health and care and the economic morality were covered in the rotating modules. The 2006 rotating modules questioned first of all issues regarding the timing of life, like for instance the appropriate age for sexual intercourse, and second individual well-being and satisfaction with life and work. The 2008 questionnaire has taken up issues regarding ageism and welfare attitudes in its rotating modules. The Central Co-ordination Team has already expressed its ambition to repeat some of the rotating modules in a later phase, also to monitor important attitudinal changes across time.

3.2.3. Managing Error

The cross-sectional but also longitudinal analysis of the social indicators is only possible if potential forms of bias are under control. Indeed, a cross-national survey project can be as reliable as the best national survey projects if it meets rigor methodological standards; therefore, it may come as no surprise that the Descartes Prize has been awarded to this survey project. In various stages of the survey design and fieldwork, error can be present. Nevertheless, the Central Coordination Team of the ESS has done many efforts to manage four common errors that may hamper cross-national research, namely coverage errors, sampling errors, measurement error and questionnaire construction and nonresponse error. With regard to all of these issues, the ESS has made many technical documents available on its website.

First of all, error concerning coverage predominantly regards the definition of the population. There is an agreement within the Central Coordination Team that this definition is “all persons aged 15 years or older resident in private households within

the borders of the nation, regardless of nationality, citizenship, language or legal status” (Häder & Lynn, 2007, p. 34). It has been shown, however, that such a definition already poses challenges for certain countries. For instance, in the first stage of the ESS, Ireland and Italy had originally specific problems with the lower limit of 15 years because regularly they used the electoral registers as a sample frame (Häder & Lynn, 2007, p. 38). Also in Israel, to give another example, no respondents were surveyed in Jerusalem during the first wave for the reason that it was too unsafe (Häder & Lynn, 2007, p. 38). Nevertheless, having a clear description of the population has reduced the coverage error drastically.

Sampling errors are the second type of error that may cause a problem in cross-national survey research. More specifically, there are three possible sources of sampling error, namely concerning the sample size, the sample frame and the sample design. First of all, the Central Coordination Team has decided that a minimum effective sample size of about 1,500 respondents is desirable (Häder & Lynn, 2007, p. 49). Second, with regard to the sample frame, the various national teams have used different methods. While in most of the countries the national population registers were used, in some countries this was not the case, like for instance in Austria and Switzerland, where the telephone book has been used to sample respondents (Häder & Lynn, 2007, p. 39). Third, harmonization in the sample design has also been reached. Most of the countries have sampled their respondents by means of a stratified sample. Also in these processes, the ESS faces growing pains, like for instance the Austrian case that has improved its sample design over the years. Investments in the harmonization of the sampling stage therefore seem to reduce sampling errors.


The third type of error is measurement error. This type of error is at the core in about four work packages within the task division of the Central Coordination Team, namely translation, piloting and data quality, question reliability and validity, and event monitoring (Jowell et al, 2007). With regard to translation, there is an extensive TRAPD-procedure (Translation, Review, Adjudicator, Pre-testing and Documentation) that needs to assure that every single indicator that has been or will be questioned is free of translation errors (Harkness, 2007, pp. 83-84). With regard to piloting and data quality, for every wave, about 400 respondents within two test cases are questioned. The tests predominantly focus on the reliability of questions of the rotating module and results (Jowell et al., 2007). The question reliability and validity part forms a research discipline in itself, by which the validity of item scales need to pass rigorous multi-trait multi-methods test and cross-national equivalence tests (Saris & Gallhofer, 2007). Lastly, one of the extensive coverage of the ESS are the context information and the media-events. At the website of the ESS, for every country macro-level data and events that occurred during the fieldwork and are reported in the media are documented (Stoop, 2007a; 2007b).

The last type of potential error is the non-response (Billiet et al., 2007). Also in this domain, various measures were undertaken to manage unit nonresponse and missing item data. First of all, there has been decided that all fieldwork is carried out in a uniform manner, namely face-to-face. Second, before interviews are conducted, there has been an extensive interviewer training and also the interviewer variance has been a frequent topic for research efforts. Third, even after a uniform fieldwork and interviewer training, there are still different response rates across countries (see further on). To investigate whether these differential response rates affect the quality of the data, also an extensive procedure has been set-up. While I will elaborate more on this procedure later in the section on differential nonresponse bias, the additional contact form that provides information on the procedures the respondents have been contacted provide important information whether respondents are cooperative or reluctant, which is an important distinction to have an insight into nonresponse.

3.2.4. The 2006 Wave of the European Social Survey

In this doctoral research into the conditional effects of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust, the 2006 wave of the ESS will be analyzed (ESS Data Archive, 2008). This survey has been carried out in 25 countries between the 32nd week of 2006 and the 12th week of 2007. Since Latvia and Romania have no information available about the respondents' design weights, these countries are left out of the analysis. As such, a data set has been provided containing roughly 43,000 respondents in 23 countries or about 1,870 respondents per country. Figure 4 shows the 23 countries that are present in the 2006 wave, thus excluding Latvia and Romania.

National deviations in the data have been documented thoroughly on the website of the ESS. To give but one example, educational degree is the most deviant variable across the national samples; however, in the pooled data file, the ESS has tried to add a cross-cultural alternative to the data file; however, this equivalent is not available for all ESS-countries. Therefore, in such occasions in which items clearly lack equivalence, alternatives for this educational attainment measure also need to be taken into account, as the next chapter will show.

Figure 4. Participating Countries in the 2006 Wave of the ESS

Note: For country labels, see Appendix C.

4. Methodological Issues in Cross-National Attitudinal Research

I have argued that one of the main arguments for opting for the ESS above all other available cross-national data sources has to do with the many efforts to manage as many as possible sources of bias that may be present when setting up the cross-national survey, as well as organizing and conducting the fieldwork. Nevertheless, it may be possible that potential sources of bias may be present and harm both the quality of the data as well as the results of the substantial analyses.⁹ With regard to the quality of the data, both the level of cross-cultural measurement equivalence of generalized trust and the potential differential nonresponse bias will be discussed. With regard to the analysis of the data, potential problems of parameter bias due to the multilevel analysis technique and bias due the analysis of data including outlier countries are summarized.

⁹ Many of these methodological issues have been addressed thoroughly in the doctoral dissertation of Bart Meuleman (2009), who was involved in the Interdisciplinary Research Project on 'Diversity and Social Cohesion', of which this doctoral project was also part of.

4.1. Cross-Cultural Measurement Equivalence

The first methodological issue involved in doing cross-national quantitative research concerns the fact that the concepts under investigation need to be culturally equivalent (Mullen, 1995). If generalized trust is routinely used in cross-cultural and comparative research, self-evidently we have to be confident that this concept is being measured in a reliable manner across cultures and languages. Despite the fact that the concept of generalized trust has been used abundantly in international social capital and social cohesion research (Putnam, 1993; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007), the technical aspects of its measurement are seldom questioned. Nevertheless, in comparative perspective, many issues can be raised against the classic trust questions.

Indeed, the validity concerns that were raised for the regular trust questions may exacerbate in a cross-national research setting. When looking at the “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful?”-item, to start with, as researchers, it is difficult to assess who the respondent in every country has in mind when one thinks about “most people”. Does this refer to people whom one encounters in a day-to-day setting, or rather to a much broader general population (Stolle, 1998)? And what does this mean across countries in which population differences may be different. Others have argued that the concept of trust too, needs to be qualified according to the setting and the specific transaction (Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002); since it is known that the country affects generalized trust to a considerable extent (Uslaner, 2002; Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009). Finally the concept of “careful” might be just as problematic in a comparative design, as ‘carefulness’ might mean something else for an Italian who has grown up in the shadow of the Sicilian mob compared to a Scandinavian who is far less familiar with corruption. For this reason, it needs to be assessed whether generalized trust has the same dimensional structure across countries.

4.1.1. Assessing Cross-Cultural Measurement Equivalence

To assess whether generalized trust has the same dimensional structure across nations, it is necessary to investigate the cross-cultural equivalence of the three-item generalized trust scale in ESS (Johnson, 1998; Cheung & Rensvold, 2000; King et al., 2004; Cheung et al., 2006). Following the literature on this topic, five different levels of measurement equivalence can be distinguished (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, pp. 80–81). The first, basic level of measurement equivalence is configural invariance, referring to the fact that the measurement instrument shows the same pattern of salient and non-salient loadings across nations (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, p. 80).

The second level of invariance is the metric one, meaning that factor loadings for the different items are equivalent across the various countries being investigated. Only if metric invariance is assured, scores on the items and on the scale can be compared in a cross-national manner (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, p. 80). In that case, an

increase of one unit in the latent variable has the same meaning in all investigated nations (Meuleman & Billiet, 2006, p. 4).

Scalar equivalence is the third, and more demanding aspect of measurement equivalence. Configural and metric equivalence are not sufficient to ensure a valid comparison of means across nations; scalar equivalence is the necessary prerequisite to compare means cross-nationally. Meredith (1995) already demonstrated that an item can measure the latent variable with equivalent metrics in different groups (i.e. metric equivalence), while the scores on that item can still be systematically biased. Therefore, scalar equivalence needs to be tested. While factor loadings are kept constant across groups to establish metric invariance, the scalar equivalence test is even stricter as intercepts are constrained across groups as well.

Tests could even be made stricter, by testing the invariance of factor variances across groups. A fifth and final level of measurement equivalence is error variance invariance, referring to the occurrence of equivalent levels of measurement error across all countries (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, p. 80). In theory, all five of these levels of measurement equivalence should be tested, but it is clear that in practice this kind of perfect comparability can never be reached in real-life comparative research (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, p. 81). To ensure a sufficient level of validity of cross-cultural research it is not really necessary to meet the fourth and fifth criterion. If we want to compare country-specific means of a concept, however, at least the first three levels of measurement invariance should be the aim. Since the configural invariance should not pose a problem for the three closely related generalized trust questions, the main concentration is on the level of metric and scalar equivalence. If the metric and scalar equivalence of the three-item generalized trust scale across European countries can be demonstrated, it is clear that this latent variable can be used safely in cross-cultural research across the continent (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998).

Since the scalar and metric invariance models are at the center of cross-national research, I will test the cross-national measurement equivalence of these three items using multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (Byrne et al., 1989; Rensvold & Cheung, 1998; Billiet, 2003) using the Mplus-software (Muthén & Muthén, 2006). The mathematical LISREL-presentation of the multiple group test is represented in formula (1) and (2) (Meuleman & Billiet, 2006):

$$x_j^g = \tau_j^g + \lambda_j^g \xi^g + \delta_j^g \quad (1)$$

In this equation, each indicator x_j^g is modeled as a regression function of latent factor ξ^g with intercept τ_j^g , factor loading λ_j^g and stochastic error term δ_j^g . The national group membership is indicated by superscript g .

As mentioned above, for testing scalar equivalence, the factor loadings and intercepts need to be constrained across the groups. This can be represented as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \tau_j^1 \\ \lambda_j^1 \end{bmatrix} = \dots = \begin{bmatrix} \tau_j^g \\ \lambda_j^g \end{bmatrix} \quad (2)$$

To test the fit of the multiple group structural equation models, I will rely on three different fit indices (Bollen, 1989; Bollen & Long, 1992). The first, rather basic test statistic is the chi-square score. It has to be remembered, however, that the chi-square test statistic is sensitive to sample size. Since cross-cultural survey research uses large samples (the sample size in the 2006 wave is about 43,000), the chi-square test statistic is inaccurate as an indicator for the model fit. Therefore, I will supplement the chi-square test with two other fit indices. The first one is a comparative index comparing the fit of the tested model with the fit of the baseline model. More specifically, the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) is interpreted. The second one is an absolute index, examining the closeness of fit. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) will be used to test the fit of the model based on an absolute index.


4.1.2. Results of a Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis

The results of the multiple group tests are split up into three different parts. First of all, the dimensional structure of generalized trust is investigated. Second the most necessary level of equivalence is discussed, namely scalar equivalence. In the last section a less complex model, namely metric equivalence, will be reviewed.

4.1.2.1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis on Pooled Data

As emphasized previously, within the trust-literature, there is an ongoing controversy whether generalized trust should be measured with only one variable (Uslaner, 2002) – the classic ‘peopletrust’-indicator – or by multiple indicators (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008; Newton & Zmerli, 2009). Figure 5 depicts a confirmatory factor analysis of the three generalized trust indicators on the pooled 2006 wave of the ESS.

Figure 5. CFA on the ESS 2006 Generalized Trust Indicators



Note: The standardized solution of a confirmatory factor analysis (in Mplus) is plotted.

The results confirm what previous American research (Brehm & Rahn, 1997) has revealed, namely that the three classic ‘misanthropy’-questions do have lots in common – i.e. one could argue that the three questions indeed measure generalized trust. The indicator with the strongest factor loading is the ‘peoplefair’ indicator while the


indicator with the most error is the ‘peoplehelp’ one. Nevertheless, given the strong correlation between the three variables, the use of a composite scale should be advised.

4.1.2.2. Scalar Equivalence Test

Although the use of the three trust-indicators is preferred, the question still remains whether the same underlying latent structure is present across all countries in the 2006 wave of the ESS. In this phase of the research, the scalar equivalence of the trust scale is tested, meaning that the factor loadings and intercepts are constrained across all groups. In its strictest interpretation, group specific means on generalized trust can only be compared if loadings and intercepts are the same across countries.

As Figure 6 shows, it is hard to defend the scalar equivalence of generalized trust across the 23 countries of the 2006 wave of the European Survey. While the TLI is with a value of 0.943 just slightly below the threshold of 0.95, the RMSEA is with a value of about 0.110 quite high. Predominantly Great Britain (the intercept of ‘peoplehelp’), Ireland (the intercept of ‘peoplehelp’), France (the intercept of ‘peoplefair’) and Austria (the intercept of ‘peoplehelp’) contribute significantly to the misfit of the model. It is, moreover, quite interesting how the English-speaking countries top this list, which stems to further research into deviances into the ‘peopletrust’-item. Nevertheless, predominantly the ‘peoplehelp’ question seems to be the most deviant indicator, although France also depicts problems with the ‘peoplefair’ indicator.

Figure 6. Scalar Equivalence Test of the Generalized Trust Questions




Note: Results indicate chi-square deviances per country after a scalar invariance test in Mplus.

4.1.2.3. Metric Invariance Test

Thus, in a strict sense, generalized trust cannot be referred to as a concept that does mean the same across all countries in the ESS. Nevertheless, one could argue that a test of equal intercepts is too strict and may rather easily induce too high levels of error. For this reason, the metric invariance test restricts only the factor loadings across all groups.

Figure 7. Metric Invariance Test of the Generalized Trust Questions



Note: Results indicate chi-square deviances per country after a metric invariance test in Mplus.

Figure 7 shows the results of the metric invariance test. The fit of the model increased significantly – the TLI satisfies classic structural equation modeling thresholds and also the RMSEA passes the strict tests. However, while the misfit contribution of most of the countries is rather small, Austria is quite deviant. Looking at the modification indices, there is also no single solution that may contribute to a better fit: according to these indices, both the ‘peopletrust’ as ‘peoplehelp’ factor loadings of the Austrian solution should be freed to lower the chi-square value.


4.1.3. How to Proceed?

The results of these equivalence tests are rather sobering. The multiple group analysis revealed that in its strictest interpretation, a latent means scale of three items is not scalar equivalent (the strongest form of measurement equivalence) across the ESS countries. Thus, applying a rather strict standard, it is not possible to compare the latent generalized trust means of the three items. However, it should be able to construct a means variable based on the satisfying metric equivalence of the trust items. What the

analysis furthermore has revealed is that the cross-cultural measurement equivalence seems to be of importance when conducting comparative research and that one cannot recommend measuring generalized trust with just a single item, as is often done in comparative research. Taking the many validity arguments into consideration, we can be quite confident that a single item does not provide us with a reliable measurement of generalized trust. The two-item GSS solution solves this problem to some extent, but self-evidently a three-item scale, as included in the ESS, allows for a more precise measurement. In the further empirical analyses based on the three item scale, it still is essential to keep this equivalence test into account, predominantly when anomalies for Austria are present since this country seem to miss a sufficient level of equivalence. Therefore, the remaining question is whether it is necessary to drop Austria or not. The trade-off with the power is quite huge: Austria is an interesting case for doing research on ethnic-cultural diversity. For this reason, Austria is included in the sample; nevertheless, if this case poses further anomalies, this decision might be recalled.

4.2. Differential Nonresponse Bias

It may not be forgotten that the ESS has proposed high standards with regard to managing nonresponse error (Billiet et al., 2007). With regard to unit nonresponse, the ESS Central Coordination Team aims at about 1,500 completed surveys. Also to achieve the aimed response rates – which is the rate of completed interviews by the eligible sample size (Biemer & Lyberg, 2003) – countries were asked to deliver response rates higher than 70 percent (Billiet, et al., 2007, p. 115). As Figure 8 shows, only three countries within the 2006 wave of the ESS were able to deliver these response rates, namely Poland, Portugal and Slovakia while the other 20 countries have considerable lower rates with France the worse student of the ESS-class with a response rate of slightly higher than 45 percent.

Figure 8. Response Rates in the 2006 European Social Survey

Source: ESS Data Archive (2008).

The question is, however, whether these differential non-response rates affect the quality of the data. It is widely known that non-respondents are not random – they have often characteristics that relate to the outcome of interest (Groves & Couper, 1998). Specifically for generalized trust, it can be expected that those respondents that score low on this attitude are in general also less integrated in their community, which makes that they are expected to be less easy to convince to participate in these social science surveys. Therefore, the hypothesis is that those who opt not to take part in social surveys have certain characteristics that more precisely relate to generalized trust, where the assumption is thus that those who do not participate will have lower levels of trust. From a methodological point of view, nonresponse bias within a certain sample, the following formula has been provided (Groves, 2006):

$$\text{Bias}(\bar{y}_r) = \left(\frac{M}{N}\right)(\bar{Y}_r - \bar{Y}_m) \quad (3)$$

In this formula, \bar{y}_r refers to the respondent mean in a sample of the target population, N to the number of units in the target population where M refers to the number of respondents in the target population, \bar{Y}_r and \bar{Y}_m refer to the population mean of respectively the respondents and nonrespondents. Consequently, nonresponse bias is caused by two mechanisms, namely the magnitude of the nonresponse and the difference between the response and the nonresponse mean. While equation (3) refers to one population, it can therefore be expected that nonresponse in multiple national populations might induce bias that might hamper cross-national analysis (Couper & De Leeuw, 2003). Indeed, based on thorough analyses of the first wave of the European Social Survey, Vehovar (2007) has already warned that trust is nonresponse is highly

dependent upon how trusting one is. In this section, a preliminary test of the differential nonresponse on generalized trust is performed.

As is evident, in large-scale data sets, information about the answer pattern with regard to generalized trust for nonrespondents is absent. Therefore, an alternative strategy to have an insight into the magnitude of nonresponse bias is followed. More specifically, the continuum of resistance model has been shown that reluctant respondents have more in common with nonrespondents (Voogt, 2004). Because the ESS has well documented information available on the contact procedure of every individual respondent (the so-called 'contact forms') (Billiet et al., 2005; Billiet et al., 2007), the cooperative respondents can be distinguished from the reluctant ones by means of their cooperative behavior after initial contact.

Based on three categories for survey cooperation, Table 2 shows that potential problems may be present in about four countries, namely Belgium, Cyprus, Netherlands, and Sweden. Predominantly Cyprus may cause a problem because the relation follows a linear pattern: cooperative respondents have higher levels of trust than those respondents which refusal has been converted after one attempt. However, this linear relation is absent for Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden, where the respondents with one successful refusal attempt have higher trust levels compared with cooperative respondents and respondents with more conversion attempts.

While technical measures have been proposed to limit the differential nonresponse bias, like post-stratified weights (Gelman & Carlin, 2002), scholars have argued that these kind of weights inflate the variances (Meuleman, 2009). Moreover, within-country analyses for Finland, Poland and Slovakia have also shown that post-weighting yields no different effects on the aggregate means levels of generalized trust (Blom, 2009). Together with the fact that, except for Cyprus, there is no linear pattern between cooperative and reluctant respondents, I opt not to take statistical methods into account to control for a potential differential nonresponse bias. Nevertheless, if Cyprus will show additional biases, it will be reconsidered whether this country will be taken up in the further sample.

Table 2. Generalized Trust Scores According to Refusal Conversion

Country	No refusal	1 refusal conversion attempt	More than 1 attempts	F-test
AT	5.565	5.393	5.372	1.78
BE	5.069	5.217	4.918	3.42*
BG	3.692	3.485	7.000	1.35
CH	5.934	5.956	5.843	0.30
CY	4.445	3.422	2.533	6.18**
DE	5.217	5.141	5.106	0.99
DK	6.759	6.862	6.841	0.53
ES	4.966	5.032	4.936	0.44
FI	6.379	6.491	6.363	1.64
FR	4.930	5.005	4.553	1.44
GB	5.629	5.591	5.531	0.51
HU	4.479	4.472	3.962	0.48
IE	5.721	5.662	5.713	0.18
NL	5.694	5.881	5.614	5.76**
NO	6.722	6.683	6.537	2.32
PL	4.109	4.213	4.374	1.12
PT	4.257	4.496	4.309	0.96
RU	4.230	4.029	4.323	0.89
SE	6.394	6.400	6.115	6.80***
SI	4.470	4.561	4.518	0.31
SK	4.345	4.448	4.619	1.00
UA	4.110	4.071	4.433	0.04

Note: Entries represent average trust scores per country based on being a cooperative respondent or on the times of attempts for refusal conversion. The associated F-test statistic for significant differences between at least two categories is also depicted. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. For country labels, check Appendix C.

4.3. Multilevel Analysis and Limited Number of Countries

The investigation into the conditional effects of diversity on generalized trust is a textbook example of the influence of contextual factors on individual outcomes. The analysis method that is quite apt to solve this kind of research question is multilevel analysis. In this section I will discuss the multilevel model and its limitations.

4.3.1. Introducing the Multilevel Model

The multilevel multiple regression model can be regarded as a member of the family of generalized linear models of which the single-level multiple regression model is also a member of. Multilevel modeling has recently become widespread in quantitative social and political science research (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002; Gelman & Hill, 2006; Hox, 2002). To start with, the regular ordinary least squares multiple regression model can be summarized as followed:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_1^n \beta_n x_{in} + e_i \quad (4)$$

In this equation, y is the outcome variable – in this research generalized trust – for each individual i . $\sum_1^n \beta_n x_{in}$ denotes the vector of n independent variables and their effect, with x_n the independent variable and β the effect parameter. For instance, x_1 may in my research be age for individual i , x_2 gender for individual i , and so on. The effect parameters β_1 and β_2 in this case then represent the increase in outcome y , i.e. generalized trust, when age increases with 1 year or when we want to look at the trust levels for women compared with men. In this equation, β_0 then is the so-called intercept or the average trust score when all independent variables have the value of 0. Since regression analysis regresses individual cases to an average trend line, error e_i expresses the distance of respondent i to the average trend line.

$$e_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2) \quad (5)$$

Within OLS regression analysis, one of the assumptions is that the residual terms e_i are normally distributed around a mean of zero and variance σ^2 . An additional assumption is that the error terms are independently distributed. However, in this cross-national research design on the conditional effect of diversity on generalized trust, this is not the case. It is known that respondents within a certain European country have more in common than they have in common with respondents from other countries. Consider four random respondents from the ESS: two Irish and two Hungarians. It is without any doubt that the two Irish will be quite independent from the Hungarians but to each other, they might have many things in common with regard to factors that determine the creation of the outcome variable, i.e. generalized trust, namely the country they live in. For this reason, multilevel analysis, which controls for the clustering of cases within nested data structures, like for instance respondents within countries, may be one of the recommended techniques. This model extends the OLS equation (4) as follows:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \sum_1^n \beta_n x_{ijn} + e_{ij} \quad (6)$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_1^m \gamma_{0m} z_{jm} + u_j \quad (7)$$

The first extension in (6) and (7) of this model compared with equation (4) is the introduction of subscript j , which refers to the ‘cluster’ the respondents are sampled in, i.e. countries of the ESS. The second extension is residual term u_j , which refers to the country residual term. What is important to denote is the random intercepts model, meaning that the intercept of generalized trust may differ from country to country. In equation (7), $\sum_1^m \gamma_{0m} z_{jm}$ denotes a vector of independent variables z and their regression coefficients γ_{0m} at the country level. Equations (6) and (7) summarize the regression model that will be at the interest of my research.

With regard to the individual and country level residual, the same assumptions as in formula (5) hold:

$$e_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_e^2) \quad u_j \sim N(0, \sigma_u^2) \quad (8)$$

The individual residuals are again assumed to have a normal distribution with a mean of zero and variance σ_e^2 while the country residuals follow a normal distribution around a mean of zero with variance σ_u^2 . Both variance terms are highly important with regard to the interpretation of multilevel models. σ_e^2 refers to the individual level variance or the within-country variance while σ_u^2 refers to the country level variance or the between-country variance. Under the assumption that both variances are independent, both variance components sum up to the total variance. Consequently, to investigate how much of the variance within the outcome variable generalized trust can be attributed to the country level, the so-called intra-class correlation can be calculated:

$$ICC = \frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma_e^2 + \sigma_u^2} \quad (9)$$

Despite many advanced extensions to the multilevel model, like for instance the random slopes model, for my research question, the fixed effects multilevel multiple regression model is the most suitable. First of all, it deals with the nested structure of the ESS and, second, the model enables to control for other country level predictors, which is not the case in for instance using the two-stage approach (Sides & Citrin, 2007; Meuleman et al., 2009). In this two-stage model, at a first stage individual level variability is explained by a large set of variables and the predicted outcomes are aggregated at the national level; in a second stage a country level covariate, like for instance the size of the immigrant population is plotted against the aggregated predicted outcome. Since research has shown that generalized trust heavily depends upon the context (Levi, 1996; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007), it is necessary to control for other potential factors that might influence the outcome of interest.

Even though this method is most appropriate for the research question, there are many drawbacks for using multilevel analysis in the case of the ESS. I will discuss two lively debates topics, namely the sampling method involved in the ESS and problems associated with the limited number of countries that are present in the ESS.

4.3.2. To Random Sample or Not To Random Sample

It may not be forgotten that in the end, a complex quantitative method like multilevel modeling relies on the basic principles of statistical modeling, namely statistical inference (Hox, 2002). By performing multilevel analysis, scholars would like to make general claims about the influence of for instance level-2 predictors on level-1 outcomes; or to be specific for this doctoral research, about country-level diversity on individual-level generalized trust.

The basic premise in statistical modeling is, however, that units are selected randomly (Agresti & Finlay, 1997). To give but one example, when scholars want to estimate the level of generalized trust within a country, they may opt to question every resident, for instance in a census based strategy. Every detected difference can then be interpreted as 'significant'. Contrary, these researchers can also decide to question only a limited number of respondents and extrapolate these findings to the general population using statistical tools. The core assumption to arrive at generalizable findings is that this limited number of respondents is randomly drawn from a sample frame that contains all persons of interest.

Moving from this individual level example to a higher level, the same kind of reasoning applies. In order to make generalizable claims about the occurrence of a certain phenomenon across countries, one has to choose between the options to investigate all countries or only a limited sample. Investigating the effects of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust, those limitations are self-evidently present. Looking at the ESS, this project is the result of the collaboration between various countries and can therefore be considered as a convenient instead of a random sample of European countries. Moreover, the 2006 wave of the ESS also does not consist out of EU member countries like Luxembourg, Italy, Greece and Czech Republic. Therefore, one can as well question whether it is possible to make generalizable claims on the relation between diversity and trust across Europe.

The dilemma whether multilevel analysis is appropriate using a convenient sample like the ESS has become a schism within the social sciences. One strand of the literature emphasize that it is difficult to impossible to make statistical inference based on multilevel analysis on a convenient sample. Predominantly educational scientists, who are used to sample students within schools, seem to adhere to this logic (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Goldstein, 1999). The other strand within the literature doesn't question this possible problem foremost out of practical considerations. The first practical consideration is that multilevel analysis on convenient samples nevertheless adds

significantly to the debate by providing a parsimonious model for comparative analysis for which, for a very long time, only a small number of countries were possible (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002; Bowers & Drake, 2005). Second, also at a higher level, variables might be included in which a certain level of error is present. Especially statistical models are able to take this measurement error into account.

Bringing all arguments together, I am in favor of the last strand of literature for the reasons that have been emphasized. The multilevel regression method has become increasingly accepted within social and political science studies. It should be taken in mind that thus far, comparative research has in general been conducted with a limited set of just two to three countries with as considerations either the ‘most similar’ or the ‘most different’ designs (Collier, 1991). By performing multilevel analysis on a convenient sample, one of the most important statistical assumptions may be neglected, but the power of the parsimoniousness of the model in combination with the intermediate number of countries is quite high.

4.3.3. Statistical Power under Decreasing Sample Size

Over the last decades, the leverage that comparative research has offered increased substantially with the introduction of cross-national datasets (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2004). While comparative research frequently focused on small-N, the availability of numerous cross-national data sets has made it possible to talk about intermediate-N (Rihoux, 2006). While most of the studies using intermediate-N samples tend to focus on a qualitative approach, the use of multilevel techniques to investigate the influence of the context on individual attitudes and behavior for a limited number of countries has become widespread (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002; Schyns, 2002; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Claes et al., 2009). However, as in any other statistical analysis, the determination of sufficient sample sizes is an important, methodological issue, having a crucial impact on the accuracy of the estimates and the power of statistical tests. The specific nature of multilevel data increases the complexity of this problem seriously as sample sizes at various levels should be considered (Afshartous, 1995).


There is a growing body of evidence on the topic of sample sizes in multilevel research. A notable conclusion from these power studies is that there exists no universal rule that determines sample size for every situation. Required sample sizes depend on many factors, of which the specific purpose of the research is a very important element. If the interest is principally in the parameters that do not vary across groups (i.e. fixed effects), accurate estimates could be obtained with as little as 30 groups (Kreft 1996; Maas & Hox, 2005). This inspired Kreft (1996) to formulate the 30/30 rule of thumb: a group sample size of 30 groups each consisting of at least 30 units is required. To obtain unbiased and stable estimates of cross-level interactions (Kreft, 1996) or random effects (Afshartous, 1995; Kreft, 1996) however, the group sample sizes should be considerably larger, and a 50/20 or even 100/10 rule is put forward (Kreft, 1996).

Various studies (Snijders & Bosker, 1993; Hox, 2002) suggest trade-off effects between sample sizes at different levels. Evidence has been provided that an increasing number of units per group, like for instance the ESS with an average sample size per country that exceeds 1500 respondents, can partially compensate for a decreasing number of groups. Nevertheless, the group sample size seems to be a more decisive factor than the individual sample size for obtaining accurate estimation (Hox, 2002; Maas & Hox, 2005). A small sample size was found to hamper estimation particularly in the case of small intra-class correlations (Hox & Maas, 2001), although more recent evidence qualifies this findings and argued that – depending on the parameters of interest and the complexity of the model – between 40 and 100 higher level units are required to obtain accurate estimates.

The studies cited show that it is impossible to formulate one general rule of thumb on required group sample sizes for multilevel analysis. Much depends on the specific research interests and the complexity of the model that is used. For estimating a model that contains random intercepts only, 40 groups would be the absolute minimum for obtaining relatively unbiased parameters. To guarantee sufficient power, however, 60 groups or more are to be preferred. These conclusions are in agreement with previous results derived from power studies (Reeskens & Meuleman, 2007) and simulation studies (Meuleman & Billiet, 2009). The consequences for this research on diversity and trust therefore seem to be that a strong focus on the power statistics is not the best way to proceed. These statistics tend to become unreliable for a small number of countries, like is the case for the ESS. Therefore, a more general focus on the direction of the effects will be given.

4.3.4. Outliers in Comparative Research

As is the case with multilevel regression analysis on an intermediate-N, meeting the regular regression assumptions must be one of the aims. One of the basic assumptions of the linear regression model is the detection of influential elements that have major effects on the estimation of the regression model – i.c. the slope of the effect parameter of diversity on generalized trust. Yet, as the literature shows, it is not easy to define an influential element. The small amount of literature on this topic defines an outlier as “an observation (or subset of observations) that appears to be inconsistent with the remainder of that set of data” (Barnett & Lewis, 1984, p. 4). Applied to our research, this means that it needs to be questioned which countries have a value on a specific diversity measure that is inconsistent with the other countries. In Figure 9, obtained from Sides and Citrin’s research into the effects of the size of the immigration population on immigrant prejudice across Europe (2007), Luxembourg may be considered as an element that has significantly leverage on the regression equation: the slope is expected to be less steep if Luxembourg would be removed out of the data.

Figure 9. Size of Immigrant Population against Anti-Immigration Sentiments

Source: Sides & Citrin, 2007, p. 495.

The definition of an outlier, as proposed by Barnett and Lewis, already depicts the problems that are involved in detecting outliers. Taking the “which appears to be” of the definition regarding influential elements into account, there is always somewhat subjectivity involved in this defining an outlier. One of the possibilities to detect outliers is the graphical representation. In the last decades, developments have made it possible to detect these influential elements more formally in order “to provide a means of assessing whether our subjective declaration of the presence of outliers in a particular set of data has important objective implications for the further analysis of the data” (Barnett & Lewis, 1984, p. 25). Since the interest in this research is mainly on the effects of diversity on trust, i.e. the effect parameters and not the intercept parameters, the main concern regards leverage elements – those elements that have a too strong impact on the slope of the regression, one of these more formal tests calculates “what the impact is of an observed value of the dependent variable of the observation i on the calculation of the predicted value of the same observation” (Welkenhuysen-Gybels & Loosveldt, 2002, p. 329). This leverage value, h_{ii} is expressed by the level of deviation of the values of a specific observation i on the independent variables from the means of these variables. In the case of a bivariate linear regression, this value can be calculated given the formula (Welkenhuysen-Gybels & Loosveldt, 2002, p. 329). The formula of the leverage value h_{ii} , as is represented in equation 10 below, is a variance function of the actual from the mean and the fitted value for the independent variable.

$$h_{ii} = \frac{1}{n} + \frac{(X_i - \bar{X})^2}{\sum_{j=1}^n (X_j - \bar{X})^2} \quad (10)$$

Given the fact that the sum of all leverage values is equal to the number of estimated regression parameters (p), a specific observation is considered as a leverage element if the leverage value of this observation is twice the mean of the leverage values:

$$h_{ii} > \frac{2p}{n} \quad (11)$$

Since I will analyze the leverage functions in the bivariate diversity-generalized trust relation on the aggregate scores of in most of the time 20 countries¹⁰, it can therefore be expected that a country can be considered a leverage element if the leverage value is greater than $2*2/20$, or 0.2. Research has shown that this rigid statistical procedure tends to depict more observation as a leverage value. Therefore, the recommendation is that the $2p/n$ -rule may not be applied too strictly but that observations with leverage values clearly greater than this threshold and greater than the leverage values of other observations should be considered as an outlier (Welkenhuysen-Geybels & Loosveldt, 2002, p. 330).

After the detection of outlier elements, the safest way to deal with it is to do the analysis with and without the influential elements. As Kruskal already suggested in a discussion paper (1960, p. 157): “I suggest that it is of great importance to preach the doctrine that apparent outliers should always be reported, even when one feels that their causes are known or when one rejects them for whatever good rule or reason.” Consequently, separate analyses on the data without the leverage values can yield different conclusions compared with analysis on the full data, which makes it important to conduct both.

5. Conclusion

While some authors claim that comparative quantitative research should be abolished and the historical method should be made more sexy to model complex cross-national phenomena (Kittel, 2006), performing a cross-national investigation into the effects of the context people live in on individual attitudes and behavior using a quantitative approach has become widespread. The use of complex statistical models for the analysis of cross-national survey data sets has exploded over the last couple of years. This boom is particularly apparent in explaining cross-national differences in generalized trust, there has been an upsurge (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2009; Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009). However, most comparative scholars seem to go by to the many type of bias that may be present in comparative attitudinal research. The aim of this chapter was to give an overview of the methodological challenges that are involved in investigating trust in a comparative research strategy.

¹⁰ In Chapter 6, in which this outlier function will be applied, deviances to this predetermined number of 20 countries will be discussed, and thus other specifications are implied.

No matter what topic social scientists are interested in, issues regarding the validity of the concepts under investigation must be dealt with before substantial analysis can take place. With regard to the validity of trust, there is a group of scholars who invest significant efforts in the research into the classic trust items, myself included. These argue that the classic trust-items as Rosenberg (1956) originally implemented are not valid for measuring trust in a valid and reliable manner. To give but a few examples, the classic trust question has been argued to measure one's own trustworthiness instead of assessment whether others are trustful. And we have also described that people are not inclined to trust just anybody at any occasion (Nannestad, 2008), which underpins the claim that generalized trust is not unconditionally trusting the unknown other. Furthermore, scholars need to be aware that when such issues concerning the validity of trust are raised, they may inflate significantly in comparative strategies.

Despite having been very critical towards the three classic trust items, this chapter has shown that we actually can be confident that variability in generalized trust can be investigated in a valid and reliable manner across countries using advanced multilevel multiple regression models, although some guidelines need to be kept in mind. It needs to be emphasized that my level of confidence in the comparability of the trust items is largely confounded to the ESS. This survey project has questioned generalized trust in such a manner that various forms of cross-national biases can be tested. By including three items and continuous response scales, which are not only classic methodological guidelines but are also particularly emphasized in comparative quantitative strategies, we can be sure that the cross-national bias, both induced by different meanings of the trust questions among the population or problems of questionnaire translation, as well as by differential nonresponse on the outcome, is somewhat under control.

The validity of the survey concepts in the ESS has, on the other hand, a considerable pay-off with regard to the further statistical analysis. The central analysis technique will be multilevel analysis by which the effect of country-level diversity on individual-level trust under control of relevant covariates can be modeled. Analysis on an intermediate-N, i.e. 20 to 25 countries, yield limitations, namely parameters may be biased and statistical Type II-errors may be induced, which means that certain effects, like of diversity on trust, may be present in reality while the number of countries are too limited to estimate this effect. For each country that is left out of the analysis, the statistical power drops. It is, also possible that in a group of only 20-25 countries, a country may behave so differently, i.e. as an outlier, that separate analyses without these countries is recommended over the aim of a sufficient number of countries. For this reason, I will in the empirical analysis pay more attention to the direction than to merely the significance of the effect.

As this chapter has demonstrated, investigating the conditional effects of diversity on trust entails a quite distinct methodology that is quite innovative for social and political science research; it is without any doubt that in the years ahead, a number of

refinements will be introduced, like for instance dealing with imputation at the group level or straightforward regression diagnostics for, to give but one example, outliers. Yet, at this moment, the multilevel method is the best method available to solve the puzzle whether diversity, under control of relevant individual and country characteristics, significantly lowers generalized trust across European countries, and whether regimes of migrant integration are able to buffer this assumed negative relation.

Chapter 3

Modeling Cross-National Variability in Generalized Trust: Establishing a Baseline Multilevel Multiple Regression Model

Why (...) did the fabric of American community life begin to unravel? (...) It is a classic brainteaser, with a *corpus delicti*, a crime scene strewn with clues, and many potential suspects. Moreover, as in Agatha Christie's 'Murder on the Orient Express', this crime turns out to have had more than one perpetrator, so that we shall need to sort out ringleaders from accomplices (Putnam, 2000, p. 184).

1. Introduction

Aiming at assessing the unique conditional impact of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust requires accounting for other possible factors that explain such cross-national differences. In other words, before the effect of diversity on trust can be modeled, those theoretically relevant characteristics that are expected to foster generalized trust among fellow citizens need in the first place to be empirically validated. Therefore, this chapter will disentangle individual and country level explanations for differences in generalized trust across the countries participating in the 2006 wave of the ESS. This step should result in a multilevel multiple regression model that will serve as a baseline to which the variables of interest concerning ethnic-cultural diversity and regimes of migrant integration can be added to.

The investigation into the determinants of generalized trust in this phase of the research is not simply a necessary undertaken to assess the unique conditional effect of diversity on trust in a later phase.¹¹ It is, as Putnam has described (2000, p. 184) a sociological 'whodunnit'-investigation into the causes the varying levels of generalized trust across countries. In this chapter, ringleaders, i.e. powerful trust-determinants, will empirically be separated from the accomplices, i.e. those whose impact is rather limited. As such,

¹¹ The content of this chapter is reflected in parts of the following publications: Hooghe et al (2009), Reeskens (2009).

the ringleaders will in a later phase be compared with the impact of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust to check whether diversity as such can also be categorized as a ringleader, accomplice or just a bystander that has been wrongfully accused.

In the past decade in which the research into the determinants of generalized trust has been investigated profoundly, several of these ringleaders have been detected. To a large extent, these causes can be categorized in three distinct theoretical strands. A first group of models explained that the roots of trust lie in everyday interaction (Putnam, 1993); as such, generalized trust is the result of socialization processes. A second model has emphasized that institutions create the conditions in which trust is expected to flourish or destroyed (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). In contrast with these two more sociological approaches towards trust, the third model has its origin in psychology by making the claim that trust is largely dependent upon personality traits (Uslaner, 2002; Reeskens, 2009). This chapter aims to evaluate the proposed sociological orientations towards generalized trust and will therefore discard the third psychological approach.

This empirical chapter builds on the methodological remarks regarding the cross-national investigation into trust. More specifically, it has been acknowledged that this specific research design – a multilevel investigation into the effects of the context on individual level attitudes – requires a distinct methodology. Not only will we become familiar with multilevel modeling and its interesting features, like the intraclass correlation, also the disadvantages of the method will become apparent throughout this chapter. Indeed, since multilevel regression analysis is the preferred analysis technique, limitations inherent when using this technique need to be remembered, especially with regard to group sample size. While group level sample size is not an issue for individual level effects, yet, at the national level, it is unviable to control for an extensive set of variables. For this reason, a selection of two contextual variables out of a wide range of country covariates will be considered.

Before turning to the empirical analyses of the individual and country level determinants of generalized trust in sections 5 and 6, it needs of course to be investigated whether there is a considerable variability in generalized trust across countries. This assessment will take place in the fourth section of this chapter. In the second section of this chapter, first all an overview of the dominant social approaches that explain differentials in generalized trust across countries is provided. In this section, society-centered, i.e. individual-level determinants are contrasted with institution-centered, i.e. national level determinants, approaches to generalized trust (Stolle & Hooghe, 2003). It needs to be emphasized that for certain theoretically relevant approaches, no empirical material in relation to trust is available. To compensate for this lacuna in the literature, often reference will be made to the social capital literature, of which it is recognized that generalized trust features as an essential component (Putnam, 2000). The way I will operationalize and empirically investigate these approaches will be explained in the third section of this chapter. After the empirical investigation, an integrated multilevel

multiple regression model, which will serve as baseline throughout this dissertation, is proposed in the seventh section. As is evident, I will also reflect on the retained model, which will be done in the eighth section.

2. A Framework for Explaining Differentials in Generalized Trust

Throughout the years, authors have, based on theoretical and empirical arguments, identified three grounds in which generalized trust is rooted. According to a first theoretical strand, generalized trust must be considered as a moral value. More specifically, this paradigm emphasizes that trust is highly dependent upon the human values one has internalized (Uslaner, 2002; Reeskens, 2009); trust generally reflects whether one has an optimistic outlook on society (Uslaner, 2002; Uslaner & Brown, 2005), and whether one is risk-oriented and has been provided with a set of self-transcendence values (Reeskens, 2009). The second model to explain the generation of generalized trust puts emphasis on social organization. According to this society-centered approach, the creation of generalized trust is rooted in socialization processes and everyday interaction (Putnam, 1995; Hardin, 2002). Importantly, this strand defends the claim that individual trust yields macro-level outcomes, like democratic performance (Putnam, 1993) and economic growth (Fukuyama, 1995). The third approach inverts the causal logic and ascribes, consequently, a major influence to national institutions in crafting pro-social attitudes (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002, 2008; Levi, 1996; Uslaner, 2002; Delhey & Newton, 2005). According to this institution-centered approach, trust is embodied in various national-level institutions that spill over in individual attitudes and behavior. Since this chapter is largely framed on sociological explanations, the first explanation regarding trust as a moral value is discarded. While I do acknowledge the role of human values in the creation of generalized trust (Reeskens, 2009), in comparative perspective, the society- and institution-centered approaches provide a more appropriate assessment into the cross-national determinants of generalized trust.

2.1. Society-Centered Approach

The society-centered approach to the creation of trust has gained widespread attention that can be traced back to several centuries. Specifically, the focal arguments for this approach have been provided by de Tocqueville (2004 [1835-1840]). In his famous “Democracy in America”, he investigated what contributed to the success of the American democratic system. One of de Tocqueville’s claims was that a lively civil society, i.e. the involvement in associations, contributed significantly to the strength of democratic realm. Associations in a Tocquevillian perspective are considered to serve as ‘schools of democracy’; being involved in voluntary associations fosters pro-social attitudes and behavior that are vital for democratic society, like for instance generalized trust. To exemplify this process, de Tocqueville emphasizes that this process works in three ways (2004 [1835-1840], p. 216), namely associations serve as discussion board in

which various opinions are ventilated, associations have the characteristic that they assemble people in order to resources can be pooled and point of views can be exchanged, and in associations, people elect those who need to represent the common idea in other assemblies.

About 170 years after the publication of “Democracy in America”, a number of neo-Tocquevillian authors have given many empirical arguments in favor of the central notion regarding the vital role associations in the creation of pro-social attitudes and as schools of democracy and. In an investigation into what explains differential democratic performance in Italy, Putnam (1993) discovered that not the economic conditions were best able to explain the success of the administrative reform in Northern Italian regions; contrary, he emphasized the importance of social capital for this success in democratic performance. More specifically, Putnam (1993, p. 90) paid considerable attention to the role of involvement in associations: “Participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavors.” Many other social scientists have, guided by empirical arguments, shared this view on civic socialization through civil society (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Halpern, 2005).

Contrary, many critics have questioned the extent to which associational involvement is in fact able to generate pro-social attitudes and behavior. First of all, in crafting generalized trust, spectators have warned that not all associations create this thin type of trust (Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005; Coffé & Geys, 2007). Portes (1998) even warns for the ‘dark side of social capital’, arguing that certain types of associations might foster anti-social behavior, such as terrorist groups. It is thus expected that only bridging associations, i.e. those associations that bring together individuals across social cleavages, are able to induce generalized trust. Second, an additional argument against the neo-Tocquevillian approach regarding the schools of democracy is that the time weekly spent in most contemporary associations is too little to foster attitudes and behavior in any way (Newton, 1997). Stolle (1998) also argues that most of the pro-social behavior is learned only in the first instances one becomes involved into the associational structure. The two arguments combined place considerable reservations to the linear socializing function associations are argued to exhibit. Third, various authors questioned the causal arrow by investigating what makes people join associations. Most outcomes (Stolle, 1998; Hooghe, 2003b, 2003c) have pointed out that joiners are already predisposed with a certain set of attitudes that are in line with these associations are being reinforced in these associations. This argument has been used to point that certain associations might be able to craft antidemocratic attitudes and behavior. Thus combined, while this process of ‘selection and adaptation’ (Hooghe, 2003c) may be in effect, scholars cannot neglect the possible effects of being involved in associations.

Next to the role of associations, it is indisputable that other social spheres may exert socializing effects as well. Related to associational involvement, evidence has been given

that in the US, associational life is in decline since the 1960s (Putnam, 2000; Brehm & Rahn, 1997). If associations bear positive effects on generalized trust, it is important to understand what replaced the time spent in associations, certainly since time use surveys have pointed out that leisure time has increased significantly from the mid-20th century onwards (Aguiar & Hurst, 2007). The loudest voice in this debate, Robert Putnam, has mainly targeted television as a major source of competition with the associations for the free time of the Americans and can therefore be regarded as a ringleader in the decline in trust in America (Putnam, 1997; 2000). Based on predominantly cultivation and psychological theories, he argues that television limits the creation pro-social attitudes like trust in two ways. First of all, television has certain influences on individual psychology that may result in depressive feelings and pessimist thoughts and can even contribute to a “mean world syndrome” (Gerbner et al., 1980; Gerbner et al., 2002). As is known from the work of Uslaner (1998; 2002), trust is heavily dependent upon optimism. If television makes people less optimistic, the creation generalized trust is inhibited. Second, not only television in general, but also specific programs may limit the generation of pro-social behavior. More specific, while watching the news is positively associated with civic attitudes (Norris, 1996), entertainment programs, on the other hand, hardly have any positive contributions in this respect (Hooghe, 2002)

Involvement in associations and watching television are self-evident examples of individual free time activities. Scholars interested in how individuals spend there time (Robinson & Godbey, 1999) emphasize that leisure time must be distinguished from contracted time (i.e. paid work and schooling), committed time (i.e. household and family care) and personal time, which is largely related to life maintaining activities like sleeping and eating. Paying attention to the way individuals are socialized must thus also account for socialization within the family, at the workplace or at school.

Starting with family life determinants, this social domain has gained less priority in the creation of pro-social behavior and attitudes (Stolle, 2003). Nevertheless, demographers would agree that within the last couple of decades, the traditional structure and functions of the family have been in decline (Popenoe, 1993; Kuijsten, 1996). One could argue that the incline in, for instance, divorce rates, which is a clear example of the decline of the family, is an expression of a general erosion of social capital and, correspondingly, generalized trust (Putnam, 1995; 2000): if partners in a civil union would like to split up, this would mean that, making abstraction of other influences, trust has faded. However, the relation between civil status and social capital is not as clear-cut as one might expect. The family does have a wide range of functions, namely procreation, socialization, the provision of care, affection, and companionship to all its members, economic cooperation and sexual regulation (Popenoe, 1993). Since families are thus regarded as a breeding place of companionship and intimacy, it can also be expected that the family is able to provide in the optimistic outlook that is underlying generalized trust. Yet, empirical evidence is not pointing unilaterally to this evidence: on a wide range of informal meetings, there are hardly any indications that singles or

divorced or separated people are less involved than people in a relationship – in the US, it are predominantly religious organizations that are less attended by divorced or separated individuals while school and youth groups are less frequented by singles (Putnam, 2000, pp. 277-278). Contrary, European evidence seems to be rather scarce.

Another function of the family is thus also procreation (Popenoe, 1993) of which the result has provided fertile grounds for research into the generation of pro-social behavior in the early childhood (Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Stolle & Hooghe, 2004). Yet, an examination of the Jennings and Niemi Student-Parent Socialization Study discovered only a weak correlation between the trust levels of the parents and their children (Dalton, 1980). Yet, this transmission of pro-social attitudes from parents to children goes by to the question how parenthood as such might be able to grasp trust among the parents. It is assumed that this effect runs via intermediary paths. First of all, it is widely known that children pull their parents into public life, making them involved in Parent-Teacher Associations, sports associations, and so on (Putnam, 2000). Given the linkage between associational involvement and generalized trust, it can thus be expected that having children increases trust in unknown others via the involvement in the public realm. Second, although there is no consensus on this topic (McLanahan & Adams, 1987) it is expected that parents with children show on average higher levels of subjective well-being, although this gain seem to decrease with having lots of children (Fawcett, 1988; Kohler et al., 2005). Consequently, this optimistic position in society can result in corresponding high levels of trust in the generalized other.

The next personal sphere that is worth discussing when it comes to the creation of generalized trust is contracted time, i.e. work and education. In this respect, education is expected to be highly relevant since it “is the central causal mechanism driving the maintenance of social stratification” (Nie, et al., 1996, p. 187). Newton (2001, p. 204) even makes the distinction between “winners” and “losers” of society to underscore the relevance of this sorting criterion. He argues that those who enjoyed a prolonged education, are employed and making lots of money, are in general more trusting than those who do not. Concerning education, many research papers attribute a significant role to the educational outcome as significant with regard to the crystallization of pro-social attitudes and behavior. Quoting Brehm and Rahn (1997, p. 1009), education may “increase exposure to cosmopolitan culture, resulting in individuals who are more tolerant and less suspicious of difference”, or to phrase it differently: “Ignorance is the father of fear, and knowledge is the mother of trust” (Galston, 2004). Within the US social capital tradition, education, together with age, is among the most discussed variables. Precisely because research has shown that education is in a highly significant relation with generalized trust and other indicators, scholars were puzzled with a decline in trust despite increasing educational levels (Brody, 1978). As an explanation, Nie and his colleagues (1996) report that while at the individual level, educational level is associated with more social capital, this effect is cancelled out at the aggregate level. The authors argue that while the absolute levels of education have risen, more people have

enjoyed higher education, which limits the role of education as a source of social prestige and its role of counterbalancing the decline in trust (Helliwell & Putnam, 2007).

Next to education, also one's employment situation is of high relevance for the creation of trust. While discussing socioeconomic status, one cannot forego to one's employment status given the fact that it, together with financial situation, unemployment encompasses contemporary multidimensional notions of poverty quite highly. Current approaches indeed emphasize that poverty regards not only a lack of financial resources but also involves being jobless – the one is of course highly correlated with the other – and socially excluded. The link between the latter two is highly relevant with regard to the literature on generalized trust. Research has shown that unemployment increases the financial poverty risk, which makes it more difficult to, in a next stage, get access to jobs (Gallie et al., 2003). From a Maslowian perspective (1943), the unemployed feel more committed about the protection of physiological safety and are expected to be less concerned about social and self-realization needs, like there is generalized trust. Moreover, while a profound research in this area is missing, the workplace may also serve as a Tocquevillian type of association that may foster skills that have positive externalities on society. As Mutz and Mondak summarize (2008, p. 153): “Of all contexts with the potential for political interaction, the workplace currently has the greatest capacity for exposing people to dialogue across lines of political difference”, simply for the reason that individuals are spending considerable time at work with others one is in frequent contact with.

Having discussed the many socialization agents that are involved in the creation of trust, it needs to be remembered that this society-centered approach follows a bottom-up approach towards the consequences of generalized trust. According to this approach to the roots of trust, trust at the micro, i.e. individual, or at the meso-level, i.e. groups in society, bears positive consequences for macro-level institutions. Famous examples thus far regard self-evidently the positive role of generalized trust on democratic performance (Putnam, 1993) but also the driving force trust has in the generation of economic growth is widely documented (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001).

2.2. Institution-Centered Approach

The thesis that generalized trust, fostered by socialization and everyday interaction, yields positive macro-level effects has led to an intense debate targeting the causality of the claims. In a review article on Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993), Levi (1996, p. 50) downplays the causal claim that individual trust affects democratic governance by arguing that “policy performance can be a source of trust, not just a result.” This notion that national institutions determine generalized trust, and not the other way, has been the central argument of the institution-centered approach (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Stolle & Hooghe, 2003; Uslaner, 2002; Tarrow, 1996). To

harmonize the debate on how macro-level institutions are able to grasp individual level generalized trust, the heuristic scheme as proposed by Parsons and Smelser (1956) is applied; i.e. the social system is composed out of the polity, economic, societal community and fiduciary subsystems.

First of all, given the focus in political science on the positive effect of trust on democratic governance (Putnam, 1993), many empirical opposite claims have been made that qualify the causality (Levi, 1996; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Nannestad, 2008). Indeed, the main argument is that if trust relations are betrayed, i.e. the trusted does not commit in what he or she engaged to do, the political system might restore this trust relation (Levi, 1996) which reduces the level of risk in future trust commitments. Rothstein and Stolle (2008) add that the analytical distinction between government effectiveness and fairness form the political bases for the generation of generalized trust. In the first place, while effectiveness relates to the Levi-argument (1996) that a government can be responsive in the case of trust betrayal, the authors argue that government institutions need, next to be effective, also be fair, i.e. impartial. The underlying logic is on the one hand that the level of fairness of the institutions might spill-over in the overall fairness of the general population; indeed, it can be questioned why citizens would actually behave properly if the politicians cannot. In the second place, the absence of impartial institutions might induce corruption and the creation of corrupt behavior. Since “corrupt behavior is untrustworthy behavior” (Delhey & Newton, 2005), it is widely claimed that corruption is harmful for the creation of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2008a; Rothstein & Eek, 2009). In the third place, corrupt institutions might foster the sense of general levels of inequality, which, as will be shown later on, is harmful for the creation of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002). Indeed, those institutions that place all citizens on an equal footing, like the Scandinavian universal welfare system is a well-documented example, are better able to craft generalized trust among the population (Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005).

Next to governmental performances, an increasing number of manuscripts highlight the role of power-sharing institutions, i.e. those institutions that include an extensive set of checks and balances of which the parliamentary democracy is regarded as the ideal type, is considered to have bearing effects on the general populations, in the generation of trust (Freitag, 2006; Norris, 2008; Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009). While responsive and impartial institutions may be important in the case of third party enforcer when trust is betrayed, the type of government underlying the principle of power-sharing between societal groups might in fact also be able to generate trust. The argument is straightforward and also translates the third argument provided by Rothstein and Stolle (2002, 2008): in political systems that are open to the voice of minority groups, these minorities become emancipated and are equally accepted into the political domain. Since it might be expected that being accepted in the political realm might be reflected into reduced social distances among national groups, i.e. other groups become aware of the grievances and the norms underlying them, it can be hypothesized that generalized

trust can be the result (Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009; Bjørnskov, 2007; Norris, 2008). In these parliamentary monarchies, which quite often have provided in a history of stability, many control systems require the reading of the policy proposals from many perspectives, including the one of the minority groups.

Second, next to the political subsystem, the economy might also be able to craft trust among a national citizenry. Originally, Fukuyama's analysis (1995) into economic growth has pointed to generalized trust as an important inducer i.e. trust aides cooperative action, it reduces transaction costs and information flows are extensive when trust among citizens is high (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001). However, the causal mechanism can also be reversed, namely national wealth makes residents more trusting. In this respect, Inglehart's modernization theory (1977, 1997) may provide in possible explanations for the way the economic subsystem might generate pro-social attitudes and behavior like generalized trust. In his theory of modernization, Inglehart argues that two processes need to be distinguished, namely industrialization and post-industrialization. The first process of industrialization gave rise to a, what he refers to as a Marxian transformation into a class society and an accompanying set of material values, including the capacity to control the environment. Industrialization is reflected in the distinction between a set of traditional vs. secular-rational values. The second modernization process, i.e. post-industrialization, formed the conditions in which autonomous individuals could flourish. The autonomous individual in the postindustrial society, a society that is characterized by high levels of security, has incorporated a set of postmaterial values, including generalized trust. According to Inglehart (1977, 1997), the post-industrialization process collapses with the security vs. self-expression value cleavage, meaning that, from an economic perspective, trust in the unknown other can be generated since the economic conditions shape a safety net in the case trust is betrayed. Thus, in the end, it can be expected that economically prosperous countries have also a trusting citizenry.

Third, related to the societal community subsystem Parsons has described, I will elaborate on the social cleavages that may be prominent in society. The literature on trust has repeatedly emphasized that trust prospers in societies in which social distances are small. Relying on the social psychological literature on group conflict, Delhey and Newton (2005, p. 312) repeat that "the greater the dissimilarity, the more suspicion and distrust." Uslaner and Brown (2005) add that in societies that are low in equality, a shared sense of togetherness is absent and people tend to be rather pessimistic. For these two reasons, the creation of trust is inhibited. Taken all together, from a theoretical point of view, arguments suggest that unequal societies will be less trusting than equal societies. Cross-national research confirms this interpretation: "a conclusion reached by virtually all studies is that income inequality is among the most robust cross-country determinants of trust" (Bjørnskov, 2007, p. 5). Indeed, the most influential studies on this topic find convincing cross-national arguments that income inequality reduces trust levels among citizens (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001;

Uslaner, 2002; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007, 2008), which is however not surprising since they rely on the same data sources, namely generalized trust obtained from the WVS (Inglehart, 1996) combined with the country level Gini coefficient for income inequality. All these results seem to add to Uslaner's trust-grasping advice of "don't get rich, get equal" (2002, p. 255).

Yet, recently, many arguments have further qualified the Gini-based research on inequalities and trust. In a review article on generalized trust, Nannestad (2008, p. 416) argued that Uslaner's model underspecifies the role of egalitarian norms that should result in more equality. Nannestad questions to what extent the Gini coefficient as a measure for income inequality is actually able to grasp those egalitarian norms. Partial evidence for this kind of reasoning has been provided by Delhey and Newton (2005), who state that income inequality is, in the causal chain of explaining cross-national differences in generalized trust, an endogenous variable, meaning that income equality has a direct positive effect on trust but also intermediates the influence of egalitarianism, as expressed by a Protestant tradition (and ethnic homogeneity). In the next paragraph, I will elaborate on the egalitarian role of Protestantism. Other nuances with regard to the Gini coefficient warn for this measure of income inequality since it insufficiently takes the lower tails of the income distribution into account (Gustavsson & Jordahl, 2008).

The last societal subsystem that is discussed regards the fiduciary system. Applying this domain on the creation of generalized trust, it can be expected that dominant norms and values also influence the generation of generalized trust. In contemporary Europe, despite its decrease in church attendance, it still is noteworthy to have a closer look at the religious tradition of the country and distinguish between the religious Christian traditions, like the Protestant, Roman Catholic and Orthodox ones. The main assumption is that, in times that those religious traditions provided the moral basis of society, the structure of these religious denominations have impacted individual attitudes and behavior. More precisely, it is known that Protestant religion places more emphasis on vertical religious relations and the requirement to be involved in the local communities compared with for instance the Catholic one, which was characterized by a horizontal and centralized organization (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Moreover, Protestantism emphasizes "equality, direct accountability to God, and the religious and economic importance of trust and trustworthiness" (Delhey & Newton, 2005).

Yet, it has to be repeated that church practice is in a rapid decline in Europe (Norris & Inglehart, 2007), which questions the persisting influence of the fiduciary system on individual trust levels and other pro-social attitudes and behavior. Yet, Inglehart and Baker provide two possibilities for this enduring influence (2000, p 36). First of all, they hypothesize that the religious institutions socializes their active members. While the authors do not elaborate further on this hypothesis, it nevertheless can be expected that the churchgoers might transmit these incorporated norms to their fellow citizens.

The second hypothesis is that other national institutions have adopted ruling traditions of the religious system. Inglehart and Barker (2000) are in favor of the second argument. Indeed, already in the 1970s, Billiet and Dobbelaere (1976) have given arguments that after a rapid secularization, Flemish society still adheres to Catholic norms because civil society, which was largely pillarized, has inherited those values that were present in this religion. Therefore, the dominant religion of a country as proxy for the fiduciary system can thus be regarded as of major influence on individual generalized trust.

3. Data and Methodology

The main aim of this Chapter is thus to distinguish ringleaders from accomplices in attributing responsibility for differentials in generalized trust across countries. First of all, I will focus on the investigation of the individual level determinants. The data for this investigation is the 2006 wave of the ESS. This survey has all information available for an in-depth test into the micro-level determinants of generalized trust. All variables have been classified into four groups, namely individual controls, family life, socioeconomics and leisure time. The set of individual controls consists out of the respondent's age, gender, his or her minority position and the level of urbanization of the area the respondent lives in. The family life set of variables regards one's legal civil status, as well as there are children at home. Next, the number of years of formal education¹², one's employment status and whether one is satisfied with its current income for living comfortably¹³ form the set of socioeconomic variables. Last but not least, leisure time contains three variables, i.e. whether one has volunteered the last 12 months, the frequency of attending religious services and the amount of hours one spends a day watching television. For a coding scheme of the individual level variables, check Appendix A.

Putting forward hypotheses, first of all, age needs to be considered. Concerning the effect of age on pro-social attitudes and behavior, the common rule is that generational effects need to be separated from lifecycle effects (Putnam, 2000; Robinson & Jackson, 2001). Predominantly with regard to the decline in trust in the US, authors have emphasized that generational change is at play, namely that the civic generation of the early baby-boomer generation is replaced by generation who have expressed less civic

¹² The survey documentation of the European Social Survey has mentioned that for many countries, there are problems with the cross-national equivalence of the categorical educational level variable. For this reason, I have opted to include years of education as an indicator for educational level, although I am aware that years of education does not cover educational level fully.

¹³ I opted for this subjective assessment of one's income level (HINCFEL) instead of the more objective income level question (HINCTNT) in the European Social Survey since the latter is hampered with many missing values.

and more material characteristics (Putnam, 2000; Rahn & Transue, 1998). In Europe, hardly any evidence is present for such a generational change in trust (Norris & Davis, 2007). Yet, since the cross-sectional design of the European Social Survey, it is only possible to investigate lifecycle effects. In this respect, it is assumed that trust does, on average, increase when individuals grow older, until it tops off at a certain age (Robinson & Jackson, 2001).

Table 3. Operationalization of the Individual Level Variables

Group	Variable	Operationalization
Individual controls	Age	Age (14-101)
	Gender	Male, female
	Minority position	Native, foreign descent
	Level of urbanization	Countryside – big city
Family life	Civil status	Legal union, ended union, single or not formalized
	Children	(Not) having children at home
Socioeconomics	Educational level	Years of schooling
	Employment status	Employed, unemployed, student, retired, other status
	Income level	Satisfied with current income
Leisure time	Volunteering	(Not) having volunteered in the last year
	Religious attendance	Frequency of attending religious services
	Watching television	Watching television each day

Note: Appendix for the full question wording, response categories and coding schemes

With regard to gender, evidence is rather scarce, since the literature on trust specifically and social capital in general has overlooked gender differences (Howell, 2007). Yet, recent analysis shows that women tend to trust their fellow neighbors more, which raises the question whether women express more bonding than bridging social capital (Lowndes, 2004). In this respect, it is difficult to propose a hypothesis with regard to the gender differences in generalized trust. Regarding foreign descent, it can be expected that those respondents with foreign roots are less trusting given structural disadvantages in Western societies (Heath et al., 2008). Because generalized trust is expressed by the so-called ‘winners’ of society (Newton, 2001), those structural disadvantages might prevent migrant citizens to develop generalized trust. Recent evidence suggests that the migrants still reflect the trust levels of the country of origin but are converging to the host country (Uslaner, 2008b). Regarding level of urbanization, it indeed seems that size matters for pro-social attitudes and behavior: where Putnam (2000) argues that people in small-scaled villages will be more trusting than individuals living in metropolitan area.

Regarding family life, it is expected that respondents in stable family situations, i.e. those who are in a stable relationship, crudely operationalized by a legal union, are more trusting than other categories. Moreover, since children pull parents into public life and add to one's subjective well-being, it can also be expected that parents will express more pro-social attitudes. Also one's socioeconomic position is considered as a strong determinant for generalized trust for which it can be expected that all three indicators, i.e. educational level, employment status and one's income, are positively related to trust. More specifically, those who have enjoyed a prolonged educational track, are employed and are satisfied with their income are expected to be more trusting. The way one enjoys his or her leisure time will also have a considerable impact on whether one is trusting. Making abstraction of causal claims, it is expected that volunteering exerts a considerable impact on the generation of generalized trust. In this respect, also being involved in one's religious community, as indicator for one's religious commitment, should induce trust. Contrary, the original reports on a decline in trust expect that watching television is negatively impacting one's overall pro-social attitudes.

The individual effects on generalized trust will first of all be tested bivariately. While considerable attention will be paid to the overall European trend, national differences will also be discussed, yet, only to a limited extent. After the bivariate correlations, an individual level regression model containing all individual level covariates is established. Since the ESS is a textbook example of a nested data structure, multilevel regression will be carried out t

Table 4. Operationalization of the Country Level Variables

Group	Variable	Source
Economy	GDP per capita, in 1,000 US\$ PPP, 2006	Human Development Report (Watkins, 2007)
Polity	Good governance, 2006	Norris Comparative Data Set (2009)
	Transparency, 2006	Norris Comparative Data Set (2009)
	Parliamentary monarchy	Norris Comparative Data Set (2009)
Societal community	Gini, 2006	Human Development Report (2009)
Fiduciary system	Protestant tradition	Norris Comparative Data Set (2009)

In the next step, the impact of country level variables on generalized trust is regarded. For the operationalization of the social spheres, reference has been made to conceptual framework Parsons & Smelser (1956) have put forward regarding the four major social subsystems, i.e. the economy, polity, social community and fiduciary system. The economy subsystem is operationalized by the national wealth of the European countries, expressed by the GDP per capita (in 1,000 US\$) for 2006. For the polity subsystem, three indicators are proposed, namely the Norris good governance index for 2006, the Corruption Perception Index as a measure for transparency, and whether a

country has a parliamentary monarchy as government type. While the social community is difficult to operationalize since it encapsulates many aspects of inequalities in social life, I have used the Gini index as a proxy for the magnitude of inequalities within society. Last but not least, the fiduciary system is operationalized by whether countries had a tradition in Protestant religion.

Regarding the economy subsystem, in countries that are wealthy and prosperous, trust is expected to flourish. In those societies, financial safeguards are at hand in the case the trust relations are broken. Regarding the polity, in countries that have an efficient democratic political system that regards all citizens as equal, it can be expected that this equal and democratic treatment also spills over into pro-social attitudes. Turning to the societal community, large inequalities between citizens are harmful for the creation of generalized trust. For this reason, it can be expected that the Gini index is negatively associated with generalized trust. Lastly, regarding the pattern maintenance of dominant values, the literature underscores the importance of having a Protestant tradition, with its emphasis on horizontal relations, as an explanation for differential trust between countries. While this is not an exhaustive list of covariates, the independent variables that have been listed above have repeatedly shown to be in relation with generalized trust (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007).

Indeed, for the investigation of the country level determinants of trust, in the first phase, only the trust levels of countries are considered, which means that individual level trust scores are aggregated. By doing this, correlations between the continuous variables and mean comparisons including t-tests along parliamentary monarchy and Protestant tradition can be calculated. The main argument, however, why the individual trust scores are aggregated to the national level is the simplicity of the model selection techniques. In the end, I would like to retain two country level variables to include as controls. In multilevel modeling, selection techniques are, however, not easy to perform even though macros are available to ease the process (Fernandez, 2009). The complexity of the model selection for multilevel modeling has led to the application of regular model selection techniques at the country level, namely stepwise regression using a triangulation of forward, backward and stepwise estimation.

At the end, the two retained country level variables that are best able to predict differences in aggregate levels of trust will be added to the individual multilevel regression model. By doing this, a baseline model to which, in a later phase, indicators of ethnic-cultural diversity and migrant integration policies can be added to is constructed. First, it needs of course to be made clear whether there is a high level of variability in trust across Europe.

4. The Distribution of Generalized Trust across Europe

The variability in generalized trust across European countries can be regarded as quite high. In Table 5, the univariate distribution of the mean trust scores is displayed and shows that, on a scale from 0 to 10, generalized trust across the ESS countries is, with a value of 4.81, just below the average scale score of 5.¹⁴ Across Europe, trust levels range from about 3.65 in Bulgaria to about 6.84 in Denmark. The Nordic countries have the most trusting citizenry with aggregate trust levels higher than 6. The most distrusting societies are the post-communist countries: next to Bulgaria, also Ukraine, Poland, Russia and Slovakia rank low with regard to the level of trust among the citizenry. Regarded from a spatial perspective, the most deviant case is Portugal, which is the fifth least trusting country among the ESS-countries with a trust value of about 4.27. Most other Western European countries can be observed in the middle of the graph, with the cluster containing France, Spain, Belgium, Estonia and Germany with trust levels ranging from about 4.90 to 5.20. So in general, there seems to be a geographical spread in generalized trust, with the Nordic countries at the top, the Central and Eastern European countries at the bottom and the Western European countries in the middle.

Table 5 depicts the considerable variability in trust across Europe, yet, it misses a statistical measure of how much of the variability in trust can be attributed to the country level and the individual differences. The multilevel model, as has been introduced in the methodological chapter (Chapter 2), provides a statistical measure for the partitioning of the variability in the outcome variable, namely the intraclass correlation, also referred to as autocorrelation. The intra-class correlation can be interpreted in two ways. First of all, it can be interpreted as “the expected correlation between two randomly chosen units that are in the same group” (Hox, 2002, p. 15). For instance, if the intraclass correlation is about .20, then there is an expected correlation of about twenty percent between two respondents in any given country with regard to the variable of interest, namely generalized trust. Second, it can also be interpreted as “the proportion of variance explained by the grouping structure in the population” (Hox, 2002, p. 15). In the .20-example, about one fifth of the individual level variability can be explained by characteristics of the country. The intra-class correlation can be obtained by estimating a so-called ‘null model’ or ‘empty model’, which is a multilevel random intercepts model explaining the variability in trust without taking individual level variables into account.

¹⁴. The rather low value can be ascribed to the influence of Russia. When excluding Russia, the aggregated trust score rises to about 5.01. Nevertheless, since the small number of countries we are investigating, I have opted to keep Russia in the data and, if it poses a problem, remove it.

Table 5. The Distribution of Generalized Trust across Europe

Country	N	Mean	Std Dev
<i>European Social Survey (ESS)</i>	42,905	4.809	2.121
Denmark	1,505	6.836	1.564
Norway	1,750	6.641	1.462
Finland	1,896	6.435	1.481
Sweden	1,927	6.311	1.572
Switzerland	1,804	5,934	1.524
Netherlands	1,889	5.773	1.513
Ireland	1,800	5.712	1.868
United Kingdom	2,394	5.600	1.622
Austria	2,405	5.426	1.945
Germany	2,916	5.175	1.720
Estonia	1,517	5.170	1.940
Belgium	1,798	5.121	3.648
Spain	1,876	4.980	1.495
France	1,986	4.924	1.636
Slovenia	1,476	4.501	2.014
Hungary	1,518	4.465	2.118
Cyprus	995	4.379	1.908
Slovak Republic	1,766	4.370	1.966
Portugal	2,222	4.273	1.879
Russia	2,437	4.192	2.151
Poland	1,721	4.133	1.834
Ukraine	2,002	4.128	2.229
Bulgaria	1,400	3.648	2.195

Note: The overall ESS result is weighted for totweight (the combination of the dweight and pweight ESS weights). The country results are weighted for the dweight design weight. Countries are sorted from most to least trusting.

Partitioning the variance in trust between individuals and countries (Table 6) shows that almost 20 percent of the variability in trust can be attributed to the country level. As research has already shown, generalized trust is an individual asset that is highly influenced by the context, but nevertheless, this measure of 20 percent is rather high – as a comparison the intra-class correlation of anti-immigrant sentiments across Europe is only .10 (Schneider, 2008). Consequently, this means that country level covariates indeed must be taken into account to explain why the Swedes are for instance more trusting than the Poles.

Table 6. Partitioning the Variance in Generalized Trust

	Parameter	Z-value
Variance component individual level	3.265***	146.43
Variance component country level	0.771***	3.40
Intra-class correlation		19.11%

Note: Parameters obtained by estimating a ‘null’ or ‘empty’ multilevel regression model. The intra-class correlation is calculated by the formula: [individual variance / (individual variance + country variance)].

5. Modeling Individual-Level Generalized Trust Determinants

In this section, the individual level covariates that, according to the literature, should foster trust will be empirically reviewed. First the bivariate findings are presented; later, a multilevel multiple regression model for individual determinants of generalized trust is established.

5.1. Bivariate Analysis

In this section regarding the bivariate analysis, I will summarize the results according to the four groups of variables that have been presented in the Data & Methodology section. Starting with the control variables, the general assumption is that, regarding age, the elderly express more pro-social attitudes since they have been raised in an era that has frequently referred to as the civic era (Putnam, 2000; Rahn & Transue, 1998), although this thesis is not confirmed for Europe (Norris & Davis, 2007). However, looking at the bivariate relation between age and generalized trust (Table 7), it can be seen that across Europe, the elderly have averagely higher trust levels than the youngsters. Nevertheless, the association is rather weak, with a correlation coefficient of about 0.02, which can largely be explained by the wide discrepancy in country correlations. At the one end of the continuum, there is a negative association between age and trust in Austria, meaning that the younger respondents are more trusting than the older generations. At the other end of the continuum, the youngsters in Ireland are significantly less trusting than the elderly. With regard to gender (Table 8) the overall European trend shows hardly any significant association with trust. But also regarding this respondent characteristic, there are huge discrepancies across Europe. More specifically, women outweigh men in Norway while men are hardly any more trusting in Hungary. The third respondent characteristic, one’s foreign descent (Table 8), is also in an insignificant relation with generalized trust – on average, those of foreign descent do not significantly differ from the native. This association fluctuates however from a negative but insignificant relation in Bulgaria to a positive and significant relation in Estonia, meaning that respondents of foreign descent in Estonia are more distrusting than native Estonians. It may, however, not be forgotten that the rationale behind the ESS is a general social survey and has therefore not oversampled minority groups. Last

but not least, also the correlation between trust and the level of urbanization the respondent lives in (Table 7) is reviewed and is negative, meaning that those respondents living in big cities are on average more distrusting than those respondents living in rural areas. In Slovenia, however, this correlation is the opposite: residents of big cities are more trusting than respondents in rural areas.

Table 7. Bivariate Associations Between Generalized Trust and Continuous Individual Level Covariates

Indicator	ESS Correlat	Lowest		Highest	
		Correlat	Country	Correlat	Country
Age	0.021***	-0.103***	Austria	0.137***	Ireland
Urbanization level	-0.017***	-0.114***	Estonia	0.083**	Slovenia
Years of education	0.130***	-0.000	Russia	0.206***	Hungary
Income satisfaction	0.274***	0.027	Portugal	0.252***	Slovenia
Religious services	0.021***	-0.010	Slovenia	0.117***	Russia
Television watching	-0.036***	-0.098***	Austria	0.027	Spain

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Turning then to the other theoretical trust determinants, I will first discuss the impact of the family on generalized trust before turning to the socioeconomics and the leisure time sets of variables. Bivariately, there is a strong association between civil status and generalized trust (Table 9). The general trend seems to be that regarding generalized trust, singles or this without a legal union are more trusting than those in a legal partnership, those who have dissolved their partnership, and those whose partner died. In Norway, the association between civil status and trust is strongest while it is lowest in Estonia. Having children at home (Table 8) does, bivariately, not seem to be positive for one's pro-social attitudes. Across Europe, respondents with children at home are more distrusting than respondents without children or children living elsewhere. Predominantly in Poland, parents are less distrusting while in Switzerland, having children at home means having slightly higher levels of generalized trust. Thus, concerning socialization in the family, the overall effects seem to be quite puzzling; multivariate effects need to provide more insightful information regarding the unique effects of the family.

Secondly, the covariates concerning individual socioeconomic status, for convenience operationalized by years of education, employment status and income, are brought in a bivariate relation with trust. Looking at the correlation coefficient between years of education and generalized trust (Table 7) there is a highly significant relation between the two across Europe: the more schooling, the more trusting. The correlation is strongest for Hungary while completely absent in Russia. Similarly, income satisfaction shows a statistically significant relation with generalized trust (Table 7): those who are very satisfied with their income are more trusting than those who are dissatisfied. In

Slovenia, this association is more pronounced, contrary to Portugal, where this bivariate association is nil. Next, the employment situation is also of high relevance for the generation of trust across Europe (Table 9). According to the significance tests, there are at least two employment categories that differ significantly regarding the trust-outcome: more specifically, the post-hoc tests showed that students are, on average, far more trusting than other employment categories. In sum, bivariately, it seems that the socioeconomic advantaged are better off regarding generalized trust: having enjoyed many years of education, being a student and having a very good income are positively related with one's trust levels.

Table 8. Bivariate Associations Between Generalized Trust and Dichotomous Individual Level Covariates

Indicator	ESS T	Lowest		Highest	
		T-value	Country	T-value	Country
Gender	-1.08	-6.40***	Norway	1.69	Hungary
Foreign descent	-0.99	-1.43	Bulgaria	6.39***	Estonia
Children at home	12.57***	-1.33	Switzerland	2.77**	Poland
Volunteering	-36.21***	-6.26***	Ukraine	0.87	Portugal

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Negative T-value: coding 1 (resp. women, foreign roots, children at home, and volunteers) has higher trust levels than coding 0 (resp. men, native, no children at home, and non-volunteers). Positive t-values: coding 1 has lower trust levels than coding 0.

Last but not least, the leisure time covariates are also considered. Starting with volunteering (Table 8), which in the literature has been regarded as an important source for generalized trust, it indeed can be seen that being involved in voluntary associations goes together with high levels of generalized trust. What is important to note is that this effect is not universally the same across all countries in Europe. In Ukraine, the difference in trust between those who volunteer and those who do not is highest, i.e. the volunteering respondents are more trusting. Contrary, in Portugal, any association between involvement in voluntary associations and generalized trust is absent. Similarly, attending religious services (Table 7) is highly determining for whether one's trusting or not. Frequently attendees of these services report higher levels of pro-social attitudes than those who do not. This association is most positive in orthodox Russia and weakest in Slovenia. Bivariately, intensely watching television (Table 7) is associated with low levels of trust. Across Europe, those respondents who frequently watch television are less trusting who never watch television. The association is, however, rather weak – the correlation coefficient does not exceed 0.04.

Table 9. Bivariate Associations Between Generalized Trust and Nominal Individual Level Covariates

Indicator	ESS T	Lowest		Highest	
		F-value	Country	F-value	Country
Employment	42.76***	0.99	Spain	10.07***	Germany
Civil status	39.51***	0.35	Estonia	10.15***	Norway

Negative T-value: coding 1 (resp. women, foreign roots, and volunteers) has higher trust levels than coding 0 (resp. men, native, and non-volunteers). Positive t-values: coding 1 has lower trust levels than coding 0.

In sum, it seems that those life domains that have been frequently discussed before in accounting for differentials in generalized trust, i.e. the socioeconomic sphere and volunteering, are also across Europe in a highly significant association with trust. Bivariately, it seems, however, that not voluntary associations but rather education must be considered as the school of democracy – i.e. years of enjoyed education, being student and having a sufficient income go along with high levels of generalized trust. The family as socialization agent has received not much attention in the literature; the bivariate associations indeed show that the family as such, i.e. one's civil status and having children at home, entails a quite complex relation with generalized trust. Last but not least, the relation of age also needs to be addressed. More specifically, the diverging effects, ranging from significantly negative to significantly positive, might show that the generational change thesis works differently across the countries in the ESS. What all relations, show, however, is that multivariate analysis, controlling for other potential influences, need to be conducted.

5.2. Multivariate Analysis

To assess the unique effect of the independent variables, multilevel multiple regression should be carried out. To give but one example, I have bivariately discovered that respondents living in big cities have, on average, lower levels of trust. It is, however, also known that inner cities suffer from concentrated disadvantage (Sampson et al., 2002), like high levels of unemployment and correspondingly low income levels. For this reason, the effect of urbanization level needs to be controlled for by at least employment status and income satisfaction, to assess its unique impact. In Table 10, the results of the multiple regression analysis are represented. Model I describes the effects of the socio-demographic and family-related variables (age, gender, minority status, level of urbanization, civil status and having children at home); Model II combines Model I together with the socioeconomic covariates (years of completed education, employment status and income satisfaction); in Model III, Model II and the leisure time variables (volunteering, attending religious services and watching television) are summarized.

Table 10. Multilevel Multiple Regression Models for Explaining Generalized Trust in Europe

	Model I: Socio-demo & family		Model II: Model I + Socioeconomics		Model III: Model II + Leisure Time	
Fixed Effects	Param	T	Param	T	Param	T
Intercept	5.167***	27.89	4.011***	25.45	3.790***	23.43
Age	0.001	1.50	0.006***	7.10	0.006***	6.43
Female (Ref: male)	0.108***	6.01	0.146***	7.97	0.129***	6.98
Foreign (Ref: native)	-0.153***	-6.00	-0.108***	-4.26	-0.108***	-4.25
Level of urbanization	-0.010	-1.26	-0.046***	-5.98	-0.037***	-4.75
Civil status:						
- Divorced/separated	-0.253***	-7.60	-0.143***	-4.30	-0.121***	-3.63
- Partner died	-0.057	-1.55	0.063	1.71	0.075*	2.02
- Single/no legal union (Ref: living together)	0.044	1.52	0.059*	2.03	0.090**	3.07
Children (ref: without)	-0.064**	-3.09	-0.014	-0.66	-0.025	-1.15
Years of education			0.047***	18.55	0.043***	16.93
Employment status						
- Unemployed			-0.173***	-3.89	-0.148**	-3.29
- Student			0.289***	7.67	0.250***	6.60
- Retired			-0.003	-0.10	0.014	0.43
- Other (Ref: employed)			-0.095***	-3.35	-0.079**	-2.76
Financial satisfaction			0.306***	24.75	0.291***	23.47
Volunteering					0.231***	11.75
Religious attendance					0.060***	9.14
Television watching					0.070***	3.79
TV watching squared					-0.009***	-4.25
Random Effects	Param	Z	Param	Z	Param	Z
Individ level variance	3.241***	144.97	3.126***	143.5	3.085***	142.33
Country level variance	0.775***	3.38	0.524***	3.38	0.523***	3.40
Intra-class correlation	19.31%		14.36%		14.50%	
N	42,057		41,191		40,541	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. In this analysis, age is grand mean centered.

As Model I shows, holding other socio-demographic and family related factors constant, age is surprisingly in no relation with trust. What is however important to emphasize is that the effect of age becomes relevant when adding other socio-economic (Model II) and leisure time covariates (Model III). Thus, it seems that the effect of age

is actually quite considerable when taking other trust covariates into account. Regarding gender, the bivariate relation is confirmed: across Europe, women are, averagely, more trusting than man. Under control of other socio-demographics, those respondents with foreign roots, i.e. those who are born abroad or have at least one parent that has been born abroad, have significantly lower levels of trust. In contrast with the effect of age, the magnitude of the unique effect of having foreign roots is lowered when adding socio-economic influences (Model II), which underscores the importance that a significant part of the lower trust scores of ethnic-cultural minorities might be explained by their socio-economic disadvantaged position. Contrary to the bivariate finding, in a multilevel regression model, trust is hardly lower among residents living in urbanized areas. However, similar to the effect of age, this effect increases in significance when socioeconomic determinants are added to the model.

Regarding the family related variables, which have also been taken up in Model I, those respondents who terminated their relation are significantly more distrusting than those in a legal union while those who are single or are not in a legal partnership are significantly more trusting. In Model I, none of the other civil status categories are in a significant relation. However, being single or not being in legal partnership exerts a significant effect on generalized trust when adding socioeconomic covariates while the situation in which a partner died negatively affects trust when adding leisure time factors. Contrary, having children at home, however, decreases one's trust level significantly, at least in Model I. Also in this example, it is apparent that the effect changes drastically under control of socioeconomic covariates. More specifically, the significant effect fades in Model II.

Next to the socio-demographic and leisure time variables, in Model II the effects of the respondents their socioeconomic situation are estimated. Before starting with this analysis, it needs to be repeated that many of the variables in Model I change in impact when adding respondents' socioeconomic situation. This evidence suggests that the impact of socioeconomic conditions on trust is quite determining. Turning to the three variables, the effect sizes confirm that one's socioeconomic position in society is highly relevant to assess whether one is trusting or not. First of all, the effect of the number of years completed education on one's levels of trust in the generalized other is highly significant: on average, those who have been only 6 year in school rank half a point, on a range from 0 to 10, lower compared with those who have enjoyed 16 years of schooling. Likewise, those who are unemployed are also more distrusting than those who are employed. Contrary, students, controlled for age and other effects, are more trusting, which means that having schooling in itself seems to contribute to one's pro-social attitudes. Additionally, one's income level, at least when it's considered as satisfying, is also able to generate generalized trust. Those who enjoy a relative income that is satisfying are significantly more trusting than those who believe that there income level is too low. In general, the socioeconomic advantaged individuals in general record higher levels of generalized trust than the disadvantaged.

The last multilevel regression equation that is estimated in Model III contains all previous variables together with the theoretically most relevant generalized trust determinants. In line with the neo-Tocquevillian scholars, being involved in voluntary associations affects the individual levels of generalized trust positively: those who have declared that they have volunteered over the last 12 months have, on average, an additional trust score of about a quarter point. Similarly, attending religious services also adds to trust: under control of other relevant covariates, those who never attend religious services are more distrusting than those who frequently participate in these activities. Last but not least, an expected negative relation of watching television on generalized trust has not been discovered. On the contrary, watching television is in a curvilinear relation: trust is slightly higher for the medium watchers while it tops for the most frequent watchers. Thus, under control of other covariates, those who never watch television are somewhat more distrusting than those who occasionally tune in; watching television frequently does not add to one's trust, rather the contrary. Coming at the end of these leisure time variables, it needs, however, to be emphasized that this set of variables is, of all tested ones, most prone to issues of causality. Modeling this regression equation, it was indeed not possible to estimate whether individuals do not participate in voluntary associations or are heavy television watchers because they are rather distrusting.


Taken altogether, it seems that one's socioeconomic position is most determining for one's levels of trust. In general, it seems that the socioeconomic realm is highly relevant: borrowing Newton's terminology of the 'winners of society' (Newton, 2001), those who have enjoyed a prolonged education or still are in training, are employed and have an income that they assess as highly satisfying, record on average the highest levels of generalized trust. Also other forms of pro-social behavior, i.e. whether one volunteers or participates in religious services, seems to add significantly to one's levels of trust. What is most surprising is, compared with other effects, the relatively weak effect of age. While scholars have warned for a general decline in trust – which could be expressed in significant lower trust values among the younger generations – it seems that the older generations are indeed most trusting; nevertheless, the impact is far from overwhelming. Looking at the country-specific bivariate correlation, there indeed seems to be a big discrepancy limiting universal claims on the relation between age and trust.

5.3. Discarding Differential Effects?

Indeed, in Tables 7 to 9, the possibility that certain individual factors exert differential effects across European countries is explicitly considered. Even though multilevel analysis using only 20 countries requires that the models are as parsimonious as possible – which means that random slopes are left out of the analyses – at this point, it needs to be emphasized that random effects in fact are present across Europe; yet, given the methodological limitations, I do not want to elaborate on this topic. Exemplifying these

differentials for the effect of age on trust, Figure 10 reveals that across Europe, on the contrary, the effect of age affects trust differently – for certain countries, this effect is, controlled for other covariates, negative while the impact is positive in other countries. Combined, this differential impact across Europe may provide evidence why the overall effect of age is rather weak. It is important to keep this kind of reasoning in mind for the overall assessment of ethnic-cultural diversity of trust across Europe (Chapters 6 and 7).

Figure 10. The Differential Impact of Age on Generalized Trust Across Europe



Note: The slopes variance was significantly different from zero, meaning that the unique impact of age on generalized trust is not the same across countries. The covariance between the slopes and the intercepts, however, was not significantly at an 0.05 level, meaning that the impact of age on trust is not dependent upon the average trust value in the country.

6. Modeling Country-Level Generalized Trust Determinants

The setup for the investigation of the country level effects on generalized trust differs from the individual-level investigation. Since the analysis will be conducted at the national level, individual trust scores are aggregated to the national level. First of all, bivariate relations between the four main subdomains, i.e. the economy, polity, societal community and fiduciary subsystem, and generalized trust will be estimated. In the second step, selection methods will be applied to assess which limited set of variables is best able to explain country differences in trust. Although in the theoretical section warnings have been placed for the complex causal relation between generalized trust and institutional characteristics, in this section, the results of the analyses will be

interpreted in line with the institution-centered approach, which means that the national level affects generalized trust, not the other way round.

6.1. Bivariate Analysis

In this section, the individual impact of six country-level variables on generalized trust is estimated; all of them have previously shown to be highly determining for cross-national differences in generalized trust. Starting with the economy subsystem, the national wealth of the country (Table 11), expressed by the GDP per capita (for 2006, in 10,000 US\$) indeed is in a strong relation with the general level of trust within the country. Referring to the Inglehart thesis (1977, 1997), it seems to be the case that in countries that meet economic satisfying conditions, pro-social attitudes, and more explicitly generalized trust, can flourish. Also with regard to the polity subsystem, all national variables are in a high positive correlation with generalized trust. Countries that are characterized by good governance and rank high on the transparency index (Table 11), and have a parliamentary monarchy (Table 12), have a citizenry that is, on average, very trusting.

Table 11. Bivariate Associations Between Generalized Trust and Continuous Country Level Covariates

	Correlation
GDP per capita	0.846***
Good governance	0.827***
Transparency	0.888***
Gini	-0.308

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Turning then to the societal subsystem, which has been operationalized by income inequality (Table 11), expressed by the Gini coefficient, it seems that the relation is absent, contrary to many empirical claims. Indeed, across Europe, high levels of inequality seem to go together with lower levels of trust; however, the correlation is far from significant, which means that there are examples for which this claim does not hold. Contrary, the relation between a Protestant tradition and generalized trust is highly significant (Table 12): having had a tradition in Protestant religion has carried out pro-social attitudes among the general population.

Table 12. Bivariate Associations Between Generalized Trust and Dichotomous Country Level Covariates

Variable	Category	Trust	T-Value
Parliamentary monarchy	No	4.804	-3.18***
	Yes	5.895	
Protestant tradition	No	4.748	-4.10***
	Yes	6.024	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

In line with an earlier remark that has been given during the bivariate individual-level analysis, it is necessary to assess the unique effect of the country-level covariates since it can be expected that many will be interrelated. To give but one example, following a Weberian line of reasoning, it can also be expected that the Protestant countries are economically more prosperous since the Protestant ethic embraced a growth-generating logic (Delhey & Newton, 2005). Indeed, multiple regression analysis is appropriate to deal with the multicollinearity of the independent country-level variables.

6.2. Selecting National Control Variables

Before turning to a multiple regression analysis of the effect of national institutions on generalized trust, a necessary step at this point is to select a limited set of two country level covariates that will serve as control in the later phase of the empirical research. Indeed, it is impossible to include a large set of control variables at the national level to the multilevel regression model (Chapter 2). The degrees of freedom, which is inherent using an intermediate-N sample of only about 20 countries, as well as the level of complexity of the multilevel model, is expected to induce parameter bias when controlling for many country-level covariates. For this reason, it is necessary to reduce the set of six country-level variables to a maximum of two.

The first step is to investigate which variable cluster may hamper the regression equation in anyway since they are multicollinear. Table 13 has summarized the OLS regression equation explaining national differences in the aggregate level of generalized trust, including the tolerance and variance inflation index (VIF). According to methodological guidelines, the tolerance test may not fall below 0.1 while the VIF test may not exceed 10. Table 13 displays that both the Norris good governance and transparency variables do not meet this criterion. Therefore, further model selections will be executed keeping in mind that both variables cannot be included simultaneously into the model. Table 13 also shows that in this multiple regression model, only GDP per capita and Protestant tradition have an impact on generalized trust: countries have a more trusting citizenry when there are high levels of national wealth and the country has a tradition in the Protestant religion. Moreover, all six covariates explain about 90 percent of the variability in the aggregate level of generalized trust.

Table 13. Multicollinearity Test for Regression Model for Explaining Aggregate Levels of Generalized Trust

	Param	T-Value	Tolerance	Var IF
Intercept	2.925***	4.51		
GDP per capita (in 1000s)	0.036*	2.32	0.196	5.103
Good governance	-0.568	-1.12	0.047	21.330
Transparency	0.304	1.83	0.045	22.172
Parliamentary Monarchy	0.078	0.37	0.595	1.681
Gini	-0.014	-0.77	0.655	1.527
Protestant Tradition	0.505*	2.41	0.597	1.674

R2 = 88.5%; Adj-R2 = 84.2%

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 13 is, thus, highly overspecified – it has not only included variables that are too much interrelated, it includes also variables that do not add to explaining cross-national differences in trust. For this reason, three model selection techniques are triangulated, namely forward, backward and stepwise regression (Table 14). All the three selection techniques arrive to the same parsimonious model, i.e. a regression model including GDP per capita and Protestant tradition. Surprisingly, the model selection analysis did select only two variables, which was originally the aim of this section regarding the selection of national control variables. Furthermore, it is important to underscore that these two variables explain about 85 percent of the variability in aggregated generalized trust. Thus, in further analyses, these two variables will be added to the regression model.

Table 14. Results of Model Selection Analysis Using Forward, Backward and Stepwise Regression

Model	Retained Variables
Forward	GDP per capita, Protestant tradition
Backward	GDP per capita, Protestant tradition
Stepwise	GDP per capita, Protestant tradition

R2 = 84.9%; Adj-R2 = 83.3%

Note: The entry and stay selection criteria were set at an alpha level of 0.05.

7. Towards an Integrated Multilevel Baseline Model

The final step in this chapter is to integrate the two retained country-level covariates GDP per capita and Protestant tradition into the individual level model (Model III in Table 10). The result of this step confirms the discovered individual and country level determinants of trust. With regard to the individual level independent variables, Table 15 shows that there are no major differences compared with the individual Model III in Table 10. The country-level variables show the same relation on generalized trust as in the bivariate test. National wealth, expressed in GDP per capita (in PPP US\$) is positively related to trust: on average an increase in about 10,000 US\$ in GDP per capita means an increase of about 0.40 in trust. Regarding the tradition in Protestant religion, also this effect is highly significant. In those countries that actually did have a tradition in Protestantism, the average trust level is about 0.75 points higher compared with those countries that do not have this religious tradition. Thus, a dominant culture that has emphasized involvement in one's local community, as has been the case for Protestantism, seems to spill over into individual pro-social attitudes.

In line with the aim of this Chapter – to tap as much as cross-national variability in generalized trust in the most parsimonious manner – Table 15 reveals that a high level of country-national level has been addressed by national wealth and the share of Protestants: while the intra-class correlation for the individual model was about 15 percent – meaning that about 15 percent of the variability in generalized trust could be explained by country characteristics, this percentage falls back to about 4 percent after introducing the two control country covariates. Nevertheless, this number leaves of course room for additional country-level characteristics, such as ethnic-cultural diversity and its interaction with regimes of migrant integration.

Table 15. Baseline Multilevel Regression Model for Explaining Generalized Trust across Europe

Model IV: Model III + Country Covariates		
Fixed Effects	Parameter	T-Value
Intercept	2.448***	12.83
Age	0.006***	6.41
Female (ref: male)	0.129***	6.99
Foreign (ref: native)	-0.108***	-4.26
Level of urbanization	-0.037***	-4.78
Civil status:		
- Divorced / separated	-0.122***	-3.64
- Partner died	0.075*	2.03
- Single / no legal union (Ref: living together)	0.089**	3.05
Children (ref: without)	-0.025	-1.16
Years of education	0.043***	16.94
Employment status		
- Unemployed	-0.149***	-3.32
- Student	0.250***	6.61
- Retired	0.015	0.45
- Other (Ref: employed)	-0.080**	-2.78
Financial satisfaction	0.290***	23.36
Volunteering	0.229***	11.69
Religious attendance	0.060***	9.15
Television watching	0.070***	3.78
Quadratic TV watching	-0.009***	-4.26
GDP per capita	0.040***	6.06
Protestant tradition	0.756***	4.86
Random Effects	Parameter	Z-Value
Individual level variance	3.085***	142.33
Country level variance	0.098***	3.33
Intra-class correlation		3.07%
N		40,541

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

8. Conclusion

The setup of this chapter was to investigate which factors are responsible for individual and cross-national differences in generalized trust. Across the literature, next to the more psychological explanations that regard trust as a moral value, most attention thus far has been given to two more sociological models. While the society-centered approach has placed the emphasis on individual socialization, the institution-centered approach explains the generation of trust in systemic spillover effects. This chapter has shown that the two are not necessarily juxtaposed; on the contrary, trust is stimulated through everyday experience and socialization as well as crafted through national institutions. Indeed, according to the last approach, the countries people are living in are highly influential for the creation of generalized trust. The empirical results confirm the importance of the national level: with an intra class correlation of about 20 percent, about one fifth in the general variability of generalized trust can be explained by the country level, which is relatively high compared with other cross-national attitudes.

At the national level, evidence has been given that predominantly the economy and fiduciary subsystems, to apply the framework provided by Parsons and Smelser (1956), are best able to explain cross-national differences in trust. In those countries that are highly prosperous, which have a high national gross domestic product per capita, all citizens benefit in the generation of generalized trust. It is a longstanding claim that pro-social attitudes and behavior flourish in those societies that are prosperous. Also in countries that are characterized by a tradition in Protestant religion, of which it is expected that the non-hierarchical relationships associated with a dense network are still reflected in the national culture, the citizens show considerable higher levels of trust. In this respect, the results reflect Inglehart's logic towards social change towards the incorporation of postmaterial attitudes, like trusting the generalized other. Generalized trust thus responds highly on economic change and a cultural tradition. Yet, since the religious subsystem is regarded to be path dependent – the influence of, across Europe, the Protestant tradition in a selected number of countries – this explains why the economy explains a lot of variability in trust across countries but still leaves unexplained the exceptional position of the Nordic countries with regard to the trust of its citizenry. Thus, both the economic and fiduciary systems are best able to explain differences in trust across citizens across countries.

What is quite remarkable is that income inequality, which in most of the studies has been an important determinant of generalized trust – Uslaner (2002; with Brown, 2005) argues that high levels of inequality reduce the level of optimism among the citizens and decrease the awareness of a shared sense of togetherness. It seems, however, that at present, trust is hardly affected by wide income gaps. This might bear also some consequences for the study of ethnic-cultural diversity and trust. Since the latter kind of diversity is another expression of persisting fractionalization of society, the question will

arise to what extent ethnic-cultural heterogeneity affects trust given the absent relation with the Gini index for income inequality.

As was the aim of this chapter, I was hoping to accuse those perpetrators who are responsible of differential levels of generalized trust across Europe. Next to institutional economical and cultural factors, also certain individual respondent characteristics are ringleaders in differences in trust. While the national level of wealth is highly important, also individual socioeconomic prosperity has a high impact on trust. Not controlling for selection effects, the individual socioeconomical realm even outweighs involvement in voluntary associations, on which the society-centered approach is largely based. If scholars refer to schools of democracy to denote the positive externalities of associational involvement, one can even argue whether voluntary associations or rather schools as such are the breeding place for trusting citizens.

$$\begin{aligned} Trust_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_1 age_{ij1} + \beta_2 gender_{ij2} + \beta_3 origin_{ij3} + \beta_4 urbanization_{ij4} \\ & + \beta_5 civilstat_{ij5} + \beta_6 children_{ij6} + \beta_7 education_{ij7} + \beta_8 employment_{ij8} \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & + \beta_9 income_{ij9} + \beta_{10} volunteering_{ij10} + \beta_{11} religious_{ij11} + \beta_{12} television_{ij12} + e_{ij} \\ \beta_{0j} = & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} economy_{j1} + \gamma_{02} culture_{j2} + u_j \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

In a later phase, it will be tested whether ethnic-cultural diversity can be regarded as a ringleader for varying levels of trust, or, on the contrary, whether it is only an accomplice or has been wrongfully accused as responsible for causing variation in trust. By estimating this baseline model, we now have an idea of the extent that other national level variables affect individual level trust. In further stages of this research, the regression model as has been simplified in equations (12) and (13) above will be form the basis for the assessment of the conditional relation of diversity on trust.

PART II

DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL COHESION IN EUROPE

Chapter 4

Literature Review on Ethnic-Cultural Diversity and Generalized Trust

The point of departure in the study of collective behavior must be an adequate theoretical approach to the social psychological issues of intergroup relations. This is to some extent represented in the so-called 'social identity' perspective, but social identity is not enough: The subtle and complex interactions between group strategies striving to achieve positive group distinctiveness, and the strategies instrumental in attempts to change or preserve the status quo must be taken into account as a fundamental issue in theories and research (Tajfel, 1984, p. 713, in Brown, 2000, p. 769).

1. Introduction

Social cohesion in diverse societies cannot be properly understood without making reference to generalized trust, i.e. trust in the generalized other. This type of thin trust lubricates social interactions and considerably lowers transaction costs that are involved in everyday life and increases information flows (Putnam, 2000). Until now, expectations about the causal relation between diversity and generalized trust have however not been regarded in this dissertation. The aim of this chapter is thus to present theoretical as well as empirical arguments for the general expectation that diversity is harmful for the creation of trust. The outline of this chapter is therefore twofold. First of all, I will summarize dominant theoretical approaches that might clarify the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust. While the literature largely predicts a rather tense relation between the two, there is also limited support for the alternative hypothesis, predicting that under certain conditions trust can prosper in mixed societies. Second, I want to identify patterns in the scarce number of research outcomes on diversity and trust that have been presented thus far. Critically reviewing this research both across and within countries will lead to preliminary conclusions that will be implemented in further stages of the empirical analysis.

It has to be emphasized, however, that the empirical investigation into whether and to what extent diversity affects social cohesion in general and generalized trust in particular is a quite recent research body. In many empirical studies, a solid theoretical framework

for the potential negative effect is, consequently, largely missing. Therefore, it is essential to formulate solid theoretical models before the empirical relation between diversity and trust can be assessed. Similarly, since this area of research is recently established, empirical studies on this relation are still quite limited, yielding quite often different and even contradictory results. In the second section of this chapter, the theories that can pinpoint the social consequences of increasing immigration will be discussed. As authors already proposed (Tajfel, 1984, in Brown, 2000), arguments from many disciplines, including social network theory and social psychology, need to be confronted. Both the theoretical arguments discussed in this chapter as well as the methodological guidelines as proposed in the Introduction, will guide the survey of the recent findings. Bringing the evidence together, some conclusions will be drawn that will serve as point of departure further in this dissertation.

2. Overview of the Theoretical Approaches

It may come as no surprise that the study of diversity and its social consequences has been a central theme in mainly American social sciences. Already since the early decades of the 20th century, urban sociologists have been interested in race and race relations (cf. Du Bois, 1903; Park, 1950), largely driven by inner-city problems. The main theories on how diversity affects social life have been established in the mid-20th century in an era in which the Black population in the US increasingly gained civil rights. Predominantly the social-psychological literature has a rich tradition in inter-group relations; many contributions in this field stem from the methodological expertise – the experiment, in which there can be controlled for various exogenous factors, is widely used; the Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif et al., 1961) has, for instance, laid to the formulation of group threat theories. In sociology and political science, the empirical investigation of the influence of diversity on wider society has followed on the social psychological tradition, namely with small groups research interested at the micro- and meso-level, and more particularly regarding friendship ties (Marsden, 1987, 1988) and classroom settings (Moody, 2001). Only recently, theories have been formed based on large-scale social survey projects (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). In this section, both negative and positive theoretical approaches that have been proposed throughout the years will be reviewed.

2.1. Negative Relation

Mainly three theoretical models underpinning a negative correlation between diversity and trust can be determined. The first model, labeled ‘aversion to heterogeneity’, has been adopted mainly from the social network literature and predicts that individuals feel less comfortable when surrounded by dissimilar others. The second theoretical strand is the group threat model, which emphasizes that in society, struggle for scarce resources implies conflict between competing groups. This threat is shown to respond not only to

‘realistic’ threats, like scarce economic resources, but also to symbolic ones, like status dominance and the maintenance of the culture. Last but not least, from sociology, anomie theory has been taken into consideration, meaning that in times of rapid social change, like immigration is one obvious process, normative consensus might weaken, which make people inclined to hunker down.

2.1.1. Aversion to Heterogeneity

Central in the model of ‘aversion to heterogeneity’, a term that has been introduced by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), is the concept of homophily (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson et al., 2001), referring to the tendency that “a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people” (McPherson et al., 2001, p. 416). First of all, the homophily-literature is reviewed. Second, since this theoretical concept misses information why networks tend to be homogeneous, arguments are presented that explain why individuals prefer to bond with those who are alike.

2.1.1.1. “Birds of a Feather Flock Together”

Theorizing on the effect of diversity on generalized trust, the polemic relation can be exemplified by reversing the causal order, namely looking at the elements that constitute those networks that are highest in trust and reciprocity. Social network theorists have argued that two principles are in competition to explain the odds for mixed networks, namely propinquity, i.e. the proximity of dissimilar others as a prerequisite for heterogeneous network formation, and homophily, i.e. the preference to associate with people with whom various personal characteristics are in common (Blau, 1977). Over the last couple of years, predominantly the principle of homophily has received widespread attention since despite the increasing diversity of society, networks still tend to be more homogeneous than the sociodemographics of a given area would predict; or to put it differently: birds of the same feather flock together (McPherson et al., 2001). What is more, evidence suggests that this principle does not only hold for homogeneous ties based on ethnic and cultural similarity, but also for gender and age (Marsden, 1987) and stability in attitudes (Kandel, 1978), to give but a few examples

The origin of the principle of homophily based on ethnic and cultural homophily has mainly been provided in the context of school friendships and interracial marriages in US societies. First of all, decades after the 1954 *Brown vs. Board of Education* ruling, which declared that school racial segregation violated the equality-principle, schools may have become more ethnically and culturally diverse, yet, friendship formation within these schools did not reflected the actual ethnic-cultural school composition but, contrary, were largely on preference to associate with similar students (Moody, 2001; Quillian & Campbell, 2003; Gonzalez et al., 2007; Mouw & Entwisle, 2006). Second, also in more intimate relations, i.e. love and marriage, homophily is widespread. Not only is ethnic preference common in dating (Yancey, 2009), also the intermarriage rates

predict that marriages are to a large extent solemnized across racial lines (Kalmijn, 1998; Alba & Nee, 2003; Model & Fisher, 2002).

While the presence of homophily is still dominant as a constituting element of tie formation, it needs, however, to be emphasized that there is evidence that the principle of homophily is in a steady decline (Alba & Nee, 2003; Rosenfeld & Kim, 2005). Therefore, if interracial networks can be regarded as a 'litmus test' for integration and decreasing social distances between ethnic-cultural groups within society (Barth, 1969; Alba & Nee, 2003; for counter-arguments see Song, 2009), the decline in homophily might be indicative for a growing trust in out-groups. Nevertheless, as can be expected from this social network argument, if people tend to associate with people who resemble them because it guarantees the highest levels of trust, it can be argued that from a more macro-level perspective, the highest levels of trust can also be obtained in societies that are homogeneous on various characteristics, like ethnic-cultural diversity.

2.1.1.2. Explanations for Homophily

Discussing the principle of homophily does, however, not describe why people are more inclined to base ties on similarity. The answer to this question involves a reference to the definition of trust, namely "a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definition of self-interest" (Levi, 1998, p. 78). One of the most crucial elements in this definition is 'risk'. To reduce the risk of betrayal, the act of trust, which in an everyday situation requires a quick decision (Messick & Kramer, 2001, p. 103), involves an assessment of the odds of betrayal. In making this decision, various factors are taken into account, including 'discrimination' and 'shallowness' (Messick & Kramer, 2001; for an overview see Hooghe, 2007). While discrimination as underlying process mainly refers to the reputation of the trusted, shallowness refers to the fact that people use stereotypes in considering who and who not to trust.

According to the first process, namely discrimination, trusters have the information at their disposal that allows them to engage in trust-relations (Mayer et al., 1995). This model predicts that the truster can assess what "the motives and behavioral patterns of the other" are (Hooghe, 2007, p. 716). Relying on this information, trusters are able to predict whether others will cooperate with or rather violate the granted trust. According to the second argument, namely the shallowness hypothesis, trusters do not have direct information at their disposal, like reputation or previous experiences, that is necessary to assess whether others are trustworthy or not. To accommodate for this lack of information, trusters might rely on other sources like there are stereotypes. It can thus be expected that people do trust others less when they cannot rely on direct information about those they are about to trust.

Additional evidence for distrust based on dissimilarity is proposed by belief ('values') congruence theory (Rokeach et al., 1960). According to this model, trust is largely dependent upon the trusted his or her ideological considerations and not one's ethnic-cultural descent. The setup of the study underlying this model was a questionnaire in which respondent were offered a set of items that crossed racial and lines of beliefs, i.e. asking a white religious respondent whether he ore she would become friends with an African American who believes in God, and a white person who is an atheist. Rokeach and his colleagues (1960) arrived to the conclusion that discrimination was larger on ideological grounds than on ethnic-cultural grounds. While the original research has been criticized frequently, especially on the methodological ground of not including statistical tests (Insko et al., 1983), over the last couple of years, it has been widely accepted that trust will decrease when cultural distances increase (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Van Oudenhoven et al., 2002).

Moving from dyad relations to wider societies, authors have argued that trust is also higher when living in societies where such cultural and social distances are small. Equality is considered to be one of the major trust-inducing factors (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2007). The pathways for the creation of trust under the condition of equality are multifold (Uslaner, 2002; Uslaner & Brown, 2005). First of all, in a society in which there are large social distances, the so-called 'losers of society' (Newton, 2001) may have the perception that their grievances are not shared by the 'winners'. For this reason, they may rather opt not to participate in general community life and consequently, the formation of trust may be inhibited. The second argument why there is less trust in unequal societies is that there is no shared sense of belonging. According to Uslaner and Brown (2005), the so-called winners will not perceive their fate as being similar to the one of the losers. Given these diverging interests, it might be expected that given this absence of shared fate, one is not expected to have trust in the other, which consequently diminishes trust. Third, in unequal societies, people generally have lower levels of optimism that the future will turn out well. Since trust is highly dependent upon being optimistic and being connected to society, high levels of inequality will drive down trust. Evidence for this negative relation between ethnic-cultural inequality and generalized trust has also been generated by welfare state scholars who argue that programs aiming at reducing social distances among all citizens are better able to generate trust (Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005); i.e. trust flourishes well in those societies that emphasize egalitarian norms (Nannestad, 2008).

Summarizing the aversion to heterogeneity argument, there is thus a general tendency to associate with people who are alike. People do so because bonding with similar others is less complex when predicting other's behavior; predictability increases when cultural distances decrease. Furthermore, living in diverse and unequal settings generally limits the creation of trust since inequality tends to erode trust in the generalized other: inequality reduces optimism and also hampers the creation of a shared sense of togetherness, which are all expected to contribute to the generation of trust.

2.1.2. Group Threat Theory

Next to the ‘aversion to heterogeneity’-model, also group threat theory predicts a tense relation between diversity and trust. This model first of all assumes the universal tendency for social categorization – by categorize others in certain predisposed schemes, people reduce the complexity in social life world. This social categorization goes along with a so-called in-group bias: individuals tend to favor the in-group. Second, when faced with a struggle over the pool of scarce goods within society, group conflict theory predicts that in-group solidarity is fostered on the expense of out-group hostility. Third, while this group conflict has mainly been applied to perceived realistic threats – scarce goods have widely been expressed in terms of socioeconomic resources – at present currently, group conflict models have incorporated the importance of symbolic threats, like social status.

2.1.2.1. Social Categorization and In-Group Bias

Social psychological literature suggests that individuals construct social categories that tend to reduce the level of complexity and, consequently, decreases the transaction cost involved in everyday life. Brown (1995), for instance, uses the example of being lost abroad: one is more likely to ask a police officer or somebody within another official local uniform to explain the route to the place one is heading to because these people are positively associated with the outcome, namely knowing the place. The police uniform is thus a marker of a social category to which people ascribe certain characteristics. Social categorization theory predicts that with regard to one’s ethnic-cultural descent, similar categorizations apply, which makes that boundaries are created that differentiate ethnic-cultural distinct individuals from the in-group.

The accompanying process defining social categorization is perceived intra-group homogeneity and out-group heterogeneity (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1983; Simon & Brown, 1987). Individuals tend to homogenize differences in the in-group; contrary, while also variability in those ethnic-cultural distinct others, namely the out-group, are homogenized, general differences between the in-group and the out-group are overestimated. Additionally, next to this tendency to overestimate the differences between the in- and out-group, people are also more likely to ascribe more positive characteristics to the in-group while the out-group is portrayed in a negative manner. By referring to the concept of in-group bias, Tajfel and Turner state that there is “a tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in evaluations and experiences” (2004, p. 56). Thus, in diverse societies, natives are generally expected to easily foster in-group levels of trust while trust in the generalized other, including other ethnic and cultural groups, requires more effort.

Social-psychologists have proposed several measures to reduce the in-group bias (Brown, 1995). Laboratory experiments have shown that if two discriminating categories cross one another, the in-group bias will be lower compared with the single

conditions. For instance, as research has shown, minorities predominantly possess the least prestigious jobs. If minorities would possess mid- or high-prestigious jobs, these crosscutting categories would cause psychological conflict, which would ultimately lead to a reduced in-group bias. But as social-psychologists also note, real-life situations are more difficult to predict than laboratory experiments in which single causes can be separated. Various conflicts all over the world do show that it is far from easy that this crosscutting paradigm is difficult to uphold outside the lab. Also with regard to the effects of diversity, the question therefore is to what extent policies that aim to cut across various group characteristics might foster generalized trust.

2.1.2.2. Realistic Group Conflict

While theories on social categorization express that categorization is a universal phenomenon, it is not able to explain rising hostility towards out-groups. The realistic group conflict theory, on the other hand, depicts that “intergroup hostility is produced by the existence of conflicting goals (i.e., competition) and reduced by the existence of mutually desired superordinate goals attainable only through intergroup cooperation” (Jackson, 1993). The basic theme is that within society, there is a pool of scarce goods, like for instance the number of available jobs. Over these scarce goods, various groups might struggle, which tends to result in hostility towards out-groups (e.g. Semyonov et al., 2008).

The formulation of the group conflict theory originates from the Robber’s Cave minimalistic group experiment, conducted by Sherif and his colleagues (1961). The experimental set-up was to investigate group dynamics evolving when a group, who did not meet before, was divided into two balanced parts and were brought in competition. Within a couple of days, each group started to organize and behave accordingly, including the use of group names. The first experimental stage was characterized by social categorization, i.e. each group became aware of the presence of the other and started to bond intensively with other group-members; typical group dynamics occurred, like giving the group an appropriate name. In the second stage, Sherif and colleagues (1961) created a competition between the two groups (in which in final a trophy could be won) of which the result was that each group created a strong sense of hostility towards the other. In the third phase of the research, the experimental leaders generated superordinate goals for the joint two groups that steadily led to a steady decline in out-group hostility.

The Robber’s Cave experiment has profiled the realistic group conflict theory as dominant in the intergroup relations literature; it emphasizes the view that intergroup relations reflect group interests, i.e. competing or superordinate goals (Brown, 1995). The most straightforward formulation of this theory has been given by LeVine, who stated “describe to me the economic intergroup situation, and I shall predict the content of the relations” (cited in Brown, 1995). As Meuleman et al summarize (2009), it may

come as no surprise that studies that have tested the realistic group conflict theory have focused on two main variables, namely minority group size and the socioeconomic situation of the country. The logic behind is that the minority group size reflects the number of competitors while the socioeconomic situation is the object of competition.

Sheriff was among the first to add to the original findings of the Robber's Cave experiment. More specifically, concerning competition, he broadened the resources to "a real or imagined threat to the safety of the group, an economic interest, a political advantage, a military consideration, prestige, or a number of others" (Sherif, 1966) Already in the 1960s, Sherif emphasized that group conflicts may not always be realistic but also imagined. As Esses et al. (2001, p. 394) repeat it, "the combination of resource stress and the salience of a potentially competitive out-group leads to perceived group competition for resources. Such perceived group competition is likely to take the form of zero-sum beliefs." To have a group conflict, two essential elements need thus to be fulfilled, namely stress on the availability of resources and an out-group that might be in competition with the in-group over these scarce resources.

Indeed, the presence of an out-group is essential for the occurrence of group threats. Yet, only the mere presence of an out-group is not a necessary precondition to generate group conflict – only if the out-group is in direct or in a perceived threat for competition over these resources, a potential conflict might arise. As an example, if policies promoting skilled labor migration might pose a threat for the native employed in these sectors in which these immigrants are trained. Moreover; this threat does not need to be real but may also be perceived as apparent. Indeed, even if raw data do not demonstrate job loss among the native population, the perception that immigrants are taking away jobs is a sufficient precondition to induce out-group hostility. In this respect, the real group conflict theory emphasizes the struggle over resources as framed on zero-sum beliefs: the scarce resources that are available are limited and consequently, if a certain group obtains more of this stock, of the perception is that this is the case, the less there is available for the other group.

2.1.2.3. Symbolic Threats

While the realistic group conflict theory has mainly been exemplified by stress on socioeconomic recourses, scholars have recently qualified whether out-group distrust is best explained by stressed over a perceived pool of socioeconomic sources or, alternative, over rather symbolic sources, like for instance the maintenance of the national culture or status in society (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Paxton & Mughan, 2006). Certainly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, there is an upsurge into research framed on the so-called 'clash of civilizations'-thesis (Huntington, 1996), arguing about the incommensurability between major cultural cleavages around the world that may, also within countries, be considered to be the source of intergroup conflict (Huntington, 2004)

Departing from tests for the validity of the realistic group conflict model, scholars emphasize the importance of the symbolic threats model. Using the 2003 wave of the ESS, both Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) on the one hand and Sides and Citrin (2007) on the other hand arrive to similar conclusion that out-group hostility can no longer be explained as mainly driven by socioeconomic stress. In disentangling educational levels and employment skills – those resources that are at the center of attention when it comes at resource stress – the first authors claim that both skills and education hardly explain differentials in individual fears about labor market competition. The authors argue that “the relation between education and views about immigration actually has very little to do with competition for jobs.” Contrary, since Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) do find evidence that more-educated place stronger emphasis on cultural diversity, they convincingly claim that anti-immigrants sentiments are driven predominantly by stress on survival of the dominant culture. Using the same data set but a distinct methodology, Sides and Citrin (2007) arrive to a similar conclusion, namely that predominantly attitudes regarding cultural diversity foster hostility towards immigration while the socioeconomic determinants are quite redundant.

Within the Netherlands, similar claim have been made. Investigating anti-Muslim sentiments, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) have questioned why the Dutch have become hostile towards Muslims over the last decade. The main research puzzle in their work was whether negative attitudes towards minority cultures could be equated with racism. In their analysis, they have set aside the classic realistic group conflict theory and emphasized that perceptions are of utmost importance. Testing a numerous battery of perceived competition, the authors conclude that mainly the fear for the erosion of Dutch cultural identity has caused prejudice towards the Muslim community. Yet, what is more important to underscore is that those Dutch who are concerned with this erosion can hardly be labeled as racists: “those who say that they object to Muslim practices – but not to Muslims – mean what they say” (2007, p. 36). Thus, what the symbolic threats argument underwrites is that instead of realistic threats, also other sources of stress beyond the economical realm can induce group hostility.

2.1.3. Anomie

While theories on aversion to heterogeneity and on group conflict have gained much attention in research into the societal consequences of diversity, the more sociological explanations have only been recently taken into consideration (Putnam, 2007; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2008). More precisely, one of the most logical explanations for decreasing trust due to increasing diversity regards the argument of anomie, i.e. that due to rapid social change, normative consensus is under erosion. In fact, when considering the social consequences of diversity from a Durkheimian point of view (cf. Chapter 1) anomie theory is a highly usable theory to consider (1984 [1893], pp. 291-309). Durkheim described anomie as the phenomenon of which “certain social functions are not adjusted to another” (1984 [1893], p. 292). More precisely, he used the example of

the division of labor in which regularly, this division led to a specific specialization in which the specialized part did not keep track of the other mutually dependent parts. As such, the division of labor might alienate individuals from the wider society they are a part of.

Later, scholars have defined anomie as “a situation characterized by indeterminate goals and unlimited aspirations, the disorientation or vertigo created by confrontation with an excessive widening of the horizons of the possible, in a context of expansion or increasing upward mobility” (Besnard, 1988, p. 93). Moreover, anomie “results when the power of social values to regulate the ends and the means of human conduct is weakened” (Bernburg, 2002, p. 729). This theory thus imposes that social change leads to a weakening of normative consensus since there has not been given interpretation to these changes.

Anomie theory has been widely used to link social change with the occurrence of deviant behavior (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995) and consequently, the disintegration of society. The application of anomie theory in criminology to assess the relation between economic development and deviant behavior may not come as surprise. Indeed, the classic anomie theory is rooted in the economic sphere – while Durkheim was under influence of the industrial transformation of French society, Merton (1939), who exported this theory to the American discipline, was inspired by the Great Depression and its aftermath in the 1930s. Yet, over the past couple of years, the literature has acknowledged a shift from economic resources to cultural maintenance (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). It is therefore remarkable that the literature on the social consequences of ethnic-cultural diversity has been immune for anomie theory. Moreover, while empirical efforts have thus far largely been framed on criminal behavior as a result of the anomic normlessness, it is surprising that these theories have not been framed around the concept of generalized trust, or, from an anomie perspective, the absence of it.

Embedding anomie in the realm of societal values, it is indeed plausible that increasing immigration erodes the normative consensus that may have flourished when immigration was rather restricted. Rapid inflows of immigrants do not only increase the mere exposure of people who are visible different of the majority population, foreign norms and values are also introduced to the wider society. Given the expected erosion of this normative consensus, the general aspirations that “regulate the ends and the means of human conduct is weakened,” referring to Bernburg (2002). As a result, anomie may be induced – people might become alienated from society. By providing in a theory that regards reactions of anomie in the investigation of the social consequences of diversity, Putnam has stretched the anomie argument but labeled it as ‘constrict theory’. The main argument in his theoretical reasoning is that due to diversity, people do not only become intolerant towards the out-group but also show lower levels of solidarity towards the in-group: “Diversity seems to trigger not group/out-group

division, but anomie or social isolation (...) people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to ‘hunker down’” (Putnam, 2007, p. 149). Thus, also diversity and immigration as a process of social change must be approached from an anomie perspective.

2.2. Non-Negative Relation

Next to the theoretical models that describe a negative impact of diversity on generalized trust, other models are proposed that have hinted to the existence of conditions in which diversity may not result in a negative effect on trust but on the other hand might yield positive consequences. First of all, according to the contact theory, under certain conditions, the mere presence of dissimilar others might foster tolerance. Second, social network theorists have paid attention to possible positive effects that heterogeneous, or so-called bridging or weak, networks might have.

2.2.1. Contact theory

In the literature, the dominant theory that emphasizes that diversity does not always undermine generalized trust is the contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998a). The main point of departure is that contact with dissimilar groups creates a kind of appreciation for these groups – to phrase it in another way: you simply cannot like those you are unfamiliar with. As such, living in mixed communities might lead to an appreciation for out-groups, the norms and values the other ethnic-cultural groups adhere to and consequently, ethnic-cultural diversity might foster generalized trust – or at least is expected not to destroy it.

The keyword in the last sentence is, however, ‘might’. Students of contact theory have emphasized that contact between groups is in itself not sufficient to foster tolerance and intergroup trust (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998a; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Allport (1954, p. 281) stated that “Prejudice (...) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups.” Next to equal status, common goals, institutional support, and cooperation, Pettigrew (1998b) adds that in order to foster interpersonal trust, ties must be of these kind that potential friendships could be created.

The first key condition that needs to be met is equal status. The logic behind this argument is that when two groups are in a situation, unequal status induces an in-group bias, which prevents the creation of general attitudes of tolerance. Based on a literature review, Mullen and colleagues (1992, p. 106) depart their meta-analysis regarding the role of status from the finding that those in a subordinate status are biased towards the in-group while higher status groups are more engaged in out-group bias. However, after

an overview, they conclude that predominantly in artificial settings, higher status groups tend to be in-group biased, while in real settings, in-group bias is limited (Mullen et al., 1992, p. 117). Thus, while equal status as a necessary condition for tolerance between groups seems to be necessary, its magnitude seems to be rather limited.

The second condition is common goals. While minority groups in fact may have a past that is different from the majority population, intergroup contact may have only positive effects when there is a mutual recognition that both groups have shared outcome (Gaertner et al., 1999). The third key condition that is related to the second one is intergroup cooperation. The understanding may be that both majority and minority population have one common goal, yet, intergroup contact may have beneficial effects when both groups work together in order to reach these goals (Sherif, 1966). The rationale behind this third condition falls back to the realistic group conflict theory: if two groups compete instead of working together on a common goal, interpersonal trust will be eroded significantly.

The combination of the two elements of common goals and intergroup cooperation is famously addressed by Allport (1954, p. 264), who argued that “only the type of contact that leads people to do things together is likely to result in changed attitudes. The principle is clearly illustrated in multi-ethnic athletic teams. Here the goal is important while the ethnic composition of the group is irrelevant. It is the cooperative striving for the goal that engenders solidarity.” Half a century after date, scholars are, however, still determining which of the two components, i.e. common goals or intergroup cooperation, are most favorable for fostering trust. Most of the evidence seems to be in favor of the latter (Gaertner et al., 1999).

The last condition that needs to be met is the support of authorities, laws or customs. According to Brown (1995, pp. 237-239) three processes which underpin this condition. First of all, authorities, law and customs provide institutional or social sanctioning for breaking the common goals that should be reached. Second, relying on Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (1957), Brown argues that people make efforts to bring their attitudes in relation with their behavior. If individuals are forced to cooperate with dissimilar others, they might incorporate accompanying successful attitudes. Third, Brown argues that a system of sanctioning can create a climate in which trust can be fostered. Indeed, supporting norms seem to be essential to foster tolerance and trust between groups; yet, the recently developed social dominance theory argues that institutions nevertheless tend to favor the dominant groups in society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 2004)

Recently, Pettigrew (1998a) added a fifth condition to the four Allport (1954) has formulated, namely “the contact situation must provide the participants with the opportunity to become friends” (1998a, p. 76). What is important in Pettigrew’s study is the emphasis that this fifth condition of friendship potential is essential and not only

facilitating; in order to have beneficial effects of intergroup contact on trust, the interaction needs to be of this kind that it may result in friendships. From a causal perspective, Pettigrew furthermore adds that this fifth condition builds upon the four key conditions that Allport has formulated. More precisely, the four conditions, equal status, common goals, cooperation and supporting norms, characterize to what extent friendships can be fostered.

As is the case with various theoretical explanations, in fact, the five conditions are interrelated. As Pettigrew shows in his review article on the contact theory (1998a), equal status is, for instance, quite often situational embedded. He refers to two examples, namely the fact that in Northern Ireland, the Catholics and Protestants, to have an earning, were obliged to cooperate in the farming industry (1998a, p. 78); also, in Southern Africa, interracial equal-status contact was limited by non-supporting norms (1998a, p. 79). Taken together, the interrelatedness of various components make it, certainly in real life situations, difficult to disentangle the conditions of interracial contact and the effects they induce. Nevertheless, what has to be remembered is that living in diverse settings might, conditionally, foster generalized trust.

2.2.2. The Strength of Bridging and Weak Ties

Stepping aside from the social-psychological literature, also in the network theory, similar arguments are present. More precisely, there is a strand in the social network literature that contributes to the homophily-argument. More precisely, it is argued that while individuals may eventually bond on similar traits, mixed networks might in the end be beneficial. Indeed, diverse networks are able to foster pro-social attitudes and behavior, like generalized trust. In this section, related arguments are discussed, namely the positive effects of bridging (Putnam, 2000) or weak ties (Granovetter, 1973).

In 'Bowling Alone' (2000), Putnam differentiates bonding from bridging networks, arguing that predominantly the latter create positive externalities on various outcomes. The distinction between bonding and bridging ties is exemplified by de Souza Briggs, who argues that social capital has two different purposes, namely 'to get by' and 'to get ahead' (1997). Social capital 'to get by' means that networks are supportive for happenings that occur in regular life. The author uses the example of poor moms who share care-giving tasks or ride to church together. De Souza Briggs emphasizes that lots of these networks are quite homogeneous in nature. On the other hand, social capital has also the purpose 'to get ahead' in life; social capital can be used to give some leverage to possible opportunities to change the live in a positive manner. De Souza Briggs argues (1997, p. 112) that this form of social capital needs to be bridging across class, race and gender – "building more diverse networks are critical, whether they be schools, community associations, or job partnerships."

Investigating the empirical underpinning of the positive externalities of bonding and bridging ties, several authors have tried to assess which types of associations are best

apt to foster pro-social behavior (Stolle, 1998; Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Hooghe, 2003b, 2003c; Coffé & Geys, 2007; Geys & Murdoch, 2008). Indeed, various authors have stressed that members of bridging associations, like humanitarian organizations, sports associations and neighborhood committees, adhere to more democratic values than the members of bonding associations, like, women's groups and associations for the retired. This positive effect of heterogeneous associations is even present after control for the potential spurious effect of self-selection (cf. Chapter 3), namely that members of bridging associations were also more positively oriented towards society in advance.

The distinction between bonding and bridging networks has also been discussed alternatively in network theory. Making reference to strong and weak ties, Granovetter (1973) argues that the first ones are those ties that link individuals together while the latter refer to ties that are not well established. For instance, in a conversation, the expression "I know somebody who ..." is quite illustrative for these kinds of weak ties: those extended network ties extend the level of information that is not present in the original network. In subsequent research efforts, Granovetter points, his arguments based on research outcomes on career development, to the positive effects of these weak ties on various spheres in life, predominantly the economic one (1995 [1974]). Moreover, it is interesting how the rise in modern social networks, like Facebook and Myspace, has renewed an interest in Granovetter's work on weak ties (Ellison et al., 2007).

2.3. Conclusion: Distinguishing Contextual Diversity from Intergroup Contact

Reviewing the theoretical arguments that determine the relation between diversity and generalized trust emphasizes the necessity to differentiate between two important features of diversity, namely contextual diversity and intergroup relations (see also Stolle et al., 2008). More precisely, one needs to make this distinction since they impact generalized trust differently. First of all, with regard to contextual diversity, all theoretical argument point to a negative relation of diversity on trust. The most trustful relations are those that are characterized by high levels of similarity, also with regard to foreign descent. Similar people simply like to bond with each other because heterogeneity makes life more difficult since one cannot rely on the prediction of other's behavior. Moreover, in diverse societies, there are diverging interests that undermine trust or, on the other hand, mutual interests that form the object of struggle between perceived distinct groups. But most importantly, in societies that change rapidly, and immigration can be considered as a major social change, people tend to hunker down and distrust not only out-groups but also the in-group. Consequently, the majority of evidence of living in diverse societies is rather pessimistic.

Second, next to the pessimistic view, various scholars emphasize that intergroup relations serve as mediator for this negative effect. Indeed, the majority of research in

the field of contact theory has underscored that under certain conditions, interactions with dissimilar other might put foster feelings of trust. The conditions, however, are not so straightforward, certainly not in diverse societies. Indeed, to have the best effects on trust, groups need to be of equal status, need to engage in cooperative interactions, there need to be opportunities for personal acquaintance, norms of egalitarianism need to be provided, and last but not least, the groups need to be of these types that friendship building should be possible. Since the contact theory has been refined predominantly in psychological experiments, it is of course the question to what extent it is straightforward to disentangle the five conditions outside lab settings.

Combining the two approaches, it may be clear that the two models do not necessarily juxtapose one another. Taking in mind the propinquity-argument, namely that in highly mixed societies, the odds that a random individual encounters a dissimilar other are fairly higher than in predominantly homogeneous societies, it is highly possible that in mixed societies intergroup contact is far from widespread. More recently, in the generation of trust, segregation has been introduced as a mechanism that is more harmful for the creation of trust (Hooghe, 2007; Uslaner, 2009b). It is known that, predominantly in metropolitan areas, the phenomenon of segregation, i.e. that ethnic minorities settle in distinct communities, is present. In this respect, it thus can be the case that two societies share the same degree of diversity, yet, in the one the immigrants are mixed with the natives while in the second one, they have formed a distinct community. It is expected that the latter is even more harmful for the generation of trust in the generalized other than diversity as such. In the next section, I will therefore take a step back from the theoretical argument and survey the empirical research on the relation between diversity and trust to discover whether it has been discovered that trust is effectively lower due to increasing diversity in a series of contexts.

3. Overview of the Empirical Research

The research into the effects of living in an ethnic-cultural diverse community on one's individual levels of generalized trust – or other community-life tapping indicators – is a rather new discipline. While preliminary empirical findings on this relation have been published since the end of the 20th century (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Knack & Keefer, 1997), the theme has boomed since the publication of Robert Putnam's "E Pluribus Unum" in *Scandinavian Political Studies* (2007). Since the debate of the social consequences of diversity is largely framed on "E Pluribus Unum", I will also depart from Putnam's findings. Subsequently, in the first part of this empirical research section, other US-based findings are also discussed.

Despite the prominence of "E Pluribus Unum" in the debate on the social consequences of diversity, it is needless to say that the American context of this relation differs highly from the context of interest, i.e. the European one. For this reason, an

additional section is dedicated to an elaboration on why we should be careful with framing the whole debate on diversity and generalized trust on Putnam's findings. Consequently, other recent empirical findings on this relation are also discussed, starting with evidence coming first of other non-European OECD-countries, second from European studies and last but not least from cross-national studies.

In this review of the recent research outcomes, it is nevertheless important to keep track of the seven methodological guidelines that have been proposed in investigating the relation between diversity and generalized trust (cf. Introduction), namely an assessment of the dependent and independent variables, the appropriate level of aggregation, the causal relation, the control variables, the possible spurious effect of self-selection and, last but not least, the context of the analysis. It will be made clear that the various research designs underpinning the empirical inquiries place different accents on these seven methodological remarks, which make strong generalizations on the diversity-trust relation at this point also problematic.

3.1. US-based Evidence

In line with theories on race and race relations, also the empirical research into the effects of contextual diversity on community life has been fuelled by US-based findings. One of the core characteristics of US society regards that it is designed by immigrants (Zolberg, 2006; Kennedy, 1964), yet, also recently there has been an upsurge in immigration flows, largely fed by a high influx of Mexican residents (Massey, 1981; Massey & Schnabel, 1983). Moreover, also with regard to the racial past, there is evidence that African American residents are still faced with considerable levels of discrimination. In his already famous race speech, Barack Obama (18.03.2008) addressed current urban problems and path dependency as a persisting process in the perpetuation of discrimination: "That history (of legalized discrimination) helps explain the wealth and income gap between black and white, and the concentrated pockets of poverty that persists in so many of today's urban and rural communities." Departing from Mr. Obama's race speech, the tradition of diversity in America does seem to point to a series of negative consequences.

3.1.1. 'E Pluribus Unum'

In his seminal article 'E Pluribus Unum', Putnam (2007) has given empirical evidence for this expected polemic but also double-coined relation. Indeed, next to potentially tense, Putnam's point of departure was quite positive. Specifically, Putnam argues that the timeframe is highly important when reflecting upon the effects of diversity on society (2007, pp. 140-141): in the long run, immigration is accepted to be necessary for American society. For instance, relying upon the country of origin of Nobel prize winners associated with US Universities, and upon other economic indicators, Putnam argues that, without any doubt, nations benefit from immigration. More nuanced,

Putnam emphasizes that at the medium run, certain societies are better able to mitigate expected negative consequences of diversity on social capital (2007, pp. 159-165). Largely building his arguments upon personal experiences, he refers to the blurry racial identity his own grandchild – born out of a Latino father and a White mother – questions and makes reference to the once segregated character of religion which currently has rather a unifying role, predominantly the megachurches. Putnam also points to recent research outcomes that need to remind us that at the mid-19th century, the Irish immigrants to the US were mainly regarded with the same disrespect as African Americans (Alba & Nee, 2003).

However, regarding the short-term effects, Putnam presents a rather negative picture. Using a classic index for ethnic-cultural fractionalization (cf. Alesina et al., 2003), created by the race categories in the 2000 Census¹⁵, he discovered that diversity is detrimental for community life. More specifically, controlling for a battery of relevant individual and community level indicators, he has tested the relation between diversity on a wide range of social capital indicators and has discovered that there are consistently lower levels of social capital in mixed neighborhoods, except for measures of associational involvement and political engagement.¹⁶ Interpreting his findings, he emphasizes that diversity does not produce bad race relations but that it also reduces in-group trust; i.e. people tend to ‘hunker down’, to make use of Putnam’s terminology. He concludes his findings on the short-term effects by emphasizing that “diversity, at least in the short-run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us” (Putnam, 2007, p. 157).

Because of this consistent negative finding of diversity on indicators of social capital, Putnam has admitted that he invested numerous years and effort to figure out whether spurious relations could be detected (2007, pp. 151-159). Not only has he used a classic index for fractionalization as a measure for community heterogeneity, but also the share of blacks and immigrants, which delivered similar results. Regarding the level of aggregation, also higher levels, like the county level, have been applied, leading to the same direction of the effect, yet less significant. In final, also self-selection, i.e. out-migration of residents high on social capital that, consequently, may cause a negative effect of diversity on social capital because the residents low on social capital are the only ones who remain in the mixed community, has also been mentioned in ‘E Pluribus Unum’. Putnam emphasizes that the selection bias argument is implausible since those residents high on social capital would have the capacities to cope with diversity and

¹⁵ The five race categories offered in the census are Hispanic, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, Asian, Indigenous and other. To create a fractionalization index of census tract homogeneity, Putnam only used the first four categories.

¹⁶ Making reference to anomie theory, i.e. people tend to hunker down in mixed societies, sound theoretical models why there is no effect of diversity on associational life and political engagement are absent.

would therefore be the least plausible to leave, which is given proof by recent empirical outcomes (Reeskens, 2008).

Putnam's findings have, first of all, fuelled an interesting and intense public and academic debate. Among scholars, the discussions have been quite intense.¹⁷ Attempts to target Putnam have predominantly pointed to a lack of methodological clarity, like for instance the measurement of diversity, i.e. the colorblind fractionalization index (Dawkins, 2008). But as de Souza Briggs replies on these critiques (2008, pp. 223): "I believe that it is high time to behave as if Putnam and others are right about the basic prescription – that despite the gaps in research knowledge and the shortcomings of even the most careful studies, we need to be acting on a much larger scale to make unprecedented diversity work in changing." Even though remarks on Putnam's diversity work can be articulated, de Souza Briggs argues, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that diversity indeed hampers community life in the US, and, consequently, this empirical reality needs to be addressed. It comes therefore also as no surprise that the media exposure with regard to these findings were quite high: major American newspapers, including the New York Times and the Boston Globe (Jonas, 05.08.2007) have elaborated on "E Pluribus Unum", as well as a number of foreign ones like the Guardian (Bunting, 18.07.2007) have addressed Putnam's findings.

3.1.2. Other US findings

Putnam's study was, however, not the first one to raise questions about the impact of the ethnic-cultural composition of US society on generalized trust and other pro-social attitudes and behavior. Mathematically, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002) have hinted that an increase in racial heterogeneity reduces the structural and cultural components of social capital, i.e. participation in associations and generalized trust. Using the General Social Survey, the US survey program, which questions about 1,500 Americans on a yearly basis, in combination with Census tract data on racial heterogeneity, they arrive to the conclusion that both racial and ethnic heterogeneity reduce the levels of social capital, but that the effect of racial heterogeneity is more sizeable than the effect of ethnic heterogeneity. The authors suggest that the negative effect of diversity on trust is predominantly attributable to the 'aversion to heterogeneity-thesis (2002) – the effect of diversity on trust is stronger for those people that are averse towards racial mixing.

Costa and Kahn (2003) have, in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), investigated the effects of heterogeneity on social capital, also from an economist viewpoint. As

¹⁷ While the first article undermining Putnam's findings on an empirical basis still needs to be published in a scientific journal, debates on workshop (for instance on the 2008 Manchester Summer Workshop on Social Change and Britain and the US) and on conferences (for instance the diversity and community workshop at the 2008 Meeting of the American Political Science Association) have in general accepted Putnam's findings but also placed reservations with the universal applicability of his interpretation.

measures for community heterogeneity they register the effects of Gini for income heterogeneity, birthplace fragmentation as a measure for resident stability and racial fragmentation on various measures of social capital, like volunteering and trust coming from various survey sources, like the American National Election Survey (ANES) and General Social Survey (GSS). Using the metropolitan area as the level of aggregation, Costa and Kahn (2003) discovered that while income inequality is in a null relation with all four tested indicators, birthplace fragmentation is in a significant relation with all indicators: in areas high on residential turnover, there is less social capital. With regard to racial fragmentation, they only found a negative effect on the DDB Lifestyle measure of volunteering, not on trust. However, combining these outcomes with cross-national evidence, they arrive to the conclusion that civic engagement, including trust, is more difficult to foster in heterogeneous communities.

Hero's study (2003, 2007) on race and social capital departed from a critique on Putnam's "Bowling Alone"-thesis (2000). According to Hero, in his seminal argument on the decline of trust and other indicators for community life, Putnam paid too little attention to the racial structure of American society. As Hero criticizes Putnam, he argues that "even more problematic, higher aggregate social capital is sometimes associated with relatively worse outcomes for racial minorities" (2003, p. 113). Testing the effects of racial equality – i.e. the black/white voter registration and turnout ratios – on social capital at the state level, Hero finds no evidence that racial equality goes hand in hand with higher levels of aggregated social capital. In sum, from a Bourdieu (1985) perspective on social capital, Hero suggests that social capital is thus also used as an asset to limit Black empowerment, which has also been articulated by Arneil (2006).

The last US-research that requires discussion is Marschall and Stolle (2004) their investigation of heterogeneity and trust in 55 Detroit neighborhoods. After a profound multilevel analysis, controlling for other individual and contextual covariates, they find a positive effect of heterogeneity on trust; however, this effect is largely due to the fact that diversity works significantly positive for Blacks but has nonsignificant positive effects for Whites. Among Whites, Marschall and Stolle note, trust is reduced predominantly because of the low neighborhood status. Nevertheless, the authors stress that the effects of interactions on trust depend upon the level of bridging ties.

While the Detroit case provided by Marschall and Stolle (2004) is a valuable and important addition for the US debate, the main trend is that diversity indeed erodes American community life. Given this Detroit case already counters the global pattern, it evidently can be questioned to what extent the Putnam-thesis can be generalized to other industrialized countries.

3.2. Limitations of US Research Outcomes

The main reason to focus this doctoral research on Europe is that it is hard to defend a linear extrapolation of the negative findings discovered in America onto European societies. Even though Putnam's findings (2007) have been widely articulated across the Atlantic – Putnam has been asked to elaborate on his findings among British and Dutch governments (Zonderop, 28.06.2008) – there are several reasons why we should be careful in drawing general conclusions from the US-case for the relation between diversity and generalized trust across European countries. These reasons have predominantly to do with the different traditions with regard to generalized trust, diversity and the differences in general levels of inequalities in the US and across European countries.

First of all, one of the most important questions with regard to the influence of increasing diversity on a decline in generalized trust is first of all whether there actually is a decline in generalized trust in Europe. In a comparative inquiry into levels of social capital, Putnam (2002, p. 410) even admits that “at the most general level, our investigation has found no general and simultaneous decline in social capital throughout the industrial/postindustrial world over the last generation.” Across Europe, there is no evidence for a general decline in generalized trust. Evidence suggests that, to give but three examples, there is no decline in social capital indicators in Great Britain (Hall, 1999), the Netherlands (Schnabel et al., 2008) and in the Flemish Region of Belgium (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007; Smits & Elchardus, 2009). While there can be some concern regarding effects of generational change – the fact that older generations have more trust levels than the younger ones – yet, also these effects are not uniform across European countries and most of the evidence suggest that trust and other indicators for pro-social behavior are not in decline in Europe (Newton & Montero, 2007; Norris & Davis, 2007).

Second, the history of the US and trends in community life cannot be understood properly without reference to its racial past (Arneil, 2006; Hero, 2007). Also in Europe, there have been massive migration flows, like for instance in the era of the Roman Empire. It is therefore quite interesting that also two millenniums ago, societies were already confronted with the issue of ethnic-cultural diversity, who is and is not an outsider, and consequently questions regarding social cohesion (MacMullen, 1966; Pollock, 2000). However, despite the massive migration flows throughout European history, hardly any current European nation-state can document its foundation interwoven with immigration in such a manner as the US story.

There are, however, parallels that can be drawn between Europe and the US that has to do with recent immigration flows. Immigration to the US has shaped its society and national identity, but also recently a steep increase in the inflow of Asians and mainly Hispanics is documented (Massey, 1981; Massey & Schnabel, 1983). In policy terms,

when the issue of migration to the US is discussed, this is predominantly an issue of Mexican immigration and migration of undocumented aliens (Cornelius & Lewis, 2007; Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993; Huntington, 2004). Also in Europe, there is a concern about new flows of immigrant integration (Pettigrew, 1998b), predominantly regarding Muslim and undocumented migration. Nevertheless, despite this similarity between recent immigration flow, the tradition of migration to the US has been too manifest that consequently hinder comparisons of the two continents.

Third, the contexts in which the effects of diversity on generalized trust take place vary widely, not only across the European continent, but also compared with the US. Europe is a continent that is also composed out of countries that differ largely from each other. Nevertheless, it can be expected that certain differences across European are still minor for the relation between diversity and trust compared with the US. To give but one example, relying on the literature that has shown that trust is highly dependent upon the level of social distances within any given society (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2007), wide gaps between societal groups causes lower levels of optimism and a lack of a shared sense of togetherness (Uslaner & Brown, 2005) which erode trust. While income inequality plays a minor role in Europe (cf. Chapter 3), WVS research has shown that in general, income inequality is decisive for cross-national variability in generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2007). However, as is known, the Gini coefficient of the US is, with 40.8 far higher compared with the average Gini coefficient of the most egalitarian countries of Europe, namely the Scandinavian ones. In Norway, the Gini is only 25.8, which is a remarkable lower with regard to the US (Watkins, 2007).

While I do acknowledge that this research aims to assess the unique effect of diversity on generalized, and thus plans to control for other possible influences, it can be expected that in the end, still a certain level of unobserved heterogeneity inhibits the generalization of the US findings on the European continent. For this reason, it is important to overlook other studies into ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust, starting with non-European OECD-countries after which the European cases are discussed, in order to complement and balance the dominant American outcomes.

3.3. Non-European OECD-Countries

Next to America, the research into diversity and community life has also gained widespread attention within Canada. Just like the US, Canada has a rich tradition with regard to immigration, predominantly to “expand the population, boost the economy and develop society” (Reitz, 2005). Compared with US society, however, Canadian policy is rather inclusive towards Canadian citizenship by explicitly supporting the integration of immigrants, granting public assistance for immigrants and promoting the idea of multiculturalism (Bloemraad, 2006). What is more important to note is that,

Bloemraad suggests that the Canadian multicultural model has not pushed minorities into marginalization.

Nevertheless, Bloemraad's analysis has not implied a test of what the effect of diversity on Canadian society in general looks like. In a comparison between the US and Canada, Stolle and here colleagues (2008) have tried to combine the two approaches to the theoretical groundings for the effects of diversity, namely the contextual and the intergroup approach. Relying on the US 'Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy' (CID) data and the 'Canadian Equality, Security and Community Survey' (ESCS) data combined with the US and Canadian census information on visible minorities in the neighborhood, they discovered a negative effect of diversity on trust in both the US and Canada. However, their most important finding is that this effect is strongly conditioned by the interaction with dissimilar individuals: interethnic contacts mitigate the negative effect of local diversity on generalized trust. In sum, they conclude by saying that "not everyone is equally sensitive to context" (Stolle et al., 2008), providing evidence for research efforts that encapsulate contextual information on intergroup contact, and the factors that condition them. Recently, Hou and Wu (2009) have made a significant addition to this debate by arguing that diversity as such has indeed a negative effect on trust, yet, the effect of the concentration of minorities bears even a more significant negative effect. The authors argue that Whites are more trusting when minorities are evenly geographically distributed than that they are concentrated.

Other recent evidence on the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and community life in non-European OECD countries has been provided on the basis of Australian data, a country that is also known to be a settler society (Freeman & Jupp, 1992). Leigh (2006) has modeled both the effects of ethnic and linguistic diversity (both operationalized by a classic index for fractionalization) on generalized trust. He discovered that while ethnic diversity has a negative effect on community life, foremost linguistic diversity drives down generalized trust. Moreover, the effect of linguistic fractionalization on trust is stronger on immigrants than on the majority Australian population. It needs, moreover, to be added that Leigh did not find a significant effect of income inequality on generalized trust, which is contrary to most of the research on this topic that has been done so far.

3.4. European Countries

The first published evidence on the social consequences of ethnic-cultural diversity in a European country has been provided by Letki (2008). Merging the 2001 Citizenship Survey with census tract data at postcode level, she has modeled local level fractionalization on three components of social capital, namely organizational volunteering, individual help and informal sociability. After profound multilevel structural equation modeling, Letki discovered that diversity drives down trust and perceptions of neighbors but, on the other hand, has no effect on interactions within

the neighborhood. Although she has no empirical tests for this claim, she explains the negative effect on attitudes by pointing to possible effects of the media. The policy advice in hand, Letki argues that instead of targeting the racial composition of the UK neighborhoods, government cannot forego to the socioeconomic status of these neighborhoods, which is a more important issue than the racial one.

A similar kind of reasoning can be found in Laurence and Heath's study into the predictors of community cohesion (2008). The variable of interest they want to explain is the question regarding the extent one agrees or disagrees that the local area one lives in (as they explain is within 15/20 minutes walking distance) is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together, which is available in the 2005 wave of the Citizenship Survey. Using multilevel modeling by which they can model both individual and neighborhood level variables, they found out that diversity is positively related with this question. However, relying on the theory of concentrated disadvantage, they are aware that the homogeneous White areas are also the ones who are least deprived and arrive to the conclusion that "it is thus deprivation that undermines cohesion, not diversity" (2008, p. 41).

Recently, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008) have triangulated these research outcomes using the same data but a different methodology. By merging the 2000 Census data at the neighborhood level on both the structural – networks – as the cultural – trust – component of social capital, they discovered that both elements are under pressure in more diverse communities. By modeling the effects separately for different minority groups, they emphasize that diversity works differently for the White majority population and the minority population – in diverse settings, the Blacks and Asian have significantly higher levels of trust which, according to the author, gives support to the argument of multiculturalism.

In the Netherlands, different research efforts have led to remarkable different research outcomes. In their 2009 article, Tolsma, van der Meer and Gesthuizen refute earlier results by Lancee and Dronkers (2009). The aim of Lancee and Dronkers (2009) research effort was to replicate Putnam's findings as close as possible. Using the 'Social Position and Resources Use by the Allochton population' – a survey among the four most sizeable minority groups together with a control group of majority Dutch residents – the authors have questioned whether there is less social capital in the most diverse neighborhoods within the 13 biggest Dutch cities. Based on multilevel multiple results, Lancee and Dronkers conclude that the Putnam-findings are also valid on the West-European continent. However, relying on a geo-coded merge of census data with a survey that has been representative for the whole Dutch population, Tolsma and his colleagues (2009) arrive to a different result, namely that there is no erosion in levels of generalized trust. Moreover, they argue that local level diversity in the Netherlands is able to have a positive impact on certain indicators for social capital, namely tolerance to neighbors from a different race.

Recently, the British and Dutch outcomes have been supplemented by preliminary German (Gundelach & Traunmüller, 2009) and Spanish (Morales & Echazarra, 2009) results. Both research efforts might be highly influential in the theory formation on the social consequences of diversity for the reason that they are two clear opposing cases. More precisely, while Germany is regarded as not only a country that has a tradition in guestworker migration but also as the textbook example regarding ethnic citizenship, Spain on the other hand is a country with a rich colonial heritage, yet, only recently it has been considered as a country of destination. In line with the diverging results from the UK and the Netherlands, there is also not a consistent story in the information that has been produced from these two new cases. The German results show a negative relation of diversity on generalized trust while in Spain, contrary, there is no consistently negative relation between immigration-caused diversity on several indicators of social capital.

3.5. Cross-National Research

Not only local level studies but also several cross-national investigations have taken place, questioning whether the creation of trust is inhibited in countries that are ethnic-culturally heterogeneous. Going to a higher level of aggregation, the research puzzle is whether trust is lower in countries that are highly diverse. Zak and Knack (2001) investigated which national factors condition the relation between trust and economic growth. Using the World Values, and it needs to be said that this survey source is used most frequently to model the relation between diversity and generalized trust, the authors discovered a curvilinear relation – a negative linear combined with a positive quadratic effect – between homogeneity and trust: “As our measure of ethnic homogeneity increases, the likelihood of two randomly-matched individuals (such as a broker and investor) being from different groups falls, and trust is predicted to rise” (Zak & Knack, 2001, p. 314). For this curvilinear relation, they give the explanation that the effect of middle values of homogeneity is strongest on trust because many small groups just do not form a threat for other groups.

Also relying on the WVS, Delhey and Newton’s study into explaining the cross-national differences in generalized trust (2005) do not place ethnic-cultural diversity at the focal point; nevertheless they do emphasize that diversity is one of the key country characteristics that explains high levels of trust. The authors try to grasp why certain countries have significantly higher levels of trust than others. Performing rigorous ordinary least squares regression – they aggregated the trust scores to the national level – testing a wide range of covariates, Delhey and Newton arrive to the conclusion that predominantly ethnic homogeneity, operationalized by the Alesina et al. (2003) fractionalization index, a Protestant tradition, good governance, national wealth and income equality affect trust positively.

The Delhey and Newton article (2005) has yielded several important conclusions. First of all, regarding the causal chain, the authors underscore that diversity is exogenous, i.e. has an impact on other covariates but not the other way around. More specifically, the authors state that diversity has not only a direct effect on generalized trust, but also an indirect via its effect on good government, national wealth and income inequality. Another important conclusion is the exceptional status of the Nordic countries. Delhey and Newton explain that the Nordic countries rank high on the trust scale because they embrace all five factors that explain whether countries can be regarded as trusting. They are not only relatively homogeneous, they have also a Protestant tradition, high levels of good governance, and rank at the top of the list when it comes to national wealth and income equality. What is important to note is that excluding the five Nordic countries, the direct effect of homogeneity on trust has disappeared.

In an analysis similar to the one performed by Delhey and Newton (2005), also Bjørnskov (2007) estimates the effect of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust across the globe, controlled for numerous other country-level covariates. Contrary to the findings of Delhey and Newton, he discovered that diversity hardly correlates with generalized trust: “while the size of the estimate remains about the same the significance of ethnic diversity depends on which countries are included” (Bjørnskov, 2007, p. 12). The effect direction is negative, but the significance is absent. In a subsequent article, Bjørnskov (2008) has tested the conditional effect of diversity on generalized trust conditioned for five country characteristics, namely income level, democracy, population size, political competition and political ideology, but discovered also in this analysis that diversity yields no effect on trust under whatever condition it is tested.

The last findings using the WVS that is worth discussing is the paper by Kesler and Bloemraad (2008). Contrary to previous analysis, the two authors have used the panel-design of the WVS and estimated the effects of diversity, i.e. the percentage foreign-born, on both the 1980, 1990 and 2000 waves. They discovered that diversity indeed lowers generalized trust. However, they also included interaction terms with level of corporatism, statist or centralized state and multicultural policies. They discovered that predominantly in corporatist societies – those societies in which “political representation is organized at the group level and in which income is distributed more equally” (2008) – there is a mitigated effect of diversity on trust. The effect of multicultural policies, on the other hand, was none.

Turning to research that resembles more closely to my research design, namely explaining the effects of diversity on trust within Europe, Gesthuizen et al (2009) have analyzed the effects of immigration on a wide range of social capital indicators using the 2004 wave of the Eurobarometer. Under control of various individual and country-level covariates, the unique effect of diversity on trust and other indicators of pro-social behavior is almost nil while predominantly the effects of a democratic history determines trust across Europe. Thus, contrary to most of the WVS studies, the

Gesthuizen and colleagues article focusing solely on Europe has not yielded similar polemic conclusions.

3.6. Conclusion: Different Designs, Different Outcomes

What this survey of the empirical outcomes on diversity and generalized trust has shown is that small nuances in both the design and outcomes hamper strong generalizations. In Table 16, the most prominent research efforts are summarized according to the guidelines proposed in the Introduction. While the issues of causality and selection bias are constant over the summarized manuscripts, i.e. they have thus far not been handled, they are nevertheless also taken up in the Table 16. Thus far, most research has relied on only one indicator for diversity. In the literature, it has been mentioned that a classic index for ethnic homogeneity – or heterogeneity – is colorblind (Stolle et al., 2008; Dawkins, 2008) and other indicators for diversity also need to be considered, like for instance the share of visible minorities; nevertheless, most authors fail to include more than one indicator. Another point of convergence is that, except for the Dutch case (Tolsma et al., 2009), all local level studies seem to point to a negative effect of diversity on trust: trust seems in general more difficult to foster in diverse neighborhoods, although articles by for instance Stolle et al (2008) emphasize that intergroup contact might mitigate this negative effect. The last referenced article is also of particular interest since it has demonstrated that that the effect sizes effectively run differently across varying contexts, i.e. the US and Canada.

Table 16. Summary of a Selection of Empirical Research on the Relation Between Diversity and Trust

	United States	Canada	Australia	Great-Britain	Netherlands	Cross-National
	Putnam (2007)	Stolle et al (2008)	Leigh (2006)	Letki (2008)	Tolsma et al (2009)	Delhey & Newton (2005) Gesthuizen et al (2009)
Dependent variable	18 indicators for social capital	Wallet version of generalized trust	Generalized trust (ppltrust)	Generalized trust and associations	Generalized Trust	Generalized trust and other variables
Independent variable	Herfindahl; blacks; immigrants	Percentage visible minorities	Herfindahl ethnic and linguistic	Herfindahl	Herfindahl	Immigration
Level of aggregation	Census tract; controlled with county level	Neighborhood	Neighborhood	Neighborhood	Zip code level	Countries around the world (WVS) (Eurobarometer)
Causality	Cross-sectional	Cross-sectional	Cross-sectional	Cross-sectional	Cross-sectional	Cross-sectional
Controls	11 census and county level covariates	Individual level; prop. higher education, median income	Neighborhood income and inequality	Neighborhood status (Index of Multiple Deprivation)	Individual level; ethnic heterog, mean income and resid mobil	Protestant, Gini, Wealth, Good Governance
Self-selection	Absent	Absent	Absent	Absent	Absent	Absent
Context	Controlled for local resources	Interaction with others	Absent	Absent	Cross-level with education	Absent
Result	Negative effect on trust, not on associations	Negative effect, mitigated by interactions	Negative effect	Negative effect on trust, not on interactions	Negative effect on trust in neighborhood	Direct and indirect negative effect

Despite these points of convergence, the lack of harmonization in these models hamper strong generalizable statements. First of all, with regard to the dependent variable, most discussed manuscripts rely on the classic Rosenberg (1956) 'peopletrust'-question or the composite generalized trust scale. It needs, however, to be mentioned that the Stolle et al (2008) research design steps away from this measure and use the wallet question. This may be a minor detail but based on a validity-test of these wallet-questions compared with the classic generalized trust question, Soroka and colleagues (2005) did not discover a negative effect of neighborhood diversity on this 'peopletrust' question (cf. Chapter 2) in contrast with the wallet question. Thus different dependent variables can induce different outcomes. Second, also the independent variable is far from equivalent across the various studies. Most articles may use a classic index for fractionalization yet, there is a considerable variability in other indicators that are used, like the percentage of visible minorities, the stock of foreigners or the share of immigrants in a certain year. Third, also the set of control variables is not equivalently the same over all manuscripts. While most studies include the socioeconomic situation of the neighborhood into the model, the range of additional variables that are included differ enormously. Putnam (2007) tops the list with 11 control variables while Letki (2008) and Stolle et al (2008) restrict their analysis to only one indicator for neighborhood deprivation. It can therefore be expected that the level of variation that has been modeled by the controls differ from study to study and consequently, also in this regard improvements can be made.

Turning to the country level, then, it is quite intriguing that various studies fail to deliver similar results. The WVS is by now most frequently used to model the relation between diversity and trust; nevertheless, outcomes diverge. In general, this set of cross-national investigations using the WVS, whether they have relied on a Herfindahl index or, like Kesler and Bloemraad (2008), the share of foreign-born, the results point to a negative relation, except for the Bjørnskov (2007, 2008) articles. At present, we can only guess why this small number of cross-national investigations are not able to arrive in a coherent explanation what the reason for these different findings are. Turning to Europe, relying on the Eurobarometer, research analyzing cross-national differences in trust in Europe showed a negative though nonsignificant effect (Gesthuizen et al., 2009). Two possible explanations for this non-negative European finding may be present. First of all, it simply is assumable that diversity just does not erode generalized trust in Europe. Second, the authors of the Eurobarometer article are also faced with a limited number of countries compared with the WVS. Contrary to methodological recommendations, they use also four additional control variables, which reduce statistical power. As such, the alternative explanation for a nonsignificant finding relates to methodological error. The authors have thus left open room for additional research into the investigation into diversity and trust in Europe.

4. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide theoretical and empirical groundings for the further empirical investigation of the social consequences of diversity across Europe. Combining both the results of a theoretical literature review and empirical results, some conclusions on estimating this relation can be made.

First of all, empirical research efforts on the social consequences of diversity often formulate their theoretical arguments based on two main dominant theoretical models for out-group prejudice, namely group threat theories and contact theory. Thus, generally, authors qualify their research setup upon whether there is less trust among residents that live in diverse societies mainly on the struggle over a small pool of resources, like economic wealth and a dominant culture. To contrast this hypothesis, authors also propose the alternative expectation of the contact theory, meaning that when residents have interactions with their ethnic-cultural distinct neighbors, this might in fact generate positive attitudes towards out-groups. Yet, as Stolle and her colleagues have already demonstrated (2008), theories related to contextual diversity need to be distinguished from intergroup contact theories. This doctoral research is merely interested in qualifying the relation between contextual diversity and generalized trust and therefore needs to step away from the expected positive outcomes from intergroup contact. While the expectation is that diversity erodes generalized trust, we need to be aware that alternatively, diversity may contribute to a more trusting orientation.

Applying this hypothesis regarding a negative relation between contextual diversity and trust does however not imply that group threat theories in itself provide a correct theoretical assessment to the hypothesized negative effect. On the contrary, two other models are proposed that, from a generalized trust perspective, are also able to guide the further empirical investigations. First of all, the ‘aversion to heterogeneity’-theory assumes that individuals are expected to foster a distrust in generalized others, particularly when living in areas with sizeable groups of residents that have a set of cultural distinct dispositions. The logic is that large cultural gaps make it more difficult to predict other’s behavior but also that these gaps erode general levels of optimism and a shared sense of togetherness. Second, anomie theory predicts that social changes might erode social bonds because the general moral is not adjusted to the changes that impact contemporary societies. Recently, Putnam has accepted this theoretical model by referring to ‘constrict theory’ and the ongoing research outcomes increasingly refer to the newly proposed theoretical paradigm (e.g. Tolsma et al., 2009).

From a Durkheimian perspective (1984 [1893]) too, the theory of anomie is quite convincing to point to a negative relation. Indeed, due to increased heterogeneity, there are more what Durkheim referred to as ‘specializations’, i.e. different norms and values, and the like. However, society might become aware of more diversity, e.g. by for instance restaurants of the country of origin, but also by debates on for instance

religious symbols in secularized European countries; yet, it is not always the case that individual state of minds have been brought into coherence with the changes with respect to ethnic-cultural diversity that take place on European territory. In this respect, the general expectation that has arisen from this theoretical overview is that diversity erodes social cohesion. This general expectation will guide the forthcoming empirical investigation.

Chapter 5

Ethnic-Cultural Diversity in Europe: Explaining Migration Patterns over Space and Time

Europe is an immigration continent — there is no doubt about it. We are attractive to many. But we are not good enough at attracting highly skilled people. Nor are we young or numerous enough to keep the wheels of our societies and economies turning on our own (Barroso, 2007).

1. Introduction

While theories and research on the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust predict a tense relation, it may, however, not be forgotten that most of the theoretical and empirical claims thus far have been concentrated on US research outcomes for which it can be questioned to what extent these findings actually can be exported to European societies. Not only is it far from sure whether there is a general decline in social cohesion, as is the case in the US (Putnam, 2000; see also Chapter 3), also regarding the levels of diversity, remarkable differences between the two continents are prominent. America has embraced diversity, for instance by “*E Pluribus Unum*” in its national seal; diversity is considered to be one of the constituting elements of US society (Zolberg, 2006; Hero, 2007); in contrast, not many national political leaders across the European continent are expected to copy Barroso by defining their country as a country of immigration.

Nevertheless, while it is acknowledged that European countries have become more diverse over the last couple of decades,¹⁸ there is a high variability between countries with regard to the levels of immigrants they receive. For instance, while the increase in immigration to the Mediterranean countries is a phenomenon that is widely documented (King & Black, 1997; Faini & Venturini, 1999; Cavoundis, 2002), the

¹⁸ The content of this chapter is reflected in parts of the following publications: Hooghe et al (2008). I would like to thank Ann Trappers and Bart Meuleman for their permission to replicate the original manuscript for this chapter. All credits for the data used in this chapter go to Ann Trappers, who has done a more than extraordinary effort to gather both immigration data and their covariates for all European OECD-countries.

recent upsurge in immigration to for instance Sweden, contrary, is less discussed. Indeed, although across Europe, similarities regarding migration patterns may be present – i.e. the recent increase in immigration is immanent in every European country – nevertheless, there are remarkable differences across the continent with regard to the volume of immigrant influx they receive annually (Salt, 2005; OECD, 2008a). Consequently, also the levels of ethnic-cultural diversity may differ from country to country.

Given the various immigration trajectories across European countries, the aim of this chapter is to provide a broad insight into the level and nature of ethnic-cultural diversity across and within European nation-states. Since it can be expected that heterogeneous countries have a less trusting citizenry (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007), it is evident that it first needs to be assessed which countries are faced with the highest share of immigration-caused diversity, and what exactly the driving forces for immigration have been over time. Relying on migration statistics as they have been made available by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), I will attempt to provide an answer to the question of the extent and the causes for the ethnic-cultural variability across the European continent.

The OECD Trends in International Migration data are, however, not undiscussed (Dumont & Lemaître, 2004; Lemaître, 2005). Many issues regarding the data reliability, i.e. the consistency of the figures over space and time, and the validity, i.e. the extent to which the data describe the number of, for instance, foreigners on the territory accurately, have been raised, predominantly originating from OECD scholars themselves. To have an overview on how useable the migration statistics are, it is noteworthy to share some reservations with respect to these data. It is likewise important to present evidence regarding the usability of the OECD Migration statistics for comparative research.

To have a clear insight into the level of accuracy of the OECD migration data, this chapter can, next to an explanation for the levels of ethnic-cultural diversity in Europe, also be interpreted as a test of the validity of this data set. More specifically, I will investigate whether theoretical approaches on migration flows are in fact able to explain differences in migration flows to European countries in time. It is widely known that since the 1960s migration to Western Europe has increased substantially, despite the fact that since the early 1970s various countries have adopted restrictive legislation on the entry of foreigners into the country (Castles & Miller, 2003; Krieger, 2004; OECD, 2006); however, less is known about why migrants specifically decide to settle in a particular country and why they tend to avoid others. In this chapter, the most common potential causes will be surveyed.

By analyzing what determines migration flows to European countries over space and time, also a substantial element will be added to the debate on the social consequences

of diversity. As Putnam articulated in his seminal ‘E Pluribus Unum’-paper (2007), in American society, the economic realm cannot be interpreted keeping immigration out of the debate on the social consequences. Turning back to Europe, recently there has, for instance, been taken place an increase into research in the economic ‘brain drain’ migration (Tung & Lazarova, 2006; Dente, 2007). However, a solid longitudinal analysis to what extent the economic realm drives migration and is able to restore imbalances in the labor market, taking a wide range of other possible explanations into account like for instance cultural hegemony or networks, is largely absent. Therefore, this chapter will, before looking at the social consequences, add significantly to the debate on potential other costs or benefits of immigration.

This chapter is constituted out of two main parts. In the first part, I will give an overview of diversity across Europe. In this section, data of the OECD Migration foreigner statistics are critically presented, i.e. next to reference to this international organization, also the general levels of equality of this data set is considered. This overview will not only be restricted to a presentation of information regarding how diverse Europe is, but also data is given that represent within-country diversity. In the second part, information of inflow of foreigners to a number of selected industrialized countries is presented and explained over time. Departing from existing theories that explain migration patterns, an empirical evaluation of these models is warranted.

2. Diversity across Europe

Before turning to the question what explains immigration to European countries in time, and as a consequence why certain countries in general have become more diverse than others, it is necessary to have a closer look at the stock of foreigner data for European societies. The data for this investigation have been provided by the OECD in various editions of *Trends in International Migration* and *International Migration Outlook*, as well as via its web-based OECD.Stats Extracts interface. Before I will turn to issues with regard to the comparability of the data, this organization is introduced and the place of migration statistics in its framework is explained.

2.1. The OECD and its Attention to International Migration

It is quite interesting that even though the OECD migration data have been used abundantly in comparative research strategies, migration as a theme does not appear as a core issue within the convention of the OECD nor in related mission statements. In describing the migration outline within the organizational frame of the OECD, it is emphasized that “Work on international migration is based on continued monitoring of migration movements and policies in member countries and outside the OECD area, and in-depth analysis of the economic and social aspects of migration. This includes the role of migration in alleviating labor shortages, links between migration, demography

and economic growth, and the fiscal impact of migration” (OECD, 25.05.2009). Migration as a topic thus seems to be fully imbedded into the economical framework of the organization. It comes as no surprise that the OECD migration statistics have in the first place been used to investigate economic causes and consequences (Coppel et al., 2001; Razin et al., 2002).


It is noteworthy that the OECD was among the first international organizations to gather data on migration, foreigners and nationalization across a wide range of countries and has invested considerably to arrive at a set of harmonized data. Since the 1980s, for almost any member country data is available with regard to the inflows of foreign population and foreign workers, the outflows of foreign population by nationality, the inflow of asylum seekers, the stock of foreign labor and foreign and foreign-born population, and the acquisition of nationality. As such, the OECD has provided a data file containing ideally longitudinal trends for 30 countries at 27 time-points.

The latest innovations with regard to the OECD migration statistics concern the electronic availability and the investment in the so-called Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC). First of all, recently, the OECD has invested much effort in the availability of all these data on the World Wide Web. Together with other country specific indicators, the migration figures have been made available on the OECD.Stats Extracts website. Second, since 2005, the OECD has developed a comparative database on the foreign-born population in almost all OECD member countries. The data that are covered in this set include citizenship, duration of stay and professional occupation.

2.2. How Diverse is Europe?

According to the stock of foreigner statistics – data on “all persons who have that [host] country as country of usual residence and who are the citizens of another country” (OECD, 2008c, p. 212) – one can observe that Europe is quite diverse. According to the OECD statistics (OECD, 2008a), Poland is about the most homogeneous country with about 1.5 foreigners per thousand inhabitants. On the contrary, in Luxembourg, there are about four foreigners for every ten nationals. At first glance, it therefore can be concluded that there is a considerable level of variability in diversity across Europe. However, it needs to be added that about seven countries clump together with official figures close to 5-6 percent non-citizens on the total populations, namely Italy, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Swede, France and the United Kingdom. Figure 11 plots the distribution of the stock of foreigners on the total population across European countries.

Figure 11. Stock of Foreigners on the Total Population across European Countries



Source: OECD (2008)

Looking more closely at the geographical spread of the foreigners across Europe, one can clearly see that the Eastern and Northern European countries are among the countries with the most foreigners, while Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland are among the least diverse. Also Netherlands and Portugal are according to the official OECD stock of foreigner statistics relatively homogeneous. Among the most heterogeneous countries are Luxembourg, Switzerland and Spain, but also Belgium, Germany, Austria and Ireland.

While there is much variation across Europe, Figure 11 does not provide information on how diverse Europe is compared with other industrialized countries. Looking at the OECD migration data (2008a; Table 18), the variation across European countries reflects the variation that can be found across other OECD countries. For instance, in Japan or South Korea, the stock of foreigners on the total population is about 1.5 percent while in Canada or the United States, estimates of the share of foreigners range from 5 to 7 percent and from 13 to 24 percent regarding the share of foreign-born residents (OECD, 2008b; Dumont & Lemaître, 2004). Consequently, the wide range of diversity that can be found across Europe reflects also the worldwide diversity within industrialized countries.

2.3. How Diverse are the European Countries?

While the stock of foreigner data may be very indicative for the level of diversity across European countries, in fact, they do tell little about the nature of diversity within these countries. From a hypothetical point of view, it can be argued that the countries with the highest shares of immigrants may be, with regard to the number of nationalities and their respective size, the most homogeneous with regard to foreigner descent. However, the OECD data on the origin of the foreigners allows us to qualify this statement. Looking at the five largest groups for each European OECD country, it can be seen that Greece, Czech Republic and, indeed, Luxembourg are the countries in which the five largest countries count for more than 70 percent of the total number of immigrants. Thus, while Luxembourg for instance is being considered as highly diverse, with about 40 percent of foreigners on its soil, with regard to the origin of the foreigners, it is relatively homogeneous: 4 out of 10 immigrants has Portuguese citizenship.

At the other end of the continuum, countries can be found that have many sizeable immigrant groups on their territory. In Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom, the five largest immigrant groups count for less than 40 percent of the total foreigners. It can therefore be expected that in these countries, numerous nationalities are present of which the groups are also considerable in size. In Denmark, for instance, the fifth largest foreigner group, the Brits, are in size about half of the size of the largest group, which are the Turks, namely about 13.000 versus 29.000. Compared with other countries, Denmark, but also Norway and Denmark, have thus many sizeable immigrant groups.

Table 17. Stock of Foreigners by Nationality of Country of Origin, in Thousands

Country	1	2	3	4	5	Share
AT	YU 305.7	TR 111.0	-	-	-	50.97%
BE	IT 171.9	FR 125.1	NL 117.0	MA 80.6	ES 42.8	57.64%
CH	IT 291.7	RS 190.8	PT 173.5	DE 172.6	TR 73.9	59.23%
CZ	UA 102.6	SK 58.4	VN 40.8	PL 18.9	RU 18.6	74.43%
DE	TR 1,738	IT 534.7	PL 361.7	GR 303.8	RS 282.1	47.68%
DK	TR 28.8	IQ 18.1	DE 15.4	NO 14.2	GB 13.2	32.25%
ES	MA 524.0	RO 507.7	EC 415.3	GB 299.3	CO 261.0	44.41%
FI	RU 25.3	EE 17.6	SE 8.3	SO 4.6	CN 3.4	48.64%
FR	PT 493.0	DZ 488.0	MA 475.0	TR 229.0	IT 178.0	53.13%
GB	IE 335.0	IN 258.0	PL 209.0	US 132.0	FR 110.0	30.78%
GR	AL 347.4	BG 29.5	RO 18.9	RU 18.9	PL 16.6	75.59%
HU	RO 67.0	UA 15.9	DE 15.0	CN 9.0	RS 8.5	69.52%
IE	GB 110.6	PL 62.7	LT 24.4	NG 16.0	LV 13.2	54.91%
IT	AL 375.9	MA 343.2	RO 342.2	CN 144.9	UA 120.1	45.13%
LU	PT 70.8	FR 24.1	IT 19.1	BE 16.5	DE 10.9	73.92%
NL	TR 96.8	MA 80.5	DE 60.2	GB 40.3	BE 26.6	44.64%
NO	SE 27.9	DK 20.3	PL 13.6	DE 12.2	IQ 12.1	36.13%
PL	DE 11.4	UA 5.2	RU 3.3	SE 2.6	AT 2.6	45.72%
PT	BR 73.4	CV 68.1	UA 41.9	AO 33.7	GW 24.8	55.62%
SE	FI 83.5	DK 35.8	NO 35.5	IQ 30.3	DE 22.5	42.20%
SK	CZ 5.1	UA 3.9	PL 3.6	DE 2.3	HU 2.1	52.96%

Source: OECD (2008a). Data represent the 2006 stock of foreigners per nationality (in thousands) for the five largest countries of origin; the data for France are for 2005. For a list of the ISO-country codes, check Appendix C.

With regard to the countries of origin, quite some interesting findings can be derived from the data. First of all, the data shows that foreign nationality can only to a limited extent traced back to neighboring countries. Predominantly in the Northern and Eastern European countries, foreigners seem to be originating from neighboring countries. Second, foreigners originating from the traditional emigrant societies do still appear as sizeable in many European countries: Turkey is in six European OECD countries among the five largest foreigner nationalities, while Moroccans and Italians are significantly present in five countries. Third, another interesting fact is that for most of the former colonial powers, the colonial tie is still represented in the data. For instance, the United Kingdom has a large group coming from India, France from Algeria, Portugal from Brazil and Spain from Ecuador. Also the guestworker heritage is dominant, like for instance the Turks in Germany, the Portugese in Luxembourg, or the Italians in Belgium. Fourth when looking at certain nationalities, except for Finland,

only the Nordic countries have Iraq as country of origin among the five largest immigrant groups while Finland, Hungary and Italy have a sizeable Chinese community; the Central European countries Germany, Switzerland and Hungary have been very responsive towards nationals from Serbia and Montenegro. Faist's remark (2000a) that there are many nationalities on European soils, but that only few groups count for most of the share of immigrants needs to be amended: across Europe, there is quite a discrepancy in this respect.

2.4. Comparability Issues in the OECD Migrant Statistics

This overview regarding the level of diversity and the nature of diversity across European countries has been based on the latest OECD Migration statistics. While the OECD has invested and will invest considerably in guaranteeing a certain level of comparability of the migration statistics (Lemaître et al., 2007) – the recent DIOC-database is for instance the best example in this respect – it nevertheless needs to be remembered that the OECD Migration Statistics have been questioned regularly with regard to their level of comparability. Various spectators have questioned to what extent these indicators on stock of foreigners and foreigner inflow can be used in comparative research (Zlotnik, 1999; Beine et al., 2003). Despite various efforts to reach standardization and to increase comparability, it remains notoriously difficult to obtain reliable and comparable statistics on migration movements (Lemaître, 2005). The reason is not only that every country uses its own procedures to identify immigrants, with varying rules on, e.g., length of residence and legal status, but also that every country uses different techniques to monitor the share of foreigners.

The loudest voices in this debate on the lack of comparability of the migration statistics are from the OECD itself. In the 2008 edition of the International Migration Outlook, the differences between the share of foreign-born are contrasted with the share of foreigners (Table 18). It is quite interesting to look at the data of for instance Germany and Sweden. According to the statistics (OECD, 2008a), Germany and Sweden have about the same level of foreign-born residents on their soil, namely about 12.9. However, looking at the share of foreigners, in Germany there are about half more foreigners than in Sweden, namely respectively 8.2 versus 5.4 percent. The reason why these data vary may largely be a reflection of different immigration policies. To be more precise, citizenship may be more easily obtained in Sweden than in Germany, meaning that in Sweden, many foreign-born have been 'disappeared' in the statistics of stocks of foreigners on the soil. It needs no explanation that these discrepancies do pose numerous challenges later on in the empirical investigation into the effects of diversity on trust.

Concerning the reliability and validity of the OECD Migration statistics, next to this discrepancy between the stock of foreigners and the stock of foreign-born residents, a second issue on data quality concerns the fact that the OECD data cover only legal

migration. It must be acknowledged that illegal migration flows to European countries is an empirical fact and politically high on the agenda. It is known that various governments have expressed concern about what they perceive as the rise in illegal immigration into European countries. As is evident, no exact figures but only estimates on these flows can be provided (Düvell, 2006) thus do not result from any official recordings (Cornelius et al., 2004). As such, such estimates will not be considered.

Table 18. Share of Foreign-Born and Foreign Residents in OECD-countries, 2006

	Foreign-Born	Foreign
Luxembourg	34.8	41.6
Switzerland	24.1	20.3
Ireland	14.4	10.1
Austria	14.1	9.9
Germany (2003)	12.9	8.2
Sweden	12.9	5.4
Belgium	12.5	8.8
Spain	11.9	10.3
Netherlands	10.6	4.2
Greece (2001)	10.1	7.0
Norway	8.7	5.1
France	8.3	5.6
Denmark	6.6	5.1
Slovak Republic	5.6	0.6
Czech Republic	5.5	3.1
Finland	3.6	2.3
Hungary	3.4	1.6
Italy (2001)	2.5	5.0
Poland (2002)	1.6	0.1
Australia	24.1	7.2
New Zealand	21.2	N/A
Canada	19.8	6.0
United States	13.0	7.4
Turkey (2000)	1.9	N/A
Mexico (2005)	0.4	N/A
Japan	N/A	1.6
Korea	N/A	1.4

Source: OECD (2008a, p. 55)

In any case, the OECD offers the most comprehensive data set on migration to Europe from the final two decades of the twentieth century onwards. While the data may not always be as reliable as textbook methodological arguments would like them to be, the wide scope of the data set offers a wide series of information necessary for the further stages in this research. Although considerable reservations have been placed with regard to the quality of the data, a pragmatic standpoint is also that the proof of the pudding must be in the eating. If the eating, i.e. the analysis of migration flows to European countries in time would show that theoretical relevant migration determinants can be discovered, this would more or less guarantee the quality of the pudding. This would of course not necessarily mean that the OECD data are fully valid, but at least it could be assumed that the margin of error tends to be stable across countries and across time. If the errors would be completely random and changing over time, this would almost automatically imply that we would not be able to detect stable explanatory patterns.

3. Explaining Migration to European Countries

While warnings regarding accuracy and precision of the OECD migration data have been articulated throughout the years, various authors have analyzed these data thoroughly (Razin et al, 2002; Adams & Page, 2005; Bettio et al., 2006). In fact, about every author using this data, including this chapter, has made reference to this potential comparative bias. Nevertheless, by engaging in such quantitative analyses and arriving to substantial and meaningful outcomes, these scholars provide leverage to the argument that these data are, to a certain extent, comparable across time and across nations. However, as a cross-check, additional analyses will be carried out that also add relevance to the puzzle on the social consequences of diversity. In this analysis, immigration will be used as a dependent variable and explanations will be given for the causes that explain immigration influx to certain countries over time. From 1980 onwards the OECD has gathered a comprehensive series of inflow of foreigner statistics for its 30 member states.¹⁹ From an empirical point of view, it is therefore possible to explain trends in this longitudinal comparative data set; are there plausible reasons why immigration to country A in year X tops while there is a remarkable dip in the immigration figures of country B in year Y? Before turning to the empirical analysis, I will address the theoretical approaches towards international migration flows.

¹⁹ In this empirical investigation, I will only focus on EU-member states that have a sufficient number of data points (Greece is therefore also excluded). These countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

3.1. Theories on Migration Patterns

3.1.1. Push-pull model of Migration Flows

Theorizing migration flows cannot go by to the rational theories that involve individual decision-making. Indeed, migration always involves two distinct decisions: migrants leave their country of origin but they also have to decide in which host country they want to settle. According to the classic push-pull model, individuals within or across national borders migrate along a utility maximization function. As Gabriel and Schmitz state (1995, p. 461), “an individual must consider numerous factors in deciding whether or not to migrate from one location to another”– potential migrants compare their current situation with the prospective conditions they might encounter in the area of destination and calculate the benefits while, on the other hand, also taking the costs of moving into account (Sjaastad, 1962; Day & Winer, 2006). Push factors have been investigated quite extensively and the knowledge on why migrants decide to leave their country of origin is well developed (Hatton & Williamson, 1994, 1998). This, however, still leaves the question why migrants are attracted to a specific country unanswered. It is by now widely known that migrants leave their country mainly because of economic reasons, and they expect better living conditions elsewhere, but it is less known why they prefer country A over country B in a specific year.

Building on previous approaches to migration, in the remainder the main focus regards so-called pull factors. According to theoretical models, at least three possible approaches to explain the pull factors determining a country’s attractiveness for migrants can be distinguished (Massey et al., 1998). First, economic and labor theories assume that migrants react to shortages in the labor market, thus providing for an equilibrium in these markets, both in their country of origin and in the country they head to (Borjas, 1989). Second, cultural and world system theory assumes that migration patterns reflect center/periphery relations in the world system. Migrants typically move from the periphery to the center, in terms of linguistic dominance or cultural hegemony (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Third, the social capital or social network approach basically assumes that migrants are attracted by the fact that other migrants from the same ethnic group have already settled in the receiving society, thus allowing for the occurrence of networks of recruitment (Massey et al., 1998). Before reviewing the three approaches, it needs to be emphasized that each one of these theories has been used in contemporary research on migration patterns. Furthermore, Massey et al (1998) argue that these various theoretical approaches do not exclude or contradict one another. It is also striking to observe that these theoretical approaches leave the role of the state untouched, which would lead to the implicit assumption that political authorities do not really have an impact on the migration patterns into their country.

3.1.2. Economic Approach

Departing from the classic push-pull framework, the economic framework is most easily extracted from this model. The classic push-pull theories focused specifically on economic factors to explain migration as they assume that the aggregate of the micro-level cost-benefit approach reflects macro-level supplies and demands (Schelling, 1978). To be precise, it can be expected that labor related supplies and demands at the macro level result in individual decisions that lead to migration and consequently to the establishment of an equilibrium on the labor market, thus reached by the aggregate effect of individual decisions to migrate to another country. These theories typically lead to the conclusion that people migrate from low income to high-income economies, or from regions experiencing a downward economic trend to regions experiencing economic expansion (Borjas, 1995).

When applying this macro-level theory to the micro-level, economic theory is rather straightforward: it is assumed that migrants will respond to incentives operating within the labor market. Perceived shortages of skilled or unskilled labor will lead to the influx of new worker groups. In this view, migration is mainly seen as a mechanism to balance supply and demand on the labor market (DaVanzo, 1978; Borjas, 1995; Feld, 2005; McPheters & Schlagenhauf, 2006). Empirically, the strategy behind the test of this approach has been a correlation between immigrant influx data and economic data, such as unemployment levels or growth figures (Borjas, 1989; Stark, 1991).

These traditional push-pull theories have been subject to considerable criticism, often due precisely to their association with economic theory, which has come to be perceived as too narrow a focus on a complex phenomenon such as migration. As Fischer and colleagues argue (1997, p. 88, in De Jong, 2000, p. 309) emphasize: “The most classical economic model is hardly able to explain the details and dynamics of migration flows, basing its explanation of migration on wage differences and assuming the homogeneous economic person to make decisions under condition of perfect certainty, no costs, perfect information and the absence of risk.” Critics would argue that the concepts have been developed in an industrial era, and as such, they no longer offer the best perspective on migration in a post-industrial, globalizing world (Massey et al., 1998, p. 12). From an empirical perspective, too, it has been ascertained that people leaving their country do not typically originate from the poorest countries, as cost-benefit approaches would suggest, but rather from regions undergoing rapid social and economic change (Castles & Miller, 1994, p. 22). Moreover, critics argue that traditional push-pull theories fail to provide a sound explanation for between-country differences, for differences between individuals – i.e., the micro-structural causes of migration – and for the resilience of certain flows whose original causes have disappeared or diminished (Portes & Böröcz, 1989, pp. 607-612).

3.1.3. Cultural Approach

A more recently developed strand of theories therefore situates migration in a broader context than that of a transfer of people between two nation-states. For instance, according to world systems theory, which developed out of historical-structural theory, migrant flows are triggered when capitalist economic relations enter non- or pre-capitalist societies. Various types of links are created between core capitalist countries and countries situated in the periphery of this core. Among these links enduring cultural ties are of crucial importance, such as the vestiges of colonization in the organization of the education system in former colonies (Massey et al., 1998, p. 40), which is one of the factors that contribute to the attraction of former colonial subjects to their former colonizer.

Massey and colleagues (1998, p. 41) for instance add that “international migration is especially likely between past colonial powers and their former colonies, because cultural, linguistic, administrative, investment, transportation, and communication links were established early and were allowed to develop free from outside competition during the colonial era, leading to the formation of specific transnational markets and cultural systems.” In reality, the legacy of these former colonial ties are still present as expressed by considerable influx from former colonized countries, which is of course facilitated by similarities in norms and languages that have been introduced in the former colonized countries, as well as modes of transportation that facilitate the creation of so-called transnational social spaces (Faist, 2000b). This model explains the successful direct flights between Amsterdam and Paramaribo or Brussels and Kinshasa.

Portes and Rumbaut (1996, p. 273), too, situate migration in a context of structural unbalances of peripheral societies under the influence of core capitalist countries, as described in various versions of the world system theory. Apart from historical causes such as occupation, colonization, or active recruitment of foreign laborers, this kind of structural unbalancing may also be brought about by means of mass communication, which spreads information on Western lifestyle and shapes consumption expectations in the culturally peripheral societies. This approach exemplifies that this cultural approach may not be interpreted solely as influx out of former colonial countries. The fact that the British Empire, for example, did spread out all over the globe has introduced English as probably the language in which nationals of two different countries have the highest odds that communication might succeed. Therefore, migration to a country that is at the center of the cultural world might be relatively easy on both the transportation side as well as the integration side.

3.1.4. Social Networks Approach

Whereas the theories discussed so far aim to identify what initially attracts migrants to their destination countries, other theories have been developed to explain why migration flows may become persistent once they have been initiated. Since we do

know that the major source of immigration to Western Europe has been initiated predominantly due to rapid economic increases at the end of the 1950s, the network approach would argue that subsequent waves of migration are caused by the available stock of foreigners in the host countries. Looking at the aggregate data, this social network approach is highly plausible. Faist (2000a) envisaged migration flows originating from a large share of countries, yet, the majority of immigrants still descend from a small number of traditional sending countries, which are distinct per country. We also do know that these groups of countries of origin do not always reflect cultural ties but may also reflect a guestworker heritage.

In general, these network theories focus on networks linking migrants to a variety of people, both migrants and nonmigrants, in their society of origin and at their destination. Such migration-facilitating networks tend to enlarge over time, reducing the costs and risks of migration for ever-greater numbers of migrants (Haug, 2000). At the same time, migration becomes institutionalized through the workings of various private and voluntary organizations active in the field (Castles & Miller, 1994, p. 25; Massey et al., 1998). In this way, migration may become the norm rather than the exception for the people within the networks: “To the extent that migration abroad fulfils the goals of individuals and families, the process continues to the point that it becomes normative” (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996, p. 276). In this way, migrant flows may be endure despite the disappearance of their initial causes.

The social networks approach therefore stresses the effect of chain migration. Once ethnic communities will have settled in a host country, for whatever reason, this allows future cohorts of this community to gain easier entrance. Often these new arrivals will be attracted by the presence of family members or other networks, offering them various resources in the new society. In the literature, however, there is some disagreement about the question how extended this phenomenon really is (Krissman, 2005). Faist (1997) takes position into this phenomenon by arguing that this meso-level approach is predominantly important for the direction and not the volume of migration. Taken together, Faist’s conclusion is in line with the argument provided by Massey and his colleagues: “The size of the migratory flow between two countries is not strongly correlated to wage differentials or employment rates, because whatever effects these variables have in promoting or inhibiting migration are progressively overshadowed by the falling costs and risks of movement stemming from the growth of migrant networks over time” (Massey et al., 1998, p. 45).

3.1.5. Political Intermediaries

What is largely left unnoticed in the pull-factors that drive migration flows regards the role of the state. However, already in the 1990s, Portes pushed this issue to the fore as one of the immigration topics scholars need to pay more attention to (1997, pp. 817-818). On the other hand, the fact that this topic has not been considered thoroughly as

a migration determinant may also relate with the fact that empirically, political systems are hardly able to exert control on the influx of immigrants (Joppke, 1998b; Castles, 2003). Yet, Freeman (1995) has argued that there is a correlation between policies and immigration history; i.e. the list of settler societies will eventually be restricted those countries that will be open for high levels of permanent migration while it is expected that the new European countries of immigration (like the Southern European countries) will resemble the European postcolonial (like the United Kingdom and France) and guestworker societies (like Belgium and Germany).


While it is difficult to map all countries on their political system, a number of potential intermediaries will be considered. It needs to be stressed that there is a considerable range of immigration policy across Europe, i.e. that not all European countries can be characterized as being open with regard to immigration (Stalker, 2002). More specifically, it can be expected that liberal and democratic states will also be more tolerant towards immigrant influx and therefore have higher levels of immigrant influx; moreover, in those states that are open towards immigrants, i.e. those countries that have adopted open migrant policies, it can be expected that they also face higher levels of immigration. Further in this Chapter, these hypotheses will be operationalized by concrete variables.

3.2. Representing Migration Flows to Europe


The theoretical literature provides us with a set of testable hypotheses on the causes and characteristics of international migration. Before the empirical assessment of explaining migration flows to European countries in time can proceed, I will first give a graphical overview of these flows, based on the combined data out of the OECD Migration Statistics.

Figure 12 shows that, in the last two decades, Europe has encountered an increasing inflow of immigrants: from 1980 to 1989, Europe received, each year, about 1 million immigrants while this number increased to an average of about 1.5 million per year over the period 1990-1999 to 2.9 million in 2006. To summarize it roughly: the number of immigrants Europe receives on average rises by 65,000 each year. This observed rise in migration inflow can be attributed to almost every European country: except for Finland and Greece, all European countries received significantly more immigrants in the 1990s and the first years of the twenty-first century than in the 1980–1990 period. The increase is strongest in Germany: while that country (East and West combined) received yearly about 500,000 immigrants in the 1980s; this was up to 600,000 in the ten years between 1997 and 2006. For the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy we can also observe substantial increases.


Figure 12. Migration Flows to European Countries, Grouped per Geographical Area, 1980-2006




Northern Europe



Southern Europe





Source: OECD (various years) plus own calculations

Regarding the geographical spread of immigration flows across Europe, we can observe that the upward trend in migration flows from 1980 to 2006 can be found roughly in all European regions. Since 1990, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, too, have experienced a rapid rise in the number of immigrants entering the country. However, different trajectories in immigration flows after the Millennium change need to be acknowledged. After 2000, the strongest increase can be found in most of the Southern and Eastern Europe, but also the rapid rise in Ireland and Sweden is quite remarkable. On the other hand, a small number of countries have encountered a decline in immigration in the last couple of years, like for instance Germany, Italy and Austria.

The similarities as well as dissimilarities across the European countries and years guarantee a certain level of variability for which empirical causes may be provided. Therefore, this overview allows us to proceed with a test of the proposed hypotheses. First, the economic theory is tested, followed by an investigation of the theory of cultural hegemony and a test of the network theory. Before an integrated model is estimated, I will also look at the possible effect that the political system might exert.

3.3. Data and Methodology

To disentangle the causes of migration flows to European countries, advanced models that are profound in econometrics will be used. But first things first, it is necessary to operationalize the theoretical approaches that explain migration flows.

3.3.1. Operationalizing Approaches to Migration Patterns

In this section, the potential causes of migration on the actual annual immigration flows to European countries from 1980 to 2006 will be modeled. Since the raw figures are modeled, it is necessary to control these raw flows on the total population of the European countries that are under investigation. More precisely, it is highly possible that the magnitude of the immigrant influx relates to the population size of the host country. Moreover, one of the most persistent questions is whether migration to European countries increases over time or not. For this reason, also year has been included into the model.

The economic approach is operationalized by four indicators. First, it can be expected that immigration flows react on the general wealth of the country. Migration flows would therefore be direct more to countries with high levels of national wealth, i.e. GDP per capita. Second, while GDP per capita is only one economic indicator for national wealth, the annual growth rate, based on the total GDP, may also affect migration flows positively. It can be expected that at a micro level, migrants would go to a country where they would have the opportunity to generate wealth, i.e. to countries where there are work opportunities; likewise, at a macro level, the hypothesis is that unemployment rates might explain variability in immigration flows. Last but not least, in public opinion, generating wealth has also been regarded by taking advantage of social security benefits. For this reason, also the effects of social expenditure on migration flows will need to be assessed.

The cultural approach, which emphasizes the cultural dominance of nations at the core of the world system, will be operationalized by three indicators. The most straightforward indicator to express the core-periphery relation is the distance from the country's capital city to the equator. A second indicator for the cultural dominance are the ties to the former colonial countries, operationalized by the sum of the total population of a country its former colonies. The third indicator relates to the second one, namely the size of the language area – the number of the people that speak the specific country's national language across the globe.

The network approach to migration flows is not easy to operationalize. Conceptually, this theory relates largely to the meso-level: it are individuals but foremost groups that structure chain migration; the social capital approach can hardly be described as a macro-level phenomenon. Nevertheless, from a macro-level point of view, it can be expected that immigrants will predominantly go to countries where already a high stock of foreigners is available. For this reason, I will add the stock of foreign population to the model. While the annual change in stocks probably yield a too high level of autocorrelation – it can be expected that stocks and immigration size correlates too much – the other way round is also possible, namely that the stocks have changed so drastically across the 27 years of investigation that from a logical point of view one can

ask whether it makes sense to predict the inflow in for instance 2004 by means of the foreigner population size of 1980. For this reason, the stock of foreigners for any year in a certain decade will be represented by the stock of foreigners in the first year of this decade – i.e. for instance I will explain immigration in 1998 by the stocks of 1990. While there is much interpretation for this operationalization, this step underscores the complexity of this network approach in macro-level research.

Table 19. Operationalization of the Approaches

Approach	Indicator	Source	Variable/ Fixed
Controls	Increase over time	Year	Variable
	Population	OECD Statistics	Fixed
Economic	GDP per capita	OECD Statistics	Variable
	Annual growth rate	World Bank	Variable
	Unemployment rate	OECD Statistics	Variable
	Social expenditure	OECD Statistics	Variable
Cultural	Distance to equator	Distance (kilometers) from capital city to equator	Fixed
	Former colonial ties	Sum of population of former colonial countries	Fixed
	Language dominance	Ethnologue	Fixed
Network	Stock of foreigners	OECD Statistics	Fixed (10 years)
System	Democracy	Freedom House	Variable
	Minority rights	MIPEX local voting rights	Fixed

Note: The table represents the approach that is tested, together with the specific indicator and the source the data are obtained from. The last column represents whether this independent variable is entered to the model as fixed, i.e. a country characteristic that does not change over time, or variable, i.e. a year characteristic (within countries).

Last but not least, also two political control variables are entered to the analyses. The first variable, the Freedom House Index, expresses the level of democracy within a certain country. The lower the score on this variable, i.e. 1, the more democratic a country is. Since there are many fluctuations over the years - for instance Poland had in 1980 a Freedom House figure of 5 while in 2006 this figure dropped to 1 – it is necessary to enter annual figures to the data. It is self-evidently the hypothesis that immigrants opt for better living conditions and therefore travel to more democratic states. Second, next to democratic liberties, also policies that target individual minorities have been added to the model. More specifically, it can be expected that immigrants might go to countries where they can express their grievances. For this reason, a variable expressing whether minorities have been granted local voting rights will be modeled as well.

3.3.2. Methodology

The distinct set-up of this study with its specific data set requires advanced modeling. Standard statistical techniques, such as multivariate regression analysis, are not appropriate to analyze this kind of clustered data. Given the nested or clustered structure of the data set – years from 1980 to 2006 that are nested within countries – I have to use general linear mixed modeling (Verbeke and Molenberghs, 2000) which resembles the multilevel model. However, in this case the level-2 effects refer to the country while the level-1 effects concern the year within the country. The differentiation between the two levels will in the analysis be obtained by specifying random intercepts. Furthermore, the observations within a country are not considered as having a random order. Instead, they are modeled as an evolution over time, by including a time-variable, indicating the year of the observation.

$$\begin{aligned} immigration_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_1 year_{ij} + \beta_2 populat_{ij} + \beta_3 economy_{ij} \\ & + \beta_4 culture_{ij} + \beta_5 networks_{ij} + \beta_6 politics_{ij} + e_{ij} + u_j \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

The aim of this analysis is to arrive at a sparse regression equation as expressed in equation (14) which underscores that immigration in a particular year i to country j is a function of time, the population in the host country, its economical and cultural situation, the networks that are available within this country and the political preconditions. Ideally, I would like to test all of the hypothesis and the corresponding indicators simultaneously to assess and compare their validity. One has to remember, however, that the available data set only covers at maximum information on 20 cases, i.e. countries, and 27 time points. Given the concern with regard to these multilevel models that I have expressed earlier, this implies that the number of independent variables that can be entered simultaneously will have to be limited. Therefore, the model is gradually built by running separate models for each of the three approaches and the political controls that have been reviewed. Subsequently, the final model will focus on the variables that proved to be significant in the economic, cultural, or network models as well as the political control variables.

Contrary to previous analysis (Hooghe et al., 2008), I have decided to keep the model as parsimonious as possible. While previous analyses for instance included a quadratic time effect together with random slopes for this quadratic time effect next to the linear effect of time, as a test, these parameters are estimated, however, their single major contribution seems to be that they complicate the model. For this reason, random slopes or quadratic effects are not introduced. Moreover, while in the original analysis (Hooghe et al, 2008), standardized coefficients have been used but in this analysis, yet, this time the unstandardized parameters are used to have a grip on what an increase in for instance the raw unemployment rates more or less means in substantial terms.

3.4. Results

The results section is split up in several parts. First of all, a baseline will be modeled that has incorporated the control variables year and population size. In the subsequent sections, each one of the proposed approaches, i.e. economic, cultural, social networks, and the political intermediaries, is modeled in relation with immigrant inflows. The final section will combine all information and qualifies the determinants that drive migration.

3.4.1. Baseline Model

Table 20 summarizes the result of the baseline model. However, before turning to the more substantial explanatory variables, the null model was estimated to have an overview of how much of the variability in the inflows can be attributed by differences between countries. As the intra-class correlation depicts, about a third in the variability in immigrant inflow is attributable by the country level. What is interesting is that, when adding the year and population effects, this figure rises to more than 40 percent, which means that differences between countries increase when controlling for time, but also for the size of the host country's population.

Table 20. Mixed Null and Baseline Models for Explaining Immigrant Inflow

Fixed effects	Model 0: Empty		Model 1: Baseline	
	Parameter	T-Value	Parameter	T-Value
Intercept	84,236*	2.69	-8,379,604***	-8.15
Year			4,194.33***	8.14
Population host country			0.004***	4.90
Random effects	Parameter	Z-Value	Parameter	Z-Value
Variance year level	7.98E9***	15.00	6.9735E9***	14.99
Variance country level	1.92E10**	3.03	8.8715E9**	2.91
Intra-class correlation	29.36%		44.01%	

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. The multilevel regression equation that is estimated in Model 1 will serve as baseline model for the further analysis.

When we look at the effects of the basic control variables, it can be noted that year has a positive linear effect. From 1980 to 2006 there is a general increase in immigrant influx. Averagely, there is an annual increase of about 4,200 immigrants. Moreover, as is evident, the population figure of the host country is one of the main determinants of the influx of immigrants. Obviously, countries with a large number of inhabitants – thus, larger countries – attract more immigrants. Keeping year constant, per thousand inhabitants there is an average influx of four immigrants.

The model including year and the population of the host country will serve as the baseline to test all indicators of the theoretical migration approaches on. Each time, one

indicator will be added to this baseline model to investigate what the bivariate relation of each indicator under control of time and host country population is.

3.4.2. Testing the Economic Approach

In Table 21, the test of the economic approach has been summarized. The results show that most hypotheses derived from the literature on economic explanations for migration are not confirmed by this analysis. Gross domestic product per capita is not significantly related to the influx of migrants, indicating that migrants do not systematically select the richest countries among the OECD member states. Also the annual economic growth rate is unrelated to immigrant inflow: there is no increase in influx in years where there is a high economic growth. Neither is there a significant relation with the percentage of social expenditure, indicating that migrants do not select countries with a generous social security regime. Unemployment is the only variable with a significant impact. The sign of the effect is negative: when unemployment rises, migration plummets. On average, controlling for year and population size of the host country, if unemployment figures raise with one percent, immigration inflows decrease with about 10,250. Indeed, migration primarily seems to function as a mechanism to restore imbalances in the labor market.

Table 21. Time Lag Analysis of the Economic Parameters in Explaining Immigrant Inflow

	Indicator	N	Year	Year – 1	Year – 2	Year – 3	Year – 4
M2	GDP per capita	440	-0.636 (-0.54)	-0.729 (-0.57)	-1.091 (-0.79)	-1.724 (-1.16)	-2.334 (-1.47)
M3	Economic growth	450	-2,710 (-1.40)	940.60 (0.49)	2,656.55 (1.42)	1,973.93 (1.06)	1,852.58 (1.09)
M4	Unemployment	411	-10,258*** (-6.34)	-9,709*** (-6.12)	-7,608*** (-5.02)	-6,425*** (-4.21)	-5,570*** (-3.54)
M5	Social expenditure	406	1625.60 (0.79)	39.705 (0.02)	-1,299.93 (-0.59)	-1,329.27 (-0.60)	-1,298.65 (-0.57)

Note: Each indicator is tested separately in addition to the Baseline (Model 1 in Table 20). Parameter estimates; t-values between brackets. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

In Table 21, the figures of the years prior to the observation of the immigrant flow (Year – T) are included. Based on the time lag analysis, it seems that both the effect of unemployment of the same year and the year before yield quite powerful effects with test statistics that fluctuate around -6. Moreover, when looking at the data for economic growth, the strongest effect, though not significant, can be found for two years before the immigration flow, which is in line with the economic theory that employment and economic growth are related, yet with a time lag of about two years. In an economic growth cycle, first a rise in GDP can be observed which is followed by shortages on the labor market, and in a next phase leads to attracting employees, which can consist out of immigrants.

This time lag analysis shows that migration is not just a powerful, but also a rather efficient mechanism to restore imbalances on the labor market. Within one year, migration flows react to signals from the labor market. It falls out of the scope of this chapter to determine the exact causal mechanism responsible for this effect. It might be that potential immigrants are specifically attracted by all kinds of job offers stemming from foreigners that already reside within the country (Paspalanova, 2007); another possible explanation is that government and recruitment agencies become more lenient in their admission procedures and decisions when there is a shortage on the labor market (Jones, 2008; Fawcett, 1989). Self-evidently a combination of both and other factors is also possible.

3.4.3. Testing the Cultural Approach

Subsequently, I turn to the test of the cultural theories on immigration. First, the “center/periphery” approach is operationalized in a rather straightforward manner, by simply calculating the distance to the equator of the host country. If we assume that migrants typically arrive in Europe from southern countries that can be considered economically peripheral, we might assume that their first “port of arrival” will be the Southern European countries. In this cultural approach, however, the stress is on cultural domination, which is expressed by the former colonial ties. As an independent variable, the total number of inhabitants of the former colonies of the host country is included. For most European countries this figure is 0, but there are also countries with huge former colonial empires. All former British colonies combined now have 1,980,000,000 inhabitants (figures for 2005), for France this is 272,000,000; for Portugal 223,000,000, and for Belgium 79,000,000 inhabitants. If the cultural explanation is correct, we might assume that the former colonial powers will still attract migrants from their former colonies.

Cultural hegemony is expressed not only by the colonial past, but also by language. The center position of the UK, France, and Spain does not refer only to their history, but also to the fact that their official languages are being spoken by a large population on various continents. The number of persons worldwide that (official) speak a language can be seen as an indicator of the dominance of that particular language. Countries where a dominant language is being spoken (like UK, Spain or France), will attract more immigrants than countries where this is not the case (like Sweden or Poland), according to the cultural approach. To test this hypothesis, the number of persons that official speak the language of the immigration country was included as an independent variable. Take France as an example: the value of this variable is the sum of the inhabitants of all the countries where French is the major official language. Obviously, there will be a strong correlation between the former colonial past and the current language use. In most former French colonies, French is still the official language, and with regard to English the same holds for most Commonwealth countries. The correlation between the variables “population of the former colonies” and “users of official language” is .55.

Table 22. Test of the Cultural Approach to Immigrant Inflow

		N	Parameter	T-Value
Model 6	Distance to equator	470	29.262	0.83
Model 7	Population former colonies	470	-0.000	-1.70
Model 8	Population language area	470	-0.000	-0.11

Note: Each indicator is tested separately in addition to the Baseline (Model 1 in Table 20).

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 22 is constructed in the same manner as the Models 2 to 5 in Table 21: time, and the population of the host country are included as control variables. Unlike our economic analysis, this model is not plagued by missing values, which makes that all 470 observations can be used. As the results in Table 22 indicate, it seems that the cultural theory only plays a minor role in determining immigration inflows. First of all, the distance from the equator to the countries of destination does not influence the inflow of migrants. The strongest effect stems from the size of the former colonies, however, this effect is still insignificant and negative: countries with a large colonial past do not attract more nor less immigrants compared with countries without an imperial history. Last but not least, the magnitude of the population of the language area hardly plays any role at all: under control of time and population of the host country, countries with a language that is spoken in large parts of the world do not attract significantly more immigrants compared with countries with a small language area.

3.4.4. Testing the Social Capital Approach

Finally, the network approach predicts that the presence of migrant communities in a settler country or city facilitates further immigration. These ethnic communities make entrance easier for persons coming from their native country, by providing them with useful information or contacts. Over time, this process would lead to chain migration. The network approach will be tested by including the stock of foreign population at the beginning of the decade as an independent variable. However, a word of caution is in order here. The network approach has to be considered a micro- or meso-level theory: it explains why the settlement of certain ethnic communities shows particular patterns. The statistical model, on the other hand, is situated at a macro-sociological level. So rather than performing a stringent test for the existence of chain migration, the macro-level model will try to grasp a process that essentially takes place at the micro or meso level. It can be argued, however, that if the current stock of immigrants does not seem to have an effect on the subsequent number of immigrants coming in, this implies that the network approach does not offer a good explanation for the total number of immigrants a country receives (macro level). Nevertheless, on a micro or meso level it might still be the case that individual immigrants or groups of immigrants are attracted by the presence of their relatives or acquaintances in the host country. Again, this is outside the scope of the Chapter.

Table 23. Test of the Social Network Approach to Immigrant Inflow

		N	Parameter	T-Value
Model 9	Stocks of foreigners (per 10 year)	393	0.085***	7.26

Note: Each indicator is tested separately in addition to the Baseline (Model 1 in Table 20).

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 23 indicates that the initial size of the stock of foreigners in the country does have a bearing on the subsequent number of immigrants. Under control of year and host country population size, for every 100 foreigners on the soil, there is an influx of about 9 immigrants. Moreover, this effect can be considered, with a corresponding t-value of 7.26, as quite strong. It needs, however, to be emphasized that this effect is, at this point, not controlled for the influence of other relevant covariates, like for instance unemployment rate. About the magnitude and the causal reasoning of network migration, there is a lively debate. For instance, Paspalanova discovered that chain migration plays an important role but only if the labor market offers opportunities (2007).

3.4.5. Testing for Political Intermediaries

Thus far I have not included any political and historical variables in the analysis, and indeed, the theoretical approaches that are tested in this chapter could be criticized on the ground that they do not address the role political systems can play in controlling immigration. Nevertheless, it seems crucial that if we want to arrive at a comprehensive explanation of immigration patterns, at least some information on political variables need to be included. Two specific country-level measurements will be included in the model in order to detect possible influences of policy systems. The political variables are separately added to the baseline model (Model I in Table 20). However, none of the two tested indicators are in a significant relation with the influx of foreigners. Migration flows are not significantly more directed to countries that are more democratic, nor to countries that grant voting rights at the local level. However, the Freedom House Index has an associated t-value of 1.57, which means that in further proceedings, it may be considered as an element that might need to be taken into consideration.

Table 24. Test for Political System Variables with Regard to Immigrant Inflow

		N	Parameter	T-Value
Model 10	Freedom House Index	470	8,015.76	1.57
Model 11	Voting Rights	470	14,691	0.25

Note: Each indicator is tested separately in addition to the Baseline (Model 1 in Table 20).

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Including political system variables, therefore, does not seem to add much to the statistical analysis of the theoretical approaches we want to discuss here. This does not imply, of course, that state policies do not matter. First of all, it should be mentioned

that it is hard to discover significant effects of variables at the country level, given that my analysis only includes 20 countries. In other words, it is possible that the role of state policies does play an important role, but sufficient statistical power cannot detect this effect. Second, state policies may mediate the effect of the labor market I discovered earlier. It is not unlikely that the states function as a gatekeeper, regulating immigration flows to fulfill the needs of the labor market. However, up till this moment, empirical evidence to corroborate this process is missing. Furthermore, it should be noted that government policies also can have an effect on economic prosperity and/or unemployment figures, so that in an indirect manner, too, government policies will still have an effect on immigration figures.

3.4.6. Towards an Integrated Model

Finally, we can now arrive at the construction of a more integrated model, simultaneously entering all the independent variables that proved to be significant or close to significance in the earlier analyses. Again, time and population of the host country are included as control variables (Model 1). From the economic analysis I keep the strongest variable, which is the unemployment rate (Model 4). From the cultural model, I retain the population of the former colonies (Model 7). Self-evidently, the country specific stock of foreigners at each decade is also entered in the model (Model 9), just as the Freedom House Index as political intermediary (Model 10).

Table 25. An Integrated Model for Immigrant Inflow to European Countries from 1980-2006


Fixed Effects	Parameter	T-Value
Intercept	-6,315,685***	-4.49
Year	3,227.50***	4.59
Population host country	0.004**	3.05
Unemployment rate	-12,541***	-6.40
Population former colonies	-0.000	-1.60
Stock of foreigners	0.052***	3.76
Freedom House Index	-43,828*	-2.11
Random Effects	Parameter	Z-Value
Variance year level	6.3142E9***	12.96
Variance country level	6.7763E9**	2.58
Intra-class correlation		51.77%

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. $N = 359$

This final model, therefore, can be considered as a simultaneous test for the three major theoretical approaches under control for the political conditions in the country. The model shows that time yields a significant effect: under control of other relevant covariates, there is a yearly increase of about 3,250 immigrants. Second, the population

of the host country remains significant, showing that large countries attract more immigrants than small countries. It is also the case that the level of democracy has a small but significant effect on immigration flows: in more democratic countries (a lower figure on the Freedom House Index means a higher level of democracy), there is a larger inflow of immigrants. If migration flows are driven by better individual conditions, democratically more stable countries are more preferred.

Figure 13. Longitudinal Relation between Unemployment and Inflow of Foreigners in Selected Countries, 1980-2006



Source: OECD; inflow of foreigners in 10,000s, for Germany in 100,000s.

However, the main interest goes of course out to the remaining three theoretical relevant variables, namely unemployment, colonial heritage, and stock of foreigners. Table 25 shows that the cultural approach renders insignificant: the former colonial past does not longer play a decisive role in migration patterns. On the contrary, the two other variables are in a significant relation. The effect of the unemployment rate is quite

strong, even the strongest from the whole series of variables, including the time effect and the size of the population of the host country. The higher the unemployment rate, the lower the influx of immigrants, and vice versa. Also the stock of immigrants at the beginning of each decade yield strong effect, indicating that chain migration is still persistent. The fact that the effect is lower than the effect of unemployment might add power to the findings of Paspalanova (2007), meaning that network migration occurs only if labor opportunities are present.

The strong effect of unemployment on immigration inflow can be detected on the bivariate plots between unemployment rate and foreigner inflow from 1980 to 2006. For each of the five plots of the foreigner inflow per geographical area that have presented earlier in this Chapter (Figure 12), the relation between immigrant inflow and levels of unemployment for the country in which the relation is best observable is plotted (Figure 13). All plots clearly show an increase of immigrant inflow in times when unemployment levels seem to drop and the other way around, namely that immigrant influx is decreasing when unemployment is rising. For the Netherlands, we can see an almost perfect inverse relation in the graphs: the inverse of employment almost matches perfectly with inflow figures.

4. Conclusion

At the end of this Chapter, quite some evidence has been given that Barroso's assessment of Europe as an immigration continent was correct. Indeed, taking various information on diversity into account, the European nation-states have become quite diverse. While Poland may be quite homogeneous, Switzerland and Luxembourg on the other hand are quite mixed, with respectively two and four residents on every ten national citizens having foreign citizenship. Also regarding diversity within these countries, there is a wide discrepancy across nations. To give but two examples, the German immigration data reflect a Turkish guestworker heritage while the Spanish data reflect a colonial past. It is also mistaken to make generalizations on geographical areas across Europe. On the one hand, turning to the Southern European block, Greece, with many foreigners from neighboring and former communist countries differs remarkably from Spain, Portugal and Italy, which have a rather mixed foreign nationalities profile; on the other hand, also in the Northern European block, it can be seen that diversity in Finland, with many Russian and Baltic foreigners, is distinct from the other Northern countries. In sum, the wide range of levels of diversity and the kind of diversity provides us with the challenge that diversity as such cannot be appropriately encapsulated in a unidimensional manner.

In this overview of diversity and immigration to Europe, I have relied on the OECD Migration data, which have earlier been analyzed thoroughly. However, it is difficult to neglect the many safeguards that are associated with this data set. Indeed, stock of

foreigner data may reflect different immigration policies that are of have been in effect. As I have shown, ranking countries on their level of diversity yield different results when looking at foreigner and foreign-born statistics, which indicates that across countries, various naturalization policies are in effect. Some countries may therefore be only relatively homogeneous in statistics while, in fact, the real level of heterogeneity may still be considerable. In general, this finding adds to the argument that, when mapping diversity across Europe, not one single measurement can be considered.

Despite the issue of a lack of comparability, the best way to have a view on the magnitude of this problem is to conduct an empirical test into the construct validity of the OECD data. From migration theory, various approaches have been proposed that might explain immigration patterns. Therefore, the main section of this chapter was dedicated to test the so-called fragmented set of migration theories to explain patterns (Massey et al., 1998) using the OECD data set on immigrant inflow for the 1980–2006 period. The results of the analysis indeed show the existence of clear patterns, which indicates not that the OECD data are not free from error, but contrary that error may be stable across place and time, and, as a consequence, can be used in a comparative research strategy.

What is first of all important to note is that, keeping track of other possible influences for immigrant inflow, the foreigner influx is still on the rise across European countries. Turning to the substantial variables, analysis indicates that cultural hegemony is hardly able to explain migration patterns but contrary, that both the economy and the network approach strongly determine the immigration inflow, together with the level of democracy in a country. With regard to the economic factor, it seems clear that potential immigrants do not systematically select countries with the highest national wealth nor countries with the most generous social security system. On the other hand, immigration flows reacts strongly on shortages in the labor market, exactly as economic theory would predict. Second, also network migration is at play. Indeed, migration flows to European countries is also determined by the size of the foreigner population that is already on the soil. Indeed, in countries where high numbers of non-citizens are present, a high level of influx can be expected. However, the strength of this effect is slightly lower than the effect of unemployment on immigration flows, which might be interpreted as migration that is facilitated by networks within the country of destination but still requires labor market opportunities. This unique effect of network migration is also indicative for the fact that it will be difficult to expect that migration will drop completely even if countries are faced with recession and unemployment rates skyrocket.

This significant effect has received additional evidence in current period of economic recession. Investigating Britain's International Passenger Survey, the Guardian (Travis, 21.05.2009) discovered that the net-migration rate dropped by about 25 percent. Moreover, other data showed that there is a considerable share (30 percent) of foreign-

born workers emigrating to their country of origin while the number of Eastern European work permits fell by 50 percent over the January-March 2009 period compared with the year before. Furthermore, looking across the Atlantic, the New York Times (Preston, 14.05.2009) has documented that there has been a drop of 25 percent in emigration in the year that ended in August 2008 compared with the year before. As Pew-researcher Jeffrey S. Passel argues in this New York Times article: “If jobs are available, people come. If jobs are not available, people don’t come.” This kind of reasoning adds, of course, to the empirical results I have laid out in this chapter.

It has to be remembered, however, that the statistics the New York Times and the Guardian covered legal migration, which is similar in my case. Illegal migrants, however, are also known to respond to signals from the (informal) labor market. Therefore, if we could arrive at a general measurement of immigration, including legal and illegal immigrants, this would probably even strengthen the power of labor market variables. Such an estimate, however, is completely impossible given the absence of reliable figures on undocumented migration. It does, however, pose the question which policy recommendations can be drawn given the strong correlation between migration and labor market imbalances. For instance, McPheters and Schlagenhauf (2006) argue that “The decision facing policy makers is whether illegal immigration should be deterred by harsher enforcement of laws, or whether the flow should be accepted as a natural consequence of the uneven economic development of the United States and Mexico.” In this respect, the question might be to what extent the European initiative regarding a Blue Card for labor migration may only cover the tip of the iceberg.

Turning back to the inquiry into the societal effects of immigration, findings in this chapter are quite puzzling for the remainder of the analyses. To be more precise, it seems that the paradox is confirmed which has also appeared in Putnam’s recent work (2007). On the one hand, migration flows react heavily on the positive notions of the economic approach: they do fill in gaps in the labor market while in times of high unemployment, migration drops; on the contrary, immigration does not react on the magnitude of the social security system. Altogether, while I’m aware of potential problems of ecological fallacy in this interpretation, one could conclude that immigrants want to have a better life but that they want to achieve it by themselves. On the other hand, among significant shares of the European population, negative attitudes towards immigration and immigrants are still widespread. The logical next step is therefore to investigate, notwithstanding the hostile out-group attitudes, whether diversity puts a buffer on social cohesion across Europe.

Chapter 6

Diversity and Trust in Europe: A Test of the Alleged Erosion of Social Cohesion in Diverse Societies

Diversity seems to trigger *not* in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation. In colloquial language, people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to ‘hunker down’ – that is, to pull in like a turtle (Putnam, 2007, p. 149).

1. Introduction

The opposing view between the economic necessity of immigration and the assumed negative consequences can be summarized by what Newton (2007b) recently has referred to as a ‘liberal dilemma’. Using this terminology, the author warns for the fact that liberal nation-states on the one hand would like to declare themselves to be ‘open’, including a stress on many political and human rights – among many, former Belgian prime minister, Guy Verhofstadt (2006), was for instance in such a strong defense of an open society in the interpretation by Popper (1963 [1945]). On the other hand, the negative outcomes that may be posed by immigration drives many national governments with a difficult policy position regarding the limits of how open its society can be. Nevertheless, it needs to be remembered that most of these negative effects of ethnic-cultural diversity stem on the one hand from US-based society (Putnam, 2007; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Costa & Kahn, 2003), which is considered to differ largely from the European nation-states, and, on the other hand, from intermediate-N cross-national research strategies that combine an amalgam of countries (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007), including many Asian and Latin-American ones. Taken altogether, a straightforward assessment of whether social cohesion is weakened due to immigration-caused diversity has not yet been proven successfully on the European continent.²⁰

²⁰ The content of this chapter is reflected in parts of the following publications: Hooghe et al (2008). This chapter has replicated this publication for the 2006 wave of the European Social Survey and relying on a more extensive set of diversity data. The results of this replication confirm the findings presented in the original article.

This chapter will thus provide empirical insights whether and to what extent generalized trust is lower in those countries that are characterized by high levels of ethnic-cultural diversity. The research strategy that will be embarked combines many guidelines that have been proposed throughout this dissertation. First of all, in contrast with many other research efforts that have used so-called fractionalization indicators to model diversity (Alesina et al., 2003; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Putnam, 2007), which are claimed to be colorblind (Stolle et al., 2008; Dawkins, 2008), the analyses are based on an extensive set of indicators that measure various distinct forms of diversity. To give but a few examples, it is self-evident that the share of foreigners on the total population is estimated in relation with generalized trust; however, another indicator that will be tested on its impact with trust is the share of immigrants that originates from countries outside the 15 original EU member states. Indeed, the theoretical assumption for this approach regards the belief or value congruence theory (Rokeach et al., 1960) according to which it can be expected that trust is more difficult to foster in societies with many immigrants that are culturally different. Second, next to advances in the proposed diversity data, also methodological advances will be incorporated. The most appropriate analysis technique to estimate this research question is multilevel multiple regression (Gelman & Hill, 2006). Yet to cope with the complexity of this technique and its underlying assumptions, this chapter will also pay considerable attention to those countries that exert a more than significant impact on the regression equation, namely the countries that are known to have a strong leverage function (see Chapter 2). By investigating these influential countries, it is also the aim to arrive at a more substantial interpretation of what the position of these outliers are in relation to diversity and trust.

In this chapter, I will proceed as follows. In the second section of this chapter, testable hypotheses will be proposed relying on a wide series of theoretical explanations (Chapter 4). By doing this, these hypotheses will be operationalized by a set of variables that will be brought in relation to generalized trust to assess its impact in the empirical investigation. In the third section, the operationalized variables that have been configured will be introduced, i.e. the univariate distribution of immigration-caused diversity variables across Europe is presented. Also briefly, the methodology by which the relation between diversity and trust will be tested gets the required attention. Before discussing the empirical relations, first of all an investigation of the influential countries will be conducted, i.e. the leverage function of countries that may hamper the general trend line and likewise, interpretations for these influential countries will be surveyed. Moving to the fifth section, the results of the empirical test of the relation between diversity and generalized trust are discussed; by presenting consecutively bivariate and multivariate findings. Since an extensive set of indicators for ethnic-cultural diversity is being tested in relation with trusting the generalized other, in the sixth section, the results are summarized and extensively reflected. In the seventh and final section, I will critically discuss the results of the analysis of the effects of immigration-caused diversity on generalized trust across Europe.

2. Operationalizing the Hypotheses

Relying on an overview of the dominant models that backbone empirical research on the social consequences of diversity (Chapter 4), the impact of diversity on trust is generally expected to be negative. While scholars have suggested that intergroup contact is able to foster generalized trust (Stolle et al., 2008; Allport, 1954), on the other hand, theories on contextual diversity predict that high levels of diversity tend to erode the social fabric of society (Putnam, 2007; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Since this chapter deals with generalized trust among individuals living in countries with varying levels of ethnic-cultural diversity, the main theoretical approaches that need to be considered regard contextual diversity; consequently, the intergroup contact theory needs to be discarded.

Deriving evidence of the expected mechanism that causes trust to be diminished in diverse societies, it can first of all be expected that simply the mere presence of foreigners might reduce trust. Indeed, according to the aversion to heterogeneity thesis, individuals like to associate with individuals who are alike since similarity reduces the complexity present in everyday life. Thus, in countries in which there is a high share of foreigners or which do enjoy a considerable number of immigrants, it is expected that population is less trusting compared with countries that rank rather low with respect to the presence of foreign population or have had only a relatively low level of influx of immigrants (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Bjørnskov, 2007; Delhey & Newton, 2005). Thus, the optimal way to estimate this relation is to have a look at figures representing the share of foreigners, which in fact only cover the legal category of having non-national citizenship, as well as those residents that have been born abroad, which covers a wider categorization of foreign descent. Moreover, also the stock of immigrants in relation to the absolute population figures might be considered. Indeed, this approach corresponds best with what is proposed as immigration-caused diversity. However, next to this immigration-caused approach to diversity, one might also be interested in the general level of ethnic and cultural fractionalization across Europe, which can be operationalized by so-called indices for fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003), as have been frequently adapted in empirical research into the social consequences of diversity.

An addition to the approach that expects that residents tend to become less trusting due to the presence of foreigners, has been introduced by Rokeach et al. (1960), who expect that in the first place social distances between the natives and the immigrant groups drive the general population to become more distrusting. This approach is also emphasized by models of symbolic threat that have demonstrated that distrust is created due to a struggle over the maintenance of social status (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007). In this respect, it can be expected that not just the mere presence of foreigners lowers trust, but the presence of foreigners that represent wide cultural gaps with the native population exemplifies large inequalities for which it is expected that they drive down trust. When it comes to operationalizing this hypothesis,

first of all the countries of the European Union might be considered as an entity that is, regarding both its social and cultural composition, relatively homogeneous outside this political entity²¹. While there are large social and cultural discrepancies over the European countries, many represent immigrants as predominantly coming from outside the European Union (see e.g. Van Houtte & Stevens, 2009). Concrete, this means that trust might be lower among residents living in countries with high shares of non-EU foreigners. Moreover, over the last couple of years, many spectators have diagnosed out-group hostility towards Muslims (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Following this logic, it can also be expected that a large share of immigrants coming from countries that are member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference might erode the social fabric of society, i.e. generalized trust.

Table 26. Operationalization of the Proposed Hypotheses

Approach	Static	Dynamic
Mere exposure	Share of foreigners	Trend share foreigners
	Share of foreign born	Trend share foreign born
	Inflow of foreigners	Trend inflow foreigners
Value incongruence / Symbolic threat	Share of non-EU foreigners	Trend share non-EU
	Share of foreigners Islam	Trend share Islamic
	Inflow non-EU foreigners	Trend inflow non-EU
	Inflow foreigners Islam	Trend inflow Islam
	Inflow asylum seekers	Trend inflow asylum
	Share naturalizations	Trend nationalizations
Realistic threat	Share of labor immigrants	Trend labor immigr
	Share of non-OECD	Trend share non-OECD
	Inflow labor immigrants	Trend labor immigrants
	Inflow non-OECD	Trend inflow non-OECD

While symbolic threats have gained widespread attention in the literature over the last couple of years, the realistic group conflict theory of which the roots date back to about half a century ago (Sheriff et al., 1961), remains a dominant model (Sniderman et al., 2004; Semyonov et al., 2008; Meuleman et al., 2009). This theory, which predicts that a zero-sum struggle over a perceived scarce pool of resources has largely been framed around the availability of jobs, for which the model thus hypothesizes that out-group hostility is generated because immigrants take away jobs. Stretching this model to the

²¹ This operationalization exemplifies the difficulties that are inherent in quantitative based approaches that categorize social reality. While Switzerland and Norway, to give but two examples, are surrounded by EU-member states, they fall out of the operationalization of this concept.

contextual level influence of diversity on generalized trust, the general expectation is that a large number of labor immigrants form a threat to the labor market of the native population, which consequently turns into distrust. Moreover, this hypothesis may not only apply to employment but also to immigrants of which it is expected that they form a threat to the general wealth of the country. Putting this hypothesis into practice, it is expected that in countries that receive a lot of immigrants originating from countries that are not member of the OECD, which can be regarded as a organization of the most advanced and industrialized countries, have a citizenry that is more distrusting compared with the residents of countries that receives predominantly immigrants from wealthier countries. Likewise, also asylum seekers that originate from countries that are highly unstable, largely politically but similarly also economically deprived, can theoretically be considered as a threat for the national wealth.

What all operationalizations thus far have in common is that it conceives diversity as mainly static. While both stock and inflow figures will be taken into consideration for testing all hypotheses that have been proposed thus far, they have not dealt with the dynamic nature that is inherent in the process of immigration (Hooghe, 2007). In this respect, also indicators that show trends over time in the various indicators that have been proposed until now need to be taken into account. Thus, not only, to give but a few examples, the mere presence of non-EU foreigners or the relative inflow of labor immigrants need to be taken into consideration, also the evolution in the share of non-EU foreigners as well as the increase in the relative inflow of labor immigrants over time need to be considered. Indeed, the theoretical model that underlies this operationalization by trends over time is anomie. This theory predicts that a rapid social change fosters alienation among the general population since the general moral is not brought into coherence with the changes that are occurring (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). Trends over time, i.e. from 2002 to 2006, of all static measures will be modeled for explaining differentials in generalized trust. The general expectation is that in countries that have encountered a rapid increase in ethnic-cultural diversity, of any kind, the population tends to be more distrusting than those of countries in which such steep increases have been absent.

3. Data and Methodology

To assess the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust across Europe, some innovations will be proposed. In accordance with previous chapters, multilevel modeling will be applied as analysis technique. But what is more important, this research will thus make use of an extensive set of indicators that measure different theoretical strands. In the first part, I will elaborate on how these various indicators are constructed. In the second part, the univariate distribution of these variables across Europe will be presented. In the third part, attention will be given to the creation and the geographical spread of a latent ethnic-cultural diversity variable, which is composed

out of various variables that are highly intercorrelated. In the fourth and final part, I will briefly resume the methodology that will be applied.

3.1. Constructing Measurements for Ethnic-Cultural Diversity

The data for constructing indicators on ethnic-cultural diversity are obtained from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Recent innovations in the availability of its comparative data sets regard a web-based interface, namely OECD.Stats Extracts (OECD, 2009), which makes it convenient to download the data of interest.²² In the Migration Statistics section, the OECD has made nine subdivisions, namely the inflow and outflow of foreigners, inflow of asylum seekers, stocks of foreigners and foreign-born residents, acquisition of nationality, the inflow of foreign workers, as well as the stock of foreign laborers and foreign-born workers. For about all of these nine categories, the OECD has data available from 1980 to the most recent years, and they include the countries of origin of the immigrants. For instance, it is known how many Turkish nationals have a permit to work in Great Britain in 2006.

Given this information, various calculations can be made. To give but one example, to measure the inflow of foreigners originating from countries that are member of the Organization of the Islamic League, it is possible to distinguish those countries in the information regarding the countries of origin. The OECD has enabled the feature to download the data of interest in several spreadsheets, e.g. applied to the Islamic inflow, this regards the inflow of foreigners from Afghanistan, Algeria, and so on, for all OECD countries. After downloading all spreadsheets, calculations over the various sheets were made, which in total express the total inflow of foreigners from these Islamic countries for all OECD countries. To arrive to a standardized interpretation, this total figure has been related to the population size of the OECD countries of interest. Alternatively, for the trends over time, regression slopes that resulted from explaining evolutions over time in each of the diversity variables were explained with as predictor the years of interest, i.e. 2002 to 2006. The regression slope for each country on each of the variables is thus treated as a new indicator that measure dynamic aspects of diversity.

Indeed, since predominantly larger countries attract higher numbers of immigrants (Chapter 5) – one of the most significant predictors for foreigner inflow is the population figure of the host country it makes no sense to take absolute stock figures into account. On the contrary, all measures are represented as a share on the total population. This may pose difficulties regarding the interpretation, i.e. it is not

²² Despite the recent availability of this set of migration data, I would like to thank Ann Trappers for collecting all these interesting data from various OECD-publications in the first stage of the research project.

straightforward to for instance interpret an evolution from 2002 to 2006 in the share of immigrants that are coming from non-OECD countries. Yet, it is the indisputable that such a representation is the most coherent in the depiction of the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust across Europe.

Thus, for all OECD countries, the operationalizations as proposed in Table 26 can be transformed into appropriate measurements. However, while the OECD has migration statistics available for at maximum 30 countries, it needs to be remember that in the end, these data need to be merged with the data of the ESS, which is composed out of 23 countries. The merge of the two data files has shown that six countries that are present in the ESS are not present in the OECD Statistics.²³ It needs, moreover, to be emphasized that this is the best-case scenario, since for some countries, some indicators are absent. The worst-case scenario in this respect is the evolution in the share of foreigners, for which a trend figure for only 11 countries could be calculated. Because I want the most harmonized data available, other data sources are not considered to complement the missing values, which makes that the number of countries is limited, which will pose challenges for the analysis. For some indicators for certain countries, data were not available for the 2006 time point and therefore, data for the nearest year that had a figure available was brought into the equation.

The various diversity indicators based on the OECD Statistics are supplemented with four other variables that have been shown to be relevant in the discussion on diversity and social cohesion. The first three variables are the regular fractionalization indicators, namely ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization, as have been obtained from Alesina et al manuscript (2003). It has to be noted, however, that these variables do not necessarily aim to represent immigration-caused diversity; i.e. to give but one example, with a score of 0.554, Belgium is considered as highly fractionalized, which is completely attributable to the linguistic divide between Flemish and Walloons. Yet, both three indicators are abundantly used in discussing the social consequences of diversity across the globe, which make that they are worth bringing in relation with generalized trust across Europe. The fourth additional variable refers to the stock of immigrants, which has been obtained from the Population Division of the United Nations (2006). The most important feature of this UN-based variable is that it is available for most of the countries that are available of the ESS, which adds statistical leverage to the multilevel multiple regression model. It needs to be emphasized that the correlation between this variable and the stock of foreigners as obtained from the OECD is roughly .90 (Table 29).

²³ The 17 countries for which data are available are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovak Republic, Sweden and Switzerland.

3.2. Distribution of the Diversity Variables across Europe

Building upon the set of new variables, Table 27 shows that Europe can be regarded as quite diverse, as shown in preceding chapter. Yet, in about all of the indicators, we can see a considerable geographical divide across Europe. On the one hand, the most homogeneous countries are those in Eastern Europe. Indeed, while there are some small differences regarding the variable that is under analysis – for instance, while Poland has the smallest share of foreigners, and Slovak Republic has the lowest inflow of foreigners from outside the original 15 EU member countries or from Islamic countries – in almost all cases, Eastern European countries top the list of homogeneity across Europe. Regarding the most heterogeneous countries, it can be seen that this list is not geographically coherent, yet, in most of the cases, Switzerland and Ireland are in competition. Switzerland is in Europe the country with the highest share of foreigners; yet, Table 27 also shows that this high share is to a considerable extent explained by the number of work permits. On the other hand, Ireland has received in 2006 a high influx of foreigners as a share of its total population. It is important to note that this inflow is not only coming from inside the EU – Ireland also tops the list of inflow from non-OECD countries. Table 27 displays that there is a high variability in various indicators regarding which country tops the list of most diverse. This high variability shows that diversity to European countries is indeed a complex phenomenon that cannot easily be captured in one index for fractionalization. Regarding the Alesina et al (2003) measures for fractionalization, Portugal is the most diverse while Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands are the most heterogeneous in respectively ethnicity, language and religion.

Table 27. Univariate Distribution of the Static Diversity Data across Europe

Diversity Indicator	N	Mean	St Dev	Min	Max
Share of foreigners	17	6.310	4.808	0.144 (PL)	20.358 (CH)
Share of foreign born	15	8.990	4.206	2.030 (PL)	14.215 (IE)
Share immigrants (UN)	23	9.513	5.295	1.300 (BG)	22.900 (CH)
Inflow of foreigners	17	0.722	0.587	0.090 (PL)	2.100 (IE)
Share non-EU foreigners	13	4.193	2.055	1.396 (HU)	8.568 (CH)
Share of foreigners Islam	17	1.023	0.783	0.004 (SK)	2.585 (DE)
Inflow non-EU foreign	14	0.610	0.454	0.161 (SK)	1.568 (ES)
Inflow foreigners Islam	15	0.075	0.072	0.002 (SK)	0.231 (SE)
Inflow asylum seekers	17	0.076	0.069	0.001 (PT)	0.268 (SE)
Share naturalizations	17	0.206	0.174	0.003 (PL)	0.624 (CH)
Share labor immigrants	16	3.441	2.714	0.121 (SK)	11.356 (CH)
Share of non-OECD	17	3.282	2.441	0.081 (PL)	8.545 (AT)
Inflow labor immigrants	17	0.329	0.253	0.016 (FR)	0.869 (NO)
Inflow non-OECD	16	0.446	0.503	0.063 (PL)	1.826 (IE)
Ethnic fractionalization	23	0.221	0.169	0.047 (PT)	0.555 (BE)
Linguistic fractionalizat	23	0.241	0.182	0.020 (PT)	0.544 (CH)
Religious fractionalizat	23	0.412	0.1888	0.144 (PT)	0.722 (NL)

Note: Data obtained from OECD Statistics portal + own calculations. All OECD-figures, including the inflow figures, are expressed in relation to the total population. Fractionalization indices are obtained from Alesina et al. (2003), the share of immigrants from the UN (2006). For country codes, check Appendix C.

With regard to the data that represent an evolution in diversity over 2002-2006 (Table 28), the Eastern European ones do, alternatively not top the list with regard to the most homogeneous ones. One of the implications is that, even though they are highly homogeneous, those countries do not know a sharp increase nor a steep drop in their shares or inflow figures in the last five years. Germany and Portugal have encountered a relatively sharp decrease in the share of foreigners and the influx of immigrants over the 2002-2006 period. On the other hand, Ireland and Spain can be regarded as the new countries of immigration. There are no countries in Europe that have witnessed such a sharp increase in immigrants than those two countries. As we will see in the analysis of the leverage functions, the influx they encounter are, in most of the times, for of the average trend values for the other European countries.

Table 28. Univariate Distribution of the Dynamic Diversity Data across Europe

Diversity Indicator	N	Mean	St Dev	Min	Max
Trend share foreigners	16	0.186	0.344	-0.209 (DE)	1.041 (IE)
Trend share foreign born	11	0.394	0.388	-0.008 (NL)	1.065 (IE)
Trend inflow foreigners	17	0.033	0.087	-0.100 (PT)	0.270 (IE)
Trend share non-EU	12	0.141	0.336	-0.323 (DE)	0.971 (IE)
Trend share Islamic	16	-0.001	0.051	-0.076 (DE)	0.142 (ES)
Trend inflow non-EU	14	0.027	0.091	-0.096 (PT)	0.243 (IE)
Trend inflow Islam	15	-0.004	0.013	-0.021 (DE)	0.025 (ES)
Trend inflow asylum	17	-0.026	0.026	-0.078 (NO)	-0.000 (PT)
Trend naturalizations	17	0.001	0.022	-0.039 (AT)	0.035 (SE)
Trend share labor immigr	16	0.114	0.225	-0.150 (SE)	0.682 (IE)
Trend share non-OECD	16	0.070	0.137	-0.084 (DE)	0.798 (ES)
Trend inflow labor immigr	17	0.014	0.060	-0.142 (IE)	0.130 (ES)
Trend inflow non-OECD	16	0.015	0.088	-0.096 (PT)	0.268 (IE)

Note: Data obtained from OECD Statistics portal + own calculations. All OECD-figures, including the inflow figures, are expressed in relation to the total population. For country codes, check Appendix C.

3.1. Constructing a Latent Immigration Index

Next to this list of diversity variables, which all have been constructed on the basis of OECD data, also one specific latent diversity variable, encapsulating several indicators for diversity, is considered. Indeed, among many critics, the OECD itself has raised questions regarding the level of comparability of its Trends in International Migration statistics (Lemaître, 2005). One way to deal with this problem is to create a latent variable for diversity that is composed out of the several indicators that are presented above. Given the intermediate-N of roughly 17 countries, it impossible to perform factor analysis (EFA) on this extensive set of diversity data. Yet, the correlations between the several diversity indicators have shown that predominantly the share of immigrants, based on the UN Population statistics, the share of foreigners, naturalizations and non-OECD foreigners, the inflow of foreigners and asylum seekers, and the Alesina et al (2003) linguistic fractionalization, share a high level of communality. To compose a new variable, the seven indicators involved have all been standardized of which a new means-based scale has been created that is internally consistent and thus is considered to reflect the general level of immigration-caused diversity across Europe. Table 30 shows the distribution of diversity across the 17 OECD countries that are involved in the ESS.

Table 29. Correlations between UN Share of Immigrants and other Relevant Indicators for Immigration-Caused Diversity

Country	Correlation with UN Share of Immigrants
Share of foreigners	0.913
Inflow of foreigners	0.679
Inflow of asylum seekers	0.516
Share of naturalizations	0.758
Share of foreigners from non-OECD countries	0.763
Linguistic fractionalization	0.435
Cronbach's alpha	0.747

Note: The only variables that were present for the 17 countries that are also present in the ESS have been taken into account. Entries represent correlation coefficients with the UN share of immigrants (2006).

In Table 30, the distribution of this new variable is been displayed.²⁴ The interpretation of this standardized variable must be decoupled from the interpretation of the previous OECD variables, which were all in relation with the total population of the European country under investigation; yet, this new standardized variable should more or less represent a standard normal distribution with means zero and a standard deviation of one; however, given the small sample of countries, this is not the case. When looking at the distribution of this variable over Europe, it can be seen that Switzerland once again outweighs the other European countries as being the most diverse. Sweden follows on a second place, followed by Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Spain. The last country with a value higher than zero is the Netherlands. Less diverse based on this composite scale are Norway, followed by Germany, the UK and France. The Nordic countries Denmark and Sweden, also Portugal, but foremost the Eastern European countries Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland close the list as being most homogeneous.

²⁴ One may argue about the addition of 'linguistic fractionality' to this index since it does not exactly capture immigration-caused diversity. However, the reliability analysis has shown that the internal consistency of this index was considerably higher after adding this variable.

Table 30. Distribution of the Newly Created Immigration Index

Country	Immigration Index
Switzerland	1.927
Sweden	0.874
Austria	0.616
Belgium	0.474
Ireland	0.461
Spain	0.441
Netherlands	0.111
Norway	-0.102
Germany	-0.103
United Kingdom	-0.226
France	-0.264
Denmark	-0.473
Finland	-0.757
Slovak Republic	-0.789
Portugal	-0.836
Hungary	-0.977
Poland	-1.163
Mean over the 17 countries	-0.046
Standard deviation over the 17 countries	0.792

Note: Variable composed by a means score of the standardized values of linguistic fractionalization, inflow of asylum seekers, inflow of foreigners, nationalizations, share of foreigners, share of foreigners from non-OECD countries and the UN share of immigrants figure.

3.3. Methodology

In the empirical analyses that will follow in the next section, all proposed ethnic-cultural diversity variables are brought separately into relation with individual level generalized trust by means of multilevel modeling. Yet, as is the case of multilevel modeling, and necessary for assessing the unique impact of diversity on trust, it allows for controlling for other individual and contextual factors that have an impact on individual trust levels (Chapter 3). In equation (15), the individual-level covariates for which the effect will be controlled for are summarized. In equation (16), the country level covariates, namely the economy (expressed by the GDP per capita in US\$) and the national culture (expressed by having a Protestant tradition), are summarized. The effect of diversity is added to equation (16). In the forthcoming empirical analyses, the impact of the individual and country level effects will not be discussed since they are extensively described in Chapter 3.

$$Trust_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1 age_{ij1} + \beta_2 gender_{ij2} + \beta_3 origin_{ij3} + \beta_4 urbanization_{ij4} + \beta_5 civilstat_{ij5} + \beta_6 children_{ij6} + \beta_7 education_{ij7} + \beta_8 employment_{ij8} \quad (15)$$

$$+ \beta_9 income_{ij9} + \beta_{10} volunteering_{ij10} + \beta_{11} religious_{ij11} + \beta_{12} television_{ij12} + e_{ij} \\ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} economy_{j1} + \gamma_{02} culture_{j2} + \gamma_{03} diversity_{j3} + u_j \quad (16)$$


In the methodological chapter, warnings have been raised about the accuracy of the estimates for an intermediate number of level-2 cases, as is the case in this research. Relying mostly on a set of mostly 17 countries, it is known that the statistical power is rather low (Maas & Hox, 2005; Meuleman & Billiet, 2009). This low power is expected to induce Type II-errors, meaning that in reality a negative impact of diversity on trust is present which cannot be detected because of the limited sample of countries. For this reason, special attention will be given to the sign of the parameter, i.e. whether there are consistent negative findings of diversity on trust.

What is also emphasized (Chapter 2) and which has been demonstrated by the distribution of the diversity variables is that certain countries deviate remarkably from the general trend across Europe. As such, a thorough investigation into which countries hamper the general relation between diversity and generalized trust does also need to be taken place. Therefore, before turning to the empirical outcomes, first of all the leverage functions of the countries will be investigated.

4. Investigating Countries' Leverage Functions

While most comparative studies, including those that make use of multilevel models, use a limited number of countries, they fail to account for one of the most basic regression assumption, namely the fact that the regression slope may be largely influenced by certain countries that exert a so-called leverage function (Barnett & Lewis, 1984). Indeed, certainly when relying on an intermediate-N, like for instance the 2006 wave of the ESS with at maximum 23 countries, in most cases only 17 data points are available. In this respect, it might be the case that one of these countries has a highly deviant value on the independent variable that might hamper the overall general trend. Certainly with respect to ethnic-cultural diversity, it is known that certain countries deviate strongly from the distribution of indicators of diversity in Europe. To give but one example, while on average, European countries have a share of foreigners that ranges from roughly 0 to 10 percent, at least according to the official OECD statistics, Switzerland, one of the countries in the ESS, has about 20 percent foreigners on its soil, which means that it may have a strong impact on the slope of diversity on trust.

Figure 14. Investigating the Outlier Functions in the Relation between the Share of Immigrants (UN) and Generalized Trust across Europe



Note: Summary of the graphical information regarding countries' influences on the regression equation, i.e. on the regression slope by the leverage value on the X-axis, and on the regression intercept by the external studentized residuals on the Y-axis. The cut-off values are represented by the, respectively, vertical and horizontal lines. For country labels, check Appendix C.

The general formula to calculate the extent to which a country has a leverage function on the general trend (cf. Chapter 2) represents a variance function of the independent variable in relation to its fitted value (Welkenhuysen-Gybels & Loosveldt, 2002). To evaluate whether a country hampers the general trend line in an extraordinary manner, the cut-off value for the comparison of this leverage function needs to be considered. This cut-off value is a function of the number of estimated parameters (which equates with two in this bivariate assessment at the aggregate level) and the number of cases involved, which in this research frequently is restricted to 17. Figure 14, for instance, clearly represents this leverage function of Switzerland on the relation between the share of immigrants on the total population – a measure that has been obtained from the UN Population Statistics – and generalized trust across Europe. While the cut-off value under consideration for being a leverage function is 0.174 for 23 countries, Switzerland is far off of this critical area with a value of 0.334. Figure 14 also represents the outlier function of specifically Denmark, which means that due to the influence of Denmark, the estimation of the intercept may be biased from the overall trend. However, since I am merely interested in the effect of diversity on trust, outlier functions are not considered.

In Table 31 and 32, the investigation of the leverage function is printed, representing the number of countries involved, the cut-off value, as well as, if necessary, the two influential countries and their leverage function between brackets. It could have been expected that the maximum as well as the minimum values for the diversity variables, as have been printed in Table 27 and 28, do deviate too much from the general trend. Table 31 and 32 are constructed in such a way that it represented at maximum two leverage countries – for all variables not more than two countries proved to leverage the regression slope.

Table 31. Investigating the Leverage Functions for the Static Diversity Indicators

Indicator	N	H	Leverage 1	Leverage 2
Immigration index	17	0.235	CH (0.447)	-
Share of foreigners	17	0.235	CH (0.592)	-
Share of foreign born	15	0.267	-	-
Share immigrants (UN)	23	0.174	CH (0.334)	-
Inflow of foreigners	17	0.235	IE (0.404)	-
Share non-EU foreigners	13	0.308	CH (0.454)	-
Share of foreigners Islam	17	0.235	DE (0.307)	-
Inflow non-EU foreign	14	0.286	ES (0.414)	IE (0.413)
Inflow foreigners Islam	15	0.267	SE (0.400)	-
Inflow asylum seekers	17	0.235	SE (0.546)	-
Share naturalizations	17	0.235	CH (0.417)	SE (0.322)
Share labor immigrants	16	0.250	CH (0.629)	-
Share of non-OECD	17	0.235	AT (0.349)	ES (0.296)
Inflow labor immigrants	17	0.235	NO (0.343)	-
Inflow non-OECD	16	0.250	IE (0.565)	ES (0.352)
Ethnic fractionalization	23	0.174	BE (0.221)	CH (0.197)
Linguistic fractionalization	23	0.174	-	-
Religious fractionalization	23	0.174	-	-

Note: Entries represent first of all the number of countries for which diversity data are available. For this number of countries, the H-cut-off value was calculated by the formula $(2 * p / N)$; since I test the bivariate relation, this formula equates with $(4 / N)$. The last two columns represent the leverage countries and the associated leverage function. For country labels, check Appendix C.

What Table 31 and 32 represent is that the leverage function is, in the case of the investigation between diversity and generalized trust, is hampered by the upper bound. By this statement, I refer to the finding that the most diverse countries have an extraordinary impact on the regression slope, not the most homogeneous countries. Thus, even the most homogeneous countries are in line with the average European

trend, so it seems. Therefore, relating Tables 27 and 28 with the univariate distribution of the diversity indicators with Tables 31 and 32 regarding the leverage function, it can be seen that in considerable cases, the countries that are most mixed are indeed mixed in such a manner that they hamper the general European trend. Only for the linguistic and religious fractionalization index, as well as foreign-born residents, no country compromises the regression equation. It needs no further elaboration that these countries will be considered to be left out of the empirical analyses in a further stage of the research. Moreover, in quite a few cases, a second country that may hamper general conclusions can be ascertained. For instance, with regard to the inflow of non-EU foreigners, both Spain and Ireland do deviate largely from other European countries in relation to the influence of the independent variable on the trust-outcome. A special strategy seems thus be advisable.

Table 32. Investigating the Leverage Functions for Dynamic Diversity Indicators

Indicator	N	H	Leverage 1	Leverage 2
Trend share foreigners	16	0.250	IE (0.474)	ES (0.430)
Trend share foreign born	11	0.364	IE (0.390)	-
Trend inflow foreigners	17	0.235	IE (0.521)	-
Trend share non-EU	12	0.333	IE (0.639)	-
Trend share Islamic	16	0.250	ES (0.590)	-
Trend inflow non-EU	14	0.286	IE (0.505)	-
Trend inflow Islam	15	0.267	ES (0.424)	-
Trend inflow asylum	17	0.235	AT (0.303)	NO (0.302)
Trend naturalizations	17	0.235	AT (0.267)	-
Trend share labor immigrants	16	0.250	IE (0.487)	ES (0.349)
Trend share non-OECD	16	0.250	ES (0.613)	IE (0.276)
Trend inflow labor immigr	17	0.235	IE (0.479)	-
Trend inflow non-OECD	16	0.250	IE (0.617)	-

Note: Entries represent first of all the number of countries for which diversity data are available. For this number of countries, the H-cut-off value was calculated by the formula $(2 * p / N)$; since I test the bivariate relation, this formula equates with $(4 / N)$. The last two columns represent the leverage countries and the associated leverage function. For country labels, check Appendix C.

Thus, the best strategy to deal with influential cases is to conduct the analysis both with and without the countries that strongly affect the regression slope and report them (Kruskal, 1960). Indeed, in excluding outlier cases from the full data set, one may not forget that these cases may provide highly relevant information in itself: derived from the hypotheses, it can be expected that these influential countries, which are all upward skewed, combine high levels of diversity with low levels of generalized trust. Yet, it can in fact also be the case that these diverse countries are characterized by high levels of

trust. As such, these countries do provide highly relevant information that nevertheless needs to be taken into consideration.

5. Results

The results section is split up in two different parts. First of all, I will present the bivariate analysis. This analysis will provide insights to the extent that diverse countries have in general low levels of trust, as is expected. However, since it has been shown that other factors may also influence the generation or erosion of trust (Chapter 3), the effect of trust needs to be controlled for other relevant covariates. In the second section, multilevel multiple regression analysis is performed to assess the unique impact of diversity on trust across Europe.

5.1. Bivariate Analysis

In Table 33, the results of the bivariate analysis between static forms of diversity and trust, both including and excluding leverage countries, are printed. What is quite interesting is that in almost all of the cases, there is a positive correlation between the indicator for ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust. Except for the share of non-EU foreigners, only after excluding one influential country, and the three indicators for fractionalization, there is a negative correlation between diversity and aggregate levels of generalized trust. Moreover, there is hardly any indicator that is in a strong significant relation with generalized trust. Regarding an alpha-level of 0.05, only the share of naturalizations (full data set) and ethnic fractionalization (without leverage countries) are in a significant relation with trust. With regard to the strength of the relation after excluding leverage countries, the relations go not in a uniform direction – for some indicators, the correlation becomes stronger, like for instance with regard to the share of Islamic foreigners, for other indicators, the correlations becomes weaker, like for instance with regard to the share of immigrants. Also in this regard, no uniform statements can be made.

Table 33. Bivariate Correlation between Static Diversity Indicators and Generalized Trust

Indicator	Including Leverage		Excluding Leverage	
	N	Correlation	N	Correlation
Immigration index	17	0.410	16	0.407
Share of foreigners	17	0.271	16	0.234
Share of foreign born	15	0.271	15	0.271
Share immigrants (UN)	23	0.264	22	0.192
Inflow of foreigners	17	0.279	16	0.284
Share non-EU foreigners	13	0.035	12	-0.083
Share of foreigners Islam	17	0.232	16	0.316
Inflow non-EU foreign	14	0.174	12	0.529•
Inflow foreigners Islam	15	0.259	14	0.115
Inflow asylum seekers	17	0.491•	16	0.441•
Share naturalizations	17	0.490*	15	0.451•
Share labor immigrants	16	0.188	15	0.120
Share of non-OECD	17	0.146	15	0.345
Inflow labor immigrants	17	0.441•	16	0.305
Inflow non-OECD	16	0.140	14	0.481•
Ethnic fractionalization	23	-0.277	21	-0.455*
Linguistic fractionalization	23	-0.114	23	-0.114
Religious fractionalization	23	-0.218	23	-0.218

• $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

While there were hardly any negative effects between the static immigration-caused diversity indicators, as has been this relation is more puzzling for the dynamic diversity indicators, yet, there are quite a few negative but insignificant relations between diversity and aggregate levels of generalized trust. In Table 34, only one of the dynamic diversity indicators is bivariately in a significant with generalized trust. More precisely, the trend in the evolution in the inflow of asylum seekers, using the full data set, is negatively associated with trust: generalized trust is lower in countries that have encountered a rapid increase in the inflow of asylum seekers. Also in Table 34, there is no uniform relation when it comes to the effect size of dynamic measures of diversity on generalized trust after excluding certain influential countries.

Table 34. Bivariate Correlation between Dynamic Diversity Indicators and Generalized Trust

Indicator	Including Leverage		Excluding Leverage	
	N	Correlat	N	Correlat
Trend share foreigners	16	0.030	14	0.214
Trend share foreign born	11	-0.232	11	-.232
Trend inflow foreigners	17	0.164	16	0.143
Trend share non-EU	12	-0.026	11	-0.003
Trend share Islamic	16	-0.174	15	-0.100
Trend inflow non-EU	14	0.138	13	0.110
Trend inflow Islam	15	-0.293	14	-0.277
Trend inflow asylum	17	-0.424•	15	-0.356
Trend nationalizations	17	0.143	17	0.143
Trend share labor immigrants	16	0.025	14	0.181
Trend share non-OECD	16	-0.018	14	0.154
Trend inflow labor immigr	17	0.239	16	0.404
Trend inflow non-OECD	16	0.101	15	0.046

• $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

In sum, the bivariate analysis has first of all revealed that the relation between diversity and trust is complex. On the one hand, it in general seems that with regard to a static approach towards immigration-caused diversity, the most mixed countries are also the ones that are also the ones that have slightly higher levels of trust; yet, it needs to be added that these relations are not statistically significant. More interesting in this respect is the fact that the indicators for fractionalization, which are regarded as incorrect for this kind of research, show a negative but insignificant relation. Similarly, there is also not a consistent relation between dynamic measurements of diversity and generalized trust. The most interesting finding is, however, that the two approaches toward diversity may lead to other interpretations. To give but one example, while the bivariate relations show that the inflow of asylum seekers is positively related with trust, the dynamic approach shows us that a rapid inflow goes together with low trust scores. A crude interpretation, making abstraction from causality claims, can be that more cohesive societies are in general better able to host asylum seekers while a sharp increase in this increase of asylum seekers might weaken social cohesion. Yet, more advanced analysis techniques needs to qualify these claims for the asylum variables, as well as the other indicators of interest.

5.2. Multilevel Multiple Regression Analysis

Coming to the multilevel regression results, in Table 35 the outcomes of the analyses of several static diversity measures on generalized trust is listed. In line with the bivariate results, the left columns present the results for the analyses with the full data set, whereas the right columns present the results excluding the countries with an extraordinary leverage function. One of the most important conclusions is that the newly created latent immigration index has no impact on the levels of generalized trust across European countries. Of the four additional measures for the mere presence of foreigners derived from the OECD data set none is in a significant negative relation with generalized trust. Thus, controlling for an extensive set of individual and country level covariates, trust is not lower in those countries that have a high share of foreigners on its soil or have encountered many immigrants in 2006 in relation to its population. Also the fractionalization indicators, which are summarized at the bottom of Table 35, do not show any consistent negative effects. What is, however, more surprising is that these variables were consistently negative in a bivariate relation with trust while they show, under control of other factors that determine generalized trust, not consistent negative effects. These opposite findings seem to legitimize the use of multilevel multiple regression models to handle this research puzzle.

Testing the models for the set of cultural distance data, more negative coefficients appear compared with the mere exposure variables. Two qualifications merit attention. One of the cultural distance indicators shows a significant negative relation, i.e. the inflow of immigrants coming from member countries of the Organization of the Islamic League. Thus, at first glance, there are lower levels of generalized trust in countries that have, in relation with the total population, envisaged a high influx of Islamic foreigners. However, this result requires additional interpretation. First of all, this negative significant effect has only been discovered after eliminating one influential country, namely Sweden, which means that it is possible to reconcile a high influx of Muslim immigrants with high levels of generalized trust. Second, the five other indicators for value incongruence/symbolic threats have not rendered effect parameters that come close to classic statistical tests of significance.

Table 35. Multilevel Regression Results for Static Diversity on Generalized Trust

Indicator	Including Leverage			Excluding Leverage		
	N	Param	T	N	Param	T
Immigration index	17	0.084	0.62	16	-0.030	-0.17
Share of foreigners	17	0.000	0.05	16	-0.042	-1.37
Share of foreign born	15	-0.035	-1.36	15	-0.035	-1.36
Share immigrants (UN)	23	0.007	0.42	22	-0.006	-0.40
Inflow of foreigners	17	-0.083	-0.48	16	-0.070	-0.34
Share non-EU foreigners	13	-0.034	-0.63	12	-0.032	-0.54
Share of foreigners Islam	17	-0.161	-1.51	16	0.005	0.04
Inflow non-EU foreign	14	-0.208	-1.01	12	-0.544	-0.93
Inflow foreigners Islam	15	-1.256	-0.98	14	-3.171**	-2.02
Inflow asylum seekers	17	1.344	1.02	16	1.277	0.46
Share of nationalizations	17	0.427	0.80	15	-1.371	-1.15
Share labor immigrants	16	-0.156	-0.40	15	-0.140**	-2.64
Share of non-OECD	17	-0.004	-0.11	15	0.013	0.20
Inflow labor immigrants	17	0.120	0.32	16	0.351	0.92
Inflow non-OECD	16	-0.059	-0.32	14	0.133	0.20
Ethnic fractionalization	23	0.348	0.83	21	0.062	0.10
Linguistic fractionalizat	23	0.449	1.22	23	0.449	1.22
Religious fractionalizat	23	-0.072	-0.19	23	-0.072	-0.19

• $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Each diversity variable has been tested separately in relation with trust; estimates under control of age, gender, foreign descent, level of urbanization, civil status, having children, educational level, employment status, income level, volunteering, religious involvement and watching television, GDP per capita (2006, in US\$) and having a Protestant tradition.

A similar interpretation can be given for the set of variables that might measure threats to the general national wealth. Also for these indicators, there are mixed results. First of all, one significant negative effect has been discovered for the share of labor immigrants on the total population, which means that, under control of other covariates, there are lower levels of trust in countries with high levels of foreign workers. But again, this effect became only significant when excluding Switzerland, which is a country with a high level of foreign laborers but also a country with an above average trusting citizenry. The three other indicators for realistic threats have also shown not to be in a significant, nor in any consistent negative or positive relation with generalized trust.

Table 36. Multilevel Regression Results for Dynamic Diversity on Generalized Trust

Indicator	Including Leverage			Excluding Leverage		
	N	Param	T	N	Param	T
Evol share foreigners	16	-0.133	-0.48	14	0.137	0.17
Evol share foreign born	11	-0.224	-0.66	11	-0.224	-0.66
Evol inflow foreigners	17	-0.255	-0.26	16	-0.080	-0.06
Evol share non-EU	12	-0.181	-0.49	11	-0.141	-0.26
Evol share Islamic	16	-0.733	-0.43	15	-0.707	-0.27
Evol inflow non-EU	14	-0.524	-0.54	13	-0.360	-0.26
Evol inflow Islam	15	6.293	0.86	14	13.371	1.40
Evol inflow asylum	17	1.875	0.48	15	-0.582	-0.11
Evol share naturalizations	17	-0.855	-0.23	17	-0.855	-0.23
Evol share labor immigrants	16	-0.387	-0.98	14	-1.201	-1.30
Evol share non-OECD	16	-0.272	-0.71	14	-0.570	-0.53
Evol inflow labor immigr	17	1.253	0.94	16	1.819	0.95
Evol inflow non-OECD	16	-0.104	-0.11	15	0.214	0.14

• $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Each diversity variable has been tested separately in relation with trust; estimates under control of age, gender, foreign descent, level of urbanization, civil status, having children, educational level, employment status, income level, volunteering, religious involvement and watching television, GDP per capita (2006, in US\$) and having a Protestant tradition.

Derived from the anomie literature, it can be expected that increases of diversity might be even more detrimental for generalized trust than static forms that are discussed higher. The analysis of the rise in diversity between 2002 and 2006, both relating to the share of foreigners as well as the influx of immigrants in relation to the total population, does not reveal major significant results (Table 36). None of the variables comes close to a significance level of .10, also not when excluding countries that have an extraordinary impact on the regression equation. Thus, in sum, across Europe, it does not seem to be that countries with a steep increase in diversity are faced with a population that has become alienated from society.

6. Discussion

In this chapter, I have brought together several indicators that measure different aspects of ethnic-cultural diversity in relation with generalized trust across Europe. These in total 31 indicators do represent different strands in the literature, namely first of all the ‘aversion to heterogeneity’-argument, which means that heterogeneity as such puts a pressure on social bonds. An addition to this theory is value incongruity or symbolic threats, which means that distrust is influenced particularly by large cultural distances

between natives and immigrants. The third set of variables were derived from the realistic group conflict theory which predicts that it is mainly the struggle over a scarce pool of predominantly socioeconomic resources that creates a general sense of distrust. The final set of variables have been supplemented with three indicators for fractionalization that have previously been used in similar research, yet which are theoretically of less relevance since they rarely reflect immigration-caused diversity. For most of the 18 static variables, also trends over time have been calculated, i.e. from 2002 to 2006, in order to get a grip on anomie theory that predicts that people tend to hunker down due to rapid social changes, like a steep increase in ethnic-cultural diversity. Thus, 13 dynamic variables are added to the 18 static ones. It needs to be emphasized that bivariate tests revealed the, from a theoretical point of view, surprising results of positive correlation coefficients, even though these correlations were not significant. Thus, diversity and trust do, bivariately, not behave like water and fire on European territory.

An important addition that this research delivers to other research efforts is that it has made use of multilevel multiple regression modeling which explicitly has taken into consideration the fact that certain countries might drive the regression slopes. To be more precise, this research has dealt with the leverage function of certain countries on the slope. Thus, next to analysis on the full data set, which covers also countries that might hamper the general trend by having a significant leverage on the regression slope, multilevel multiple regression analysis has also been conducted on a restrictive set of countries that has excluded those countries that exerted a strong impact on this regression equation. In Table 37, a summary of this empirical investigation of the four sets of variables is represented, distinguishing the static approaches from the dynamic ones, and keeping track of the outliers in the research.

Table 37. Summary of the Relation between Ethnic-Cultural Diversity Indicators and Generalized Trust

Set of variables	Static Approach				Dynamic Approach			
	Incl Leverage		Excl Lev'age		Incl Lev'age		Excl Lev'age	
	Neg	Sign	Neg	Sign	Neg	Sign	Neg	Sign
Mere exposure	2/5	0/5	5/5	0/5	3/3	0/3	2/3	0/3
Value incongr	4/6	0/6	4/6	1/6	4/6	0/6	5/6	0/6
Realistic threat	3/4	0/4	1/4	1/4	3/4	0/4	2/4	0/4
Fractionalizat	1/3	0/3	1/3	0/3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total	10/18	0/18	11/18	2/18	10/13	0/13	9/13	0/13

Note: Entries represent the summary of Tables 35 and 36; a distinction has been made between the negative direction of the effect parameter on generalized trust and whether this parameter was significant at an alpha level of .10. For instance there have been tested four static realistic threats variables; including the leverage elements, three out of four showed a negative direction yet none was significant. Excluding leverage values, only one indicator was negative and in a significant relation with generalized trust.

By summarizing the empirical outcomes, I want to reach beyond the classic test statistics. In Chapter 2, it is underscored that the limited number of countries might induce Type II-errors. Therefore, other innovations might need to be taken into consideration to give more interpretation to the outcomes obtained above. By testing several indicators, this problem can be circumvented by relying on nonparametric statistics.²⁵ This kind of statistics can be exemplified by the tossing of a coin. Ideally, in 100 tosses, a non-corrupt coin would show tails and heads each 50 times. If out of this 100 tosses, 66 times heads would appear, one might consider this coin as corrupt.

A similar kind of logic can be applied to this research into the investigation of the relation between diversity and generalized trust. Table 37 shows that with regard to the outliers, 31 variables for ethnic-cultural diversity have been tested. Ideally, if there is hardly any relation, one might consider that roughly 15-16 of these variables show a negative relation. Indeed, about 10 of the 18 static indicators, which is close to half, show a negative sign while 10 out of the 13 dynamic indicators show a negative sign, which stems for a careful interpretation. Yet, this picture becomes even more puzzled when looking at results after removing the outlier countries are removed. Of the 18 static variables, 11 show a negative relation while for the dynamic indicators, this figure drops from 10 to 9. Thus, relying on nonparametric statistics, one might argue that a null relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust is far from absent – indeed, there is a consistent negative relation that may not remain without discussion.

However, one may also not exacerbate this consistent negative relation. When combining this nonparametric interpretation with classic test statistics, in the majority of the cases, the relation is not significant and is even far off reaching classic confidence intervals. In Chapter 3, I have argued that when doing sociological research, ringleaders need to be distinguished from accomplices and bystanders. When, at the aggregate level, major sources for differentials in individual levels of trust can be found in for instance the national wealth, expressed by the GDP per capita, and a Protestant tradition, the interpretation of the impact of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust is, related to these strong influences, weak to absent. The most conservative interpretation in this respect is that ethnic-cultural diversity as such may not significantly lower individual levels of trust – i.e. social cohesion is not lower in mixed societies – yet, diversity as such does also not add to one's trust levels. Thus, relying on Putnam's metaphor of social science as a sociological 'whodunnit', diversity can largely be regarded as a bystander that is wrongfully accused for systematic lower levels of trust in certain European countries.

²⁵ I would like to thank Bart Meuleman for this remark.

7. Conclusion

The investigation into the relation between immigration-caused diversity and generalized trust in European societies has built on earlier theoretical models and empirical outcomes, but at the same time some innovations were incorporated. Utilizing appropriate multilevel models and controlling for influential countries, I have tested whether a variety of diversity indicators influence individual levels of generalized trust. Contrary to previous studies, this comparative analysis in the European context did not lead to the obvious and clear-cut conclusion that rising ethnic diversity had significant detrimental effects on generalized trust. Testing an extensive set of 31 different measurements for diversity in separate models, in only two cases significant results were discovered: the inflow of Islamic foreigners and the share of foreign workers on the total population. These findings might suggest that large cultural distances as well as the perceived competition on the labor market might indeed have a detrimental effect on generalized trust. On the other hand, these findings should not lead to far-reaching conclusions. First of all, these significant negative effects were only obtained after excluding this country that combines high levels of diversity with a considerable level of generalized trust. On the other hand, even though most of the effect parameters show a negative sign, the classic statistical t-test is mostly nonsignificant.

Yet, it is always difficult to interpret nonsignificant findings, but that is especially the case in intermediate-N multilevel analysis. Whereas t-values are generally close to one for most of the diversity variables, with the few exceptions noted, the problem is that the small sample size of this analysis can yield an underestimation of the t-value (Hox & Maas, 2005; Meuleman & Billiet, 2009). So we should be aware of the risk that this analysis might underestimate the strength of the effects, leading to Type II errors, which means that the negative effect of diversity on trust might in fact be present while the low number of countries does not enable us to detect it. It has to be acknowledged that the sign of many coefficients of diversity measures tends to be negative, which gives further evidence for this interpretation of a negative, yet weak, relation between diversity and trust. However, including the intermediate-N problem, the related underestimation of t-values, and the outlier issues into the analyses, it still cannot be concluded that ethnic diversity or its recent rise have a robust and consistent negative effect on generalized trust in the European context, therefore disconfirming earlier findings in North America (Putnam, 2007; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Costa & Kahn, 2003). However, a negative yet weak and inconsistent tendency in the relationship between diversity and generalized trust in Europe must be acknowledged as well.

I would like to refrain from questioning the validity of earlier research demonstrating a significant negative relation between diversity and social cohesion indicators. Yet comparing this analysis to earlier studies, there are several plausible reasons why different results are obtained with most of the predominantly American research efforts thus far. First of all, this study is the most comprehensive one available when it comes

to the vast variety of diversity indicators tested. While most of the studies thus far, including cross-national investigations, most of the times relied on an index for fractionalization, this investigation included a wide range of different indicators that were all closely related to the literature. Therefore, this research is in a better position to evaluate which aspects of diversity seem most threatening to the European populations and which aspects are not. Second, these results are based on appropriate multilevel modeling. Of course, other authors too pay attention to this problem. In his well-known 2007 article, Putnam explicitly acknowledges the dangers of single-level regression models. In the single-level model he presents, the standardized regression coefficient of ethnic fractionalization on trust is only .04. When Putnam goes on to test the effect in a more appropriate multilevel model, the significance of the coefficient is substantially reduced. A third issue that might cause different results has to do with the fact that many analyses seem to be sensitive to outliers. The analysis in this chapter shows how sensitive intermediate-N studies are to the effect of outliers; excluding the disproportionate influence of outliers on the results yields slightly different regression parameters in some cases. The outcomes seem to suggest that in the field of quantitative comparative research more attention needs to be paid to model assumptions and particularly to the influence of outliers.

Finally, it needs to be emphasized that the measurements for diversity are situated at a relatively high aggregate level, namely, that of the country. Previous research has relied on diversity measures at the municipal level or at the level of census tracts, thus attempting to capture the diverse character of daily social interactions. Of course, diversity at the country level does not capture the composition of neighborhoods, work environments or other loci where pro-social attitudes can be generated. Although it is entirely plausible that an analysis of actual social interactions with diverse others reveals different results, this Chapter departed from the analysis of the effect of contextual diversity on individual generalized trust. It is therefore interesting to note that the diversity measurements show a substantial range across European societies, in the example of percentage of foreign nationals, the range is between 1 percent in Poland and 9 percent in Germany. While self-evidently within Germany the actual percentage of foreigners shows a strong variation, for example, in relation with the degree of urbanization, it seems still plausible to assume that inhabitants of a major city in Germany will be confronted much more often with cultural and ethnic diversity than inhabitants of a similar city in Poland. Given the difficulty of obtaining census tract data across all European countries linked to survey data, the use of national level diversity data as an important first step toward examining the relationship between diversity and trust comparatively. A next step in the analysis certainly would be to supplement this analysis with more fine-grained information about specific European societies, integrating information from the local or community levels where available.

The implication of this study certainly does not mean that ethnic diversity would or could not create social tensions or social problems. But my analysis has revealed that

diversity does not exert the consistent and strong negative effects often attributed to it. For societies and countries that are confronted with a sudden increase in diversity, the question “Who are we?” (Huntington, 2004) might indeed become salient and might be perceived as troublesome. What I hoped to have demonstrated, however, is that even paying attention to a variety of diversity measures and methodological safeguards, the full-blown negative relationship between ethnic diversity and generalized trust does not hold across Europe. This analysis, thus, also plays considerable reservations regarding the liberal dilemma Newton has proposed (2007b): concerning the social consequences of diversity in Europe, the negative tone thus seems to be unwarranted.

Chapter 7

Diversity and Generalized Trust at the Local Level: The Case of Flanders (Belgium)

Vlaanderen is een open en verdraagzame samenleving. Vlaanderen blijft ook in zijn beleid de openheid en verdraagzaamheid koesteren. Vlaanderen verwelkomt niet alleen de nieuwkomers, maar investeert ook effectief in deze mensen. (...) Investeren in mensen, zowel kinderen als volwassenen is investeren in de toekomst van de welvaart van Vlaanderen en in het welzijn van alle Vlamingen. (Keulen, 25.08.2008).²⁶

1. Introduction

The investigation into the relationship between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust across European countries led to a number of negative yet insignificant results that are not completely in line with most of the research outcomes on this topic thus far which mostly detected a systematic negative relation. However, as we do know from recent research into inequality (Soobader & LeClere, 1999), it is highly plausible that different levels of aggregation lead to differential impacts. It can indeed be expected that the national and local levels of diversity affect individual level trust differently. In this respect, the concern about the appropriate level of aggregation is explicitly taken into account.²⁷ While the recent body of evidence, led by Putnam's 'E Pluribus Unum' (2007), approaches this relation from the lowest considerable level in community research, i.e. the neighborhood, this doctoral dissertation has taken the global national-level European outcomes as point of departure²⁸ to add to the scarce local level studies

²⁶ Translated: "Flanders is an open and tolerant society. The Flemish government also has incorporated this open and tolerant orientation in its policy. Flanders does not only welcome newcomers, but in fact also invests in these people. (...) Investing in people, both in children and in adults, is investing in the future of Flemish prosperity and in the welfare of all Flemish.

²⁷ The content of this chapter is reflected in parts of the following publications: Reeskens & Hooghe (2009).

²⁸ In fact, Putnam (personal conversation, 30 January 2008, Cambridge), has commented that extrapolating this European research design to the American case would imply assessing the impact of immigration to San Diego on social capital in a small town in New Hampshire.

(Letki, 2008; Tolsma et al., 2009). This argument thus goes beyond the methodological argument of ecological fallacy (King, 1997) and incorporates arguments that research strategies should incorporate various levels of aggregation (King et al., 1994; Soobader & LeClere, 1999).

The aim of this chapter is thus to contribute and give structure to the growing body of local level outcomes on the relation between diversity and trust in Europe by investigating an additional case, namely Flanders (Belgium). An overview of the scarce number of studies has shown that there is a considerable variety in outcomes. On the one hand, published British results point to a negative impact on trust (Letki, 2008) while in the Netherlands, this effect is absent (Tolsma et al., 2009).²⁹ Also unpublished papers covering Germany (Gundelach & Traunmüller, 2009) and Spain (Morales & Echazarra, 2009) articulate that we should be careful with generalizing the claim that diversity erodes social cohesion in Europe. It may however not be forgotten that thus far, only four of the EU15-countries delivered research outcomes, which makes it rather difficult to arrive to generalizable conclusions, not only for the relation between diversity and generalized trust in general, but also for Europe specifically. Moreover, what is of additional interest with regard to the debate of the social consequences of diversity is that both the UK and the Netherlands are regarded as multicultural models of immigrant integration (Koopmans et al., 2005), while the 13 other EU15-countries share different trajectories (Geddes, 2003). The diverging UK and Dutch research outcomes thus seem to require additional efforts that incorporate first of all cases that go beyond the multicultural model as well as take regimes of migrant integration into account.

While the conditioning by migrant integration regimes will receive more attention later in this dissertation, this chapter is dedicated to an additional local level study that focus on Flanders, i.e. the Dutch-speaking part in the north of Belgium. In line with other European countries, one of major social changes that have shaped Flemish societies is an increase in ethnic and cultural diversity (Willems, 2008). As a political region in Belgium, Flanders is since the 1960s characterized by a high influx of guestworker migration (Grimmeau, 1993), followed by an associated inflow based on family reunification (Lievens, 1999). According to 2008 administrative data (Algemene Directie Statistiek, 2009), Belgium in general has about 9.10 foreigners on its territory, with the Brussels-Capital as most diverse Region with about 28.14 percent. The Walloon Region consists of about 9.32 percent foreigners and the Flemish one, last but not least, has about 5.75 percent foreigners on its soil. Consequently, the Flemish Region of all Belgian regions the least heterogeneous.

²⁹ For the UK and the Netherlands, a number of other studies have been conducted but not been published this far (Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Laurence & Heath, 2008; Lancee & Dronkers, 2009). They do, however, not necessarily yield the same outcomes (cf. Chapter 4).

While immigration to the Flemish Region has increased over the last couple of decades, general public opinion towards immigration and immigrants is rather hostile. Meuleman and Billiet (2005) have for instance demonstrated that, largely driven by a decline in the economic prosperity, the perception of an ethnic threat has increased at the end of the 1990s. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that considerable shares of the Flemish have aversive attitudes towards Islam (Billiet & Swyngedouw, 2009). E.g., half of the Flemish state that Islam has nothing to contribute to European culture. With regard to a serene coexistence between native Belgians and residents of foreign descent, these figures are quite troublesome. Moreover, the political responses towards these anti-immigrant sentiments in Flanders have been institutionalized by the successful extreme right *Vlaams Belang* party³⁰ (Swyngedouw, 1998). Combined, the fear that diversity forms a threat for the native culture is at the core of this party and a significant part of the Flemish population.

Given the success of the *Vlaams Belang* together with indicators pointing to considerable levels of out-group prejudice, many spectators expect that especially in Flanders, the negative consequences of diversity may have found fertile ground. In this chapter, Flanders is approached as an additional case to investigate the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust. Given the Belgian history in guestworker immigration and the success of the right-wing *Vlaams Belang*, Flanders is indeed a very usable case, yet, additional arguments to underscore the importance of this case will be given in the second section. In the third section, the data and methods for this study will be discussed. In the fourth section of this chapter, the results are presented, starting with crude bivariate relations to more refined multilevel multiple regression results. In the fifth part the findings are concluded by a critical reflection. In the sixth and final part, I will discuss this local level study in relation with the findings at the European national levels.

2. The Flemish Case

Flanders is without any doubt a very interesting case to test the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust. To give a little overview, the Flemish Region is the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium (thus, without Brussels-Capital), the northern counterpart of the French-speaking Walloon Region. In various comparative research strategies that aim at qualifying the consequences of diversity (e.g. Delhey & Newton, 2005), Belgium has been characterized as highly diverse, i.e. by a fractionalization index of .50 (Alesina et al., 2003), which mainly refers to the linguistic divide between the

³⁰ In Section 2.3, I will go more in detail into the *Vlaams Belang*. For issues of clarification, it needs to be remembered that this party was founded as *Vlaams Blok* but changed name in 2004, after affiliated associations were convicted for racism.

Flemish and Walloons. For this reason alone, more research on diversity and generalized trust within Belgium might be of a general interest.

In this section, I would like to focus more closely on the Flemish Regional case and provide a brief overview of Flemish sociopolitical and socioeconomic evolution. Next, also information regarding local diversity in Flanders is presented, for instance which waves in and types of immigration can be distinguished over time (Grimmeau, 1993). In the next section, attention is given to reactions towards immigration and immigrants, more specifically regarding hostile opinions in public opinion, and the rise of the extreme right *Vlaams Belang* party. Since the unique impact of diversity on trust is assessed, i.e. whether there are considerable lower levels of trust in the generalized other among resident living in mixed municipalities, a review is given regarding Flemish indicators for community cohesion in general and generalized trust to be specific.

2.1. Situating Flanders in Europe

Providing an exhaustive overview of the sociopolitical and socioeconomic evolution of Flanders could be a piece of work in itself; yet, in this section, the genesis of the Flemish regional authority and the socioeconomic forces underpinning this evolution is reviewed. Indeed, since the 1992 St. Michel Treaty, the First Article in the Belgian Constitution states that “Belgium is a Federal State made up of Communities and Regions” (Craenen & Dewachter, 2001). To be precise, Belgium consists out of three Communities, namely the Dutch, French and German-speaking Community, and out of three Regions, namely the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-Capital Region. Originally, the Communities were founded on the basis of Belgian linguistic divisions, and the corresponding authorities regarded individual and personal matters, like culture, social welfare, and immigrant integration. On the other hand, the Regions have been founded on the basis of territorial divisions and the authorities follow this logic, concerning economy, transport, and the environment. As the Belgian Constitution declares, those issues in concern of the ‘general interest’, like justice, social security, and finance, are still core authorities of the Federal authority.

Swenden and Jans (2006) ascribe four processes that have contributed to the foundation of the Belgian federal state as it is today. First of all, the authors declare that the struggle to recognize Dutch as one of the three official languages in Belgium led to the perceived incompatibility between Belgian and Flemish nationalism, resulting in increased regional demands. Second, the linguistic cleavage become more pronounced since the ideological cleavage (‘pillarization’) and the socioeconomic cleavage became less salient. Third, in the 1960s, for the first time the Flemish economy became more prosperous compared with the Walloon one, leading to different economic realities above and below the virtual language border. Fourth, the demarcation of the language zones fuelled certain separatist sentiments, particularly around Brussels, which has become more French-speaking than has been institutionalized by the language laws of

1963. The difficult but successful (Lijphart, 1999) reconciliation between linguistic diversity thus forms an essential claim throughout Belgian history.

Without getting involved into a normative discussion on the Federal state structure and the increasing demand for more local authorities, discussing immigration cannot be decoupled from interpreting the labor market (cf. Chapter 5). Various studies have shown that three Belgian Regions reflect indeed different labor market demands (Janssens & Konings, 1998; Meunier & Mignolet, 2005; Estevao, 2003). For instance, Estevao (2003) notices that the job mismatch is larger in Wallonia than in Flanders; also, with regard to labor market mobility and long-term unemployment, Wallonia is disadvantaged compared to Belgium. After an investigation of the wage curve in Belgium, Janssens and Konings (1998, p. 227) conclude that: “The evidence presented here also suggests that labor market policy should be oriented towards the regional dimension of the economy. Belgium is a federal state, yet the labor market policy has not been transformed to the level of the regions. However, this paper suggests that it would be better to do so.”


With regard to the economic condition in Flanders, the outlook seems, despite the current financial crisis, in general to be positive. In a 2008 review on the Flemish economy, Vergeynst (2008) draws a positive picture, arguing that, controlling for commuting, the Flemish Community has the third highest GDP per capita of the original EU15-Member States, with only Ireland and the Netherlands who are surpassing the Flemish situation. In any respect, Flanders leaves the prosperous Scandinavian countries behind and is atop of the wealthiest regions in the world. When comparing the three Belgian Regions (Vergeynst, 2008, p. 4) with regard to their levels of GDP per capita over time (reference year 2000, controlled for commuting), Wallonia lags behind with, for 2008, a GDP per capita of about 23,000 euro, coming from about 15,000 in 1983. The GDP per capita in Brussels-Capital was in 1983 better than the one of Flanders, i.e. respectively about 20,000 and 18,000 euro. However, for the year 2008, the Flemish Region has surpassed the Brussels-Capital one, i.e. in Flanders, the GDP per capita is about 30,000 euro vs. 29.000 in the Brussels-Capital Region. It is necessary to keep track of the prosperous Flemish economy in relation to the inflow of foreigners over the past years, as well as to theories of group conflict that explain hostile reactions.

2.2. Migration to Flanders

Indeed, authors have documented that economic prosperity with corresponding opportunities in the labor market has in Flanders, too, created incentives for migration. In explaining migration to Belgium, Grimmeau (1993) demonstrates a shift with regard to the levels and nature of immigration from the 1920s onwards. More specifically, since that time, the descent of the foreign population was no longer limited to predominantly the neighboring countries and instead of spontaneous, immigration has become a well-considered strategy. According to Grimmeau (1993), three major

immigration flows can be detected, namely from 1921 to 1939, from 1948 to 1958 and from 1962 to 1966; all three immigration flows have their own characteristics, which are discussed later in this section. Future trend analysis will indicate whether current increase in immigrant to Belgian in general and Flanders to be precise (cf. Chapter 5), can be recognized as a potential fourth wave of immigration to Flanders.

Figure 15. Stock of Foreigners on the Total Population, 2006



Note: Provinces (thick border) from east to west: Limburg, Antwerp (upper middle), Flemish Brabant (lower middle), East Flanders and West Flanders. Source: FPS Economy – Directorate-General Statistics and Economic Information (from this point on ‘FPS Economy’).


Figure 15 represents the share of foreigners on the total population in Flanders. Four main patterns can be found. First of all, all capital cities – Antwerp, Ghent, Leuven, and to a lesser extent Hasselt and Bruges – are characterized by a high share of foreigners. Second, Limburg is by far the province with the most municipalities with many non-Belgians on the total population. Also the Antwerp northern municipalities are populated by a considerable numbers of foreigners while the municipalities in East and West Flanders that lie next to the border of the Netherlands or France are not so diverse. Third, also the municipalities around Brussels are highly mixed. Fourth, the midlands of East- and West-Flanders are relatively homogeneous compared with the other provinces. In general, Figure 15 shows a considerable regional spread regarding the levels of diversity, which the critics of the national level studies on diversity and trust have argued warned for.

During the three immigration waves to Flanders, each time other nationalities have determined the foreigner influx (Grimmeau, 1993). Self-evidently, the neighboring countries have always played a determinant role in Belgian immigration statistics, yet, the magnitude varied from period to period. The first immigration wave during the interwar period, immigration was predominantly characterized by immigration from Central and Eastern European. The second wave, from 1948 to 1958, was characterized by a high influx of labor immigrants who were recruited predominantly in Italy but also in Spain and Greece. Lastly, the third period, from 1962 to 1966, has been characterized by a economic prosperous time which led to an explosion in the number of labor

permits for immigrants predominantly from Mediterranean countries like Turkey and Morocco. Since Belgium and consequently Flanders is at the political center of the European Union, European integration has led to a considerable influx of European civil servants from all over the continent. Looking back at Table 17 in Chapter 5, the five most sizeable foreigner groups are the Italian, French, Dutch, Moroccan and Spanish, which can be regarded as being the results of a heritage in guestworker migration and chain migration complemented with immigration from neighboring countries.

Thus, the foreigner inflow to Flanders falls to a considerable extent back to European residents, not only from neighboring countries like France or Netherlands but also from Italy and Spain. Therefore, a more straightforward assessment of how ethnic-cultural diverse the Flemish municipalities are can be ascertained by separating European migrants from the official statistics and consequently focus on only non-EU foreigners. Looking at the regional spread of the share of non-EU foreigners in Figure 16, first of all, it can be regarded that the major cities have, as expected, also a high share of non-EU residents on their soil. Second, also the Brussels region is highly diverse, also with regard to non-EU foreigners. Third, the triangle Antwerp-Brussels-Ghent is quite mixed; foremost the municipalities Sint-Niklaas, Lokeren and Zele in the region that is known as *‘Waasland’* are apparent in the data. The fourth finding is that also in the province of Limburg, there is still a considerable share of non-European residents on the territory, which can mainly be explained by the former history in industrial mining. Fifth, when comparing the two maps, the northern Antwerp and North-East Limburg municipalities are far less diverse when considering the share of non-EU residents; the highest proportion of non-EU residents in these municipalities therefore are mainly EU-citizens.

Figure 16. Share of Non-EU Foreigners on Total Population, 2006



Note: Provinces from east to west: Limburg, Antwerp (upper middle), Flemish Brabant (lower middle), East Flanders and West Flanders. Source: FPS Economy.

The two different representations of local level diversity in Flanders has revealed that, in line with the European trend, it is hard to investigate the social consequences of

diversity relying on only one indicator for diversity. When analyzing both maps, the regional spread in ethnic-cultural diversity in Flanders can be summarized in three global patterns. First, the major cities, namely Antwerp en Ghent, are both with regard to the stocks as with regard to originating countries quite diverse. The triangle Antwerp-Brussels-Ghent is the most colorful area of the Flemish Region. Second, the current ethnic-cultural composition of Flemish municipalities can to a considerable extent be explained by the heritage of the former industrial era and the corresponding guestworker immigration; predominantly the province of Limburg, with its history in mining, is quite exemplary. Third, a significant part of the West- and East-Flanders provinces are quite homogeneous, not only with regard to the share of non-EU immigrants but also with regard to the general stocks of foreigners. In sum, the discrepancy in the different indicators of diversity is summarized in Table 38, which depicts the 10 municipalities that rank highest on the three respective indicators for diversity; the ranking shows that the most diverse municipalities with regard to the share of foreigners have a different rank for the immigrant inflow and the share of non-EU residents.

Table 38. The 10 Most Diverse Municipalities according to Three Different Indicators, 2006

Stock of foreigners		Immigrant inflow		Share of non-EU citizens	
Municipality	Pct	Municipality	Pct	Municipality	Pct
Baarle-Hertog	42.67	Baarle-Hertog	3.47	Antwerpen	7.99
Hamont-Achel	28.90	Overijse	3.02	Leuven	5.71
Kraainem	26.43	Ravels	2.89	Gent	5.31
Lanaken	25.89	Tervuren	2.73	Mechelen	5.24
Ravels	25.85	Lanaken	2.64	Kraainem	5.15
Voeren	24.72	Voeren	2.39	Vilvoorde	4.35
Tervuren	23.64	Kraainem	2.30	Lokeren	4.34
W'beek-Oppem	21.16	Hoogstraten	2.29	Zaventem	4.13
Overijse	19.98	Riemst	2.27	Boom	3.76
Hoogstraten	19.88	Mesen	2.23	Genk	3.66

Source: FPS Economy (plus own calculations).

Thus, according to the official statistics, Flanders is a region that has become quite diverse over the last couple of years. What is even more remarkable is that immigration is responsible for the general growth in Flemish population (Willems, 2008). The natural increase – the births given by immigrant mothers – will contribute to the share of residents that have foreign roots (De Beer, 2007). Moreover, economic prognoses seem to show that Flemish society will, in line with other European countries, become even more diverse (Hooghe et al., 2008; Willems, 2008). First of all, evolutions on the labor market seem to indicate that immigration still might be considered. On the one

hand, immigration is necessary to fill in the gaps on the labor market due to the retiring of the labor population. On the other hand, in contemporary segmented labor markets, autochthon population might search for the primary jobs while the secondary jobs might require immigration. The policy of the Belgian federal government underpins this evolution. Second, next to the economic argument, the demographic arguments leading to a more diverse Flanders are also present.

Thus in sum, regarding the level and nature of diversity, Flanders as a case contributes significantly to the existing local level case studies. While the US has a long-standing tradition in immigration (Zolberg, 2006; Kennedy, 1964), which gave rise to a specific mix within US neighborhoods, immigration to European countries generally and Flanders specifically is more recently developed. While the UK is characterized by a postcolonial immigrant influx, diversity in the Netherlands and Belgium can be classified as a (post-)guestworker model, in which immigration out of predominantly Mediterranean country shaped the composition of its municipalities. As such, the Flemish Region can add significantly to the ongoing debate in the field of the social consequences of diversity.

2.3. Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and the Flemish Interest Party

While the mix of ethnic-cultural diversity in Flanders can be categorized as a heritage of the guestworker model that was incorporated in the 1960s, a part of the Flemish population has refrained from embracing immigration and immigrants since that time. As Billiet argues (2006, pp. 37-38) in an overview article on the longitudinal analysis into immigrant prejudice, at the end of the 1980s, when research into attitudes towards immigrants in Flanders started, “the number of Belgians who believed that immigrants constituted a threat to their own job and their own social assets was significantly greater than the number who did not hold this view.” He added that the Flemish, compared with the Walloons, in general feel less threatened which can largely be explained by the disadvantaged socioeconomic position of the French-speaking part of Belgium.

The anti-immigrant sentiments have been encapsulated as a political ideology by the extreme right *Vlaams Belang* party (Swyngedouw, 1998). The party, originally founded as *Vlaams Blok* in 1978 to set-off from the rather moderate *Volksumie*, which was decreasing in size and in power (Swyngedouw, 1998), has framed itself as the party that opposes immigration, questions the traditional political parties and are in favor of a separate Flanders (Swyngedouw, 1998). Where other Flemish parties have also adopted anti-establishment sentiments, like for instance *Lijst Dedecker*, or a separatist discourse, like the N-VA, no other party in Flanders has profiled itself as opposing immigration, and more specifically Muslim immigration. After the 1991 elections in Flanders, which is considered to be the breakthrough of *Vlaams Blok*, the party has proposed its “70-Points Program for Resolving the Aliens Problems.” To focus on a couple of points, the party wanted to stop immigration inflow, enact a return policy for immigrants, and

establish a police force with the purpose to hunt for illegal immigrants. Since then, *Vlaams Blok* used the slogan '*Eigen Volk Eerst*' ('Own People First'), meaning that the Flemish interests always prevail above those of others.

After a conviction of associations closely related with the *Vlaams Blok* in 2004, the party changed name to *Vlaams Belang*. During the last regional elections, the party had an electoral score of about 15 percent, a loss of about 9 percent compared with the regional elections in 2005. Turning back to the anti-immigrant sentiments, research on voting behavior has shown that the best predictor for voting on *Vlaams Belang* is ethnic prejudice. Taking a wide range of relevant social explanations into account, Billiet and De Witte (1995) have investigated which ones are able to explain extreme right voting. While traditional theories have stressed the importance of an 'authoritarian personality' (Adorno et al., 1950), the authors claim that authoritarianism is hardly able to explain voting for the Flemish extreme right party. On the contrary, they argue that anti-immigrant sentiments, largely determined by educational level, and Flemish nationalism, predict preference for extreme right voting. Thus, while the *Vlaams Belang* profiles itself also as an anti-establishment and a Flemish autonomy party, the electorate largely follows the anti-immigrant discourse the party leaders preach.

What is important to note for this research is that evidence suggests that not only individual causes, and more specifically one's socioeconomic position, is able to explain one's odds to vote for *Vlaams Belang*, also the municipality one lives in determines extreme right voting (Coffé, Heyndels & Vermeir, 2007; Rink, Swyngedouw & Phalet, 2008). Recently, Rink, Swyngedouw and Phalet (2008) have shown that, controlling for other relevant covariates at the individual and municipality level, there is a curvilinear relationship between living in a diverse municipality and voting for the *Vlaams Belang*: in medium diverse municipalities, the likelihood to vote for the party increases while it decreases when municipalities become even more diverse.

2.4. Generalized Trust in Flanders

In Flanders, anti-immigrant sentiments are shared among a considerable part of the population, and these sentiments are even institutionalized in the extreme right political party of the *Vlaams Belang* for which the odds of voting due to diversity increase in a curvilinear manner. Yet, while prejudice and extreme right voting may be explained by living in diverse municipalities, this self-evidently may not be extrapolated to social cohesion in general and generalized trust to be specific. Flanders, with its distinct tradition of guestworker migration and its successful extreme right party, may indeed not fit in many US models that have been proposed to explain the relation between diversity and generalized trust.

However, while it is known that, compared with other European countries, Belgium ranks somewhere in the middle with regard to trust, for Flanders, less evidence is given

about determinants and the evolution of trust over time. There is hardly any published material available providing time-series in generalized trust, and also cross-sectional information is largely absent. Therefore, giving an overview on the status of generalized trust is quite impossible. While research outcomes on trust in Flanders are rather scarce, there is a rich body of research into associational involvement in Flanders (Hooghe, 2003; Elchardus et al., 2001; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007). Some conclusions that have been drawn on this research into the structural component of social capital can, to a certain extent, thus also be applied on the cultural generalized trust component.

When looking at studies that try to grasp evolutions in associational involvement (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007; Smits & Elchardus, 2009), it seems that Flanders is in line with the general European trend. From the 1980s onwards, there has been no steady decline in participation in associations. It needs however to be emphasized that new types of associations, more specifically sports associations, are on the rise, while more traditional associations, of which the women's associations top the list, are in a sharp decline. Trends also show that the average age of the associations is slightly rising, predominantly in those traditional associations that are in a decline. Nevertheless all experts on the Flemish case do agree: the Flemish population has not become inclined to bowl alone (Hooghe, 2003a; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007; Smits & Elchardus, 2009). As such, the Flemish case balances the negative US-Bowling Alone-sentiments.

However, while the structural associational involvement component of social capital may be not in decline in Flanders, this does, of course, not entail that there is an equal access into associational life. In line with other countries, the socioeconomic 'winners' are more prone to become active in one or more associations. Those who have enjoyed higher levels of education, are employed and have a high income are in general better equipped to participate in associations. Moreover, since Flemish society is in an aftermath of societal pillarization on ideological basis (Huysse, 1987), associational involvement is also determined by church practice: those who frequently attend church are also more easily directed to one or more associations (Hooghe, 2003a). Another determinant for lower levels of involvement, namely the television, exerts in Flanders a significant effect (Hooghe, 2003b): frequent and commercial television watchers are less involved in associations compared with those who do not watch the television or spend time watching predominantly news coverage.

The determinants listed above show that research on generalized trust in Flanders not only lacks a thorough investigation of this analysis, also the context has been largely overlooked. Analyses on generalized trust taking both information of individuals and municipalities into account are absent, for which two potential causes can be articulated. First of all, advanced statistical models, like multilevel analysis, have only recently gained access into the wider social science community. Second, these kinds of analyses necessitate nested data sources, i.e. respondents sampled within municipalities, together with information of the municipalities these respondents are living in. The design of

most Flemish surveys has, however, largely overlooked the nesting of the respondents. These two prerequisites have therefore not always been fulfilled in research thus far. As such, this chapter would also add significantly to the current debate by analyzing simultaneously individual and municipality determinants for variability in individual levels of generalized trust.

In sum, considering the determinants of why Flemish residents are involved in associations, it can be expected that there is also a high level of variability in individual levels of generalized trust. To explain this variability, a considerable number of individual explanatory factors will be taken into account and also, for the first time, municipality characteristics will be modeled on trust in the generalized other. It still needs to be remembered that in general, Flanders is regarding trust considered as an average student in the European class. Derived from preceding Chapter 6, we can therefore expect that residents in mixed communities might report only slightly lower levels of trust in the generalized other. In the next section, the data and methods to analyze this research problem is presented.

3. Data and Methods

To assess whether residents in mixed municipalities have lower levels of generalized trust, the municipality level foreigner data, obtained from the Belgian FPS Economy, is merged with the 2007 wave of the geo-coded ‘Social Cultural Changes’ (SCC; in Dutch: *Sociaal Culturele Verschuivingen*) survey, which has been assembled by the Research Council of the Flemish Government. The SCC is an annual survey program that is carried out among a representative sample of about 1,500 Flemish residents. The survey questions values, attitudes and behavior with regard to many social themes. In this survey, also questions with regard to generalized trust have been taken up. Since this survey is geo-coded, every respondent has been assigned the municipality code one is living in. Likewise, it is known in which municipality each respondent resides and as a consequence, municipality level information can be assigned to each and every respondent. As a result, using this geo-coded survey instrument allows us to explain individual level trust by municipality level diversity data under control of other relevant explanations.

The dependent variable of interest, i.e. generalized trust, resembles the ESS questioning, namely ‘peopletrust’, ‘peoplefair’ and ‘peoplehelp’ are offered with a response scale ranging from 0-10. Yet, the independent variable, on the contrary, deserves more information. The use of classic indices for ethnic fractionalization to measure diversity within the Flemish municipalities is abolished since this measure is not able to encapsulate the complex representation of diversity in Flanders. Instead, theoretically relevant diversity-variables will be constructed based on the foreigner data that are

obtained from the 2006 diversity statistics of the FPS Economy.³¹ To be specific, indicators that tap a static conception of diversity are constructed, i.e. the share of foreigners and the share of immigrants. Next, also two indicators that represent a rather dynamic aspect of diversity are used, namely the evolution in the share of foreigners and immigrants from 2002-2006. Finally, one indicator tapping the cultural distance between the native and foreigner population, i.e. the share of non-EU citizens, will also be applied as indicator of local level diversity. Since the dominant discourse on ‘foreigners’, in the Flemish case clearly refers to people originating from outside the European Union (e.g., Van Houtte & Stevens, 2009) it indeed can be expected that this indicator is of relevant interest. It needs to be added that the municipality level, which on average consists out of 20,000 inhabitants, is the lowest administrative level of aggregation reliable data can be obtained from.


Various questions have been raised with regard to the validity of the proposed diversity statistics as have been made available by the FPS Economy. Ben Abdeljelil and Vranken (1997) have expressed their concern regarding the use of these foreigner data for public policy. A large share of the population of foreign descent is, according to the authors, naturalized into Belgian citizen and is not longer present in these foreigner statistics. The authors therefore argue that research based on these statistics might actually lead to wrong policy decisions since the data conceal the true nature of diversity in Belgium. Indeed, naturalization rates lead to an underestimation of the actual diversity levels in Europe; as a consequence, the official figures of Flanders can also be expected to be an underestimation. To cope with this issue, I have compared these data on the number of foreigners (non-Belgians) for 2004 with the data on foreign descent of the same year as provided by the Research Council of the Flemish Government (Lodewijckx, 2008). The latter set of data thus not only covers the number of non-Belgian citizens but also residents who required Belgian citizenship and even a significant part of the so-called ‘third generation’ (Corijn & Lodewijckx, 2009). To test the validity of the official data on non-Belgian residents, the correlation between the both 2004 variables is calculated and equates .99, meaning that the two variables overlap quite highly.³² For this reason, I will rely on the official data on non-Belgian residents that have been provided by the FPS Economy.

³¹ By using the 2006 municipality data to explain generalized trust in 2007, I circumvent potential problems of endogeneity. More specifically, this design implies that in time, attitudes like generalized trust, react on contextual factors.

³² It is known that the ‘legal’ data of non-nationals on the territorium is an underrepresentation of the real ‘sociological’ level of diversity, namely the non-nationals plus those that have acquired citizenship. By estimating a regression equation with the ‘sociological’ data regressed on the ‘legal’ data, it seems that the ‘legal’ data are underestimated by factor 2.2 of the ‘sociological’ description of diversity, including the naturalized immigrants.

Since I want to assess the unique effect of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust, it is necessary to control for other possible explanatory variables, both at the individual and municipality level. At the individual level, a similar set of respondent characteristics that have been proven to be in a significant relation with generalized trust is modeled (see Chapter 3; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002). As seen before, it can be expected that age is in a positive relation with trust. Moreover, women are considered to be more trusting, just as married people. The socioeconomic status is in the literature the best predictor for generalized trust: those who are employed, have a high educational level and have a high income are considered to be more trusting than the disadvantaged. Moreover, frequent churchgoers are also more trusting while those of foreign descent are expected to be less trusting.

Figure 17. Conceptual Diagram for Ethnic-Cultural Diversity and Generalized Trust in Flanders



Regarding the control variables at the municipality level, it seems that American outcomes regarding concentrated disadvantage (Sampson et al., 2002) can, to a certain extent, also be extrapolated to the Flemish context; more specifically, a number of socioeconomic disadvantages occur together. In those municipalities with high levels of unemployment, there have also been found high crime rates. Because of this problem of multicollinearity, it is impossible to control for numerous independent municipality characteristics at the same time. For this reason I have opted to control for population density (expressed by 100 inhabitants per square kilometer), the average fiscal income of 2005 (in 1,000 euro) and the employment rate of 2006. It can be expected that in more dense communities, trust will be lower while a high level of municipality wealth, both expressed in average income levels as in low levels of unemployment, will go together with high levels of trust. Figure 17 summarizes the conceptual diagram of this local level investigation.

$$\begin{aligned}
Trust_{ij} = & \gamma_{00} + \beta_1 age_{ij1} + \beta_2 gender_{ij2} + \beta_3 lower_s_{ij3} + \beta_4 high_s_{ij4} + \beta_5 higher_{ij5} \\
& + \beta_6 div_sep_{ij6} + \beta_7 p_died_{ij7} + \beta_8 single_{ij8} + \beta_9 church_{ij9} + \beta_{10} foreign_{ij10} \\
& + \gamma_{01} density_{j1} + \gamma_{02} unempl_{j2} + \gamma_{03} income_{j3} + \gamma_{04} diversity_{j4} + u_j + e_{ij}
\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Since each respondent is nested within one's municipality, multilevel analysis seems to be the most appropriate analysis technique, as summarized in equation (17). In the 2007 wave of the SCC survey, about 1,500 respondents were questioned in 100 municipalities, which leaves us with about 15 respondents per municipality. Regarding multilevel modeling, while it seems that there is a sufficient number of level 2 units, i.e. municipalities (see Chapter 2), this time, the low number of respondents per group may cause a number of limitations. Simulations have indeed shown that the optimal number for multilevel analysis is 30/30 (Kreft, 1996), meaning 30 units per level with a preference of more groups at the second level (Chapter 2). However, since only 11 respondents per municipality is rather low, there are possibilities that the parameter estimates at the individual level are biased (Meuleman et al., 2007). For this reason, the individual level estimates will be critically interpreted.

4. Results

4.1. Bivariate Analysis

Before the more advanced results obtained by the multilevel multiple regression analysis of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust in Flanders are discussed, I will start the analysis by presenting the bivariate correlations between the five diversity indicators and generalized trust. For this type of analysis, generalized trust is aggregated at the municipality level and all diversity indicators are separately correlated with generalized trust.

Table 39. Correlation between Ethnic-Cultural Diversity and Generalized Trust


Indicator	Correlation coefficient
Stock of foreigners on the total population	-0.036
Immigrant inflow on the total population	0.014
Evolution in stock of foreigners (2002-2006)	0.089
Evolution in immigrant inflow (2002-2006)	0.084
Share of non-EU foreigners	-0.062

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

The correlation coefficients in Table 39 show a rather surprising finding. In contrast with all studies so far (Putnam, 2007; Letki, 2008; Lancee & Dronkers, 2008), there is no consistent negative relation between diversity and trust. What's quite important to underscore is that all two dynamic indicators, which depict an evolution in both the

share of foreigners and the immigrant inflow, is in a positive, yet nonsignificant relation with the aggregated trust scores. However, the indicator that is most in line with the *de facto* understanding of ethnic-cultural diversity, i.e. the share of non-EU foreigners, is not in a significant relation with generalized trust. Thus, bivariately, in municipalities with a high rate of non-EU foreigners, hardly any lower levels of trust can be found.

Figure 18. Bivariate Relation between Non-EU Residents and Generalized Trust in Flemish communities, 2006



Source: FPS Economy and SCC survey.

It needs no elaboration that this finding foremost contradicts the influential US findings. The graphs of the relation between ethnic homogeneity and trust in the more than 40 sites Putnam has investigated (2007, pp. 147-150), sharply contrasts the bivariate relation. Figure 18 has plotted the bivariate relation between the share of non-EU foreigners on the total population and the generalized trust. The graph clearly shows this modest negative relation that has been discovered in Table 39. In municipalities with a high share of non-EU citizens, there are slightly lower levels of generalized trust. What is more important to note in Figure 18 is the considerable level of heteroscedasticity in the data. Most of the municipalities have a share of non-EU foreigners between 0 to 1.5 percent. Figure 18 also shows that Antwerpen (with code 11002), with a share of about 8 percent non-EU foreigners, is able to maintain a relatively average level of generalized trust. The two other most diverse municipalities, namely Leuven (with code 24062), Ghent (with code 44021) and Mechelen (12025), are able to combine ethnic-cultural diversity with a high-trusting citizenry. To cope with

this heteroscedasticity in the data, I will add a quadratic effect of the diversity indicators.³³

The surprising graph above – having knowledge of the Flemish social situation, it is difficult to grasp that Mechelen ranks outperforms ‘college town’ Leuven with regard to trust – the optimal way to analyze the relation between diversity and generalized trust is to investigate its unique effect by controlling for other possible covariates, both at the local and municipality level, in a multilevel multiple regression analysis. In the next step, I will therefore establish a model in such a way that a sufficient level of generalized trust is explained by independent explanatory variables at both levels (this model will be the baseline). Moreover, I will add the five diversity indicators, together with its quadratic effect, separately to the baseline model of individual and contextual control variables.

4.2. Multilevel Multiple Regression Analysis

Before it can be assessed whether ethnic-cultural diversity has a negative effect on generalized trust in Flemish societies, it first needs to be ascertained whether there is sufficient variability in generalized trust between the municipalities. In other words: what is the share of variability in generalized trust which can be explained by both individual and municipality characteristics. By estimating the so-called null or empty model, the intra class correlation of about 3.95 percent³⁴ shows that about only four percent of the variability in generalized trust is attributable to the municipality level. This analysis of the variance component of generalized trust clearly reveals that the municipality level is of little influence with regard to one’s trust levels. To make a comparison, the analysis on the ESS revealed that about 20 percent of the variability in trust was explained by country level characteristics (Chapter 6). At the local level, it thus seems that predominantly individual characteristics determine whether one is trusting; the municipality level is of less importance.

Before turning at the unique effect of ethnic-cultural diversity, I will first discuss the individual level effects. As Table 40 shows, the effects of most of the individual covariates are in line with previous research (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000). Contrary to previous research (cf. Chapter 3), age is not in a significant relation with generalized trust. In Flanders, the elderly are not significantly more trusting compared with the younger generations. Contrary to the general European trend, women have lower levels of trust than men. In line with previous analyses, one’s socioeconomic situation is the best predictor for one’s trust levels. More specifically, the higher educated are far more trusting compared with other educational levels; having paid

³³ I have also estimated linear effects but the results reflected the ones with a quadratic effect.

³⁴ Variance component of the individual level is 2.659 while the variance component at the municipality level is 0.109. The intra class correlation is thus $0.109/(0.109+2.659)$.

work, on the other hand, does not yield higher trust levels. Those who are separated tend to report lower levels of trust than those respondents who are married or are living together with a partner. In line with the European results, going to church is also in Flanders highly determining of one's levels of generalized trust. Those respondents who have indicated that they frequently attend religious services are significantly more trusting than those who do not go to church. Last but not least, also in Flanders those respondents of foreign descent – those who were born abroad or have parents with foreign roots – don't have significantly lower levels of trust compared with majority residents.

Table 40. Multilevel Multiple Regression Model for Generalized Trust in Flanders

Model 1	Parameter	T-Value
Intercept	3.847***	5.19
Age	0.007	1.94
Women (Ref: Men)	-0.148	-1.66
Educational level:		
- Lower secondary education	0.277*	1.97
- Higher secondary education	0.499***	3.89
- Higher education (Ref: Lower education)	0.903***	6.44
Paid work (Ref: No paid work)	0.176	1.53
Civil Status		
- Divorced/separated	0.233	1.34
- Partner died	-0.398*	-2.00
- Single (Ref: Married/living together)	0.230	1.82
Churchgoing	0.080*	2.55
Foreign descent (Ref: Native)	0.195	1.09
Population density	-0.014	-0.93
Mean income	0.014	0.62
Unemployment level	0.025	0.71
Share of non-EU foreigners	-0.221*	-1.98
Quadratic share non-EU	0.032*	2.44
Variance component individual level	2.564	
Variance component municipality level	0.060	
Intra class correlation	2.28%	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Concerning the individual level effects, the Flemish results generally follow the European trend. However, at the municipality level, the variance components have

already shown to be tremendously low, more specifically about four percent for the null model and when adding individual and municipality control variables, this percentage drops to about one percent. The lack of statistical significance of the municipality level for explaining variation in individual trust between municipalities is also proven in the lack of robust independent variables at the municipality level that explain individual variation in trust. Nor population density, mean income and unemployment levels explain why certain individuals are more trusting than others.

With regard to ethnic-cultural diversity, Table 41 summarizes the methodology that has been followed. In this model, I have included the linear and squared effect of the share of non-EU residents to the baseline model of individual and municipality control variables. As Table 42 shows, there is a small negative linear effect combined with a positive quadratic one, meaning that concerning the shape, trust decreases for medium heterogeneous municipalities while trust increases for the most diverse municipalities.³⁵ Thus, a consistent negative effect of the share of non-EU foreigners on generalized trust, as could have been expected following the US and UK results, is absent; contrary, this analysis largely confirms the general European trend (Chapter 6) and the Dutch local level study (Tolsma et al., 2009).

Table 41. Multilevel Multiple Regression Analysis of Indicators of Ethnic-Cultural Diversity on Generalized Trust

Model	Diversity Indicator	Parameter	T-Value
Model 1	Share of non-EU foreigners	-0.221*	-1.98
	Quadratic non-EU foreigners	0.032*	2.44
Model 2	Share of immigrants	0.008	0.19
	Quadratic immigrants	-0.001	-0.31
Model 3	Evolution share foreigners 02-06	0.237	0.65
	Quadratic evolution foreigners	-0.083	-0.64
Model 4	Evolution share immigrants 02-06	0.024	0.27
	Quadratic evolution immigrants	0.064	1.54
Model 5	Share of foreign population	0.128	0.24
	Quadratic foreign population	0.810	0.61

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

For the other four diversity indicators, I proceeded in the same manner, namely testing the linear and quadratic effect controlled for individual covariates and population density, average income and unemployment rate at the municipality level. Table 41 shows the results of the test of the additional for indicators. The indicators confirm the

³⁵ A straightforward linear estimation of the effect of diversity on trust led to a nonsignificant finding.

nonsignificant curvilinear relation of the share of non-EU residents on trust. Except for the evolution of foreigners, all indicators show a nonsignificant positive linear and a nonsignificant negative quadratic effect on trust. In general, it can thus be concluded that, in Flanders, the hypothesis that diversity erodes generalized trust must be refuted.

5. Conclusion

It is undisputable that, in line with other Western European countries, immigration has shaped Flemish society as it is today. The dominant hypothesis throughout this dissertation, that found only limited evidence across Europe at the country level, is that ethnic-cultural diversity diminishes generalized trust. This case study at the Flemish level adds significantly to the previous chapter as well as to other local level studies that addresses the relation between diversity and trust and has discovered that a linear relation between diversity and generalized trust is absent in Flanders. Before interpreting this result, it needs to be remembered that this number of local level studies remains low; Giddens (2007), for instance, was among the first to formulate his doubts with regard to empirical replications of the so-called Putnam thesis within European countries since reliable foreigner data at the local level remain scarce. Indeed, in most of the countries these statistics are simply unavailable; the French model of *républicanisme* even prohibits the use of racial categories (Jennings, 2000; Weil, 2002). Therefore, merging the FPS Economy foreigner data with the geo-coded SCC survey data as provided by the Flemish authorities have led to a significant addition to the current debate on the social consequences of diversity and immigration.

This chapter has given additional evidence that one should be cautious to generalize the US-findings to the European context. Evidence that the Flemish results differ significantly from the American ones can, first of all, be noted in analysis of the variance components. Information regarding the intra-class correlation revealed that individual generalized trust among the Flemish is only weakly influenced by the municipality as contextual unit. In the US, on the other hand, quite some evidence is present that the effect of the community is far more determining. In other words, this can be interpreted in such a way that the level of inequality within the Flemish municipalities is more limited than in the US. Not only is Flemish society on ethnic-cultural grounds less segregated than the US, also levels of inequality, crime, and other types of so-called concentrated disadvantage are less pronounced. For this reason, additional European studies, including this chapter, add significantly to the influential Putnam findings.

The lack of explained variance at the municipality level means that in Flanders generalized trust is highly determined by individual level characteristics. Predominantly one's socioeconomic position, and more specific the level of completed education, significantly adds to individual levels of generalized trust. Also attending religious

practices increases one's generalized trust level significantly: frequent churchgoers are more trusting than those who never go to church, even in a time and in a European region in which church practice has decreased sharply since the 1960. The municipality characteristics that served as control variables do not exert an influence on individual trust levels. Nor population density, average income and unemployment explain one's level of trust, contrary to findings in America.

The relation between ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust is not as tense compared with US research outcomes (Putnam, 2007; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). To test the effects of ethnic-cultural diversity on trust, five different diversity indicators that all tap a different form of local level diversity are composed. Taking methodological guidelines into consideration, it seems that ethnic-cultural diversity hardly affects generalized trust in Flanders. Even the indicator that may reflect ethnic-cultural diversity in the most appropriate way, i.e. the share of non-EU residents, is not in a significant linear relation with trust. Only when estimating a curvilinear relation, an effect on trust can be noted. More specifically, trust is lower among residents in medium diverse municipalities; the trust levels of residents in mixed municipalities do, however, not differ significantly from residents living in white ones. Thus, while a share of the Flemish population is rather hostile oriented towards immigration and immigrants, living in diverse municipalities does not hamper their social life. Consequently, Flanders seems to deviate from the expected negative relation, namely the US and the UK; however, the result regarding an absent linear effect of diversity on trust is in line with the Dutch outcomes.

The results may, however, give not rise to positive sentiments; the analyses may not be interpreted that inner-city problems are absent. On the contrary, as Figure 18 displays, there is a considerable variability among the Flemish municipalities with regard to generalized trust, ranging from about 4 to about 6 on an interval scale from 0 to 10. Yet, as I have already indicated paraphrasing Putnam's quote on the 'Murder of the Orient Express' atop of Chapter 3, in investigating what determines variation in generalized trust, we need to look at multiple perpetrators. In this Flemish case, it is not diversity but the socioeconomic position that makes individuals to become less trusting. Those citizens that have not enjoyed a full educational track and have an income that limits one's financial security, also inhibits one's development as a civic individual. Thus, policy programs aiming at crafting trust and enhancing social cohesion, like for instance is described in the *Pact van Vilvoorde* (2001), should first of all aim at a strategy that enhances the general levels of socioeconomic wealth. In this respect, the speech, of which two sentences are presented in the Introduction of this Chapter, given by former Flemish Minister of Migrant Integration Mr. Keulen in reaction to a newspaper article in the International Herald Tribune on the linguistic tensions in Flanders, is right: to attain general levels of social wealth, policy should follow a strategy to invest in all people within the national and regional borders.

6. Discussion

At this point of the dissertation, the moment has come to make a round-up on the relation between diversity and generalized trust across Europe. This chapter on this relation in Flanders was not aiming at making generalizable claims on the social consequences of diversity in Europe. Contrary, it has served as a valuable addition for the UK and Dutch local level studies as a source of information for the claims that have been made on the national level study in Chapter 6. In that specific chapter, trust was only weakly under pressure due to immigration-caused diversity, holding other relevant individual and country level covariates constant. Residents living in countries with a high share of foreigners have in general only slightly lower levels of generalized trust; on the contrary, predominantly national wealth and a Protestant tradition add to individual levels of trust.


Discussing this weak negative effect, we need to keep track of Chapter 2, in which the methodological limitations when relying on only 20 countries or less for performing multilevel research were discussed. Using this intermediate-N inflates the possibility of so-called Type II-errors, meaning that we might be unable to discover certain effects while in reality, those effects may be present. Using various indicators for diversity, most of the effect signs were in a negative relation, which, according to nonparametric statistics, would mean that there is a negative relation whatsoever. Thus, taking many methodological guidelines into account, it seems that the claim that diversity lowers generalized trust, yet only weakly, does hold.

The scarce number of local level studies thus far adds substantial information to the methodological Type II-error remark. While Letki's UK study (2008) point to significant lower levels of trust among the residents of diverse British neighborhood, the Dutch study hardly shows any negative relation under control of relevant neighborhood characteristics. The Flemish local level case study has in this respect been an essential addition for various reasons. Many relevant European countries, at least 12 of the 15 classic EU Member States, are missing in this complex relation between diversity and generalized trust. Since there is no information on these countries, we can only guess how the relation might be. In Figure 18, I have plotted, next to the British, Dutch and Flemish results, also hypothetical effects of other European countries. It can be expected that most countries might show a negative trend, but also a weak positive trend might be expected. As such, the local level outcomes might give support for the weak negative trend at the European level.

Figure 19 corresponds with Figure 10, in which I have displayed the differential impact of age on generalized trust across Europe; more specifically, in almost every country that is present in the ESS, age impacted trust differently, varying from strong a significant negative to a strong positive effect. In fact, assessing the overall effect of diversity on trust in Europe confronts us with a similar kind of generalization. While the

overall trend tends to be negative, but only in a weak manner, there is in fact a considerable variability across the European countries. While the published UK and unpublished German results point to a polemic relation between diversity and trust, the published Dutch and unpublished Spanish and Flemish results indicate that the concern for a decline in trust due to immigration is unwarranted. Given the absence of other European local level studies, the outcomes thus far seem to add to the general European trend discovered at the national level.

Figure 19. Hypothetical Graph of Local Level Studies Combined with the Average European Trend



Note: Hypothetical depiction of a number of local level studies plotted in relation with the effect at the European level (ESS).

Regarding the interpretation of the between-country differences, it is only possible to speculate. For instance, while still less segregated than the American ones, it can be hypothesized that British neighborhoods are more segregated than Dutch and Flemish societies. There is, for instance, been repeatedly warned for the deteriorating effect of residential segregation on generalized trust levels (Hooghe, 2007; Uslander, 2009). While reliable information to test this thesis is missing, i.e. it would require a comparative local level research strategy involving measures for segregation, other creative manners to circumvent this problem are as hand as well. It may for instance be the case that certain regimes of migrant integration are better able to integrate minorities into mainstream societies while other regimes might lead to a segregation of immigrant groups from native population. To have a clear insight in these effects, the next part of this dissertation is concerned with an evaluation of regimes of migrant integration across Europe and a test of the effect of diversity on generalized trust under the condition of the migrant integration regimes that are in effect.

PART III

MIGRANT INTEGRATION REGIMES AND SOCIAL COHESION

Chapter 8

Migrant Integration Regimes Across Europe: Evaluating The Validity of Dominant Typologies

Mais l'adhésion à la loi et aux valeurs de la République passe nécessairement par la justice, la fraternité, la générosité. C'est ce qui fait que l'on appartient à une communauté nationale. C'est dans les mots et les regards, avec le cœur et dans les faits, que se marque le respect auquel chacun a droit. Et je veux dire aux enfants des quartiers difficiles, quelles que soient leurs origines, qu'ils sont tous les filles et les fils de la République (Chirac, 14.11.2005).

1. Introduction

At this point in the dissertation, the remaining puzzle that is left unsolved regards the questions whether and to what extent regimes of migrant integration are able to craft generalized trust in diverse societies. Before this question can be answered, we need to have an idea what regimes for the integration of foreigners are in effect over European nation-states.³⁶ As is known, while originally, many countries expected that the influx of immigrants could be managed since immigrants were expected to return when labor market opportunities would plummet, at present many immigrants have settled or would like to do so (Zimmerman, 1995; Groenendijk & Guild, 2001, p. 40; Kofman, 2004). Given permanent immigration has become frequent, it has become necessary for national policies to manage the incorporation of immigrants into the host society. In this respect, integration policies must be distinguished from immigration policies, since the former requires the understanding of permanent settlement (Favell, 2001a). In fact, countries may be offered a palette full of policy options to deal with immigrant incorporation, in reality, however European countries are limited by on the one hand path dependency, i.e. national narratives on boundaries between natives and non-natives (Brubaker, 1992; Bail, 2008), and on the other hand European Community law which confounds national governments (Groenendijk & Guild, 2001; Joppke, 2007).

³⁶ The content of this chapter is reflected in parts of the following publications: Reeskens & Hooghe (2008) and Hooghe & Reeskens (2009).

While preceding paragraph has only exemplified policies as being able to distinguish citizens from noncitizens, it is evident that also the native population can draw similar boundaries between them and non-natives. In simplifying the modes in which migrants can be incorporated, various authors have recently produced typologies of migrant integration focusing on the extent and the grounds newcomers are considered as citizens of the country of destination, i.e. not only by national policies but also by public opinion. While I do acknowledge processes of transnational citizenship (Soysal, 1994; Davidson, 1996), my concern is about national regimes, which are at present still regarded as dominant ways that describe immigrant citizenship (Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Joppke, 1999). Regarding these national regimes, one of the most influential works in this respect is Brubaker's (1992) distinction between civic and ethnic citizenship and how these narratives are translated into modes of immigrant integration. Civic citizenship models consider migrants as full citizens as they are willing to adapt to the national culture. Contrary, ethnic models determine citizenship on the basis of a long-lasting relation with the country. While this dichotomy has been criticized for a lack of conceptual clarity (Kymlicka, 2001; Kuzio, 2002), the advantage is that it can be applied both on society's structure (policy) and culture (public opinion). In the second section of this chapter, this dichotomy will be explained as well as the issues that have been raised against it.

The aim of this chapter is to add to the current debate on the validity of civic-ethnic and west-east distinctions in the field of regimes of migrant integration across Europe. The validity of the civic-ethnic model and how it collapses with the European division of Western and Eastern nation-states has been questioned abundantly (Kuzio, 2002; Shulman, 2002; Bail, 2008; Davidov, 2009). What this chapter aims to provide, in addition to most investigations thus far, is the analysis of two different data sources that have, thus far, not been tested widely for an integrated assessment of the validity of the dominant civic-ethnic dichotomy. On the one hand, in the third section of this Chapter, survey data obtained from the ISSP (*Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung*, 2003) to investigate whether civic and ethnic citizenship requirements, i.e. which requirements immigrants need to comply with before one is considered as a full citizen, are salient and clearly crystallized concepts among European citizens and whether these concepts are equivalent across the participating countries. On the other hand, in the fourth section, the Migrant Integration Policy Index data (MIPEX; Niessen et al., 2007) is used to investigate whether clusters of countries can be detected and to what extent they correspond to EU Directives on migrant integration. Using both data sources, and triangulating the outcomes in section 5, we will arrive at a clear overview for the prevalence of modes of migrant integration across Europe.

2. Regimes of Migrant Integration Across Europe

Before a critical assessment of the validity of the dominant civic-ethnic model in the field of migrant integration regimes can take place, first the literature on this topic will be surveyed. First of all, since regimes of migrant integration are at the core of this chapter, I will present my view on integration. In the second section, the civic-ethnic model and its origins will be discussed. Third, extensions to the civic-ethnic dichotomy as has been developed in the last couple of years will be provided. Critical voices that have raised questions regarding the civic-ethnic dichotomy are introduced in the fourth section. These critical remarks will also serve as guidelines in the empirical investigation into the validity of the dichotomy later on.

2.1. Defining Integration

The word ‘integration’ has become salient in philosophies of how European societies should deal with its new citizens (Favell, 1998; Joppke, 1999). Yet, in line with Adrian Favell (2003, p. 14), I conceive integration as a process that affects migrant as well as the native population: integration “invariably includes the projection of both deep social change for the country concerned, and of fundamental continuity between the past and some idealized social endpoint.” In this respect, the concept is closely related to ‘assimilation’, as is dominant in the US discourse (Alba & Nee, 1997; 2003). As Bloemraad and colleagues (2008, p. 163) note, assimilation, in this understanding, inherently is about narrowing the differences between native and immigrant groups on certain domains, yet it leaves room for differences in other fields (see also Alba & Nee, 2003; Brubaker, 2001). As will be considered later on in this chapter, ‘assimilation’ will be used in a different understanding and will mainly follow the interpretation provided by Koopmans and colleagues (2005). According to Favell (2003), integration thus encapsulates adaptation from both the immigrant population, for instance from migrants, who have access to jobs in the primary segment of the labor market, and from the general population, for whom interethnic marriages become more widely accepted.

In practice, about three major dimensions of migrant integration have been proposed (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003), namely socioeconomic, cultural and political integration. First of all, socioeconomic integration describes to what level migrants are socioeconomically lagging behind compared with the native population – including residential segregation, educational outcomes and positions on the labor market. With regard to this kind of immigrant integration, major theories like segregated assimilation (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), which deals with the finding that certain minorities have mainly been assimilated to an underclass and not to the general mainstream, have been developed. Second, with regard to cultural integration, two subsections can be noted. On the one hand, cultural integration discusses the commensurability of the native and the immigrant cultures, like for instance discussions

on the compatibility between native and migrant norms and values, exemplified by the enduring debate on the headscarf (Joppke, 2009). On the other hand, cultural integration also regards bridging ties between the migrant and native population, including intermarriage and dominant language skills (Alba & Nee, 2003). The third dimension of integration is the legal and political one. More specifically, this dimension argues that integration into the host country is tied with active and passive political participation, i.e. immigrants become part of the associational and political networks of the host country (Bloemraad, 2000), sometimes in addition to remaining politically active in the country of destination (Bauböck, 2005).

This two-sided view on immigrant integration, which largely focuses on outcomes of both natives and immigrants, can, however, not be separated from social institutions that guide immigrant integration (Joppke, 1999; Berry, 2001; Alba, 2005). With regard to these institutions, one can distinguish between two relevant approaches that can largely be traced back to the literature on boundaries (Lamont & Molnar, 2002). The first approach is the cultural one, which emphasizes that immigrant integration depends upon the symbolic boundaries that are drawn by the native population (Bail, 2008). According to this approach, the majority population upholds certain criteria to which newcomers are considered as full citizens of the host country. It can be expected that these boundaries will reflect upon the integration process of migrants into wider society (Alba, 2005). The second approach emphasizes a structural perspective, approaching immigrant integration from a social boundaries approach by emphasizing the role of national governments in defining to what extent migrants are granted the same set of rights as the native population (Berry, 2001).

The common denominator underlying the two approaches is thus 'citizenship'. In line with Bloemraad (2000), I approach citizenship as an analytical concept defining membership in a socio-political community. In this conception, Bloemraad (2008) distinguishes between four dimensions of citizenship, namely legal status, rights, identity and participation. The data that in a later phase will be used to empirically overview the dominant regimes of migrant integration foremost fit into the first three dimensions. The cultural approach regarding the salience of civic and ethnic citizenship orientations among European residents predominantly relates to the identity dimension: which requirements do citizens in Europe impose to newcomers for being fully accepted as a citizen? The structural approach concerning the migrant policies across Europe, on the other hand, regards the legal status and rights dimensions in Bloemraad's (2008) analytical framework. In this respect, it needs to be investigated which countries have a similar policy palette with regard to the legal status and rights they enjoy migrants.

Before I will elaborate more thoroughly on the civic-ethnic dichotomy, it needs to be emphasized that the two approaches, i.e. the one based on public opinion boundaries and the other one based on legal boundaries, may not necessarily overlap. Public opinion may require for immigrants that they respect the political institutions and laws

but that they also need to have a long-lasting relation with the host country to be considered as a full citizen. On the other hand, national legislation can consider granting citizenship to people outside the own ethnic group (Koopmans et al., 2005). Taken altogether, the logic of civic and ethnic citizenship, as well as the various societal levels that make use of this framework, poses certain intellectual challenges that will be addressed in this chapter.

2.2. The Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy

Without any doubt, the civic-ethnic typology is one of the most influential citizenship concepts that have described how national narratives reflect on regimes of immigrant integration (Brubaker, 1992). According to the civic citizenship model, which has penetrated into the legal principle of the *ius soli*, citizenship is considered on the basis of birth on the soil (Brubaker, 1992; Weil, 2002). In civic nation-states, being accepted as a citizen is based on the willingness to comply with the political system (Bloemraad et al., 2008). The textbook example of this model is France: adherence to the French law, integration into French culture and respect for the fundamental values of the French Republic are seen as essential to define citizenship. According to the ethnic model, on the other hand, citizenship is only granted when one can show a strong connection to the host country. The *ius sanguinis* legal approach clearly states that citizenship is considered in the presence of an ethnic connection with the host country (Brubaker, 1992). Citizenship status in Germany is often portrayed as ethnic since having German ancestors (even when this ancestry has to be dated back several centuries) is the main criterion to require citizenship. Consequently, it is no surprise that the French model draws predominantly upon inclusive or voluntarist boundaries while the German model relies upon rather exclusive or ascriptive boundaries (Zimmer, 2003). In France, for instance, descent plays no determining role for acquiring citizenship, rather the contrary. It needs to be remembered that current French president, Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, was born in a family of Hungarian refugees.

The distinction between civic and ethnic citizenship can be traced back to the nationalism literature. In 1907, Meinecke introduced the concepts of *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*, distinguishing both by arguing that there is a difference between “nations that are primarily based on some jointly experience of cultural heritage and nations that are primarily based on the unifying force of a common political history and constitution” (Meinecke (1970 [1907], p. 10). The *Staatsnation*, therefore, is based on a form of social contract that in principle is open to all who wish to adhere to it. In the classical literature, the Swiss Federation and the US are usually portrayed as typical examples of such political nations. On the other hand, the *Kulturnation* is depicted as a rather ethnic community in which inclusion is based on descent. The textbook examples are, next to Germany, Japan and Israel. Ideal typically, the two citizenship ideas are considered to be mutually exclusive: if a society stresses its political character,

it cannot simultaneously use references to a shared ethnic identity and an alleged glorious past as its founding myth. Already in the earlier work of Meinecke, states were seen as balancing between these two extremes; in fact, the political history of Germany during the 18th and the 19th century was mainly a struggle between ideas of Germany as a *Kulturnation* or a *Staatsnation* (Giesen, 1991).

While Kohn (1944) also uses the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, in his work these concepts are rather seen as fixed and stable characteristics of nation-states. Famously, he portrayed Eastern European societies as primordially ethnic, while the liberal regimes of Western Europe were seen as civic. More recently, in the work of Brubaker (1992, p. 3), the same distinction is being applied, but this time with regard to Germany and France: “for the distinctive and deeply rooted French and German understandings of nationhood have remained surprisingly robust. Nowhere is this more striking than in the policies and politics of citizenship vis-à-vis immigrants.” It is important to note here that Brubaker does not assume that this deep-rooted distinction in citizenship conceptions is purely valid for the study of legal systems: in his work, the distinction between civic and ethnic identities is seen as a societal and historical characteristic of nation-states. These characteristics express themselves in acts of legislation, but they should be seen as enduring and comprehensive elements of national identity. His assumption therefore is that at least a majority of French or German citizens actually applies these arguments in their self-identification, or in their reasoning about community and citizenship (Brubaker, 1996, p. 170). This self-conceptualization of the French nation was well expressed by the former French president Mr. Chirac after the riots in the Paris suburbs, who emphasized that immigrant youth, no matter what their past is, are full citizens of the French state.

In recent years, various authors have expressed their concern about the empirical validity of broad and encompassing generalizations about the division of ethnic and civic concepts across nations. Based on quantitative survey data, Shulman (2002) argues that ethnic concepts are present just as well in Western European societies, while in Eastern Europe too notions of civic identity can be found. Shulman summarizes his results by stating that “imperial and communist rule have not pushed Eastern European nationhood in a strongly cultural direction while greatly weakening civicness. And whereas most of the West has a long tradition of democracy and relatively strong and stable political institutions, cultural conceptions of nationhood are alive and well, and support for multiculturalism is relatively weak” (Shulman, 2002, p. 583). Based on survey data from Latvia, Poland and Lithuania, Björklund (2006, p. 112) too, claims that Eastern Europe is not a civic desert area: “The results of the Baltic survey do not support the idea of a uniform and specifically East European ‘ethnic’ concept of nationality.”

In an attempt to counter this point of critique, Brubaker (2004) admits that the concept of civic and ethnic nationhood suffers from two major weaknesses. First, he says that

there are analytical ambiguities associated with the civic-ethnic distinction. Within the literature, there is no agreement on the question which elements exactly refer to civic, and which refers to ethnic concepts of citizenship (Brubaker, 2004, p. 137). It has to be noted here that while Brubaker expresses doubt about the operationalization of the concepts, he does not question the fact that both concepts can be used as ideal types. The second problem is associated with the normative implications of the distinction. Civic nationalism is portrayed as liberal, universalistic and inclusive while the ethnic form of nationality concepts is regarded as illiberal, particularistic and exclusive. Especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where ethnic divisions do not necessarily coincide with state borders, ethnic and civic conceptualizations of group identity do not necessarily overlap. Brubaker (2004) therefore introduces a further distinction between state-framed and counter-state understandings of nationalism.

2.3. Extending the Civic-Ethnic Model

Based on the ambiguities that are present in the civic-ethnic dichotomy some authors have proposed to supplement this dichotomy with additional dimensions. One of the most cited undertakings in this respect is proposed by Koopmans and colleagues (2005), who proposed an additional monism-pluralism dichotomy regarding cultural group rights along the civic-ethnic dimensions of individual rights. On the one hand, one dimension of the typology regards equality of individual access to citizenship, which is represented by the classic civic-ethnic dichotomy. On the other hand, the other perspective in the classification regard the level of cultural differences and group rights that are associated with the citizenship rights that are granted; the dichotomy of monism vs. pluralism is introduced to capture this typology on cultural differences, i.e. respectively the requirement to adapt to one culture contrary to the right to hold on to one's immigrant culture. Combining the two dichotomies, a classic two by two classification – where social scientists in general are very fond of – has been created.

Table 42. A Two-Dimensional Conception of Citizenship

		Cultural difference and group rights	
		monism	pluralism
Equality of individual rights	ethnic	assimilationism	segregationism
	civic	universalism	multiculturalism

Source: Koopmans et al. (2005, p. 10)

First of all, in multicultural societies (the lower right quadrant), citizenship is granted on a territorial basis, i.e. having been born on the soil or have lived there for most of one's life; with regard to the cultural rights, a pluralist approach is supported. Although originally, multicultural models have been introduced to consider citizenship rights of minority indigenous groups (Taylor, 1993; Kymlicka, 1995), these models have been abundantly applied on citizenship rights for immigrant groups (Joppke, 1996). In

Europe, the Netherlands can be labeled as multiculturalist and, to a lesser extent also Great Britain can be regarded as a multicultural society. Second, in a universalism model, citizenship is, just like in the multicultural model, also based on a civic-territorial basis but is combined with a monistic approach towards cultural differences. It is thus expected that those immigrants who are granted citizenship on a *ius soli* basis give up their own culture and adapt to the native one. Predominantly France is an example of this model in which integration into *le creuset français* has been dominant (Todd, 1994). Third, ethnic countries, which base citizenship on descent, in which immigrants need to give up their culture, can be regarded as ‘assimilationist’. Germany is in this respect ideal case since it is possible to become a full citizen but only by reject one’s own descent (Koopmans et al., 2005). Last but not least, segregationist models exclude non-*Aussiedler* immigrants descent from citizenship but stimulate cultural differences. The classic guestworker model is a textbook example of this classification: immigrants were refrained from citizenship but, on the other hand, certain policies were in effect that were supposed to keep the immigrants in touch with the culture of the country of origin (Joppke, 1996). As such, integration after return to the country of origin would be facilitated.

The four dimensions proposed by Koopmans et al. (2005) typology corroborates with other typologies that have been proposed throughout the years, like for instance Hollifield’s (1997) distinction between the guestworker, assimilation and ethnic minorities model. Nevertheless, the model proposed by Koopmans and colleagues (2005) has become accepted as a usable heuristic scheme to discuss citizenship rights (Bloemraad, 2008; Weldon, 2006). In this respect, Bloemraad and colleagues note (2008) that according to this classification, immigrants in France and the Netherlands, despite both being classified as civic, have thus different claims over membership in their countries of destination. Yet, despite this valuable addition of the cultural monism and pluralism dichotomy to the civic-ethnic dichotomy, such an additional dimension might indeed solve complexities are inherent in classifying countries with regard to the their migrant integration policies; nevertheless, in this respect, also conceptual problems that are inherent in the typologies are expected to accumulate by introducing a second dichotomy. To have a good overview on the problems that are inherent in the former civic-ethnic dichotomy and how I will structure the arguments for the empirical investigation, various authors’ concern about the empirical validity of this continuum are echoed.

2.4. Problems with the Civic-Ethnic Typology

Indeed, in the literature, many important conceptual and theoretical reservations against the civic-ethnic dichotomy can be identified. First, it is striking to note that both concepts are often not strictly defined or delineated. Kymlicka (2001, p. 243), therefore, notes that “this sort of distinction is almost a cliché in the literature, but it needs to be

handled carefully, and can easily be misinterpreted or misapplied.” While there is some consensus that adherence to legal principles is repeated by civic citizenship while both descent and religion are more closely tied to ethnic citizenship, the delineation between these various forms is seldom explicitly made.

Second, authors have argued that a simple dichotomy is not sufficient to fully understand the varieties of citizenship concepts (Nieguth, 1999; Janmaat, 2006). Kymlicka (2001, p. 244) claims that ‘membership’ is not just a question of law or ethnic heritage, but also of culture. This cultural factor is most often neglected in the literature on nationalism and identity. Kymlicka uses Quebec and Catalonia as examples of this cultural nationalism: Québécois and Catalans are concerned with the survival of their culture and they do accept immigrants as long as they respect the cultural tradition of these regions. The theoretical insight to be gained here is that citizenship concepts clearly are not just two-dimensional, but incorporate various elements of community, society and politics. Kymlicka proposes that in stead of a dichotomy, at least three dimensions of citizenship should be distinguished, namely ethnic, civic and cultural ones.

Third, the question whether these concepts should be considered as mutually exclusive or not, has led to an intensive debate (Smith, 2000; Miller, 2000; Kastoryano, 2002). Miller (2000, p. 131) argues that the various concepts cannot be combined. In his view, societies hold on to either a civic or an ethnic citizenship character (or cultural), while it is almost inconceivable to take some middle position. If a society stresses one’s stay on the territory as a criterion for full citizenship, it cannot also stress the importance of, e.g., ancestry or race. Another strand of authors (Smith, 2000; Brubaker, 2004, p. 139) on the other hand, strongly oppose this view. Smith (2000, p. 25), for instance, argues that “No nation, no nationalism, can be seen as purely the one or the other, even if at certain moments one or other of these elements predominate in the ensemble of components of national identity.” According to these authors, citizenship concepts within a society are based on ethnic and civic, and potentially cultural considerations, and all these elements are used simultaneously in order to reach decision on who is considered as a full member of the political community, and who is not.

Fourth, it remains to be ascertained how specific criteria relate to the theoretical citizenship concepts, or to put it differently, how the concepts could be operationalized. There is some consensus on the question that obeying the law, respecting political institutions, ethnic descent, speaking the language, adhering to a majority religion, etc., at various stages all are being used as admission criteria. How exactly these criteria relate to the theoretical concepts is seldom explicitly addressed. The fact that language is interchangeably being used as an element of civic or ethnic citizenship has already been exemplified. Shulman (2002) circumvents this problem by *a priori* assigning specific items to a theoretical concept, which is hardly in line with accepted practices in survey research or in data reduction. In his study he does not investigate the empirical validity

of this assignment and the factor structure he presupposes. In Table 43, the operationalization of the concepts of civic, ethnic and cultural identity as provided by Shulman is printed. Yet, before this operationalization can be accepted, at least it should be tested whether these criteria indeed are so strictly and one-dimensionally related to the specific theoretical concepts.

Table 43. Operationalization of Civic, Cultural and Ethnic Citizenship

Content of national identity	Key indicators
Civic	Live on the territory Have citizenship status Express will to join political community Adhere to basic state ideology Adhere to political institutions and rights
Cultural	Belief in dominant religion Speak language Share national traditions
Ethnic	Ancestry, descent Belong to the dominant ethnic/racial group

Source: Shulman, 2002, p. 559.

Five, Shulman (2002) implicitly assumes that his operationalization is cross-culturally equivalent: in all of the nations that were included in his investigation, the same structure and the relations between items and concepts are thought to be found. To put it simply: Shulman assumes that the delineation between civic and ethnic citizenship concepts works in the same manner in France as it does in Latvia, but he fails to test this idea. It is, however, highly plausible that in new countries of destination, other conceptions might be present compared with traditional immigrant societies. To test the assumption that civic and ethnic has the same dimensional representation across Europe, it is necessary to test the cross-cultural equivalence of these concepts (cf. the measurement equivalence of generalized trust in Chapter 2). The possibility that 'language' might have a different meaning in Germany than it has in Great Britain needs to be taken into consideration. Only if the test for cross-cultural measurement equivalence is positive, it is possible to compare countries with respect to their levels of civic or ethnic citizenship. If not, we can only conclude that the two concepts have different meanings across Europe.

3. Evaluating the Cultural Approach to Regimes Migrant Integration: Testing the Validity of Civic-Ethnic Models among European Public Opinion

In this part of the chapter, the extent to which civic and ethnic citizenship concepts are salient and well-structured latent concepts among Europeans is discussed. In the first

section, the data and methodology is discussed, which is followed by an empirical investigation.

3.1. Data and Methodology

The data used to test the micro-level approach to civic and ethnic citizenship is the 2003 ‘National Identity’ wave of the ISSP. The purpose of this cross-national survey project is to build “a continuing annual program of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics important for social science research” (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 2003, p. I-6). Every year, this survey project covers a different topic, such as religion, social inequality, environment or national identity. In this 2003 National Identity study the number of participating countries was 35. Although there have been made reservations with regard to the quality of the ISSP surveys – problems present in the ISSP have for instance laid the foundations of the ESS (Jowell, 1998) – research outcomes thus far point out that the 2003 wave is sufficiently reliable and useable for my research question (Janmaat, 2006; Davidov, 2009).

In this analysis into the dimensional structure of the civic-ethnic dichotomy, and the cross-cultural equivalence of this dichotomy, the analysis will be limited to the 16 European OECD member countries. There are three reasons why this restricted sample is used. First, the debate on civic and ethnic citizenship conceptions is vivid in prosperous Western societies, which are nowadays faced with increasing immigration flows (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2008). Second, by comparing only European OECD countries, all of whom enjoy relatively high levels of prosperity, the test is considered as conservative. Including the entire sample would add unnecessary heterogeneity that is present in the considerable differences in income and democratic government that reach beyond the European member countries. This additional heterogeneity would make it more difficult to reach measurement equivalence across societies. In the sample of 16 countries, both countries are included that are generally considered as having a civic citizenship concept (e.g. France), as countries which are most often described as predominantly ethnic (e.g. Germany).³⁷

In the ISSP survey, respondents were questioned about the criteria they considered as essential to be accepted as a true citizen of their country (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 2003). More specifically, they could rate eight different criteria: being born in the country, to have citizenship status, to have lived in the country for most of

³⁷ The 16 European countries that are included in the ISSP 2003 wave and thus under investigation in this empirical evaluation are Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (East and West are combined in my research), Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovak Republic, Sweden and Switzerland. See Appendix B for the distribution of the variables per country.

one's life, to speak the dominant language, to adhere to the dominant religion, to respect the laws, to 'feel' a member of the community and to have ethnic ancestry. While the availability of these survey items in the ISSP has provided a convenient tool to test the validity of the civic-ethnic dichotomy, in the literature thus far any test of the cross-cultural validity and measurement equivalence of these concepts is missing. Concerning the response scales, respondents could rank the importance of these criteria on a four-point interval scale, ranging from not important to important.

Table 44. Citizenship Requirement Items in ISSP 2003

	Mean	St Dev	N
To have been born in [country]	1.994	0.961	19,160
To have [country] citizenship	2.306	0.802	19,164
To have lived in [country] for most of one's life	2.031	0.876	19,065
To be able to speak [country language]	2.448	0.762	19,211
To be a [religion]	1.226	1.127	18,751
To respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws	2.339	0.760	19,101
To feel [country nationality]	2.339	0.797	19,059
To have [country nationality] ancestry	1.763	1.035	18,978

Note: Each of the items is presented in a matrix questionnaire design. The items are preceded by the phrase: "Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is..." (0-3). In Appendix B, the univariate distribution per country is represented.

The means reported in Table 44 make clear that respondents tend to consider many of these criteria as very important. Language, citizenship status, the 'feeling' of identity and respecting the law are clearly of tantamount importance, while place of birth, religion, length of stay and ancestry receive lower rankings. If we look at the ideal typical civic and ethnic concepts, namely respectively respect political institutions and laws and have national ancestry, it can be regarded that Europeans are, on average, more civic than ethnic oriented. However, these results do not clearly indicate which items belong together at the individual level; it is not clear whether individuals discriminate between a set of 'civic' and a set of 'ethnic' citizenship attributes.

To test whether civic notions of citizenship can be distinguished from ethnic ones and whether the underlying patterns of civic and ethnic citizenship are equivalent across all Western OECD countries in the OECD countries, I will proceed in three ways. First of all, an exploratory factor analysis on the pooled data will be performed. By doing this, it can be assessed which items more or less group together. Using a threshold for the factor loadings of .40 and the absence of a cross-loading of .15, the underlying structure of citizenship requirements can be ascertained. The second step is to test the stability of this model by performing a confirmatory factor analysis, guided by several fit indices

including the RMSEA (lower than .05) and TLI (larger than .95). If necessary, modification indices will be analyzed to assess which adjustments may be necessary to arrive at a stable model. In the third and final step, a multiple group confirmatory factor analysis will be applied in order to test the cross-cultural equivalence of the stable model (cf. Chapter 2 for more information on these equivalence tests).

3.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis

The first question that is addressed is whether the distinction between ethnic and civic identity is empirically valid, and whether the various items in this module indeed relate to these concepts as is often assumed, but seldom tested. By means of an exploratory factor analysis, it will be able to gain more insight into the structure of the eight citizenship criteria. Before the dimensional structure can be investigated, the question arises how many factors are extracted from the eight items. The investigation of the factors' eigenvalues and difference between subsequent factors in Table 45 shows that a two factor solution is preferred since the eigenvalues of the first two factors are larger than 1. These factors are labeled as civic and ethnic concepts of citizenship since the textbook indicators for these concepts, i.e. respectively complying with the political system and having ethnic ancestry, are in a strong relation with the underlying latent concepts (Table 46).

Table 45. Results of an Exploratory Factor Analysis

	Eigenvalue	Difference
Factor 1	3.432	2.200
Factor 2	1.232	0.478
Factor 3	0.753	0.095
Factor 4	0.659	0.029
Factor 5	0.630	0.127
Factor 6	0.503	0.042
Factor 7	0.461	0.129
Factor 8	0.332	

Note: Result of an exploratory factor analysis for categorical data with Promax rotation in Mplus.

Table 46 displays the results of the exploratory factor analysis. At first sight, the items indeed respond to a clear dichotomous latent structure. Place of birth, length of residence, religion and ancestry clearly load on one factor. It is not clear how this factor needs to be labeled, namely culture or ethnic. Since the ancestry-item shows the strongest factor loading and this item has always been regarded as ethnic, this factor will be given the ethnic label. On the other hand, language, respect for laws and institutions and to a lesser extent, the feeling of identity just as clearly load on a second factor that can be labeled as civic. The question of citizenship status, however, simply does not

work, as it loads equally on both factors. One of the explanations here could be that for some respondents it might have been confusing to state that ‘in order to be considered as a full citizen of the community, one needs to have a citizenship status of that community’. It is also interesting to note that four negative but rather weak factor loadings have been discovered: having been born in the country, being a member of the dominant religion, and having national ancestry have a negative relation with civic citizenship, while respecting the law has a negative relation with the ethnic concept.

Table 46. Exploratory Factor Analysis on Citizenship Concepts

	F1: Ethnic	F2: Civic
To have been born in [country]	0.812	-0.045
To have [country] citizenship	0.443	0.334
To have lived in [country] for most of one’s life	0.567	0.211
To be able to speak [country language]	0.013	0.597
To be a [religion]	0.581	-0.080
To respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws	-0.139	0.574
To feel [country nationality]	0.276	0.449
To have [nationality] ancestry	0.837	-0.091
Inter-axis correlation	0.511	

Note: Result of an exploratory factor analysis for categorical data with Promax rotation in Mplus. The inter-axis correlations coefficients indicate the correlation between the two extracted axes.


What is important to notice is the positive inter-axis correlation, which is about .5. This quite high number indicates that the two factors are highly correlated: those respondents who give high scores on the ethnic items also are in favor of civic requirements. Nevertheless, given the analysis of the eigenvalues, this explanatory factor analysis seems to lead to clear results: on the pooled data, an ethnic and civic conception of citizenship can be distinguished, and various items relate quite unambiguously to one of these two concepts. A more appropriate and stricter test of the distinction however, involves confirmatory factor analysis to ascertain the stability of the factor solutions.

3.3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

A more rigorous test of the factor structure is provided by confirmatory factor analysis, which gives additional information on the fit and stability of the model. In this analysis, I assign, in line with the exploratory factor analysis, the have been born, have lived for most of one’s life and the national ancestry item to an ethnic factor while speak the language, respect the national laws and political institutions and to feel a country

national are assigned to the civic factor, as is in line with the results from the exploratory factor analysis. In Figure 20, one can observe that the results of the exploratory factor analysis do not lead to a stable factor solution. Both the RMSEA, of 0.075, and the TLI, of 0.882, are far off from the regular thresholds of respectively 0.05 and 0.95. Looking at the modification indices, the first suggestion is to free the error correlation between lived in the country and having national ancestry. While out of theoretical considerations, freeing this parameter is quite puzzling – it can for instance be expected that ‘being born’ and ‘having national ancestry’ would share even more error since they have a long-standing relation with the country in common – empirical considerations necessitates to free the error to arrive at a more stable solution. Moreover, the modification indices also point to freeing the factor loading from ethnic citizenship to respecting the political institutions and national laws. Adjusting the model with these two steps adds significantly to the fit of the model, i.e. the RMSEA drops to about .054 while the TLI rises to .94. It needs to be remembered that this model is in a strict sense not satisfying according to classic CFA-guidelines; i.e. minor adjustments can still be implemented to arrive at a slightly better model fit. These adjustments consequently indicate that civic and ethnic citizenship are not straightforward concepts. Nevertheless, this model as it is presented in Figure 20 is relatively parsimonious and can thus be used for further empirical scrutiny.

Figure 20. Confirmatory Factor Analysis on Civic and Ethnic Citizenship



Note: Result of a confirmatory factor analysis for categorical data in Mplus (items response categories: 0-3). N = 17,666.

At this point in the analysis, some preliminary conclusions need to be discussed. First, a more or less stable two factor solution can be found, which implies that with the current list of items, there is no need to construct a third, cultural form of citizenship in the way Kymlicka (2001) has suggested. Elements like religion or language can easily and in a valid manner be assigned to ethnic or civic citizenship, and there is no third

factor to be detected. A third cultural factor does thus not seem to have any empirical validity in population survey data.

Second, what is important to note is that this discovered two-factor solution largely corresponds to the distinction between civic and ethnic citizenship. Being born in the country, having lived there for a long time and adhering to the dominant religion clearly refer to an ethnic concept of citizenship, with having national ancestry as the most characteristic and the most powerful item. Respecting the law, speaking the language and feeling a citizen are equally strong expressions of a civic concept of citizenship. Here, the item on respecting the institutions and the laws is the most characteristic and statistically the most powerful. What is important to note is that both components, thus, are present in one given country, which is confirmed by the strong correlation between the two latent factors (about .70).


Third, we can observe that the items used to measure both concepts, are not always in coherence with previous theoretical assumptions. Shulman (2002), e.g., claims that speaking the language of the country is an element of cultural citizenship. Empirically, however, this assumption is unwarranted. The criterion of speaking the language relates to a civic conceptualization of citizenship, as is demonstrated by the confirmatory factor analysis and therefore, at least with regard to public opinion data, the assumption of Shulman is falsified.

Fourth, it is quite remarkable that the model only becomes stable when allowing a negative factor loading, which is rather uncommon in this kind of factor analysis. It has to be remembered however that the goal is to capture a logic of exclusion. Citizenship is always internally inclusive and externally exclusive, as Brubaker (1992) reminded us. Whether one adheres to a civic or an ethnic concept of citizenship, this list of criteria always implies that some people are not being considered as full members of one's community. If one adheres to an ethnic logic, it is clear that if one is not born in the country, has not lived in the country for a long time, and does not share the main religion, he or she does not qualify as a full member. The entrance test is made even stricter, because there are not just these three 'positive' criteria, there is also one negative criterion. Within the ethnic concept of citizenship it is also clear that newcomers should not have any illusory aspirations: it is not because they respect the institutions and the law of the country, that they will ever be considered as full members of society. To put it differently, one of the defining elements of ethnic citizenship concepts is exactly that it rejects an important element of the civic logic. The backdoor of acquiring full citizenship by accepting the law and the institutions of a new country is firmly locked in this citizenship concept.

3.4. Cross-Cultural Validity

The previous analyses have demonstrated the empirical validity of introducing a distinction between ethnic and civic concepts of citizenship. A remarkable element is that even though the correlation between civic and ethnic citizenship is quite high, both concepts are clearly analytically distinct from each other. Measurements of civic and ethnic citizenship, however, are often also used to classify nations and societies on this continuum. While France is seen as civic, Germany is typically portrayed as ethnic. While the liberal democracies of Western Europe are seen as civic, Eastern and Central Europe are traditionally associated with ethnic citizenship. The previous analyses have already hinted at the fact that these distinctions are too crude. The fact that we find a strong correlation between both concepts (the correlation is about .70), indicates that both concepts coexist. Individuals obtaining a high score on civic citizenship requirements, usually will have a high score too on ethnic requirements. In order to compare these scores across countries, however, it is crucial that the concepts being measured are cross-culturally equivalent, which has already been demonstrated for generalized trust. Only if the latent structures are equivalent across nations, one can directly compare the scores of these countries.

Figure 21. Chi-Square Contribution of Misfit to the Metric Invariance Model



Note: Results indicate the chi-square deviances per country after a test for metric invariance in Mplus.

Therefore, the next step in the analysis is the investigation of the cross-national measurement equivalence of the civic-ethnic dichotomy by using MGCFA (in Mplus). Because it needs to be ascertain whether countries can be directly compared in their

composite scores on these constructs (as, e.g., in Shulman's (2002) research), I will limit myself to a test of the metric invariance model, meaning that factor loadings need to be equal across all countries under investigation (see Chapter 2). Figure 21 has summarized the model fit together with the countries' contribution to the chi-square of the model. The fit indices have skyrocketed compared with the regular confirmatory factor analysis: the RMSEA and TLI indices clearly show that there are numerous problems with the metric invariance of the civic and ethnic factors. When looking at the chi-square contributions per country, it seems that in almost all countries, major deviations are present, however, most problematic in this equivalence test are Ireland, Poland and Portugal while the 'best' fits can be found in Denmark and Great Britain.

By checking the Likelihood Ratio tests (the modification indices), the most deviant factor loadings can be observed. It can be regarded, for instance, that in the Irish sample, the factor loading from 'speaking the language' to the ethnic component needs to be freed, indicating that in Ireland, speaking the language is also regarded as part of ethnic citizenship. In Poland, the religious item clearly belongs to ethnic citizenship (the modification indices indicate that this loading needs to be estimated) and not to civic citizenship (this loading needs to be freed according to the sixth highest contribution). A similar reasoning can be found for religion in Portugal. While it is impossible to list all the necessary adjustments required to arrive to a stable multiple group factor solution, the analysis shows that predominantly religion causes major problems, even though that other indicators pop up as somewhat problematic. Nevertheless, the basic idea after this undertaking is indeed that notions of civic and ethnic citizenship do exist as heuristic devices, but that they are operationalized using completely different indicators in the various countries under investigation.

Table 47. Cross-Cultural Metric Equivalence Test on the Civic-Ethnic Typology

Model Modification	Model Adjustment	Chi-Square Decrease
Step 1	IE: free constraint of ethnic on speak	222.936
Step 2	PL: free constraint of ethnic on religion	179.979
Step 3	FR: free constraint of civic on religion	149.726
Step 4	PT: free constraint of ethnic on religion	148.207
Step 5	NO: free constraint of civic on religion	114.989
Step 6	PL: free constraint of civic on religion	99.943
Step 7	CZ: free constraint of ethnic on religion	74.247
Step 8	PT: free constraint of civic on religion	74.061
Step 9	IE: free constraint of ethnic on feel	59.383
Step 10	HU: free constraint of civic on born	57.138

Note: Results are the test statistics after testing the metric invariance in a MGCFAs (item response categories: 0-3). The ten factor loadings with highest chi-square contribution are highlighted. For country labels, check Appendix C.

In summary, the multiple group confirmatory factor analysis models of the 2003 National Identity wave of the ISSP provides strong evidence that the civic and ethnic typology are not being measured cross-culturally equivalent across nations. It is therefore not advisable to rank countries based on their 'scores' on these two dimensions, contrary to what has become practice in current comparative research.

3.5. Conclusion

The distinction between civic and ethnic citizenship concepts dominates the study of migrant integration. It can be expected that these citizenship requirements that country nationals adhere to create boundaries for newcomers and may affect the wider society. Therefore, the main aim of this section was to assess whether both civic and ethnic citizenship concepts can be measured in a valid manner at the individual level, and whether this measurement holds across European OECD nations. While I have found a two-factor solution that has shown that at the general level ethnic and civic citizenship concepts prevail as heuristic devices, it is clear that scores on these factors cannot be compared in a valid manner across the various OECD-countries participating in ISSP.

The validity of the two-factor solution implies that there is no empirical reason to assume the existence of a third factor, as has been put forward in the work of Kymlicka (2001). Having national ancestry is shown to be the clearest expression of ethnic citizenship, while adhering to the laws of the country is the main criterion for civic citizenship. It is important to note, however, that citizenship can also be measured in a negative manner. For respondents adhering to an ethnic conception of citizenship it is clear that obeying the laws is not sufficient to become a full member of the community. Although various authors have already criticized the normative assumptions underlying the distinction between civic and ethnic citizenship (Brubaker, 1992), one cannot escape the conclusion that this finding is quite revealing for the 'ugly face' of ethnic nationalism. Not only various criteria are listed that one should confirm to if one wants to become accepted as a full citizen; one even closes the idea of a civic form of integration of newcomers by asking them to obey to the laws of the country. In effect, this amounts to a "Damned if you do, damned if you don't"-logic.

One can safely assume that the negative relation between ethnic concepts of citizenship and the 'obey the law' criterion does not imply that non-citizens do not have the duty to obey the law of the country they reside in. It can further be assumed that respondents who adhere to the ethnic citizenship concept will also be concerned about maintaining the state of law in their country. In this case, obeying the law is seen as a relevant criterion, but in both cases the outcome is the same. If non-citizens do not obey the law, they do not qualify as full citizens; but if they do obey the law, they do not qualify either. Two different propositions therefore lead to the same outcome: the non-citizens are not accepted as full citizens. The concept of ethnic citizenship therefore seems to suffer from a logical inconsistency. This inconsistency implies that ethnic concepts of

citizenship almost automatically lead to exclusion and segregation. Given the fact that, worldwide, societies are becoming more diverse, and that we have every reason to assume that migration flows will continue to intensify in the decades ahead, this renders the concept of ethnic citizenship all the more problematical.

For comparative research, the main implication of my finding is that it is virtually impossible to rank countries on a civic-ethnic continuum based on latent constructs. The reason is that various items have different meanings in various cultural contexts, like for instance speaking the language. In some countries, a focus on knowledge of the language functions as an open invitation to civic citizenship, while in other countries the same criterion can actually be used to close off access to all newcomers that are not familiar with the language. The criteria for exclusion apparently are quite idiosyncratic for various societies. Although at first sight, these considerations might seem to be purely methodological, they do imply that, unfortunately for those of us who like easy dichotomies, in reality it is impossible to simply rank states and political systems on a scale between the opposing ideal types of civic and ethnic citizenship. One can only acknowledge here that the comparative method, too, has its limits.

In order to deal with the cross-national inequivalence of the civic-ethnic dichotomy, four strategies are available (Poortinga, 1989). First of all, one might simply refrain from ranking countries on their levels of civicness and ethnicness since the analysis reveal that the concepts simply have a different meaning in different countries. Second, one can ignore the inequivalence of the concepts and compare the latent means anyway. Third, one can interpret the inequivalence. The fact that, for instance, the religious membership item is a very powerful indicator for ethnic citizenship in Poland is a meaningful finding by itself that can be taken into account. Fourth, it is possible to reduce the bias by removing those items that pose most cross-national bias. In fact, this would mean that the comparison of countries on their civicness and ethnicness would be based on a single item measurement, namely those items that have shown to receive the strongest factor loading, i.e. respectively respecting the national institutions and laws, and having national ancestry. Both items have also proven to show no major cross-national deviances and the distinction between, on the one hand upholding the national laws, and on the other hand, having national ancestry, seem to capture the distinction between civic and ethnic citizenship remarkably well.

4. An Institutional Approach to Migrant Integration Regimes: Creating Country Clusters Based on Migrant Integration Policies

Next to the investigation of the cultural approach regarding the civic-ethnic typology, I will now turn to the investigation of clusters of European countries on the basis of migrant policies that are in effect. First of all, the data and methods for this

investigation are presented after which the results are presented. In final, also these results are critically reflected upon.

4.1. Data and Methods

To assess whether countries can be classified on the basis of their migrant policies, I will analyze the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). This data set covers the integration policies for 27 European countries³⁸ plus Canada on six main policy domains for the year 2006. The domains that are covered in this data file are labor market access, family reunion, long term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. With regard to labor market status, there are several indicators on eligibility, integration measures, security of employment and the rights associated with the status are covered. For family reunion, the subdivisions are the eligibility (of both sponsor and family members), the conditions for the acquisition of the status, security of the status and rights associated with the status. The four subdivisions of long-term residence are alike. Political participation is split up into formal and informal political rights, the presence of consultative bodies and the implementation of policies. Concerning access to nationality, the subdivisions are eligibility, conditions for the acquisition of the status, security of the status and dual nationality. Last but not least, definitions and concepts, fields of application, enforcement and equality policies are the four sections enclose anti-discrimination measures. In sum, 140 indicators or on average more than 20 indicators per policy domain are available for 27 European countries plus Canada.

The MIPEX-data have been gathered by the Migration Policy Group by expert survey (Niessen et al., 2009). For each of the 28 countries, two independent experts have been invited to classify the national policies on these 140 indicators. If there was disagreement between the experts on a certain indicator, they needed to persuade each other based on policy documents, why their coding was expected to be correct. What is important to stress is that the coding was only based on political considerations, namely the fair and equal treatment of immigrants (Niessen, 2009), and thus does not reflect any underlying theoretical assumption. Each of the 140 items was given a code from 1 to 3 on the basis of meeting the standards of the EU Directives (Niessen et al., 2007). The policy that was closest to EU Policy Directives receives the highest coding, namely 3, while the policy that was the furthest from these directives had a coding of 1. I can illustrate this by showing how the indicator language and integration assessments on acquiring citizenship status work. If a country has very open requirements, this receives the code of '3'. The EU directive here is simply "none" and has code 3. In other words,

³⁸ These countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland

if both language and integration tests are required, the country is the furthest away from the EU directives and is coded as 1. When only either a language assessment or integration test is required, a code of 2 is given to the country. Consequently, the measurement level is ordinal, which will provide more room for further analysis.

Table 48. Migrant Integration Policies across Europe, 2006

Country	MIPEX	Labor	Family	Resid	Politic	Nation	Discr
Sweden	88	100	92	76	93	71	94
Portugal	79	90	84	67	79	69	87
Belgium	69	75	61	74	57	71	75
Netherlands	68	70	59	66	80	51	81
Finland	67	70	68	65	81	44	75
Italy	65	85	79	67	55	33	69
Norway	64	70	66	72	86	39	54
Great Britain	63	60	61	67	46	62	81
Spain	61	90	66	70	50	41	50
Slovenia	55	60	71	63	15	41	79
France	55	50	45	48	52	54	81
Luxembourg	55	45	50	48	84	45	56
Germany	53	50	61	53	66	38	50
Ireland	53	50	50	39	59	62	58
Switzerland	50	75	43	51	55	44	33
Hungary	48	40	50	50	29	36	85
Czech Republic	48	50	58	63	41	50	27
Estonia	46	75	61	61	30	26	23
Lithuania	45	55	68	47	12	38	48
Poland	44	25	66	67	14	45	46
Denmark	44	40	36	67	55	33	33
Malta	41	30	66	65	19	29	38
Slovakia	40	55	38	51	14	40	44
Greece	40	40	41	60	14	25	58
Austria	39	45	34	55	34	22	42
Cyprus	39	40	32	47	18	36	60
Latvia	30	20	42	51	11	25	33

Note: Entries represent a score on 100 of the extent to which migrant integration policies meet the EU Directives. Source: Niessen, Huddleston & Citron (2007). The countries are sorted by the aggregated MIPEX-score.

For each of the six policy domains, the Migration Policy Group has calculated a score from 0 to 100. On the full set of integration policy indicators, an inconvenient set of

countries ranks at the top of the list, namely a Scandinavian country, i.e. Sweden, a Southern European one, i.e. Portugal and Belgium as a Western country. The majority of Western and Northern European countries score quite high on how close they are on EU Directives. At the bottom, predominantly Eastern and Southern European countries close the list, namely Slovakia, Greece, Austria, Cyprus and Latvia. When looking at the six policy domains, one can see that Sweden is always the best student in the European minority integration policy class, while Latvia, which has the lowest overall MIPEX-score, does not rank lowest for each and every policy domain. There is a remarkable variation in the list on certain policy domains – for instance Hungary, which ranks quite averagely on the composite MIPEX variable – ranks quite high on anti-discrimination measures. This Hungarian example, of which can be expected that these measures regarding anti-discrimination were established to protect the rights of its ethnic minorities, like for instance the Roma, already denotes that the rationale behind every policy domain is not always in line with the point of departure in this investigation, namely policies of migrant integration. Nevertheless, given the wide range of indicators that are presented in the MIPEX-file, it can be expected that such deviances may not harm the overall interpretation.

Investigating the overall score on the MIPEX-data (e.g. the total score on political participation) is only informative to a limited level. This overall rating provides information on the extent to which countries on average meet the EU Directives regarding integration policies; such composite scores do not discriminate between countries regarding the homogeneity of their respective policy palette. For instance, country A and B may have implemented policies W and X while they have not implemented Y and Z while countries C and D did the opposite. The overall score will rate all four countries equally high while countries A and B are clearly distinct from countries C and D. Therefore, to test whether countries can be classified on the basis of their migration policies, I will use cluster analysis on the MIPEX indicators, which is among the appropriate and parsimonious techniques for this kind of research puzzle. Using this technique, it will be possible to assess the degree of association between various countries on the basis of the policies in use.

Cluster analysis investigates the degree of similarity and dissimilarity between the various cases, i.e. countries, with respect to the variables of interest, namely the MIPEX policy indicators (Sharma, 1995). Since there are no clear-cut criteria to assess the number of clusters, I will, also driven by the aim to keep the results as parsimonious as possible, summarize the two main clusters except when the clustering results show a clear third cluster. Yet, one of the disadvantages of this clustering technique relates to difficulties with missing data; therefore, 29 indicators that have no substantial information available have been kept out of the analysis, like for instance whether immigrants have the right to vote at the regional level which is absent for countries which have no regional levels with formal authorities. With regard to the technical

aspects, the clustering method is based on the Ward-estimator, which is, among all available techniques, considered as providing highly reliable outcomes (Sharma, 1995).

In relating the results of the cluster analysis to the analytical challenges that are highlighted earlier in this chapter, it will be possible to identify how the following analysis can contribute to the current research. First of all, the most straightforward result will be that the clustering of the countries will allow us to check whether Kohn's (1944) West-East distinction holds on the basis of the MIPEX data. Second, maybe less straightforward, it will become clear whether these clusters can be referred to as civic and ethnic by looking more closely at how textbook examples France and Germany are related to each other. Third, the number of clusters can provide new insights in the debate on the additional cultural dimensions next to the civic and ethnic ones. Last but not least, the question on the mutually exclusivity of the civic-ethnic citizenship dimensions can be reframed based on the distances of the obtained clusters from each other. At the end of the analysis, an answer might be provided to all of the formulated four research questions.

4.2. Results


Based on the cluster analysis on the pooled data covering 111 indicators, the following results are obtained. The discrimination between the countries points out that two main clusters of about equal size have emerged. One indeed can argue whether the second cluster in the right side of the graph is composed out of a subcluster. However, since at first glance it is difficult to label these clusters, I will hold on to only two for the reasons of parsimony and clarity.³⁹ One cluster, in the right side of the figure, is easy to classify and contains predominantly Scandinavian and Western European countries, including a small number of Southern European countries. What is quite important to note is that in this cluster already shows some deviances from the composite MIPEX-score. More specifically, Great Britain and Ireland form a subcluster together with Belgium, Portugal and Sweden; however, they are somewhat above the average MIPEX-score. The most appropriate label for this cluster is 'open policies'.

The second cluster contains most Eastern European countries, including Austria. Next to the Eastern countries, also most of the Southern European countries, with the exception of Spain, and Luxembourg and Denmark are included in this cluster. It is quite interesting to regard what some of the minor subclusters are composed of. While Italy and Slovenia are quite homogeneous, which seems evident since they are neighboring, other subclusters require more attention, for instance the subcluster

³⁹ France and the Netherlands do, for instance, belong to the same cluster while, according to the ideal typical models, Netherlands is considered as multicultural while France is considered as universalist (Koopmans, 2005).

Greece and Slovakia or Estonia and Malta, indicating that these countries have implemented a homogeneous set of policies. This second cluster can be labeled as ‘restrictive policies’.

Figure 22. Cluster analysis on the pooled MIPEX data set



Note: The graph depicts the results of a cluster analysis with ward-estimation method on 111 MIPEX indicators. For country labels, check Appendix C.

The analysis on the full migrant integration policies data set has shown interesting patterns. First, using cluster analysis provides us with a different kind of information compared with an investigation of the country specific means on the aggregated MIPEX score. For instance, while Sweden and Portugal are, just like on the overall MIPEX variable, clustering together, the fact that Finland and Germany are grouped is different compared with the overall MIPEX ranking. A similar kind of reasoning can be applied to other country clusters, like for instance Italy and Slovenia. Their similarity regarding certain policies is therefore greater than the composed score as at first glance seems to be revealed.

Second, the analysis seems to provide further evidence for a major East-West distinction with regard to migrant integration policies. Despite noteworthy countries, which provide substantial information in its own respect, the major clusters have been formed around the Western European countries and the former Soviet countries. Two hypotheses do arise that require further qualification in the near future. The first hypothesis is that the Eastern European countries lag behind with regard to their migrant policies due to lower levels of political integration in the European Union. It has to be remembered that the coding of the migrant policies were based on meeting

the EU Directives, which may take more time to implement in countries that are less integrated within this EU framework. The second and more plausible thesis is that this cluster of Eastern countries has no history in immigration, which results in public policy that is not yet as refined compared with the “old” immigrant societies (Triandafyllidou, 2000; Carrera, 2006).

Third, the exceptions in this analysis – those countries that do not fit the discovered East and West clusters – may have specific characteristics which require further investigation. On the first hand, Austria and Denmark are, despite its geographical location, clustered together in the group of Eastern European countries. One of the possible hypothesis is that given successful far right government or government support – the Freedom Party in Austria and the Danish People’s Party – certain integration policies have emerged that are more in harmony with Eastern European than with Western European countries. However, evidence for this hypothesis has not emerged out of this data. The relation between extreme-right parties and the adoption of restrictive policies needs to be further qualified.

Fourth, relating to European geography, while the analysis has provided evidence for a East-West divide, the country clusters do not collapse with the North-South divide which is widely discussed in comparative politics (cf. Chapter 3; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Esping-Andersen, 1990). For instance, while Finland and Norway fit into one subcluster, the absence of Sweden and predominantly Denmark makes it hard to label certain migrant policies as Scandinavian; moreover, the variation among Southern European countries – on the one hand, Portugal is in the same cluster the Nordic countries while Spain groups together with most Western countries while on the other hand, Greece and Cyprus can be traced back to the Eastern European clusters of countries.

Fifth, the cluster analysis raises questions about processes of policy learning. To what extent might countries adopt policies from their neighboring countries? Even though clear examples of this issue are present, for instance Greece-Cyprus and Italy-Slovenia, the majority of the results indicate that it is hard to sustain that neighboring countries adopt policies from each other. The observation that Sweden and Portugal, for instance, group together – which is also the case when looking at the aggregate scores and not only at the associational test provided by this cluster analysis – reveals that other processes, those we do not have a clear view on, might form integration policies. While many have written about the formation of immigration policies (Guiraudon, 2000; 2003), similar research on integration policies is emerging (Castles, 2008; Brubaker, 1992).

Sixth, relating to my theoretical framework, one of the most interesting topics features the civic-ethnic dichotomy. Applying Brubaker’s framework to this model, it seems far from evident that clusters of civic and ethnic countries seem to differentiate on, first of

all, the basis of a continuum, and second of all, that France and Germany are ideal types for the two concepts. The analysis has revealed that Germany and France are grouped into the same minor cluster that is part of the Western European group. Given the various migrant integration policy reforms in Germany, these results may perhaps not come as a surprise, nevertheless, the finding that Germany and France are so closely related to each other raises some considerable questions about the extent of the still widespread applicability of *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*. Given the similarity of these textbook examples in their general policies towards migrant integration, the alternative wording of open and restrictive policies is warranted.

Table 49. Cluster Analysis of the Migrant Integration Policies Subdomains

Policy domain	Restrictive policies	Open policies
Labor market access	AT, HU, CZ, SK, GR, LU, MA, PL, CY, DE, DK, LV, LT	BE, SI, GB, FI, NO, IE, EE, NL, IT, PT, ES, SE, CH, FR
Family reunification	AT, CH, DK, LV, CY, GR, GB, FR, NL, NO	BE, SE, CZ, EE, SI, MA, LT, PL, FI, DE, IT, PT, ES, HU, SK, IE, LU
Long-term residence	CY, LV, LT, LU, IE	AT, GR, DE, NO, FR, BE, ES, DK, GB, CZ, PL, PT, FI, SI, CH, EE, MA, IT, NL, SK, HU
Political participation	CZ, EE, LV, SI, LT, SK, CY, GR, PL, MA, HU, DK, IE	AT, FR, IT, DE, BE, LU, ES, CH, FI, NL, NO, SE, PT, GB
Access to nationality	AT, IT, SI, MA, SK, ES, PL, NL, CZ, CY, FI, DK, EE, NO, DE, HU, CH, FR, GR, LV, LT, LU	BE, GB, IE, SE, PT
Anti-discrimination	AT, MA, SK, GR, LU, NO, CZ, ES, CY, DE, IE, LT, DK, LV, EE, CH, PL	BE, IT, NL, FI, FR, SI, GB, HU, PT, SE

Note: Results of cluster analysis (Ward estimator) on the six subdomains of migrant integration policies (MIPEX). Source: Niessen, et al (2007) and own calculations. The open vs. restrictive reference has been based on the position of Sweden. For country labels, check Appendix C.

Looking at the six individual policy domains, I have split the results up to the categories of restrictive versus open policies. The point of departure to classify countries in this manner was the position of Sweden, which was at the top of all migrant integration policies and can therefore meet the EU Directives in the best manner. The results seem to be more or less in line with the overall MIPEX-clusters. However, two policy domains are worth discussing. First of all, with regard to long-term residence, about five countries are quite homogeneous and restrictive in such a manner that they deviate from other, more open policies. While I have stressed that predominantly the Eastern European countries adopt restrictive policies, it needs to be stressed that for long-term residence, Luxembourg and Ireland have adopted quite similar policies as Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania. With regard to access to nationality, on the other hand, only a

small number of countries have adopted a set of homogeneous open policies, namely Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden and Portugal. All the other countries form a distinct cluster that can be labeled as restrictive.

4.3. Conclusion

The literature on migrant integration has generally been concerned with what modes national governments have implemented to manage the stocks of foreigners. By implementing integration policies, countries have embraced permanent settlement; yet, less is known why certain policy options were chosen and, consequently, how these policies have formed. In an attempt to investigate which countries seem to be alike concerning their integration regimes, I have applied cluster analysis on the extensive set of data the Migration Policy Group has provided (Niessen & Huddleston, 2009). Using this analysis technique, the main finding is that the distinction between East and West largely persists but is difficult to reconcile with the ethnic-civic opposition. Despite this interesting finding, other interesting results relate to the countries that do form a cluster together. Most importantly, Austria and Denmark group together with the Eastern European countries group, raising questions concerning the nature of the resemblance between these two countries and countries like Poland or Latvia.

A second important remark regards anomalies in the classical geographical spread. First of all, the widespread idea that the Scandinavian countries form one homogeneous block is not supported by the analysis of their integration policies. Interestingly in this respect is the clustering of Denmark with most of the Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover, on the pooled data, Sweden is present in another subcluster than in the expected Nordic cluster containing Norway and Finland. Investigating the specific domains, in quite few cases these three Nordic countries are present in distinct subclusters. Second, also the Mediterranean countries are not monolithic. On the first hand, Greece clusters with the Eastern European countries, together with Malta. On the other hand, Portugal seems to cluster quite frequently with Sweden and Western countries like the United Kingdom.

Taken together these interesting findings regarding the communalities between certain countries, lots of questions can be raised about how countries arrive to their specific legislation concerning immigrant integration. As this straightforward analysis has shown – and which is also supported by the overall MIPEX country means – it is far from evident that neighboring countries have the same type of legislation. While this is more evident for countries like Great Britain and Ireland, Italy and Slovenia, Greece and Cyprus, the Baltic States, to give some examples, this is absolutely not universally valid. Future research strategies could therefore investigate neighboring countries to investigate why they may be so different from each other.

Next to this policy learning process, evidence seems to be present that there are efforts to harmonize immigrant integration policy (Joppke, 2007). This seems predominantly be the case for political participation: the founding of one gigantic Western European block is in for no other variables so apparent. The question is, of course, what the processes behind this harmonization in the field of political participation have been. Moreover, equally if not more important is to know what the consequences this process is for, first of all, migrants in the new countries of destination, and second, of the political integration into the European Union. Further research will need to qualify this issue.

With regard to our theoretical civic-ethnic question, the question still remains whether the East-West divide can be equalized with respectively ethnic and civic types of integration regimes. Since the last couple of years, the literature seems to emphasize that civic and ethnic does not collapse with West and East (Shulman, 2002; Björklund, 2006). Based on this analysis, the answer is that it is difficult to assess this relation since, in the first place, since I have no specific view on the various integration policies causing the Eastern European countries to diverge from the Western ones. Logically, the next step would then be to correlate structural policy information on open and restrictive policies with cultural public opinion information on civic and ethnic citizenship criteria.


5. Relating the Micro-Level to the Macro-Level Approach

The remaining undertaking is thus to integrate the cultural approach to immigrant integration with the structural legal aspects. In this step, I will therefore correlate the discovered clusters in the MIPEX data with the civic and ethnic concepts derived from the ISSP civic-ethnic items. Since the civic and ethnic latent concepts are not equivalently measured across countries, it is not possible to include a highly reliable scale, but on the contrary, only one item per dimension – which I do acknowledge is a suboptimal solution in comparative attitudinal research – will be correlated with the MIPEX clusters. To be concrete, the items that load most strongly on the civic and ethnic dimensions, namely the importance of respecting the national political institutions and laws as an indicator for civic citizenship and having national ancestry as an ethnic citizenship indicator are used as proxy.

In this analysis, 17 countries are included that are both in the ISSP and the MIPEX data files, namely Austria, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovak Republic. To test whether countries with open or restrictive policies have a population that is more oriented towards civic or ethnic citizenship conceptions, the two civic-ethnic items have been aggregated at the national level. On this aggregated score, a t-test has been performed along the categories ‘open’ vs. ‘restrictive’ policies. It

needs to be remembered, however, that statistical power for this difference test using only 17 cases is quite limited.

Figure 23. Relation between Micro-Level Civic-Ethnic Citizenship Conceptions and Macro-Level Migrant Integration Policies Country Clusters



Note: The graph represents the scores on resp. civic and ethnic citizenship requirements along restrictive (light gray bar) and open (dark gray bar) migrant integration policies. The civic variable that has been used is the item: “How important do you think respecting [country nationality] political institutions and laws is for being truly [nationality]?” The ethnic variable that has been used is the item: “How important do you think having [country nationality] ancestry is for being truly [nationality]?” Both variables range from 0 to 3 and have been aggregated at the country level. With regard to the Migrant Integration Policies, the results of the clustering based on the full data set (111 policy indicators) have been used.

Figure 23 summarizes the aggregated means of civic and ethnic citizenship conceptions along the degree of openness of migrant integration policies. Public opinion in these countries are on average more civic than ethnic (cf. Table 44), which is clearly plotted in this graph and also supported by the literature (Joppke, 2007). What is, however, more important to note is that countries which have adopted more open policies towards immigrants – i.e. those countries which have policies that closely relate to the EU Directives on migrant integration – have a citizenry that is slightly more in favor of civic citizenship conceptions, although Table 50 emphasizes that this difference is not statistically significant. With regard to ethnic citizenship conceptions, the opposite is true: among the citizenry of more restrictive countries, slightly more ethnic conceptions are present than among countries that have adopted open policies.

Table 50. T-Test on the Difference between Civic and Ethnic Citizenship Conceptions Based on Open vs. Restrictive Migrant Integration Policies

	Civic			Ethnic		
	Restrict	Open	T-value	Restrict	Open	T-value
MIPEX clustering	2.193	2.398	-1.75	1.883	1.653	1.42
Labor market access	2.198	2.395	-1.67	1.875	1.658	1.33
Family reunification	2.491	2.217	2.44*	1.593	1.832	-1.43
Long-term residence	2.076	2.329	-0.97	2.162	1.722	1.28
Political participation	2.157	2.424	-2.45*	1.943	1.611	2.21*
Access to nationality	2.298	2.366	-0.46	1.754	1.728	0.13
Anti-discrimination	2.250	2.405	-1.27	1.803	1.668	0.79

Note: Entries represent the results of independent sample t-test at the aggregate (country) level.

The same exercise has been done for the six policy domains. Three important findings pop up. First of all, the political participation migrant policies yield the strongest effects. In countries that have open policies, the citizenry is significantly more in favor of civic citizenship conceptions and less in favor of ethnic ones compared with restrictive countries. Second, with regard of family reunification, the direction is in the other way compared with the other five policy domains. More specifically, more open policies go together with less civic conceptions and more ethnic conceptions compared with restrictive policies; for the civic citizenship conceptions this difference is even statistically significant. Third, in the literature on civic and ethnic citizenship conceptions, this distinction regularly concerns nationality status. However, when observing the difference between restrictive and open policies on the level of civic and ethnic conceptions among the citizenry, one can see that there are hardly any significant differences along the two types of policies. Following classical statistical guidelines, countries that are rather open in granting citizenship are more civic than countries that are rather restrictive in their policies, however, the differences are not full-blown.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to evaluate dominant models that explain variation in regimes of migrant integration across Europe by departing from the influential civic-ethnic dichotomy. From a theoretical perspective, those regimes of migrant integration can be investigated from both a cultural (public opinion) and structural (national legislation) approach, which in fact closely relate to the theoretical debate on symbolic and social boundaries. First of all policies, i.e. the structural approach, provide the legal basis to what full citizens are distinguished from non-citizens or citizens with unequal rights compared with the majority population. However, when discussing integration regimes, one cannot forego to the fact that certain salient attitudes among the native population might also draw boundaries among their symbolic kind between those who

are or are not considered as a citizen and, consequently, determine the integration of minorities within wider society.

Concern about the validity of one of the most influential concepts of migrant integration regimes, namely the distinction between civic and ethnic citizenship, is thus legitimized. With regard to the cultural approach to migrant integration, i.e. individuals' symbolic boundaries based on civic and ethnic conceptions of citizenship, across Europe it indeed can be shown that a civic citizenship structure can be distinguished from an ethnic one, with respecting the national political institutions and laws as the most civic indicator and having national ancestry as most ethnic. However, this dimensional structure of citizenship concepts is far from equivalent across countries – to give but one example, not in every country religion is an equally important marker of ethnic citizenship.

Looking at governmental policies, clustering European countries on the basis of the Migrant Integration Policy Index has revealed that the classic description of West and East as being respectively inclusive and exclusive towards immigrants largely seems to hold. The majority of the Scandinavian and Western European countries clump together in a cluster of countries that have adopted policies close to the EU Directives and can be labeled as 'open'. Contrary, predominantly Eastern and Southern European countries cluster together in a set of restrictive policies. However, what is more notable are, as always, the outliers in these analyses, namely those countries which, according to their geographical location or European integration, do not fall in the expected cluster. In this respect it is remarkable to note that Portugal is encapsulated in the open cluster while Austria and Denmark belong to the cluster of restrictive countries.

From both a theoretical and an empirical point of view, it is also interesting that the national policies, to a certain level, reflect the citizenship concepts that are salient among the citizenry. While this undertaking is far from uncontroversial since the citizenship concepts are not equivalent across countries, the delineation of open policies as correlating with civic citizenship while restrictive policies are rather ethnic gives an additional leverage to Brubaker's claim that this civic and ethnic dichotomy does not only reflect in national policies but also among public opinion. This triangulation of a validity test of civic and ethnic citizenship by using both survey data and national policies consequently add significantly to the current debate whether this dichotomy has not passed its expiry date.

Yet, taken altogether, predominantly the analysis of the national migrant integration policies has shown that, despite the EU Directives that guide European nation states towards a harmonized set of minority policies, European countries are still quite divisive with respect to their integration policies. While the East-West distinction has been a target of questioning, the national policies still reflect this distinction to a certain extent. With regard to the integration of migrants within society, this distinction might reflect

upon immigrant incorporation within the years ahead: while Western European countries have a tradition of immigrant integration, which, as the history shows, has not always been without any problems, in this era of global migration flows also the Southern and Eastern European countries will be the destination of migrants. Therefore, it can be questioned whether these restrictive policies might pose challenges for the new countries of destination with regard to the incorporation of the newly arrived immigrants in the present 'Age of Migration' and its social consequences. It needs no elaboration that largely the future will indicate whether this claim holds; however, given the cross-sectional data that is available, at this moment we are already able to touch upon into this puzzle, of which the results are presented in next chapter.

Chapter 9

The Role of Migrant Integration Regimes on Conditioning the Effect of Diversity on Generalized Trust

La République, c'est la promotion sociale fondée sur le mérite et le talent. L'égalitarisme, c'est donner la même chose à tout le monde. La République tire tout le monde vers le haut. L'égalitarisme, c'est le nivellement par le bas. Qui ne voit que notre modèle d'intégration ne fonctionne plus? Au lieu de produire de l'égalité, il produit de l'inégalité. Au lieu de produire de la cohésion, il produit du ressentiment (Sarkozy, 22.06.2009).

1. Introduction

The final unsolved piece of the proposed research puzzle regards the role of regimes of migrant integration in conditioning the effect of diversity on trust. Generalized trust is only weakly under pressure due to immigration-caused diversity in Europe. Yet, the contrasting outcomes of this manuscripts that have qualified this relation at the local level, including the Flemish case study, have demonstrated that the context in which diversity is expected to affect trust is regarded to be of high importance. More specifically, Durkheim (1984 [1893]) reminded us that to prevent anomie in times of social change, governments must emphasize equality of each and every citizen. Applying this hypothesis on immigration-caused diversity, it can for instance be the case that Flanders and the Netherlands are characterized by egalitarian regimes of migrant integration that makes that trust is not under erosion, while for Great Britain it might be the case that rather restrictive regimes are more harmful for trust. The aim of this chapter is therefore to investigate whether trust is effectively higher in those diverse societies that are characterized by a certain kind of migrant integration regime compared with mixed countries that have another regime type.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ The content of this chapter is reflected in parts of the following publications: Reeskens (2008b).

From a generalized trust perspective it is indeed expected that national institutions are highly relevant for the generation of generalized trust (cf. Chapter 3; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Levi, 1996; Tarrow, 1996; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). Especially those institutions that emphasize equality among all citizens and are impartially responsive towards its residents are expected to contribute to individual levels of generalized trust. Framing this argument on regimes of migrant integration, it can be expected that those regimes that treat immigrants in the same manner as the native population, as well as those regimes that treat the foreigners and natives equally are better able to craft trust among the general population. In line with preceding Chapter 8, those regimes are not only restricted to national policies, which are referred to as the structural approach towards migrant integration. Also the general public opinion, which is referred to as the cultural approach, reflects inequalities as it incorporates the requirements that distinguish citizens from noncitizens.

Theoretically, both the structural and cultural approach towards regimes of migrant integration reflect boundaries, respectively social and symbolic ones, to which the common citizenship-denominator can be applied to. Indeed, citizenship “brings within its orbit three fundamental issues: how the boundaries of membership within a polity and between polities should be defined, how the benefits and burdens of membership should be allocated and how the identities of members should be comprehended and accommodated” (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, 2001, p. 3, in Weldon, 2006). Since these symbolic (cultural approach, i.e. public opinion) and social (structural approach, i.e. national legislation) boundaries that define citizens incorporate certain dimensions of equality between natives and immigrants – the definition makes explicit reference to the allocation of benefits and burdens – it can be expected that those boundaries impact the generation of trust in the generalized other.

To give structure to the theoretical arguments, the same terminology as proposed in preceding chapter will be applied. The cultural approach towards regimes of migrant integration has been framed around the concepts of civic and ethnic conceptions of citizenship. Largely theoretical models of symbolic threat can be applied in the expectation of how both models of civic and ethnic requirements towards citizenship are in relation to trust. The structural approach, on the other hand, regards the distinction between open and restrictive policies governments have implemented, and mainly the institution-centered approach towards generalized trust propose an expected outcome. In the second section of this chapter, these theoretical arguments are summarized. In the third section, the data and methods are introduced. For the cultural approach, I will rely on the empirical validity of civic and ethnic citizenship dimensions (ISSP data) while for the structural approach, the clustering of the ‘Migration Integration Policy Index’ (MIPEX) will be brought in relation with the share of immigrants (UN, 2006) and generalized trust. In this section, the analysis strategy is also introduced, paying considerable attention to the interpretation of interaction terms. In

the fourth section, the results are discussed. In the final section, the implications of the obtained results are discussed.

2. Theories on Minority Integration Regimes and Generalized Trust

In order to gain a clear insight into the way regimes of migrant integration condition the relation between diversity and generalized trust, it is necessary to separate the cultural from the structural approach previously argued. While the cultural approach refers to the general requirements that fellow citizens consider before newcomers can be considered as citizens, the structural approach relates to the actual set of migrant integration policies that countries have implemented and which describe the legal basis of the extent to which immigrants are granted rights and duties. Coming to a symbiosis between the institution-centered approach towards generalized trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008) and the literature on symbolic and social boundaries (Lamont & Molnar, 2002), those regimes that emphasize equality among all citizens, i.e. adhering to a civic logic and refuting an ethnic one, and open policies towards migrant integration, are better able to craft trust among the whole population. Yet, while both approaches might be rooted in the boundaries literature and the institution-centered approach towards generalized trust, both approaches must, in the end, be clearly differentiated. Thus, first of all, the way both approaches can be related to the creation of trust in the generalized other is reviewed before both approaches are integrated in a general framework.

2.1. How the Cultural Approach regarding Civic and Ethnic Requirements Might Stimulate or Inhibit the Creation of Generalized Trust

Conceptually, the civic and ethnic requirements for being considered as a full citizen have been given the cultural approach label. Adapting a set of requirements other citizens need to comply with can be equated with the concept of symbolic boundaries, i.e. they are “conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize (...) people (...) [and] separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership (...) through which people acquire status and monopolize resources” (Lamont & Molnar, 2002, p. 168). By drawing these boundaries, noncitizens are distinguished from citizens and as such, representations about the community are given. In this respect, it may not be forgotten that citizenship plays an essential role in social cohesion; indeed, it emphasizes the notion that social cohesion is not possible without social exclusion.

Yet, relating civic and ethnic citizenship conceptions to generalized trust, the relation is far from clear. One can expect that nations in which the citizenry strongly expresses its loyalty to a particular community, which is considered to be essential in representing citizenship (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000) by drawing boundaries between citizens and noncitizens, exemplifies a particular emphasis on thick or particularized trust. Evidence has suggested that particularized trust thus not always translates into trust in the

generalized other (Uslaner, 2002; Newton & Zmerli, 2009). However, this negative relation between these requirements and social cohesion is an oversimplification for two reasons. First of all, this relation tends to overlook the conceptualization of social cohesion by means of generalized trust, which implies that not the thick but thin type of trust is at the focus when reflecting upon social cohesion. The second reason regards the fact that this straightforward emphasis on citizenship discards the distinction between civic and ethnic requirements and its potential differential impact on generalized trust. Indeed, the differences between civic and ethnic citizenship requirements are essential in the understanding how these boundaries might impact social cohesion. While civic citizenship is portrayed as rather inclusive and voluntary, it gives immigrants the ability to be regarded as a full citizen by speaking the national language and obeying the national institutions and laws. This inclusive approach towards citizenship expresses trust in the unknown other, however, not unconditionally. Contrary, ethnic citizenship requirements are exclusive since immigrants cannot choose their ancestry, which is an essential element in the ethnic representation, even not when one fully complies with other norms that are incorporated in the nation-state. Since ethnic conceptions towards citizenship is inherently exclusive, it can be expected that adherence to this logic largely fosters a sense of generalized distrust. Consequently, it can be expected that the relation between civic citizenship and generalized trust is positive while it might be negative for ethnic requirements.

While the literature on the relation between civic and ethnic requirements and generalized trust is rather underspecified, outcomes for the relation with out-group prejudice is, on the contrary, well-documented (Maddens et al., 2000; Billiet et al., 2003; Weldon, 2006; Pehrson et al., 2009). It does need no further elaboration that prejudice is not necessarily the inverse of trusting the generalized other (cf. Chapter 2), however, the concept of prejudice presents us with a heuristic device to qualify the relation with generalized trust. Surveying the relation between civic and ethnic concepts and prejudice, predominantly group threat theories have been used to backbone this relation by questioning whether an emphasis on the own group goes along with an increase in out-group prejudice. Maddens and his colleagues (2000) have for instance cleared the relation between national identity and immigrant tolerance in Belgium and discovered that this relation runs differently across the two Belgian language areas. In Flanders, they argue, Flemish nationalist are significantly more prone to out-group hostility while in the French-speaking area, residents with Belgian unitary ideas express slightly more ethnocentric attitudes. They explain this difference over the two language areas by the social representation of national identity, i.e. Flemish national identity is portrayed as largely ethnic. By connecting this social representation with out-group distrust, Maddens et al (2000) acknowledge the impact of symbolic boundaries on anti-social attitudes. Stretching the author's findings to generalized trust, it might be expected that in ethnic nations, generalized trust will, in generally, be lower while this type of thin trust will be higher in civic nations.

Recent evidence at the country level confirms the Flemish studies cited above. In investigating the relation between migrant integration regimes and tolerance, Weldon (2006) first of all classified Western countries on the basis of being considered as individualistic-civic, collectivistic-civic, collectivistic-ethnic,⁴¹ and investigated which of these regime type is able to deliver in higher level of social and political tolerance. He discovered that tolerance, both social and political, is highest in the individualistic-civic country clusters and lowest in collectivist-ethnic countries. Weldon has attributed the largest effects along the line of civic and ethnic regimes and less along the line of individualistic and collectivistic since, according to his interpretation, the civic vs. ethnic dimension specifies intermediary effects of national identity, ideology and tolerance. Additional evidence on this topic adds that the relation between national identity and immigrant prejudice is context-dependent (Pehrson et al., 2009b), i.e. aggregately, this effect is strongest in countries that request speaking the language and lowest in countries that emphasize the importance of national citizenship. At the individual level, a strong positive relation between having national ancestry and prejudice was found. Additional laboratory evidence confirmed the author's findings (Pehrson et al., 2009a), supporting the claim that civic representations are in general positive for tolerance while ethnic ones are rather inducing out-group prejudice. In line with the interpretation of the Flemish results, one can expect a positive relation between civic requirements and generalized trust while ethnic conceptions rather expected to be harmful for the creation of trust.

Bringing all evidence together, it might therefore sounds convincing that in 'E Pluribus Unum' Putnam (2007) embraces civic 'nationalism' as one potential way to ameliorate the relation between diversity and generalized trust. Building upon the work of Mirel (2002), he acknowledges that the American orientation towards immigrants has shifted from predominantly ethnic towards civic (Putnam, 2007, p. 163). This shift, he argues, has been exemplified by the tendency for the inclusion of ethnic-cultural minorities into various societal spheres, like there are the army (Stouffer, 1949), the church (Dougherty, 2003), and also the political subsystem (Citrin et al., 1990). In fact, one might classify the debate on the importance of President Obama's descent – his father was citizen of Kenya – as an issue regarding the definition of the country as largely civic or ethnic. Yet, a thorough empirical investigation whether this shift from ethnic towards civic nationalism has led to a citizenry that has become more trusting towards the generalized other is, thus far absent. Yet, also a less complex cross-sectional investigation into the relation between both civic and ethnic requirements and generalized trust has thus far been left untouched. Later in this chapter, empirical evidence on this relation is given.

41. Weldon's classification is based on the access to citizenship (this distinguishes civic from ethnic countries) and on the attachment to one's distinct culture (distinction between collectivistic and individualistic). As Weldon remarks, the classification is largely driven by theoretical arguments (2006, p. 337), predominantly by the Koopmans & Statham classification scheme (2005).

2.2. How the Structural Approach Regarding Open vs. Restrictive Migrant Integration Policies Might Foster Generalized Trust

Next to the cultural approach touching upon the link between citizenship requirements for maintaining generalized trust in diverse societies, national policies of migrant integration have clearly institutionalized the level to which immigrants are accepted as full citizens of the country. The assumption that will be made is that a certain set of policies represents the egalitarian nature of certain national governments. To frame it on Nannestad's review paper on generalized trust (2008) an open set of migrant integration policies may reflect the egalitarian norms that are carried out by the political system. In this respect, the theoretical framework on the relation between migrant integration policies and generalized trust can partially fall back on the new-institution centered approach to generalized trust as has been introduced recently (cf. Chapter 3; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005).

In this respect the influence of migrant integration policies on generalized trust might reflect the research that has been carried out on universal welfare policies. Students of the welfare state argue that those regimes that are impartially and equally oriented towards citizens, i.e. universal welfare programs, are in fact able to craft trust in the generalized other (Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). Compared with these universal policies, selective policies are highly conditioned: only after an individual needs test taking certain criteria into account, citizens can have access to certain allowances. In contrast, universal policies do not depend upon an exhaustive list of limitations to be granted access to benefits. Rather, these policies target everybody in society, for instance, the poor as well the rich, without making distinctions based on income levels or other criteria. Health care is a very clear example, since this service is in most industrialized countries, universally designed and not dependent upon strict criteria. Yet, in the US for instance, health care is not universal, yet, a better treatment condition may depend upon a better insurance program, which in most of the cases will reflect one's socioeconomic position. As such, universal regimes represent a completely different logic compared with selective policies, exemplified by the statement "the question becomes not 'how shall we solve their problem?' but rather 'how shall we solve our common problem (healthcare, education, pensions, etc.)?'" (Rothstein, 1998, p. 160). This expression underscores the egalitarian character that is inherent in universal policies.

In fact, these universal welfare institutions have shown to be able to grasp trust among the general population. The mechanisms behind this effect are twofold (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein, 2005). The first mechanism is impartiality, which means that the needs-testing procedures that are inherent in the selective procedures must be unambiguous. Taking many applications into consideration, ambiguity in these needs-testing procedures makes that there is a certain degree of discretion involved. Since those who apply for benefits are in need to have access to this benefit, they might

provide the agency of interest with wrongful information about their situation. Contrary, those agencies providing the benefits need to judge upon these criteria and may be aware that certain requests may be packed in lies. The result is a general distrust from both sides. The second mechanism regards that these universal institutions aim to treat citizens in the same respect. Instead of giving assistance after a thorough means-investigation, to give an example in the light of the welfare state research, those policies aim at providing help for those in need regardless of a thorough investigation. Since equality is known to be essential in the creation of trust (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2007), it is also the case that these universal welfare policies, which exemplify equality among citizens, are best able to grasp generalized trust among the residents. This overview has also shown that impartiality and equality are not always highly related: while institutions may be means-tested, they may do so in an impartial manner. Coming back to health care, selective health care might be impartial since it investigates private insurances of every citizen in the same respect; yet, by providing different services according to the insurance program, equality is not emphasized. Thus, at best, those regimes that combine both should result in the generation of generalized trust.

Similarly, the same kind of logic regarding the impartiality of universal welfare regimes can also be applied to policies of migrant integration. First of all, open policies might be more able to enhance the equality among all residents on the soil compared with restrictive policies; these policies give equal rights to the immigrants as to native residents. From an equality point of view, the social distance between the two groups is reduced, which is beneficial for the creation of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002; Rohmann et al., 2006). The example of a policy measure that tends to reduce the social distances between natives and immigrants is for instance language courses. Not speaking the dominant language can be an impediment that still tends to draw lines among groups. Second, those open migrant integration policies reflect political institutions that show an “equal concern and respect” (Dworkin, 1977, p. 180, in Rothstein, 1998, p. 32). In practice, granting voting rights is an example of such a policy, since they provide migrant groups the instrument to voice their grievances to those who can address them. From an institution-centered approach, this equal concern and respect translates into individual pro-social behavior and attitudes since the equal grounding of these policies ‘teach’ individual citizens the norms of equality.

2.3. Qualifying the Expected Relation Between Regimes of Migrant Integration and Generalized Trust

Thus, bringing all evidence regarding the cultural and structural approach towards regimes of migrant integration together, it can be hypothesized that the higher the boundaries between natives and nonnatives, i.e. immigrants, the lower the levels of generalized trust. In those countries in which the citizenry adheres to a civic logic, which exemplifies an inclusive orientation towards newcomers, or rejects ethnic

requirements, which emphasize an exclusive logic, residents are expected to express higher levels of trust in the generalized other. Likewise, countries in which the citizenry has not adopted a civic orientation or prefers a set of ethnic requirements, it can be expected that the residents will show lower levels of trust. Similarly, countries that have adopted open policies, which are considered to largely strive towards an equal status between natives and, should be better able to craft trust than those countries that implemented rather restrictive policies, which reflect strong boundaries between groups. Thus, the expectation that manifest boundaries between groups are able to destroy trust in the generalized other has been derived from the theoretical arguments.

However, we need to be aware of the alternative hypothesis that is inherent in this research puzzle. Predominantly from a symbolic threat argumentation (see Chapter 4), it can be expected that the absence of those boundaries that distinguish natives from nonnatives might be perceived as a threat by the native population. The pool of resources that is available in a society might be perceived as not only restricted to jobs, but also to maintenance of the national culture (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) and status positions in general (Paxton & Mughan, 2006). It is expected that the struggle over these perceived scarce resources might induce distrust. Since manifest boundaries restrict the access of immigrants to these resources, it can likewise be hypothesized that the absence of these boundaries, thus inclusive civic citizenship requirements and open policies regarding migrant integration, are expected to result in access to these resources and thus form a threat. The alternative hypothesis that is thus proposed is that those inclusive and open regimes of migrant integration might be considered as a threat and therefore tends to reduce the levels of trust in the generalized other.

3. Data and Methods

This chapter that aims at qualifying the conditional effect of diversity on generalized trust a combination of all data and methodologies that have thus far been taken into empirical scrutiny will be accumulated. First of all, in line with the inquiry into the effect of diversity on generalized trust, the analysis is under control of the baseline model containing a series of individual and country-level covariates (cf. Chapter 3), including age, gender, and socioeconomic status and the like at the respondent level, and national wealth, expressed by the GDP per capita (in PPP, 2006 US dollar), and a Protestant tradition at the national level.

In contrast with previous studies that frame regimes of migrant integration on ideal typical representations of what, to exemplify, civic and ethnic are considered to represent (Weldon, 2006), the data for the regimes of migrant integration have been adopted from an empirical evaluation of the validity of the dominant civic-ethnic typology (Chapter 8). Departing with the cultural approach regarding civic and ethnic citizenship requirements, the analysis based on 2003 ISSP National Identity

(Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 2003) has demonstrated that latent civic and ethnic factors are compromised for comparative research strategies. Given the absence of an equivalent set of indicators, I have opted for the suboptimal solution, namely use the indicator that has the strongest loading from the respective factor and have shown to cause no major deviances regarding equivalence (Poortinga, 1989). More specifically, the indicator ‘to respect the national political institutions and laws’ is used as an indicator for civic citizenship requirements where ‘to have national ancestry’ is considered as a measure for ethnic citizenship requirements⁴² While the use of only one attitudinal indicator is not advised in quantitative comparative strategies, the lack of equivalence of the civic-ethnic factor structure justifies this undertaking. It is evident that the individual scores on these indicators are aggregated at the national level to have an insight in the level of how civic and ethnic the countries are.

Second, for an assessment of the relation between diversity on trust under condition of the national policies, country clusters based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (Niessen & Huddleston, 2009) are composed. While the Migrant Policy Group has provided us with aggregated scores, varying from 0 to 100, these aggregated scores have the disadvantage that they do not tell us which countries are rather homogeneous in their set of policies. It is known that cluster analysis is able to distinguish between groups of countries that have adapted a more or less homogeneous palette of policies (cf. Chapter 8). By distinguishing open from restrictive policies, variation within the clusters is not regarded. By modeling clusters of similar sets of countries, the boundaries between open and restrictive policies are better pronounced compared with a 0-100 interval score

It needs, however, to be remembered that the coding on which the clustering is based resembles the extent to which these countries meet the EU Directives regarding integration policies. To give but one example, I have already hinted to the coding of language courses in the set of migrant regimes. If countries refrain from impose these courses, countries are coded as meeting the EU Directives while from the perspective of generalized trust, it might be expected that language initiatives reduce the cultural distance between immigrants and the natives. Nevertheless, since these country clusters form a homogeneous set of policies, it can be expected that these specific indicators are exemplary for the general egalitarian character of a nation-state. Thus, from this perspective, this approach towards the clustering, based on policy-coded variables, is appropriate.

⁴². To be complete, the full question wording was: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is ...?” Thus, respectively “to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws” for civic citizenship and “to have [country nationality] ancestry” for ethnic citizenship.

Critics may also argue that the distinction between open and restrictive policies is too crude and within-cluster variation may be lacking. Similar criticism has been raised against Esping-Andersen typology of welfare state regimes (1990). However, Esping-Andersen defended his approach by arguing that “the peculiarities of these cases are variations within a distinct overall logic, not a wholly different logic per se” (1999, p. 90). Indeed, while the clusters of open vs. restrictive countries represent a set of policies that are heterogeneous between but homogeneous within the clusters. While it is not the aim to minimize the within-cluster heterogeneity, the two clusters as they are represented provide us with a convincing framework to which the hypotheses that have been derived from the theoretical arguments can be tested.

To capture the level of ethnic-cultural diversity within the country, the UN data with regard to share of immigrants on the total population will be used (Chapter 6). Indeed, the use of the OECD data on the stock of foreigners is discarded in this chapter since the test of the interaction between diversity and minority policies requires as many countries as possible. In the 2006 wave of the ESS (for the measurement of generalized trust), as well as in the ISSP (for civic and ethnic citizenship requirements), and the MIPEX data file (for the minority integration policies), more countries are available than are countries member of the OECD. From a methodological point of view, relying on the OECD data would limit the statistical power, which can alternatively be increased by relying on the UN Population Statistics (2006). From a substantial point of view, however, incorporating additional European non-OECD countries in the analysis does also make sense in the light of the debate on the EU Directives on Migrant Incorporation. Therefore, since the Population Division of the United Nations has gathered the migrant stock size for almost all countries across the globe, this data source is used for ethnic-cultural diversity. To be complete, the correlation between this data source and the stocks of foreigners for the available OECD countries is about .90.

Table 51 summarizes the data of interest. Next to the average level of trust in the countries of the ESS and the share of immigrants – it needs to be emphasized that Switzerland is, given its leverage function on the UN share of immigrants value (see Chapter 6), kept out of the analysis and consequently out of Table 51 – also the aggregated scores on the ISSP civic and ethnic citizenship requirements have been taken up, just as the clustering with regard to the overall Migrant Integration Policy Index and the different dimensions of migrant policies, namely labor market access, family reunification, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination measures. A code of 0 refers to restrictive policies and a code of 1 refers to open policies. Table 51 also reveals that there is missing information for certain countries in the list. With regard to the civic and ethnic items, Belgium, Estonia and Netherlands have not taken part in the 2003 wave, while Bulgaria has not taken up the ‘having national ancestry’-item in its questionnaire. Bulgaria and Russia have not been present in the MIPEX data set. But overall, at its maximum analysis on 19 countries will be done while at its minimum, only 16 countries are available.

Table 51. Distribution of the Variables of Interest Across the Countries in the Sample

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
AT	5.41	15.1	2.33	1.75	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
BE	5.11	6.9	n/a	n/a	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
BG	3.67	1.3	2.41	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
CY	4.41	13.9	n/a	n/a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DE	5.20	12.3	2.24	1.54	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
DK	6.83	7.2	2.64	1.81	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
EE	5.18	15.2	n/a	n/a	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
ES	4.98	11.1	2.25	1.98	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
FI	6.43	3.0	2.36	1.64	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
FR	4.92	10.7	2.69	1.51	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
HU	4.46	3.1	2.20	2.18	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
IE	5.68	14.1	2.08	2.16	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
NL	5.76	10.1	n/a	n/a	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
NO	6.65	7.4	2.68	1.68	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
PL	4.14	1.8	2.13	2.30	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
PT	4.27	7.3	2.34	2.16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
RU	4.14	8.4	2.26	2.12	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
SE	6.32	12.4	2.74	1.04	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SI	4.51	8.5	2.21	1.60	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
SI	4.38	2.3	1.79	1.63	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
UK	5.61	9.1	2.31	1.55	1	1	0	1	1	1	1

Note: Column labels: (1) Country; (2) aggregated trust scores; (3) UN share of immigrants; (4) civic citizenship requirements; (5) ethnic citizenship requirements; (6) pooled MIPEX-clustering; (7) labor market access; (8) family reunion; (9) long-term residence; (10) political participation rights; (11) access to nationality; (12) anti-discrimination initiatives. Trust scores are predicted values under control of age (grand mean centered), gender, origin, residence urbanization, civil status, years of education, employment status, financial satisfaction, volunteering, church practice, television watching, and gross domestic product per capita (in PPP, 1,000 US\$, 2006) and a Protestant tradition (see Chapter 3). Diversity data are obtained from the UN Population Statistics, the civic and ethnic data are obtained from the ISSP 2003, respectively the ‘respecting the national institutions and laws’ and ‘having national ancestry’-indicators (see Chapter 8) while the MIPEX-data are obtained from country clustering based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (see Chapter 8).

In line with previous empirical chapters, I will perform multilevel multiple regression analysis to estimate the conditional effect of diversity on generalized trust. Central in this Chapter is the effect of diversity is under condition of varying regimes of migrant integration. Therefore, it is necessary to add an interaction between regimes of migrant integration and ethnic-cultural diversity to the regression equation. According to the

methodological guidelines, all main effects, i.e. the main effect of diversity and the main effect of integration policy, need to be present in the regression equation next to the interaction terms (Brambor & Clark, 2006; Pickery, 2008). The interpretation, however, can become complex. However, given the dummy coding for the migrant integration regimes based on the MIPEX country clustering, the interpretation is rather straightforward.

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}economy_{j1} + \gamma_{02}culture_{j2} + \gamma_{03}diversity_{j3} + \gamma_{04}regime_{j4} + \gamma_{05}diversity * regime_{j5} + u_j \quad (18)$$

Thus, for countries with restrictive policies, the effect of diversity is $\gamma_{03}diversity_{j3}$, since the other terms in the regression equation cancel out because policy then has the value of 0. However, for open policies, which have as code a 1, the effect of diversity is $\gamma_{03}diversity_{j3} + \gamma_{05}diversity$. To figure out whether this effect is positive or negative, the two terms therefore need to be summed up. If for instance the main effect of diversity is -0.10 and the interaction term is 0.15, then the effect of diversity under the condition of open policies is +0.05.

Given the interval measurement level of civic and ethnic citizenship requirements, the interpretation is for more difficult. For instance, when civic citizenship requirements are low, e.g. have a code of 1, the effect of diversity is $\gamma_{03}diversity_{j3} + \gamma_{05}diversity$. However, if civic citizenship is prominent in the country and has, for instance, a code of 3, then the effect of diversity is $\gamma_{03}diversity_{j3} + \gamma_{05}diversity * 3$. To be more precise, if the main effect of diversity is -0.10 and the interaction term for civic citizenship and diversity is about 0.10, then the effect of diversity for high civic nations (e.g. a code of 3) is $-0.10 + (0.10 * 3)$ or 0.20.

Hypothesizing about the expected relation between regimes of migrant integration and generalized trust, and the interaction between those regimes with ethnic-cultural diversity on trust, it thus can be expected that civic and open regimes of migrant integration will show considerable higher levels of generalized trust. Those regimes show an inclusive orientation towards newcomers and by emphasizing the equal treatment between migrants and newcomers, the regimes emphasize that the new members are part of the community, which is expected to foster trust. It can therefore also be expected that those civic and open regimes might be able to mitigate the weak negative effect of diversity on trust. Contrary, with regard to ethnic and restrictive regimes, the hypothesis is that these rather exclusive regimes draw strong boundaries between natives and migrants. While it can be expected that these regimes might foster particularized trust, it is expected that the creation of the generalized type of trust will be inhibited. Consequently, the hypothesis is also that these regimes are not able to buffer the negative effect of diversity on trust.

4. Results

Refreshing earlier findings (cf. Chapter 6), relying on a nonparametric interpretation, diversity lowers trust only to a weak extent. The weak negative effect sign of the UN share of immigrants on generalized trust exemplifies this general negative relation for a majority of other indicators of immigration-caused diversity. In what follows, first the effects of citizenship requirements are discussed, namely does diversity have a more detrimental effect on generalized trust when nations are more civic, or do civic citizenship requirements have a positive effect of ethnic cultural diversity on generalized trust across European countries? Likewise, also the similar relation for ethnic citizenship requirements is being investigated. In a second phase the effects of integration regimes as have been constructed on the basis of the MIPEX-data is regarded. Distinguishing between open and restrictive policies, it will be tested whether open policies of which is expected that they emphasize the equality between all citizens are more able to mitigate the weak negative effect of immigration-caused diversity on trust. For restrictive policies, the expectation is thus that generalized trust is lower among the citizenry of countries that are more ethnically and culturally diverse.

4.1. Civic and Ethnic Citizenship Requirements

In the first step of the analysis, the effects of civic and ethnic citizenship requirements and the interaction with diversity on generalized trust is estimated. Table 52 summarizes the results of regressions for civic and ethnic citizenship separately. In Model 1, the stock of immigrants on the total population, the score on the ISSP item on respecting the national laws and political institutions, and the interaction between both on generalized trust are given. The model without the interaction term clearly shows that the share of immigrants has a negative yet insignificant effect on trust. On the other hand, civic citizenship has a positive but also insignificant effect on generalized trust. Countries in which the citizenry adheres to the notion that citizenship is based on adhering to the national laws and institutions, there is on average a slightly higher level of generalized trust under control of other relevant generalized trust factors. When looking at the interaction term between the stock of immigrants on the total population and civic citizenship requirements on generalized trust, one can observe a positive term. To be concrete, this means that civic requirements for citizenship are positively associated with trust and that trust increases for in civic nations that are diverse.

Next to civic citizenship requirements, also ethnic citizenship requirements are taken into consideration as a conditioner for the effects of diversity on generalized trust. As Model 2 in Table 52 shows, under control of other covariates, there is slightly more generalized trust in countries in which the citizenry emphasizes an ethnic understanding of citizenship, i.e. the requirement of having national ancestry for being regarded as a true citizen. However, when adding the interaction between diversity and ethnic

citizenship requirements, the main effect of these requirements becomes negative while the interaction is positive. The interpretation is that that mixed societies that stress the importance of having national ancestry have slightly higher levels of generalized trust compared with mixed countries with a low level of ethnic understanding.

Table 52. Multilevel Multiple Regression Model for the Interaction Between Ethnic-Cultural Diversity and Civic-Ethnic Citizenship on Generalized Trust

		Without interaction		With interaction	
		Param	T-Value	Param	T-Value
Model 1	Diversity	-0.021	-0.96	-0.052	-0.30
	Civic citizenship	0.396	1.11	0.291	0.42
	Diversity * civic			0.014	0.18
Model 2	Diversity	-0.017	-0.69	-0.072	-0.62
	Ethnic citizenship	0.135	0.43	-0.143	-0.22
	Diversity * ethnic			0.031	0.48


* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Controlled for all micro- and macro-level independent variables from Model IV in Table 15 (Chapter 3).

Next to the statistical interpretation, also the interaction between civic and ethnic requirements on the one hand, and diversity on the other hand, on trust is represented in a graphical manner. Since both civic and ethnic citizenship requirements are metric variables, the countries have been divided by a cut-off at the median for the requirements, meaning that an equal number of countries are categorized as civic and non-civic or ethnic and non-ethnic. As the upper part of Figure 24 shows, those countries that adhere to a civic logic (code 1) do have higher levels of generalized trust than those countries in which the citizenry refutes civic requirements (code 0). Moreover, for the most diverse countries, the most trusting citizenry adheres to a civic logic instead of refraining from it. In contrast, the lower part shows that there is no difference regarding the trust levels of the citizenry along the ethnic dimension. Yet, for the most homogeneous countries, the highest levels of trust can be found in countries that refrain from an ethnic logic (code 0).

What Figure 23 moreover reveals is the heteroscedasticity in the data. As the civic model shows, the trend line for the least civic countries is quite solid – about all less civic countries seem to be captured by the regression line. However, with regard to the most civic nations, the heteroscedasticity in the data is quite large, which is also exemplified by on average low R^2 values. There are for instance certain ‘civic’ countries that are expected to be less civic, like for instance Bulgaria, Portugal, and Austria, which actually lie on the not-ethnic regression line. With regard to ethnic citizenship requirements, the plot shows that the trend lines are hardly able to capture the variability in generalized trust. The least ethnic countries are almost randomly spread in the graph. The predictive power is slightly higher for the most ethnic nations but

Denmark seems to be quite deviant compared to the other nations that rank high on ethnic requirements.

Figure 24. Interaction Between Civic and Ethnic Citizenship Requirements and Ethnic-Cultural Diversity on Generalized Trust



The plots represent the aggregated relation between diversity and trust under control of the civic and ethnic citizenship requirements (median cut-off). A value of 1 means that the country ranks high on civic/ethnic citizenship, a value of 0 means that the country ranks low on civic/ethnic. The predicted value of generalized trust is controlled for all other covariates as in Model IV in Table 15 (Chapter 3).

The methodological remarks regarding the limited statistical power when relying on a limited number of countries need to be kept track of. In this analysis, only 16 countries are included, which is quite low for these complex models (Kreft, 1996; Maas & Hox, 2005) that have included four country-level covariates and an interaction term between two of them. Therefore, bringing all evidence together, i.e. not only staring at the classic statistical tests, but also looking at the sign of the effects and a glance at the plots learns that countries that adhere to a civic logic and those that refute an ethnic ones rank, on general, higher on generalized trust. Yet, it moreover seems that in diverse countries, none of these symbolic boundaries are better able to cope with diversity – i.e. civic regimes, that are regarded are inclusive and expected to be more equal compared with regimes that refrain from a civic notion, are not performing the ‘un’-civic regimes in crafting trust. Similarly, countries that adhere to a strong ethnic logic, and are therefore regarded to impose boundaries that express the inequality among newcomers and natives, are not more harmful for trust in mixed societies compared with countries in which the citizenry refutes these ethnic requirements.

4.2. Migrant Integration Policies

Next to the citizenship requirements, also the effect of diversity on generalized trust under the condition of policies of migrant integration is estimated. The countries have been classified as having restrictive (code 0) or open (code 1) policies. Table 53 summarizes the multilevel multiple regression model for explaining generalized trust with diversity and the pooled Migrant Integration Policy Index, and whether certain policies might mitigate the negative effects of diversity on generalized trust. As the model without the interaction terms shows, diversity affects generalized trust in a weak negative manner. However, there is a slight negative trend for migrant policies: countries that have adapted open policies with regard to their migrant integration have, on average, slightly lower trust levels among the citizenry. When adding the interaction effect, the interpretation changes: one can notice that the effect of diversity on trust is nonsignificant but slightly negative effect for restrictive countries (since the main MIPEX-effect and the interaction cancel out). On the other hand, for countries with open regimes, there is a significant and slightly positive main effect (since the negative main diversity effect is combined with a positive main MIPEX effect and a negative interaction term), meaning that countries with open migrant integration regimes have slightly higher levels of trust among its residents. However, the negative interaction term denotes that, while open countries do have higher trust levels than restrictive countries, trust declines for more diverse countries. Thus, open regimes seemingly are not able to mitigate the effect of diversity on trust.


Table 53. Multilevel Multiple Regression Model for the Interaction Between Ethnic-Cultural Diversity and Migrant Integration Policy (Clustering Based on Pooled Data Set) on Generalized Trust

	Without interaction		With interaction	
	Param	T-Value	Param	T-Value
Diversity	-0.022	-1.25	-0.016	-0.77
Mipex	-0.102	-0.59	0.062	0.16
Diversity * Mipex			-0.017	-0.46

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. The variables are controlled for all other covariates as in Model IV in Table 15 (Chapter 3).

Figure 25 has plotted the interaction between the stock of immigrants on the total population and restrictive versus open policies on generalized trust. The graph shows that trust is in general slightly higher in countries with open policies. Yet, what once again is quite remarkable is the heteroscedasticity for both the open and restrictive countries – the explained variance (R^2) at the aggregate level does not exceed 10 percent, which is low. To start with, the cluster of France, Spain and Germany almost collapse with the trend line for the relation of diversity on trust for unrestrictive countries; however, the three mentioned countries are all countries that have adopted policies that can be labeled as open. Second, in line with the analysis of civic and ethnic citizenship requirements, the clear outliers in the data may be as well highly informative. On the one hand, Portugal combines quite open migrant policies with an average level of heterogeneity while it has about the lowest trust levels among its citizenry. On the other hand, Denmark has about the same level of immigrants on its territory and has adopted a set of restrictive policies while it has among the highest levels of generalized trust in Europe.

Figure 25. Interaction Between Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and Ethnic-Cultural Diversity on Generalized Trust



The plots represent the aggregated relation between diversity and trust under control of the country clustering on the basis of the pooled MIPEX-data. In the model, these variables are controlled for all other covariates as in Model IV in Table 15 (Chapter 3)

When disaggregating the migrant integration policies to the six domains that have been questioned, namely labor market access, family reunification, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination measures, one can see that in general, the same trend can be observed. Looking at the models without interaction, all models except family reunification and political participation show a positive but nonsignificant effect of the policies on generalized trust. Thus, countries that have adopted open policies regarding migrant integration rank on average slightly higher on generalized trust than countries with restrictive policies. Including the interaction between diversity and the policies, diversity consistently shows a negative but insignificant effect for the restrictive policies (since the main effect of the policies and the interactions are left out of the equation). For open policies, the main effect is, except for access to nationality, positive combined with, on average, a negative effect of the interaction. Thus, countries with open policies have higher levels of trust but trust still declines for more heterogeneous countries.


Table 54. Multilevel Multiple Regression Models for the Interaction Between Ethnic-Cultural Diversity and Migrant Integration Policies on Generalized Trust

		Without interaction		With interaction	
		Param	T-Value	Param	T-Value
Model 1	Diversity	-0.022	-1.22	-0.037	-1.56
	Labor market access	0.056	0.36	-0.282	-0.73
	Diversity * Labor market			0.035	0.95
Model 2	Diversity	-0.021	-1.19	-0.028	-0.56
	Family reunion	-0.013	-0.08	-0.106	-0.16
	Diversity * Family reunion			0.008	0.14
Model 3	Diversity	-0.018	-0.94	1.891	0.85
	Long-term residence	0.109	0.41	26.81	0.86
	Diversity * Long-term resid			-1.908	-0.86
Model 4	Diversity	-0.021	-1.21	-0.018	-0.82
	Political participation	-0.068	-0.42	0.010	0.02
	Diversity * Pol participation			-0.008	-0.21
Model 5	Diversity	-0.021	-1.19	-0.026	-1.43
	Access to nationality	0.002	0.01	-0.450	-0.86
	Diversity * Access nation'ty			0.046	0.91
Model 6	Diversity	-0.018	-1.01	-0.014	-0.67
	Anti-discrimination	0.085	0.59	0.239	0.67
	Diversity * Anti-discrimin			-0.018	-0.47

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. The variables are controlled for all other covariates as in Model IV in Table 15 (Chapter 3).

Once again, plots have been printed for the clarification of these interaction models. The first remark regards the interaction effect for the long-term residence policies. As the clustering of the countries (cf. Chapter 8) has revealed is that for long-term residence, most of the countries do cluster together as being open in this type of migrant integration policy. As a result, only two countries remain, which leads to the quite absurd plot and regression result (i.e. the main effect of long-term residence policies has a slope of more than 20). But for the other policy domains, most of the graphs look quite similar to the general MIPEX-trend, i.e. highly different trust-levels for homogeneous countries according to the policy that is in effect, and convergence in these generalized trust levels when countries are mixed.

Figure 26. Interaction Between Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and Ethnic-Cultural Diversity on Generalized Trust



The plots represent the aggregated relation between diversity and trust under control of the country clustering on the basis of the pooled MIPEX-data.

Thus, while the plots give mixed results, the results of the multilevel test are rather straightforward: migrant integration policies, i.e. open policies, are positively associated with generalized trust, which is in line with the theory. However, contrary to what was expected, these policies hardly affect the negative effect of diversity on trust: diversity still has a negative effect on generalized trust, even taking the varying country policies into account.

5. Conclusion

Concluding this dissertation with a chapter on the mitigating effects of regimes of migrant integration on the relation between ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust has led to both interesting and puzzling findings. Based on a multilevel multiple regression analysis of the aggregate level of the ISSP civic and ethnic requirements in a country on the one hand, and MIPEX policy data on the other hand, this chapter has demonstrated that on average, regimes which tend to be inclusive towards migrants – i.e. countries in which the citizenry adheres to a civic logic, and countries that have in general open migrant integration legislation – are associated with on average slightly higher levels of generalized trust. It has to be noted however that this effect is not significant according to classic significance test statistics, which can not only be explained by the fact that the effects may in general are expected to be this weak, but also to the limited number of countries that are involved in the study.

When including the interaction term between these regimes of migrant integration and diversity on generalized trust, which responds to the question whether diverse countries with certain policies are better able to maintain trust, the results are rather disappointing. For the restrictive policies, the absence of civic citizenship requirements and the presence of ethnic ones, one can observe that a low level of generalized trust is combined with almost a null relation between diversity and generalized trust. This means that in those restrictive countries, there is generally a lower level of trust but that trust does not significantly decline neither increases for more heterogeneous countries. On the other hand, for those countries with open policies or those in which the citizenry adheres to a civic logic or refutes an ethnic one, trust levels are generally slightly higher but, on the other hand, trust declines when diversity increases. Thus taken together, open regimes, which are generally seem to be preferred by not only policy makers but also by scholars are not able to mitigate the negative effect of diversity on trust: the negative trend between diversity and trust that has been discovered in Chapter 6 has not been mitigated by controlling for the presence of certain types of regimes of migrant integration.

With regard to policy advice, the results are quite puzzling. Putnam argues in ‘E Pluribus Unum’ (2007) that one way to mitigate the negative effects of diversity on indicators of social capital is to adhere to a civic citizenship logic. When looking at the

analysis, there is indeed a certain difference in trust levels in diverse countries that adhere to a civic logic compared with those countries in which this logic is absent. However, while at the national level, civic and ethnic citizenship may be opposed, at the individual level, citizens do not differentiate easily between the two – those who adhere to a civic logic are also more inclined to adopt a set of ethnic items. Civic and ethnic citizenship concepts are not in a zero sum game relation, which may complicate the perspective on diversity and social cohesion. Thus, if social engineers aim at enhancing a civic logic among the citizenry, it can be expected that they stimulate a sense of nationalism that might also include an ethnic and exclusionary logic. Therefore, in the near future, more research needs to be done regarding the creation of a civic logic that differentiates from an ethnic one.

The findings in this chapter raise some more questions with regard to policy implementations. More specifically, we should be skeptical about the causal arrow in this relation. Is it the case, as I assume implicitly by specifying the multilevel multiple regression model, that by granting certain rights the equality among all citizens is promoted and that this indirectly fosters trust? Or have governments in highly cohesive and trusting societies granted immigrants these formal political rights precisely because high levels of trust were already present? Based on this cross-sectional research design, it is at this moment impossible to disentangle these causal issues, but it is my belief that certain policies of inclusion emphasize equality and the egalitarian character of the state, which have an important message to convey, as such policies emphasize an overarching identity that unites citizens as well as immigrants under the umbrella of equal access to citizenship. This is an element, however, that needs further investigation.

The second point of discussion relates to the type and quality of the policy data. Indeed, the coding of the policies measures the closeness of each policy aspect to the EU directives. As such, the MIPEX figures represent a policy score, and they do not depart from any theoretical reflection on migration and integration. Therefore, a further analysis of the reliability and the structure of this dataset is called for. Similarly, the data simply measures actual enforced policies in a certain country. However, the local implementation of the policies can – to a considerable extent – differ from how the enacted policies (Trappers, 2009). For instance, it is highly likely that in a number of countries, like for instance Sweden, minority children at school may hold on to their heritage language. Yet, depending on the concentration of ethnic groups in schools this rule can be overruled by the peer pressure to learn the national language. The design of this study makes it, in this respect, impossible to control for the local enforcement of these different policies for every single country. Nevertheless, in this chapter, social and symbolic boundaries have been under investigation that might theoretically matter in their own respect.

The third issue that needs to be addressed and implies a strategy for further research is the relation between the measures of regimes of migrant integration and the design of

this study. The analysis as they have been presented in this chapter relate to contextual diversity, i.e. whether trust is lower in areas with high shares of foreigners; the intergroup contact models have not been considered since the design of this study does not allow for it. However, while I have given theoretical arguments to relate these regimes to contextual diversity, it might be even more plausible that those regimes are especially designed to foster contact between various groups in society. This perspective is thus largely overlooked in this research while the outcomes are expected to be powerful. Future research strategies should thus implement a strategy in which the relation between policies, diversity, the possibility of intergroup contact and the generation of trust is considered.

This analysis regarding the influence of regimes of migrant integration and diversity on generalized trust therefore, represents us with quite some puzzling findings and challenges for further research. As this chapter has shown, the impact of those regimes, both regarding symbolic boundaries, i.e. civic and ethnic citizenship requirements, and regarding social boundaries, i.e. national legislation, the effects are nonsignificant. While the determination of country's trust level on the basis of their national GDP per capita is for instance quite solid, looking at the plots, many countries have enacted policies that differ hugely from what is expected according to their trust levels. Thus, the relation between migrant integration regimes and trust is far from straightforward compared with other institutional variables that are at hand.

Conclusion

Can Diversity be Reconciled with Social Cohesion?

Coming at the end of this dissertation, the preceding research outcomes need to be integrated and require a critical reflection, as well as some guidelines for future research strategies that aim at investigating differentials in social cohesion due to immigration to in European societies are presented. Throughout this dissertation, I have tried to contribute to the literature of this research area by integrating advances in social theory, methodology and implication for public policy. In this Conclusion, it is however not my aim to repeat each and every single contribution by summarizing all chapters; yet, by integrating the general results, I hope to provide a solid answer to the question that has been proposed in the Introduction, namely:

Under control of other possible factors that explain cross-national differences in social cohesion across European nation-states, does immigration-caused diversity weaken social cohesion, and if so, are regimes of migrant integration able to mitigate this negative effect?

In the first section, I will combine all insights that have been gained throughout this dissertation to give information on the social consequences of ethnic-cultural diversity and the mitigating role of migrant integration regimes. In the second section, recommendations for future research strategies are proposed

1. Is Ethnic-Cultural Diversity Harmful for European Societies?

In concluding this research project, it has to be remembered that ethnic-cultural diversity is but one example of the major social changes that are currently transforming European societies and are affecting human life accordingly. Yet, in this respect, immigration is considered as an important case to investigate since it affects all levels of society. Immigration for instance impacts national legislation since policies need to define under what conditions newcomers are accepted and whether they are granted similar rights and obligations compared with the native population; as such, immigration imposes a national debate on citizenship. Moreover, to give another example, immigration is also expected to have a general impact on the national culture. Indeed, newcomers not only introduce a set of values that the native population has been unfamiliar with, like for instance the enduring debate on the headscarf (Joppke,

2009), it also broadens for instance the culinary horizons since each immigrant group imports its distinct cuisine. Despite these interesting transformations that all deserve the required attention, in the 'Age of Migration' the main research question that must be at the center of the agenda should be whether social cohesion is under pressure due to increasing immigration; or to put it differently, is it more difficult to live in countries with high shares of foreigners?

This research question cannot be answered appropriately without a brief reference to what social cohesion in diverse societies actually means. A review of contemporary reflections on social cohesion, which all ascribe multiple dimensions for societies to be classified as cohesive, has shown that these dimensions are hardly able to cope with the heterogeneous composition of industrialized societies. To give but one example, a widely accepted dimension of social cohesion refers to consensus on a dominant set of values and norms. Sociological research documents, however, that due to processes of modernization, a common set of values and norms has gradually disappeared. Of course, one can argue that this fading represents a decline in social cohesion; contrary, I have proposed that in diverse societies a different form of social cohesion is at play that is able to unite individuals to each other and to society even in the absence of value consensus. The lack of conceptual clarification in classic multidimensional conceptions of social cohesion has also obscured empirical scrutiny regarding what determines social cohesion and what its consequences are. Indeed, if a common set of values and norms is one of the aspects of social cohesion, it can be questioned which set of norms citizens need to be reached consensus in to regard the society they are part of as cohesive.

Theoretical arguments that contemporary heterogeneous societies rely on other mechanisms for establishing social cohesion have been derived from Durkheim's seminal work on the social division of labor (1984 [1893]). Durkheim's main conclusion was that modern societies, under influence of major socioeconomic changes, would be able to establish cohesion, yet, a type of cohesion that differs largely from social cohesion in traditional societies. More importantly, social cohesion in complex societies can exactly be established because heterogeneity is present. This modern form of what Durkheim referred to as organic solidarity relied on the interdependence between distinct parts of society. While Durkheim was unclear in describing the mechanisms that encompassed this interdependence – he made reference to altruism but failed to make convincing connections with interdependence – trust in fact can serve as a basis for mutual exchange that is inherent between independent parts. Trust enables individuals to take risks and reach beyond their self-interests when they are dealing with others. Predominantly the generalized kind of trust is in this respect important for diverse societies since everyday interactions with others we do not know are facilitated by this attitude. Thus, social cohesion in diverse societies refers to trusting the generalized other.

What Durkheim has also added to the understanding of social cohesion in times of social change is that this transformation to new models of social cohesion is not always successful. More precisely, societies can turn in a state of anomie, which refers to the fact that individuals miss the necessary moral that gives meaning to those deeply affecting processes of social change, like there is immigration. Over the past few years, foremost studies on US-territory have shown that people tend to hunker down when living in diverse societies. In this respect, Putnam has proposed to us the metaphor of the turtle (2007), meaning that people living in diverse communities tend to withdraw from public life. Yet, looking at European data, this negative portrait of the American-turtle seems to be largely overstated. Departing from the state-of-the-art theoretical and methodological considerations, ethnic-cultural diversity cannot be held responsible for the fact that certain European countries have a more trusting citizenry than others. While there are consistent negative effect parameters of diversity indicators on trust, rarely one is discovered that is in a statistically relevant relation with trust, even when controlled for other relevant covariates. The thesis that diversity erodes social cohesion in Europe therefore needs to be rejected.

In this respect, it may also not be forgotten that the most homogeneous countries, namely the Eastern European ones, have also the most distrusting population. While spectators may argue that in those countries social cohesion is based on other mechanisms than on trusting the generalized other – the Polish population is for instance strongly adhering to the Catholic Church – it cannot be neglected that methodological evidence suggests that also in the most homogeneous countries, generalized trust is a clearly crystallized concepts that lends itself for comparative research. In fact, this argument provides additional leverage for the fact that diverse societies may have crafted more of this specific type of thin solidarity that enables societies to be cohesive. Indeed, while countries like Germany, Austria and Belgium are quite mixed, they have a citizenry that are averagely ranked among the European countries; only the Nordic countries, which rank of all European countries in the middle with regard to diversity, show higher trust levels, which can largely be attributed to the fact that these countries have a legacy in trust-fostering Protestant religion. Keeping also this evidence in mind, the conclusion that social cohesion is possible in heterogeneous societies is still warranted.

The conclusion that across Europe, immigration does not lead to lower levels of social cohesion does, however, not mean that European societies are free from within-country problems that have arisen due to recent upsurges in immigrant influx. In this respect, one may point to the scarce number of local level studies in Europe that have been published recently, supplemented by a local level study in Flanders. These studies seem to add leverage to the notion that across Europe, diversity hardly affects trust. In Great Britain, evidence has been provided that trust is lower in mixed neighborhoods, however, structural deprivation of these neighborhoods has been regarded as even more detrimental for the creation of trust. On the contrary, the Dutch analysis has

discovered that social cohesion is not affected by ethnic heterogeneity. The Flemish local level study adds to this debate, as it has shown that, first of all, in line with the Dutch results generalized trust is not eroded due to heterogeneity. Secondly, the overall influence of the local level on individual outcomes is in general also relatively low in Flanders. While this last finding gives additional legitimacy for the use of the national level as unit of analysis, i.e. countries have shown to exert a strong impact on individual generalized trust, this goes not by to the fact that there are differential outcomes in local level diversity on trust across European countries, which require further qualification.

In qualifying the relation between diversity and social cohesion, evidence from various angles has been presented that the context thus highly matters. In this respect, one of the additional puzzles was whether regimes of migrant integration are best able to explain differences in trust across European countries, depending upon the level of foreigners on the territory. In this debate, discussions are often framed on the distinction between civic and ethnic narratives, i.e. regimes that regard immigrant integration respectively as rather inclusive and voluntarist vs. a rather exclusionary view of integration based on ethnic descent. Despite the dominance of civic and ethnic citizenship, outcomes suggest that these concepts are indeed theoretically relevant but nevertheless lack cross-national precision, which limits the strategies for comparative research. On the contrary, to benchmark policy initiatives in the policy field, the Migrant Integration Policy Index, which covers the extent to which policies meet EU Directives regarding immigrant incorporation has contributed to the comparative study on the institutional aspect of regimes of migrant integration. When it comes to the openness of migrant integration regimes, it indeed can be regarded that in most cases, there is an overlap with the classical comparative politics distinction between East-West and South-North. In this respect, the most recent member states seem to fail in implementing a set of open policies as have been proposed by the EU Directives.

The answer to the puzzle whether these open or restrictive migrant integration regimes are better able to maintain social cohesion is rather disappointing. The results indicate that trust is not significantly different among the citizens of diverse countries living in an open migrant integration regimes than in mixed countries that are characterized by restrictive regimes. With regard to the formulation of policy recommendations, the outcomes do thus not give evidence for the preference of one specific model over the other. While the civic model and open policies have been proposed as benchmarks, i.e. they do reflect the tendency to be inclusive towards newcomers, they are hardly able to make a difference for the trust levels of citizens in diverse countries. This may, however, not discourage policy makers to consider open policies or stimulate civic and prevent ethnic citizenship conceptions among public opinion. In fact, citizens in countries with civic requirements and open policies, making abstraction of whether these countries are diverse, do have slightly higher levels of generalized trust in comparison with citizens of countries with restrictive policies or that refrains from a civic logic but adheres to an ethnic one.

Self-evidently, this finding requires some more interpretation with regard to the causal mechanisms. While it can be expected that the effect of diversity on social cohesion at the country level may be less prone for causal criticism, for the relation between regimes of immigrant integration and social cohesion, the causal relation is less clear. More specifically, it is more likely to assume that countries do adopt more open policies when cultural preconditions are fulfilled. Many scholars, predominantly in the US, have shown that policy formation is responsive to public opinion (Page & Shapiro, 1983; Monroe, 1998; Putnam, 1993). It can thus be expected that when societies have a citizenry that is very trusting, legislators may introduce policies that give migrants equal rights compared with the native population. This causal reasoning is summarized well by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005, p. 43), arguing that “Since social trust is a measure of how people evaluate the moral fabric their society, there is little reason to believe that countries with low social trust will establish universal social programs precisely because such programs must be based on a general political understanding that the various groups in society share a common fate.” While not going into more detail into further research pathways at this moment, it is obvious that this argument certainly needs more attention in the near future.

The absence of straightforward dampening effects of regimes of migrant integration on social cohesion might however not obscure the debate regarding other initiatives that governments can take to generate cohesion in diverse societies. First of all, the different outcomes in the European local level case studies, namely the United Kingdom vs. Netherlands and Flanders, may be indicative for the social geography within the respective countries. While further research needs to qualify this hypothesis, it may be argued that segregation rather than diversity is responsible for the erosion of social cohesion (Hooghe, 2007; Uslaner, 2009). Compared with the Anglo-Saxon countries, the general assumption is that the level of segregation in the Netherlands and Flanders are considerable lower. While in America, certain neighborhoods may be almost completely segregated, the Flemish municipalities are considered being mixed. While this conclusion is very tentative since the absence of straightforward segregation data hinders the empirical results, this interpretation makes explicit reference to intergroup contact models since it assumes lower trust in the generalized other in those societies in which interaction between natives and immigrants do not occurs. Thus, from a policy perspective, reducing segregations, in every aspect, might be considered; yet, future research outcomes need to qualify this statement.

Second, in considering a social cohesion strategy, national legislators must be aware that the best initiatives are to be taken in the field of socioeconomic development. Both immigration and integration policies that are tested in this investigation hardly seem to matter in the generation of trust in diverse societies. From a policy perspective, one might consider an immigration stop with as manifest effect limiting the influx of immigrants and as latent effect maintaining social cohesion. However, as this dissertation has demonstrated, with regard to this latent function, cohesion is only

weakly affected by diversity; with regard to the manifest function, immigration flows are strongly dependent upon incentives in the labor market and not on public policy. It needs to be emphasized that the labor market not only provides incentives for immigrants, but also creates opportunities for the native population. Indeed, one's cultural capital is still considered to be essential in fostering social cohesion. Brehm and Rahn (1997, p. 1009) already indicated that education may "increase exposure to cosmopolitan culture, resulting in individuals who are more tolerant and less suspicious of difference." The labor market generates certain skills that are not only required on the job but also in social life, as a growing body of research has indicated.

Furthermore, while future research needs to qualify this hypothesis, it can be the case that people might actually learn to become comfortable with diversity. Cases like Switzerland already demonstrate that countries can actually outweigh other European countries with respect to the stock of foreigners on the territory while simultaneously having a more than average trusting citizenry. Moreover, Flemish evidence also suggests that, controlled for other relevant factors, certain municipalities are able to combine a considerable level of ethnic-cultural diversity with high levels of cohesion. In fact, it can be argued that those municipalities that are mixed have a tradition in diversity. The native inhabitants in these societies may have adapted to the cultural culprit of its municipality. Additionally, it might be the case that the multicultural character of these heterogeneous cities might serve as a way of 'branding' for other natives who are already disposed with a cosmopolitan outlook on society. As such, selection bias can thus work in the other way as has been proposed. While originally, this argument is used, though not in a convincing manner, in the US to suggest that the negative effect of diversity on trust can be attributed to the fact that the most trusting residents have fled due to diversity, in fact, it is theoretically also possible that diversity has attracted certain residents with a universal outlook to settle in this mixed society. This conclusion is nevertheless tentative and needs further qualification.

2. Future Research Strategies on Diversity and Social Cohesion

Indeed, this research on the social consequences of immigration-caused diversity and the mitigating role of regimes of migrant integration regimes leaves a number of puzzles unanswered, including more appropriate research into many aspects of selection bias. In discussing future research strategies, I will mainly focus on four topics. These topics cover first of all a comparative empirical investigation into cultural and structural aspects of social cohesion, second a profound longitudinal analysis into the relation between diversity and social cohesion in order to make causal claims, third a comparative local level strategy to arrive at an explanation for cross-national differences in local level outcomes, and fourth a profound research that aims at showing how diversity might affect trust at various levels of aggregation.

First of all, the next generation of scholars that are interested in the effects and consequences of social cohesion ought, in the first place, to pay considerable effort in aspects of social cohesion and whether these aspects are similar across countries. In this dissertation, generalized trust has been put to the fore as operationalization of social cohesion, which was legitimized on both theoretical and methodological grounds. From a theoretical perspective, generalized trust indeed facilitates exchange between interdependent members of contemporary modern and diverse societies. Moreover, both theoretical arguments, namely the institution-centered approach (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008), as well as empirical evidence, i.e. the considerably high intraclass correlation, have underscored that generalized trust is highly dependent upon the national context citizens live in. Thus, generalized trust is understood as solely an individual asset; for a large part, trust is also shared by other citizens on the territory. What is more, across countries, generalized trust does also have the same underlying latent representations across European societies, which enables comparative research strategy and strategies to benchmark social cohesion policies.

However, it may not be forgotten that authors have warned that social cohesion is a complex and abstract concept that is expected to be difficult to capture in one single concept. Kearns and Forrest (2000) hold on to a straightforward yet multidimensional conception of social cohesion – in this respect, generalized trust collapses with the dimension they have referred to as ‘social networks and social capital’. Since I have argued that this multidimensional representation hinders comparative research, it may not be forgotten that as such, future efforts might actually to be dedicated to a comparative test of the validity of the Kearns and Forrest-typology. By bringing together uniform sets of data that reflect the various dimensions, including reference to generalized trust, and test whether an underlying concept appears that confirms to cross-national methodological standards, the literature in this topic can be significantly increased. Indeed, the ongoing interest into the topic of social cohesion, whether it is labeled as social capital, collective efficacy or values consensus, may thus not go by to a profound reflection of the social cohesion concept itself.

The second recommendation for further research regards the causal claim, which this research was not able to disentangle. While it sounds reasonable that diversity erodes social cohesion, it is nevertheless also plausible that the most cohesive societies are the ones that, in fact, are able to keep foreigners out. It needs to be remembered that, under control of other relevant covariates, it has been shown that the most trusting societies are in fact not the most ethnic-cultural homogeneous ones. The multilevel multiple regression analysis has in this aspect contributed to the causal questioning, yet, a complete causal picture is far from clear. The picture becomes even more obscure when reflecting on the role of the national migrant integration initiatives. It is more sounding to assume that cohesive countries are better able to give newcomers rights that are equal to the rights of the native citizens. In this respect, it is not surprising that a clear causal relation from diversity and regimes of migrant integration on social cohesion has not

been found, which is in line with the qualitative anthropological research performed in multiple European cities by Trappers (2009).

A research strategy that should be developed in the years ahead should be able to address these causal claims. In this respect I advice two different research strategies. The first one is to bring together evidence that clarifies the process that can address the formation of immigration and integration policies. Since it is difficult to regress survey information, i.e. investigate whether social cohesion is able to produce policies that are more accepting for immigrants, there are alternative strategies to take in consideration. To give but one example, by newspapers to policy formation, the public opinion can be, in an alternative manner, brought in relation with policies in the field of immigration and migrant integration. This strategy closely reflects the research strategies Koopmans and Statham are well-known for, yet, it should be the aim to extend efforts to for instance all OECD member countries. Second, also a longitudinal analysis of the relation between diversity and social cohesion must be at the core of the forthcoming cross-validations. Since Meuleman and colleagues (2009) have found significant effects between diversity, unemployment and out-group hostility in the first three waves of the ESS, it can be expected that similar undertakings might also be beneficial in the understanding of differentials in generalized trust in specific and social cohesion in general.

The third research recommendation actually relates to the importance the context has in shaping the relation between diversity and social cohesion. The cross-national investigation into diversity and generalized trust indeed showed negative yet insignificant relations, contrary to the US and UK local level studies. Yet, the Dutch and Flemish local level studies show that the context may work differently across various Western countries. In the years ahead, research activities should implement cross-national local level strategies. As the lack of local level studies in this field of the social consequences of diversity has shown, it is however far from unproblematic to arrive at harmonization of all variables in such strategies, i.e. the level of aggregation (neighborhoods vs. wards vs. municipalities vs. counties, and so on) as well as circumvent the limited availability of data for the construction of equivalent constructs across countries. Yet, the gains to invest in this kind of research strategy are evident: it can shed a light on the reasons why certain contextual effects are limited to national borders.

The fourth and last recommendation for future research relates to the last comment. From social inequality scholars, it is known that structural inequalities may affect individuals at various levels of aggregation. While at the national level, diversity does not seem to affect the citizenry of European countries, the puzzling results regarding this relation across Great Britain compared with Flanders and the Netherlands do also stem to consider the way diversity may affect trust differently at the country level, country level, neighborhood level, and so on. The question whether ethnic-cultural

diversity affects social cohesion, can be analyzed at various levels of society, i.e. the individual, the neighborhood, NUTS-levels and also at the country level, and it is expected that the causal processes vary depending upon the level of aggregation. This undertaken is also legitimized by various theoretical arguments: while local level studies can rely on intergroup contact theories, this model is not evident to apply at national level studies. For this reason, the research agenda should be complemented with more studies that specifically address the way diversity affects trust – looking not only at correlation, as in this research, or causation, as has been the advice higher, but also at the explaining mechanisms.

Indeed, the agenda for future research is considerable. Given the many advances in research methodologies, not only quantitative but also qualitative approaches, and in theoretical models, it can be expected that in the years ahead, the accumulation of knowledge on the extent to and the manner in which immigration impacts society will increase exponentially. In this respect, I hope that this research has contributed to this rich research agenda.

Appendix A

Exploration of the European Social Survey

Questions and Response Categories plus Recoding of the Used Variables

Generalized Trust

The generalized trust scale is a continuous means scale based on the following three survey items:

- Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (0-10; in ESS: PPLTRST).
- Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? (0-10; in ESS: PPLFAIR).
- Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? (0-10; in ESS: PPLHLP).

Age

Continuous variable calculated (by ESS) based on the question “And in what year were you born?” (original variable in ESS: YRBRN; new variable: AGE).

Gender

Dichotomous variable based on the question on the question “Now, I would like to ask you some details about yourself and others in your household. Gender.” (in ESS: GNDR).

Foreign Descent

Dichotomous variable composed out of the variables:

- Were you born in [country]? (yes – no) (in ESS: BRNCNTR).
- Was your father born in [country]? (yes – no) (in ESS: FACNTR).
- Was your mother born in [country]? (yes – no) (in ESS: MOCNTR).

If at least one of the responses to these questions was negative, the respondent was coded as having foreign roots.

Years of education

Continuous variable based on the question “About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time? Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling.” (in ESS: EDUYRS).

Employment status

Categorical variable based on the respondents’ activities for the last 7 days. The nine substantive categories that were offered to the respondent were:

- In paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business) (in ESS: PDWRK).
- In education (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation (in ESS: EDCTN).
- Unemployed and actively looking for a job (in ESS: UEMPLA).
- Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job (in ESS: UEMPLI).
- Permanently sick or disabled (in ESS: DSBLD).
- Retired (in ESS: RTRD).
- In community or military service (in ESS: CMSRV).
- Doing housework, looking after children or other persons (in ESS: HSWRK).
- Other (in ESS: DNGOTH)

If the respondent answered positively on more than one category, a follow-up question concerned the main activity of the respondent. Thus, if the respondent answered positively on more than one category, a new “work category”-variable was assigned the “main activity”; otherwise, if the respondent only responded positively on one category, then this category was assigned to the “work category” of the respondent. Next, “employment status”, nominal variable containing five categories out of this “work category” variable:

- Employed: In paid work
- Student: In education
- Unemployed: Unemployed and actively looking for a job; Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job
- Retired: Retired
- Other: Permanently sick or disabled; in community or military service; doing housework, looking after children or other persons; other

Income satisfaction

The income satisfaction variable is treated as quasi-metric and is based on the question “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your

household's income nowadays?" with the response categories (recoded to 0-3) (in ESS: HINCFEL):

- 0: Finding it very difficult on present income
- 1: Finding it difficult on present income
- 2: Coping on present income
- 3: Living comfortable on present income

Civil status

Nominal variable with four categories based on the question "Could I ask about your current legal marital status?" (in ESS: MARITALA):

- In a legal relation: Married; in a civil partnership
- Separated or divorced: Separated (still legally married); separated (still in a civil partnership); divorced; formerly in a civil partnership, now dissolved
- Widowed: Widowed; formerly in a civil partnership, partner died
- Not in a legal relation: Never married and never in a civil partnership

Volunteering

Dichotomous variable based on the question: "In the past 12 months, how often did you get involved in work for voluntary or charitable organisations?" If the respondent answered "Never", then the code 0 was assigned, otherwise, in the responses "at least once a week", "at least once a month", "at least once every three months", "at least once every six months" or "less often", then the code 1 was assigned (in ESS: WKVLOG):

Religious practice

Variable treated as quasi-metric based on the question "Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?" (in ESS: RLGATND). Recoded to:

- 0: Never
- 1: Less often
- 2: Only on special holy days
- 3: At least once a month
- 4: Once a week
- 5: More than once a week
- 6: Every day

Level of Urbanization

Variable treated as quasi-metric based on the question “Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?” (in ESS: DOMICIL). Recoded to:

- 0: A farm or home in the countryside
- 1: A country village
- 2: A town or a small city
- 3: The suburbs or outskirts of a big city
- 4: A big city

Watching television

Variable treated as quasi-metric, bas on the question “On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watching television?” (in ESS: TVTOT):

- 0: No time at all
- 1: Less than 0.5 hour
- 2: 0.5 hour to 1 hour
- 3: More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours
- 4: More than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours
- 5: More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours
- 6: More than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours
- 7: More than 3 hours

Distribution of the Used Variables

Table A 1. Univariate Distribution of Generalized Trust, Age, Income Satisfaction and Churchgoing across the ESS-Countries

Cntry	Trust		Age		Income		Religious	
	Mean	StDev	Mean	StDev	Mean	StDev	Mean	StDev
<i>ESS</i>	4.809	2.12	46.168	19.656	1.748	0.975	1.466	1.599
AT	5.426	1.945	41.937	17.344	2.260	0.717	1.870	1.468
BE	5.121	1.702	46.194	18.643	2.128	0.839	1.094	1.394
BG	3.648	2.195	47.941	17.303	0.892	0.798	1.563	1.165
CH	5.934	1.524	47.607	18.060	2.364	0.760	1.618	1.372
CY	4.379	1.908	44.596	16.924	1.945	0.723	2.640	1.147
DE	5.175	1.720	48.148	17.915	2.021	0.751	1.347	1.389
DK	6.836	1.564	49.777	17.511	2.603	0.639	1.170	1.140
EE	5.170	1.940	47.415	19.297	1.708	0.736	1.147	1.066
ES	4.980	1.495	46.203	18.961	2.130	0.748	1.561	1.651
FI	6.435	1.481	48.741	19.022	2.083	0.639	1.260	1.129
FR	4.924	1.636	45.843	17.466	2.157	0.688	1.061	1.315
GB	5.601	1.622	47.300	18.785	2.252	0.762	1.146	1.527
HU	4.465	2.118	48.248	18.249	1.491	0.782	1.292	1.405
IE	5.712	1.868	44.146	17.749	2.351	0.718	2.774	1.686
NL	5.773	1.513	47.175	17.241	2.328	0.760	1.204	1.585
NO	6.641	1.462	45.890	18.121	2.445	0.701	1.178	1.213
PL	4.133	1.834	44.141	18.590	1.669	0.638	3.261	1.187
PT	4.273	1.879	48.501	18.878	1.557	0.820	2.137	1.697
RU	4.192	2.151	43.856	18.387	1.173	0.829	1.089	1.233
SE	6.311	1.572	47.213	18.701	2.480	0.703	1.056	1.109
SI	4.501	2.014	46.756	18.877	2.302	0.747	1.854	1.479
SK	4,370	1.966	43.428	17.886	1.567	0.841	2.212	1.743
UA	4.128	2.229	48.718	18.372	0.936	0.743	2.072	1.408

Trust: 0-10; Age: 14-101; Hincfel: 0-3; Religious: 0-6; Tvtot: 0-7.

Table A 2. Univariate Distribution of Watching Television, Level of Urbanization and Years of Enjoyed Education

Country	Watching Television		Level of Urbanization		Years of Education	
	Mean	StDev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	St Dev
<i>ESS</i>	4.305	2.176	2.104	1.228	12.268	4.138
AT	3.775	1.994	1.812	1.107	12.504	2.899
BE	4.299	1.985	1.721	1.080	12.101	3.682
BG	5.052	1.972	2.585	1.307	11.208	3.357
CH	3.175	1.943	1.585	1.005	13.218	3.653
CY	5.174	1.807	2.638	1.345	11.574	3.654
DE	4.247	1.937	2.237	1.041	13.171	3.467
DK	4.158	1.859	2.138	1.193	13.166	5.126
EE	4.395	2.048	2.435	1.248	12.251	3.167
ES	4.005	1.932	1.991	1.183	11.564	5.362
FI	3.905	1.927	1.849	1.306	12.407	4.249
FR	4.223	2.026	2.063	1.150	12.554	3.960
GB	4.882	2.045	2.103	0.936	13.503	3.915
HU	4.239	1.988	2.089	1.134	11.898	3.716
IE	4.268	1.966	1.666	1.281	12.819	3.445
NL	4.238	1.956	1.980	1.212	13.229	4.405
NO	3.761	1.787	1.792	1.328	13.363	3.803
PL	4.074	2.075	2.013	1.148	11.377	3.266
PT	4.168	2.028	2.023	1.125	7.399	4.822
RU	4.466	2.057	2.383	1.202	12.083	3.143
SE	3.695	1.846	2.066	1.180	12.576	3.636
SI	3.419	1.966	1.697	1.101	11.621	3.648
SK	4.304	1.944	1.967	1.100	12.451	3.271
UA	4.238	2.121	1.578	0.968	11.246	3.592

Table A 3. Univariate Distribution of the Dichotomous Variables across the ESS-Countries

Country	Gender		Foreign		Volunteering	
	Male	Female	No	Yes	No	Yes
<i>ESS</i>	45.83	54.17	85.08	14.92	68.38	31.62
AT	46.25	53.75	86.01	13.39	41.90	58.10
BE	46.72	53.28	82.65	17.35	64.72	35.28
BG	39.96	60.04	96.24	3.76	93.07	6.93
CH	46.60	53.40	66.37	33.63	46.27	53.73
CY	47.37	52.63	92.43	7.57	55.42	44.58
DE	49.38	50.62	84.00	16.00	53.44	46.56
DK	49.04	50.96	88.63	11.37	56.94	43.06
EE	43.51	56.49	58.55	41.45	82.09	17.91
ES	48.34	51.66	90.18	9.82	61.03	38.97
FI	48.47	51.53	95.77	4.23	50.69	49.31
FR	48.74	51.26	78.96	21.04	64.88	35.12
GB	47.50	52.50	82.29	17.71	59.16	40.84
HU	42.28	57.72	93.55	6.45	81.76	18.24
IE	46.70	53.30	83.10	16.90	51.04	48.96
NL	47.53	52.47	84.50	15.50	50.53	49.47
NO	50.91	49.09	88.21	11.79	33.16	66.84
PL	47.54	52.46	95.58	4.42	86.62	13.38
PT	41.01	58.99	90.14	9.86	66.52	33.48
RU	41.61	58.39	86.07	13.93	82.51	17.49
SE	49.38	50.62	79.83	20.17	68.44	31.56
SI	45.19	54.81	81.67	18.33	64.30	35.70
SK	48.42	51.58	91.30	8.70	76.09	23.91
UA	42.74	57.26	79.97	20.03	77.69	22.31

Table A 4. Univariate Distribution of Employment Status across the ESS-Countries

Country	Employed	Unemployed	Student	Retired	Other
<i>ESS</i>	<i>50.65</i>	<i>4.57</i>	<i>9.50</i>	<i>21.91</i>	<i>13.37</i>
AT	58.55	2.24	11.97	14.23	13.01
BE	48.19	5.73	9.29	19.42	17.36
BG	44.22	12.39	7.03	25.53	10.83
CH	54.68	1.98	7.58	18.29	17.47
CY	51.70	3.47	2.16	13.59	29.08
DE	47.65	6.18	8.78	22.37	15.02
DK	56.58	1.69	8.64	24.71	8.37
EE	55.41	2.04	10.62	25.99	5.94
ES	54.10	3.77	7.92	12.65	21.55
FI	51.50	4.70	10.61	28.76	4.43
FR	54.55	5.47	8.49	20.77	10.73
GB	55.05	3.97	7.06	21.66	12.25
HU	44.93	4.59	7.14	28.23	15.11
IE	51.39	4.01	9.33	12.43	22.83
NL	51.54	2.83	6.98	14.67	23.97
NO	61.96	1.72	11.21	15.73	9.38
PL	44.73	5.84	12.59	26.53	10.31
PT	48.37	6.30	8.73	24.50	12.10
RU	52.27	3.59	12.19	21.39	10.56
SE	60.88	3.90	11.27	17.51	6.44
SI	42.45	5.15	13.87	25.21	13.32
SK	52.16	6.39	9.61	18.60	13.24
UA	39.62	4.05	7.16	32.97	16.20

Table A 5. Univariate Distribution of Civil Status across the ESS-Countries

Country	Together	Divor Separ	Widowed	Unmarried
<i>ESS</i>	<i>56.63</i>	<i>8.42</i>	<i>8.95</i>	<i>26.01</i>
AT	52.10	6.95	4.54	36.41
BE	60.71	10.13	5.56	23.59
BG	66.14	6.02	8.47	19.37
CH	63.13	8.84	4.93	23.09
CY	67.60	3.05	4.78	24.58
DE	55.42	9.80	7.70	27.08
DK	57.82	10.36	7.72	24.10
EE	43.89	12.28	11.75	32.08
ES	57.71	4.57	7.46	30.25
FI	50.82	11.72	7.28	30.18
FR	58.04	7.67	4.96	29.33
GB	58.37	9.28	6.99	25.36
HU	59.50	10.73	11.86	17.91
IE	55.37	4.17	4.97	35.49
NL	62.00	7.45	6.22	24.33
NO	52.65	11.80	5.64	29.92
PL	56.05	4.25	11.08	28.62
PT	61.63	4.81	8.96	24.60
RU	52.58	10.37	11.30	25.75
SE	44.61	12.23	5.67	37.48
SI	61.81	5.70	9.62	22.87
SK	60.28	6.54	8.61	8.61
UA	63.00	6.81	15.06	15.13

Table A 6. Correlations between Continuous Variables and Generalized Trust across the Countries in the European Social Survey

Country	Age	Educat	Income	Religious	Television	Urbaniz
<i>ESS</i>	0.021***	0.130***	0.274***	0.021***	-0.036***	-0.017***
AT	-0.103***	0.054**	0.139***	0.076***	-0.098***	-0.072***
BE	-0.019	0.190***	0.231***	0.059*	-0.051*	-0.065*
BG	0.037	0.123***	0.145***	0.005	-0.022	0.057*
CH	0.019	0.131***	0.186***	-0.006	-0.074**	-0.018
CY	-0.013***	0.062	0.085**	0.049	0.022	-0.082**
DE	-0.050**	0.114***	0.211***	0.069***	-0.095***	0.025
DK	0.053*	0.162***	0.173***	0.075**	-0.058*	0.030
EE	0.048	0.078**	0.116***	0.080**	-0.030	-0.114***
ES	-0.010	0.099***	0.108***	0.039	0.027	0.031
FI	0.057*	0.046*	0.137***	0.083**	-0.004	-0.018
FR	0.022	0.138***	0.151***	0.029	-0.040	-0.000
GB	0.121***	0.094***	0.165***	0.115***	-0.071***	-0.070***
HU	-0.064*	0.206***	0.229***	0.090***	-0.049	0.038
IE	0.137***	0.049*	0.152***	0.075**	-0.047*	-0.022
NL	0.024	0.176***	0.213***	0.029	-0.105***	-0.059*
NO	0.132***	0.107***	0.142***	0.084***	-0.054*	-0.014
PL	-0.104***	0.144***	0.160***	0.065**	-0.016	0.015
PT	-0.050*	0.059**	0.027	0.078***	0.027	-0.047*
RU	0.024	-0.000	0.101***	0.117***	0.006	0.006
SE	0.071**	0.112***	0.166***	0.042	-0.066**	-0.044
SI	-0.052*	0.166***	0.252***	-0.010	0.011	0.083**
SK	-0.043	0.089***	0.180***	0.071	-0.001	0.085
UA	-0.005	0.083***	0.077***	0.029	-0.016	-0.014

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table A 7. Bivariate Relation between Categorical Variables and Generalized Trust across the Countries of the ESS

Country	Two Categories (T-test)			More Than Two (F-test)	
	Gender	Minority	Volunteer	Employment	Civil Stat
<i>ESS</i>	-1.08	-0.99	-36.21***	42.76***	39.51***
AT	-2.67**	0.89	-6.23***	5.77***	3.58*
BE	0.38	4.31***	-5.48***	6.08***	8.21***
BG	-1.28	-1.43	-2.74**	4.86***	0.64
CH	-1.10	3.69***	-4.88***	1.52	1.90
CY	-0.91	0.16	-3.31**	1.14	5.99***
DE	-1.59	2.06*	-5.91***	10.07***	8.00***
DK	-3.03**	3.03**	-2.74**	1.95	4.40**
EE	-1.77	6.93***	-3.87***	2.77*	0.35
ES	-0.78	-0.85	-5.90***	0.99	1.04
FI	-3.40***	0.83	-1.62	2.71*	6.40***
FR	-0.31	1.50	-3.92***	4.01**	0.61
GB	-0.64	0.67	-4.52***	9.39***	8.64***
HU	1.69	0.71	-3.66***	6.04***	6.11***
IE	1.22	-0.37	-2.98**	6.77***	2.17
NL	-1.32	2.07*	-5.58***	4.34**	2.17
NO	-6.40***	2.57*	-2.88**	4.89***	10.15***
PL	-1.72	-1.43	-4.94***	9.13***	7.49***
PT	0.47	-0.33	0.87	3.53*	3.27*
RU	-1.75	-0.81	-4.47***	3.73**	3.22*
SE	-2.49*	3.21**	-3.04**	7.01***	5.64***
SI	0.40	-0.31	-3.60***	5.54***	5.78***
SK	-0.56	1.87	-3.11**	8.64***	6.84***
UA	0.48	0.46	-6.26***	3.18*	1.23

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Appendix B

Exploration of the ISSP Citizenship Requirements

Table B 1. Univariate Distribution of Citizenship Requirements, 2003

Cntry	Born	Citizen	Life	Speak	Relig	Law	Feel	Ances
AT	1.777 (1.05)	2.448 (0.74)	1.974 (0.93)	2.543 (0.68)	1.196 (1.15)	2.326 (0.74)	2.536 (0.70)	1.275 (1.09)
CH	1.549 (1.00)	2.140 (0.86)	1.835 (0.88)	2.429 (0.64)	1.230 (1.08)	2.308 (0.58)	1.987 (0.84)	1.264 (0.98)
CZ	2.104 (0.85)	2.298 (0.76)	2.201 (0.82)	2.476 (0.69)	1.052 (1.05)	2.065 (0.80)	2.327 (0.75)	1.916 (0.89)
DE	1.760 (0.97)	2.154 (0.84)	1.849 (0.88)	2.577 (0.644)	0.965 (0.98)	2.240 (0.72)	1.986 (0.90)	1.544 (1.02)
DK	1.985 (0.94)	2.337 (0.79)	2.047 (0.51)	2.732 (0.51)	1.182 (1.05)	2.636 (0.58)	2.472 (0.70)	1.811 (1.00)
ES	2.234 (0.73)	2.225 (0.716)	2.169 (0.70)	2.144 (0.76)	1.298 (1.03)	2.247 (0.65)	2.227 (0.72)	1.986 (0.79)
FI	2.011 (0.97)	2.306 (0.82)	1.833 (0.90)	2.304 (0.81)	0.802 (1.02)	2.356 (0.78)	2.384 (0.78)	1.637 (1.03)
FR	1.794 (1.13)	2.365 (0.86)	1.972 (0.98)	2.566 (0.69)	0.586 (0.98)	2.685 (0.60)	2.528 (0.75)	1.507 (0.75)
HU	1.964 (0.94)	2.120 (0.90)	2.078 (0.84)	2.663 (0.58)	1.354 (1.05)	2.196 (0.78)	2.694 (0.55)	2.183 (0.89)
IE	2.336 (0.84)	2.462 (0.75)	2.145 (0.87)	1.209 (0.98)	1.589 (1.15)	2.076 (0.89)	2.327 (0.81)	2.162 (0.91)
NO	1.870 (0.98)	2.434 (0.75)	2.009 (0.85)	2.728 (0.54)	0.787 (0.96)	2.681 (0.56)	2.306 (0.82)	1.676 (1.07)
PL	2.326 (0.73)	2.417 (0.68)	2.249 (0.78)	2.551 (0.63)	2.090 (0.97)	2.129 (0.78)	2.613 (0.56)	2.296 (0.78)
PT	2.342 (0.68)	2.382 (0.65)	2.266 (0.68)	2.418 (0.62)	1.831 (1.04)	2.343 (0.66)	2.459 (0.61)	2.157 (0.79)
SE	1.482 (1.07)	2.280 (0.88)	1.647 (0.96)	2.656 (0.59)	0.660 (0.91)	2.739 (0.56)	2.222 (0.87)	1.040 (1.06)
SK	1.827 (0.97)	2.031 (0.92)	1.924 (0.96)	2.405 (0.79)	1.599 (1.12)	1.791 (0.94)	2.111 (0.98)	1.629 (1.03)
UK	2.092 (0.99)	2.340 (0.77)	2.013 (0.88)	2.512 (0.76)	1.073 (1.11)	2.308 (0.83)	2.143 (0.93)	1.553 (1.11)

Note: Entries represent means and (standard deviations) per country

Appendix C

List of the Country Codes

Code	Country	Code	Country
AL	Albania	IQ	Iraq
AO	Angola	IT	Italy
AT	Austria	LT	Lithuania
BE	Belgium	LU	Luxembourg
BG	Bulgaria	LV	Latvia
BR	Brazil	MA	Morocco
CH	Switzerland	MT	Malta
CN	China	NG	Nigeria
CO	Columbia	NL	Netherlands
CV	Cape Verde	NO	Norway
CY	Cyprus	PL	Poland
CZ	Czech Republic	PT	Portugal
DE	Germany	RO	Romania
DK	Denmark	RS	Serbia
DZ	Algeria	RU	Russia
EC	Ecuador	SE	Sweden
EE	Estonia	SI	Slovenia
ES	Spain	SK	Slovak Republic
FI	Finland	SN	Senegal
FR	France	SO	Somalia
GB	United Kingdom	TR	Turkey
GR	Greece	UA	Ukraine
GW	Guinea-Bissau	US	United States
HU	Hungary	VN	Vietnam
IE	Ireland	YU	Yugoslavia
IN	India		

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Abstracts

1. Abstract

The question whether social cohesion is under pressure due to increasing societal complexity and diversity has been at the core of social science research. The recent upsurge in immigration flows to European societies has renewed the interest in this puzzle both from an academic and policy point of view. In this doctoral dissertation, the research question that is analyzed is whether social cohesion is weaker in European societies that are highly diverse and whether integration policy are able to strengthen the social fabric of diverse societies.

Before this question can be tackled, it first of all needs to be assessed how social cohesion in diverse societies actually can be represented. Traditional definitions that, for instance, depart from a shared set of norms and values seem to imply a tense relation between diversity and social cohesion. However, classical sociological theories have emphasized that social solidarity in complex society is based on the interdependence of differentiated parts. Moreover, this interdependence is facilitated by trust in the generalized other. This kind of trust is moreover an individual attitude that is highly dependent from the national context and consequently lends itself to comparative research.

Despite the fact that generalized trust is a valid representation of social cohesion in diverse societies, there are nevertheless various theoretical arguments that emphasize that trust is lower in diverse settings. Recent empirical research in the US has given additional leverage to these theoretical models by showing that trust is lower in diverse neighborhoods. Analyzing this relation across the continent, I have demonstrated that a similar strong erosion of social cohesion due to the share of immigrants, an upsurge in immigration or the social distance of the immigrant population and the native population, is not present in Europe.

Finally, bringing in integration policy, countries that have adopted an open set of policy measures have on average a citizenry that ranks slightly higher on generalized trust compared with countries that are restrictive in their integration policies. However, the analysis also shows that the most diverse countries that are open in their policies are not more cohesive than diverse countries with restrictive integration measures.

The general conclusion thus, is that in Europe, diversity and social cohesion are not irreconcilable, in contrast with the dominant Anglo-Saxon models that have been

proposed so far. Moreover, the analysis has shown that in order to strengthen the social fabric of societies, i.e. to craft trust among citizens, the best policy initiatives can be taken in ameliorating the socioeconomic position, both at the national level (a prosperous economy) as at the individual level (education and employment).

2. Samenvatting

De vraag of het sociale weefsel wordt aangetast door een toenemende maatschappelijke complexiteit en diversiteit heeft altijd al het voorwerp van onderzoek gevormd in de sociale wetenschappen. De recente stijging in immigratie naar de geïndustrialiseerde landen heeft deze onderzoeksvraag opnieuw hoog op zowel de onderzoeks- als de beleidsagenda geplaatst. In dit doctoraal proefschrift wordt de vraag beantwoord of de sociale samenhang systematisch zwakker is in Europese landen met een hoge mate van diversiteit en of integratiebeleid de sociale cohesie in gemengde samenlevingen kan versterken.

Alvorens deze vraag kan worden beantwoord is eerst nagegaan hoe sociale cohesie in diverse samenlevingen voorgesteld kan worden. Traditionele definities die bijvoorbeeld uitgaan van een gedeelde set van waarden en normen impliceren automatisch een conflictmodel. Echter, klassieke sociologische theorieën leren dat in complexe samenlevingen sociale samenhang berust op de interdependentie van gedifferentieerde delen binnen deze samenleving. Deze interdependentie wordt tevens vergemakkelijkt door veralgemeend vertrouwen, een individuele attitude die zich leent voor landenvergelijkend onderzoek in Europa en sterk afhankelijk is van de nationale context.

Ook al biedt veralgemeend vertrouwen een valide weergave van sociale cohesie in complexe samenlevingen, toch zijn er verschillende theoretische verklaringen die stellen dat deze vorm van vertrouwen onder druk staat in gemengde settings. Empirisch onderzoek in Amerika lijkt deze hypothese bovendien kracht bij te zetten. Echter, wanneer deze relatie grondig bestudeerd wordt in Europa dan blijkt er van een systematische uitholling van het sociale weefsel door het aandeel vreemdelingen, een stijging in immigratie of de sociale afstand van de immigrantenbevolking met de autochtone bevolking geenszins sprake te zijn.

Wanneer de factor integratiebeleid, ten slotte, mee in rekening wordt genomen valt op dat landen met een open beleid hogere niveaus van veralgemeend vertrouwen onder hun bevolking laten optekenen dan landen met een restrictief beleid. Echter, de meest diverse landen met een open beleid worden niet gekenmerkt door systematisch hogere niveaus van vertrouwen in vergelijking met de meest gemengde landen met een restrictief beleid.

De algemene conclusie is dan ook dat diversiteit en sociale cohesie in Europa elkaar niet lijken uit te sluiten. Bovendien blijkt dat de beste opties om het sociale weefsel van een samenleving te versterken vooral te liggen in het verbeteren van de socioeconomische positie, zowel op het nationale niveau (een goede economie) als op het individuele niveau (onderwijs en tewerkstelling).

3. Résumé

Est-ce que le réseau social est affecté par une complexité et diversité sociale croissante? C'est une question qui a toujours été l'objet de recherche dans les sciences sociales. L'augmentation récente de l'immigration dans les pays industrialisés a mis cette question en tête de l'agenda académique et politique. Dans cette thèse doctorale, la question est répondue si la cohésion sociale est moins forte dans les pays européens qui connaissent un haut degré de diversité et, si cette cohésion sociale dans une société mixte peut être renforcée par une politique d'intégration.

Avant de répondre à cette question, on analyse d'abord la manière de laquelle « la cohésion sociale dans les sociétés diverses » peut être présentée. Les définitions traditionnelles qui, par exemple, présument un ensemble de valeurs et de normes partagés, impliquent automatiquement un modèle conflictuel. Cependant, selon les théories sociologiques classiques, la cohésion sociale dans les sociétés complexes réside dans l'interdépendance des unités différenciées de cette société. Cette interdépendance est à la fois facilitée par une confiance généralisée, ce qui est une attitude susceptible de la recherche comparable des pays européens et qui est très dépendant du contexte national.

Une confiance généralisée offre une image valide de la cohésion sociale des sociétés complexes. Néanmoins, il existe plusieurs explications théoriques qui argumentent qu'il y a une pression sur cette forme de confiance dans les circonstances mixtes. En outre, cette hypothèse semble être confirmée par des recherches empiriques aux Etats-Unis. Cependant, en étudiant cette relation de manière plus approfondie en Europe, on a constaté qu'il ne paraît pas y avoir une érosion systématique du réseau social causée par le nombre d'étrangers, une augmentation de l'immigration ou la distance sociale des immigrés à la population autochtone.

Finalement, l'incorporation de la politique d'intégration comme facteur résulte dans un niveau de confiance généralisée plus élevé aux pays qui mènent une politique ouverte qu'aux pays qui mènent une politique plus restrictive. Néanmoins, en comparaison avec les pays les plus mixtes qui mènent une politique restrictive, on n'observe pas de niveaux systématiquement plus élevés dans les pays les plus divers qui adoptent une politique ouverte.

Alors, la conclusion générale est que la diversité et la cohésion sociale en Europe ne semblent pas être antagoniques. En outre, les meilleures options pour renforcer le réseau social de la société résident dans l'amélioration de la position socio-économique, aussi bien au niveau national (une économie vivante) qu'au niveau individuel (l'éducation et l'emploi).

Doctoraten in de Sociale Wetenschappen

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